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Abstract	This	thesis	is	concerned	with	the	role	of	sexuality	and	intimacy	in	austerity	politics	in	the	UK	since	the	formation	of	the	Coalition	Government	in	2010.	Conceptualising	austerity	politics	as	a	broad	political,	cultural,	and	economic	formation,	 it	 interrogates	 some	 of	 the	 key	 ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	 and	intimacy	are	embedded	within	the	discursive	and	regulatory	functioning	of	austerity.	 Each	 of	 its	 three	 case	 studies	 examines	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	within	 a	 different	 discursive	 and/or	 regulatory	 site,	 including	 policy	discourse,	 media	 discourse,	 and	 processes	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	service	 delivery.	 The	 cases	 studies	 focus,	 specifically,	 on	 the	 sexual	 and	gendered	 assumptions	 embedded	 in	 austerity	 discourse;	 the	 limited	narrative	possibilities	available	for	sexualised	and	racialised	subjectivities	in	circulations	 of	 austerity	 discourse	 within	 popular	 media;	 and	 the	materialisation	 of	 neoliberal	 penalisation	 in	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives	 as	 a	series	of	intimate	disruptions.		In	enquiring	after	the	kinds	of	sexual	and	intimate	lives,	subjects,	and	politics	 that	 are	 made	 (un)imaginable,	 (il)legible,	 or	 (il)legitimate	 by	 and	within	 austerity	 politics,	 central	 to	 this	 thesis	 is	 the	 claim	 that	 austerity	politics	 has	 a	 sexual	and	 intimate	 life.	 It	 focuses	 on	 non-identitarian	 forms	and	 modes	 of	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy,	 examining	 them	 through	 the	frameworks	 of	 sexual	 inequalities,	 sexual	 subjectivities,	 and	 intimate	disruptions.	 Finally,	 as	 well	 as	 intervening	 in	 epistemologies	 of	 sexuality,	this	 thesis	 also	 explores	 the	 consequences	 that	 the	 embeddedness	 of	sexuality	 and	 intimacy	within	 austerity	 politics	 has	 for	 conceptualisations	and	understandings	of	the	political.			 	
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Origin	Stories	In	 a	 small	 city	 in	Finland	 in	 the	1990s,	my	not-very-well-off	 family	of	 two	(my	mother	 and	 I)	 lived	 in	 a	 relatively	 affluent	 (upper)	middle-class	 area,	surrounded	by	families	with	recognisably	better	access	not	just	to	financial	security,	but	also	to	various	kinds	of	middle-class	cultural	capital.	I	grew	up	well	 cared	 for,	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 intensely	 aware	 of	 the	 differences	between	my	friends’	families	and	mine.	These	differences	materialised	over	time	 and	 became	 known	 to	 me	 in	 our	 divergent	 access	 to	 hobbies	 and	leisure	 activities;	 in	 our	 knowledge	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 foods	 and	 food	cultures;	in	the	amount	of	time	our	parents	were	able	to	give	to	us	alongside	their	jobs	and	other	commitments;	and,	much	later,	in	the	different	degrees	of	 access	 we	 had	 to	 information	 regarding	 higher	 education	 and	 what	 it	meant	 to	 study	 at	 university	 –	 perhaps	 signalling	 the	 importance	 of	considering	 not	 only	 economic	 but	 also	 cultural	 and	 social	 capital	 in	determining	 class	 position	 and	 location	 (Bourdieu	 1984).	 In	 addition	 to	these	 differences	 that	 functioned	 to	 mark	 belonging	 to	 particular	 class	categories,	however,	I	knew	we	were	also	different	because	of	the	nature	of	our	families.		Surrounded	 by	 families	 that	 much	 better	 matched	 classed	expectations	 about	 what	 a	 legible	 and	 legitimate	 family	 looks	 like	 –	 two	parents,	 two	 children,	 two	 cars,	 a	 pet,	 and	 a	 summer	 house	 –	 my	 family,	headed	by	a	single	mother	in	receipt	of	benefits,	at	times	unemployed,	and	
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with	no	father	in	sight,	certainly	attracted	more	than	a	few	raised	eyebrows.	The	 status	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 my	 family	 and	 particularly	 of	 my	 mother	seemed	 to	always	be	 in	question	more	 than	 those	of	other	 families	 and	of	other	mothers.	This	‘questioning’	included	the	doubts	raised	at	my	primary	school	 about	my	mother’s	 ability	 to	 raise	 a	 child	who	 could	 do	 so	well	 at	school;	my	close	friend’s	insistence	that	it	was	not	possible	my	parents	were	not	married	when	they	had	me;	and,	perhaps	most	acutely,	the	concerns	my	friend’s	mother	whispered	to	me	at	a	sleepover	regarding	my	mother’s	new	(much	younger)	partner	moving	in	with	us	–	what	did	I	think	of	it,	was	I	safe,	was	 it	 appropriate.	 I	 grew	 up	 knowing	 –	 if	 not	 cognitively,	 then	 certainly	affectively	–	that	my	mother’s	choices	regarding	reproduction,	sexuality,	and	intimacy	 were	 frequently	 deemed	 questionable,	 if	 not	 outright	 wrong,	 by	others	in	our	community.		I	detail	some	of	the	experiences	of	sexual	regulation	I	both	witnessed	and	was	 subject	 to	 in	my	 childhood	 not	 in	 order	 to	 centre	myself	 in	 this	thesis’	analysis,	but	 instead	to	highlight	 the	origins	and	the	 implications	of	this	 project	 beyond	 its	 particular	 scope	 –	 that	 of	 UK	 austerity	 politics,	conceptualised	 in	 this	 thesis	 as	 a	 broad	 economic,	 political,	 and	 cultural	formation,	 with	 internal	 logics,	 implications,	 and	 impacts	 that	 reach	 far	beyond	 the	 field	 of	 policy	 (as	 I	 discuss	 in	more	 detail	 below).	My	 interest	and	 investments	 in	 both	 enquiring	 after	 and	 challenging	 the	 suturing	 of	sexuality	 to	 the	political	economy	 in	multiple	and	varied	ways	originate	 in	these	 early	 experiences.	 Central	 to	 this	 thesis	 is,	 thus,	 the	 claim	 that	austerity	 has	 a	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 life	 –	 as	 indicated	 by	 its	 title.	 It	interrogates	 the	multiple,	 sometimes	 distinct	 and	 sometimes	 overlapping,	ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 are	 enmeshed	 in	 the	 political	 and	cultural	 functioning	 of	 austerity	 politics,	 focusing,	 in	 particular,	 on	 the	discursive	 and	 regulatory	 aspects	 of	 these	 entanglements.	 The	 central	question	 that	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 to	 answer	 is:	 what	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 and	intimate	lives,	subjects,	and	politics	are	made	possible,	legible,	or	legitimate	–	 or,	 indeed,	 impossible,	 illegible,	 or	 illegitimate	 –	 by	 and	within	 austerity	politics?	 In	what	 follows	 I	 argue	 that	 sexuality	matters	 a	 great	 deal	 to	 the	functioning,	 legitimacy,	 and	 futurity	of	 austerity	politics	 and	 that	 austerity	
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politics,	 conversely,	 matter	 to	 both	 experiences	 and	 understandings	 of	sexuality	and	intimacy.	While	my	awareness	of	the	processes	of	sexual	regulation	mentioned	above	was	at	the	time	limited	to	their	materialisation	in	my	day-to-day	life,	these	 everyday	 interactions	 and	 moments	 of	 judgement,	 concern,	 and	disapproval	no	doubt	had	their	counterparts	in	national	media	and	political	discourses,	as	well	as	possibly	 in	policy	 frameworks	–	as	 is	 the	case	 in	 the	austerity	 context.	 These	 experiences,	 thus,	 highlight	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 in	which	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	mechanisms	 associated	with	 political	and	 economic	 formations	 can	 permeate	 the	 everyday.	 The	 –	 often,	 but	 not	always,	 relatively	 minor	 –	 ways	 in	 which	 processes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	reverberate	 through	 the	 daily	 lives	 of	 those	 subject	 to	 them	 are	 part	 of	 a	larger	 fabric	 that	 ties	 sexuality	 and	 its	 regulation	 together	 with	understandings	 and	 discourses	 of	 social	 welfare,	 class,	 and	 the	 political.	Importantly	 then,	 and	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 sexuality	 and	intimacy	 are	 here	 understood	 not	 as	 centrally	 sutured	 to	 the	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction,	but	rather	as	encompassing	a	broader	field	 of	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 judgements,	 assumptions,	 subjectivities,	 and	relations	that	bear	a	significance	to	political	economic	processes.		Conversely	 to	 this	 intuitive	 and	 affective	 sense	 I	 had	 of	 the	interconnectedness	of	sexuality	to	class	and	the	political	economy,	however,	for	a	long	time	I	was	completely	unaware	of	the	role	of	race	and	racialisation	in	these	processes.	Thinking	now,	retrospectively,	I	can	see	that	the	family	of	my	only	non-white	classmate	was	subject	to	similar	–	but	of	course	in	some	key	 ways	 different	 –	 sexualised	 regulation,	 judgement,	 and	 disapproval,	which	I	was	blind	to	due	to	my	own	limited	social	location	and	positioning.	Thus,	 while	 engaging	 in	 research	 that	 holds	 a	 long-standing	 personal	significance	to	me	has	 led	me	to	view	this	project	as	epistemologically	and	politically	 urgent	 beyond	 its	 particular	 –	 temporal	 and	 geographical	 –	location,	at	the	same	time	these	experiences	also	mark	some	of	the	limits	of	my	 intimate	 understanding	 of	 the	 processes	 under	 analysis	 here.	 Race,	racialisation,	and	racism	certainly	carry	 their	own	regulations	of	 sexuality,	intimacy,	 and	 the	 family,	which	 are	 often	 as	 intrinsically	 connected	 to	 the	
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political	 economy	 as	 processes	 of	 classed	 regulation	 are.	 This	 thesis,	 thus,	also	 looks	 at	 the	 overlaps	 and	 linkages	 between	 racialised,	 gendered,	 and	class	 discourses	 –	 and	 specifically	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 discourses	function	to	regulate	sexuality	and	disrupt	intimate	lives.		This	discussion	of	my	personal	 experiences	 also	 serves	 to	highlight	that	the	issues	examined	in	this	thesis	are	at	the	same	time	specific	and	not	specific	to	austerity.	As	I	discuss	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter,	the	post-2010	context	of	UK	austerity	politics	is	both	noteworthy	in	its	specificity	and	almost	mundane	in	 its	continuation	of	the	much	longer-standing	processes	of	welfare	retrenchment	and	neoliberalisation	more	broadly;	both	a	rupture	in	certain	discursive	and	regulatory	processes	and	a	perpetuation	of	others.	The	suturing	of	sexuality	to	the	political	economy	in	the	austerity	context	is	also,	 therefore,	 both	 specific	 to	 that	 particular	 context	 and	 potentially	applicable	to	a	much	wider	variety	of	geographical	and	temporal	 locations.	My	detailing	of	 the	not	 entirely	dissimilar	processes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 I	witnessed	 and	 experienced	 in	 a	 vastly	 different	 context	 –	 with	 different	political	 economic	 arrangements,	 a	 different	 kind	 of	 welfare	 state,	 and	different	dominant	 cultural	 formations	–	 is,	 thus,	 intended	 to	highlight	 the	continuities	 and	 similarities	 in	 sexuality’s	 deployments	 in	 relation	 to	welfare,	 class,	 race,	 and	 the	 political	 economy	 across	 varying	 times	 and	places.	 However,	 as	 my	 choice	 to	 frame	 this	 thesis	 as	 an	 enquiry	 and	intervention	 into	 the	 deployment	 and	 regulation	 of	 sexuality	 specifically	within	 the	 context	 of	 austerity	 politics	 indicates,	 there	 is	 also	 something	specific	about	the	discursive	and	regulatory	relationships	between	sexuality,	intimacy,	 and	 the	 family,	 on	 the	 one	hand,	 and	 austerity	 as	 a	 political	 and	cultural	formation,	on	the	other.		Each	 of	 the	 three	 case	 studies	 that	 together	 form	 the	 core	 of	 this	thesis	 pertains	 to	 a	 different	 discursive	 and/or	 regulatory	 site	 –	 policy	discourse	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 media	 discourse	 in	 Chapter	 4,	 and	 processes	 of	policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 In	 this	 thesis,	examining	 the	 ‘sexual	 and	 intimate	 life’	 of	 austerity,	 thus,	 encompasses	 a	wide	variety	of	discursive	and	regulatory	arenas,	as	well	as,	 importantly,	a	number	of	different	understandings	of	sexuality	and	intimacy.	In	the	case	of	
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Chapter	3	this	entails	enquiring	after	the	ways	in	which	sexuality	features	in	the	 increasing	 familialisation	 and	 culturalisation	 of	 social	 policy	 that	 have	accompanied	 austerity,	 specifically	 around	 (child)	 poverty	 discourse	 and	policy.	The	notion	of	‘cultural	poverty’	echoes	my	own	experiences	above,	as	often	it	was	specifically	my	(single)	mother’s	ability	to	pass	the	right	kinds	of	 cultural	 values	 and	 norms	 on	 to	 me	 that	 was	 questioned	 by	 others.	Discursive	framings	of	poverty	position	family	form,	and	relatedly	the	sexual	and	 reproductive	 decisions	 of	 poor	 mothers,	 as	 the	 subject	 of	 both	increasing	 attention	 and	 regulation,	 indicating	 that	 processes	 of	 sexual	regulation	tend	to	be	closely	related	to	normative	judgements	around	what	makes	a	family	(il)legitimate	or	(in)appropriate.		It	 also	 entails	 asking	 questions	 about	 which	 subjects	 and	subjectivities	 are	 made	 (il)legible	 or	 (il)legitimate	 in	 austerity	 discourse	through	processes	of	sexualisation	and	racialisation,	specifically	 in	relation	to	 the	 circulation	 and	 reproduction	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	 figuration	within	media	sites	(Chapter	4)	–	suggesting	that	the	formulation	of	classed	subjectivities	is	always	already	indexed	by	sexuality	and	race,	as	well	as,	for	instance,	 gender.	 Specifically,	 it	 is	 racialised	 and	 sexualised	 subjects	 who	tend	to	be	deemed	furthest	away	from	classed	notions	of	respectability	–	as	the	 questioning	 I	 was	 subject	 to	 as	 a	 child	 about	 my	 mother’s	 choice	 of	partner	suggests.	Finally,	it	involves	investigating	the	various	ways	in	which	the	 regulatory	 processes	 associated	 with	 neoliberalising	 austerity	 politics	disrupt	intimate	–	and	not	just	sexual	–	lives,	relations,	and	spaces	(Chapter	5),	indicating	certain	shifts	in	the	public/private	division	–	although	perhaps	not	in	the	ways	often	assumed	in	neoliberalising	contexts.	The	processes	by	which	 state	 actors	 increasingly	 intrude	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 suggest	 that	this	 sphere	 tends	 to	materialise	 as	more	 fragile	 and	 less	 protected	 in	 the	case	 of	 marginalised	 populations.	 The	 lives	 of	 these	 populations	 tend	 to,	thus,	 always	 be	 deemed	 slightly	 more	 public	 than	 those	 of	 others	 –	 as	evident	 both	 in	 these	 processes	 of	 state	 intrusion	 and	 in	 the	 discursive	frameworks	that	mark	the	intimate	lives	of	marginalised	populations	as	the	subject	of	intense	public	scrutiny	and	judgement,	as	indicated,	again,	by	my	own	example.		
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Sexuality	 is	 here	 conceptualised	 variously	 through	 the	 notion	 of	sexual	inequalities,	as	sexualised	subjectivities,	and	as	pertaining	to	intimacy	more	 broadly,	 as	 Chapter	 2	 discusses.	 Altogether	 these	 conceptualisations	point	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 studying	 sexuality	 beyond	 identity	 formations.	Thus,	 apart	 from	 arguing	 that	 sexuality	 is	 key	 to	 understanding	 austerity	politics	 –	 as	 well	 as	 other,	 related	 and	 unrelated,	 economic	 and	 political	formations	 such	 as	 neoliberalism/-ation	 and	 the	 state,	 as	 highlighted	 in	Chapter	 1	 –	 this	 thesis	 also	 deliberately	 probes	 and	 pushes	 at	 the	
epistemological	boundaries	 of	 sexuality	 itself.	 The	 overwhelming	 emphasis	in	sexuality	scholarship	on	questions	of	identity	and	subjectivity	–	although	important	matters	 in	their	own	right	–	has	the	unintended	consequence	of	masking	 some	 of	 the	many	 other	ways	 in	which	 sexuality	 operates	 –	 and,	indeed,	matters	 to	 and	 in	 political	 and	 economic	 considerations	 –	 beyond	the	 inclusion	 (or	 exclusion)	 of	 LG(b)	 or	 sexual	 minority	 subjects. 1	Consequently,	in	this	thesis	my	focus	is	explicitly	on	non-identitarian	forms	of	 sexuality	and	sexual	 regulation	–	although,	 importantly,	 this	 thesis	does	not	constitute	the	limits	of	such	an	investigation.	As	I	explain	in	more	detail	below,	 the	case	studies	here	have	been	chosen	because	of	 their	salience	to	austerity,	and	specifically	to	austerity	as	a	cultural	and	political	formation	–	a	process	that	is	necessarily	not	only	subjective,	but	also	exclusive	of	many	other	ways	of	thinking	austerity	and	sexuality	together.		Finally,	 my	 brief	 discussion	 of	 my	 own	 experiences	 points	 at	 the	political	 commitments	and	 investments	 that	have	guided	 this	project	 from	its	conception.	My	acutely	felt	sense	that	something	was	not	right	about	the	ways	in	which	other	people	frequently	made	assumptions	about	and	passed	judgement	on	my	 family	and	our	way	of	 life	gradually	gave	way	to	a	more	familiar	 and	 easily	 recognisable	 set	 of	 political	 engagements	 –	 framed,	 in	significant	 part,	 through	 sexual	 identity.	 These	 engagements	 with	 sexual	identity	or	LG(b)	politics	had	a	name	and	a	legitimate	avenue	for	action	and	they	 allowed	 me	 to	 inhabit	 a	 recognisable	 –	 and,	 at	 least	 to	 an	 extent,																																																									1	Throughout	this	thesis,	I	use	the	phrasing	‘LB(b)’	to	indicate	the	frequent	lesser	inclusion	and	consideration	of	bisexual	subjects	in	many	formulations	of	sexual	politics,	as	well	as	to	suggest	 the	 continuous	 tendency	 to	 frame	 sexual	 politics	 as	 sutured	 to	 the	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction.		
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legitimate	 –	 political	 subjectivity	 for	 many	 years.	 Neither	 my	 own	 early	frustration	 with,	 nor	 my	 mother’s	 refusal	 of,	 the	 judgements	 we	 faced,	conversely,	had	a	name,	an	activism	attached	to	it,	or	a	legible	or	legitimate	way	 of	 inhabiting	 a	 political	 subjectivity.	 These	 frustrations	 and	 refusals	were	 simply	 illegible,	 not	 only	 as	 sexual	 politics,	 but	 also	 as	 politics	 at	 all.	This	thesis	as	a	political	project,	thus,	continues	the	work	of	many	others	in	attempting	to	give	these	frustrations	and	refusals	a	name,	and	in	enquiring	after	 potential	 avenues	 for	 political	 action	 and	 possible	 political	subjectivities	that	might	follow	from	them.	As	I	discuss	in	more	detail	below,	I	 intentionally	name	 these	 enquiries	 as	 an	 exploration	of	 sexual	politics,	 in	order	 to	 highlight	 that	 such	 a	 politics	 intervenes	 not	 only	 in	 the	 related	political	 economic	 processes,	 but	 also	 in	 sexuality	 itself.	 Claims	 to	 sexual	politics	that,	perhaps,	flow	more	easily	from	specific,	predefined,	and	easily	recognisable	 sexual	 (and	 gendered)	 subject	 positions	 are,	 thus,	 decentred	from	the	outset	in	this	thesis’	analysis.		In	the	rest	of	this	introductory	chapter	I	focus,	firstly,	on	the	overall	research	 site	 of	 this	 thesis	 –	 that	 of	 austerity	 politics.	 While	 explicit	deployments	 of	 austerity	 in	 the	 rhetoric	 of	 politicians	 and	 policymakers	have	 significantly	 decreased	 since	 the	 end	 of	 the	 Coalition	 Government	 in	2015	 and	 particularly	 since	 the	 replacement	 of	 David	 Cameron	 as	 Prime	Minister	with	Theresa	May	in	2016,	in	this	section	I	make	the	argument	that	austerity	 bears	 a	 political	 and	 cultural	 significance	 beyond	 the	 period	 in	which	it	was	explicitly	promoted	in	policy	discourse,	thus	conceptualising	it	as	 a	 future-oriented	 political	 and	 cultural	 formation.	 The	 second	 section	broadly	outlines	 the	gaps	 in	 literatures	 this	 thesis	 intervenes	 in,	as	well	as	introduces	the	key	theoretical	framings	both	employed	and	developed	in	the	rest	 of	 this	 thesis,	 its	 methodological	 approach,	 and	 its	 scope.	 Thirdly,	 I	briefly	 explore	 the	 question	 of	 sexual	 politics	more	 explicitly,	 and,	 finally,	this	 chapter	 closes	 with	 a	 more	 detailed	 description	 of	 each	 of	 the	subsequent	chapters.			
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(Still?)	Austerity	Politics	In	 November	 2017	 the	 Equality	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 (EHRC)	(Portes	 and	Reed	 2017)	 published	 an	 interim	 report	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 tax	and	welfare	 reform	 in	 the	UK	between	2010	and	2017,	 following	a	 seven-year	period	of	what	 this	 thesis	 terms	austerity	politics	 in	 the	UK.	Austerity	politics	 is	 here,	 in	 the	 first	 instance,	 conceptualised	 as	 a	 policy	 formation	comprising	 the	wide-ranging	array	of	 cuts	and	reforms	 in	various	areas	of	state	 provision,	 implemented	 by	 the	 Coalition	 (2010-2015)	 and	Conservative	 (2015–)	 Governments	 –	 explored	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 the	 next	chapter.	Most	obviously	these	cuts	and	reforms	have	taken	place	in	the	area	of	social	welfare,	but	arguably	the	framework	of	austerity	could	also	be	seen	to	 include	 the	 numerous	 recent	 changes	 to,	 and	 reductions	 in,	 state	provision	in	areas	such	as	healthcare,	education,	housing,	immigration,	legal	aid,	 taxation,	 and	 Local	 Authority	 (LA)	 funding.	 The	 EHRC	 report	 also	follows	and	responds	to	the	repeated	refusals	by	both	the	Coalition	and	the	Conservative	Governments	to	track	and	report	on	the	cumulative	 impact	of	welfare	 reform,	 thus	 disproving	 the	 Governments’	 insistence	 on	 the	impossibility	of	such	a	task	(SSAC	2014).	In	line	with	the	argument	made	by	many	others	 (Beatty	and	Fothergill	2013;	Fawcett	Society	2012;	Hall	et	al.	2017;	 Pearson	 and	 Elson	 2015;	 Sandhu	 and	 Stephenson	 2015;	 Women’s	Budget	 Group	 2010),	 the	 report’s	 findings	 suggest	 that	 the	 impacts	 of	austerity	 both	 have	 fallen,	 and	 will	 most	 likely	 continue	 to	 fall,	disproportionately	 on	 the	 poorest	 and	 most	 disadvantaged	 in	 society	 –	whether	in	relation	to	gender,	race,	class,	locality,	or	disability,	for	instance.	As	well	as	a	policy	formation,	however,	increasing	scholarly	attention	has	 been	 directed	 at	 austerity	 as	 a	 political	 and	 cultural	 formation.	 The	numerous	 recent	 studies	 that	 have	 focused	 on	 the	 cultural	 and	 discursive	mechanisms	deployed	to	justify	austerity	measures2;	on	the	potentially	far-reaching	 future	 consequences	 of	 these	 deployments	 (as	 I	 explore	 below);	and	on	 the	 incorporation	or	co-optation	of	 identity	politics,	or	a	politics	of	
																																																								2	On	 these	 cultural	 and	 discursive	 mechanisms,	 see	 Chapters	 2	 and	 3,	 as	 well	 as,	 for	instance,	 Bramall	 (2013),	 Clarke	 and	 Newman	 (2012),	 Jensen	 (2014),	 Jensen	 and	 Tyler	(2015),	Negra	and	Tasker	(2014),	Tyler	(2013),	and	Wiggan	(2012).	
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difference,	 within	 neoliberal	 or	 austerity	 discourse3	–	 many	 of	 which	 are	examined	on	 subsequent	pages	of	 this	 thesis	 –	 attest	 to	 the	 importance	of	viewing	 austerity	 through	 a	 lens	 that	 encompasses	 not	 only	 its	 policy	impacts,	 but	 also	 its	 cultural	 and	 political	 impacts,	 implications,	 and	underpinnings.	I	follow	many	of	these	interventions	and	take	as	my	starting	point	the	assumption	that	austerity	measures	are	not	the	necessary	solution	to	 the	 existing	 and	 self-evident	problems	of	 economic	 crisis	 and	 spiralling	public	debt,	as	they	have	tended	to	be	presented	in	the	rhetoric	of	politicians	(Cameron	2009;	HC	Deb	2010:	cols	166-180).	 Instead,	 I	direct	my	 focus	at	the	discursive	and	regulatory	mechanisms	that	have	not	only	(re)produced	the	 current	 time	 as	 one	 of	 exceptional	 crisis,	 but	 also	 installed	 a	 set	 of	‘exceptional’	measures	 –	 primarily,	welfare	 retrenchment	 and	 increasingly	disciplinary	 social	 policy	 –	 as	 the	 solution	 to	 the	 supposedly	 widespread	issues	 of	 cultures	 of	 poverty	 and	 irresponsibility,	 and	 a	 ‘broken	 society’	(Cameron	2009;	Conservative	Party	2010).	Rather	than	through	the	frame	of	exceptionality,	 then,	 austerity	 is	 here	 viewed	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to,	 and	 a	vehicle	for,	deepening	neoliberalisation,	as	Chapter	1	centrally	argues.	The	cultural	and	political	mechanisms	that	have	been	deployed	time	and	 time	 again	 to	 justify	 austerity	 and	 intensifying	 neoliberalisation	 are	reproduced	 in	 policy	 discourse	 and	 frameworks,	 but	 also	 in	 media	 and	visual	cultures.	Cultural	products	play	a	part	not	just	in	helping	forge	public	opinion,	 but	 also	 in	 legitimising	 certain	 worldviews	 over	 others	 and	 in	enabling	and	constraining	political	imaginaries	–	as	do	the	discursive	tropes	and	framings	found	within	policy	processes.	A	significant	part	of	the	cultural	life	 of	 austerity	 is	 the	 reproduction	 (or,	 at	 times,	 the	 contestation	 or	reworking)	within	 the	 cultural	 field	 of	 the	political	messages	presented	 in	policy	discourses	surrounding	austerity.	In	addition	to	these	reproductions,	however,	austerity	as	a	cultural	formation	has	a	life	of	its	own	that	extends	beyond	the	policy	field.	Many	scholars	have	analysed	the	various	frequently	circulated	 figurations	 of	 austerity	 politics,	 from	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	(Briant	 et	 al.	 2013;	 Garthwaite	 2011;	 Valentine	 and	 Harris	 2014),	 to	 the																																																									3	On	 ‘narratives	of	difference’	 in	the	austerity	context,	specifically,	see	Gedalof	(2017).	See	also	 Duggan	 (2003)	 and	 Fraser	 (1996,	 1997)	 for	 different	 takes	 on	 neoliberalism	 and	equality	or	identity	politics;	and	Rofel	(2007)	on	neoliberalism	and	sexuality	in	China.		
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‘chav	 mum’	 (Tyler	 2008),	 and	 ‘benefits	 brood’	 families	 (Jensen	 and	 Tyler	2015).	These	figurations	form	a	key	part	of	the	discursive	stigmatisation	of	welfare	 recipients	 within	 the	 context	 of	 austerity,	 but	 frequently	 the	figurative	 tropes	 they	 reproduce	 have	 much	 longer	 histories	 than	 the	current	 period	 of	 austerity	 –	 meaning	 that	 their	 reach,	 popularity,	 and	affective	 intensity	 tend	 to	 exceed	 their	 deployments	 within	 austerity	discourse	specifically.			Austerity	 discourse,	 reproduced	 both	 in	 policy	 processes	 and	through	media	and	visual	cultures,	thus,	plays	a	central	role	in	justifying	and	legitimating	 further	welfare	 retrenchment	and	deepening	neoliberalisation	in	various	areas	of	state	provision.	However,	some	scholars	(Bhattacharyya	2015;	 Cherniavsky	 2017)	 have	 questioned	 whether	 neoliberalising	 states	are,	 in	 fact,	 interested	 in	 consent	 at	 all	 –	 and	 the	way	 in	which	 neoliberal	logics	have	tended	to	be	presented	as	technical	and	instrumental	solutions	devoid	 of	 politics,	 as	 others	 (Bourdieu	 1998;	 Duggan	 2003;	 Dunford	 and	Perrons	2014)	have	suggested,	 certainly	seems	 to	support	 this	view.	 Irene	Gedalof	argues,	conversely,	that	consent	does	matter	to	austerity	politics	in	the	 UK,	 as	 austerity	 discourse	 seeks	 to	 evoke	 a	 desired	 viewpoint	representing	 ‘the	 good	 citizen	 as	 an	 aspirational	 neo-liberal	 subject	 who	embodies	a	project	of	independent	self-actualization	without	relying	on	the	state’	 (2017:	13;	cf.	Tyler	2013).	Yet,	 these	discursive	 logics	may	–	despite	their	 seeming	 oppositionality	 –	 function	 in	 cooperation	 with	 each	 other.	While	 the	 discursive	 tropes	 of	 irresponsible	 ‘benefit	 scroungers’	 and	‘intergenerational	 cultures’	 of	 worklessness	 and	 disadvantage,	 among	others,	 help	 justify	 welfare	 retrenchment	 and	 ‘reform’	 specifically,	 the	presentation	of	austerity	not	 just	as	a	set	of	technical	solutions,	but	also	as	the	most	effective	solution,	functions	to	position	austerity	as	inevitable	and	commonsensical.	The	suggestion	that	austerity	is	inevitable	–	because	it	just	
makes	 sense	 –	 in	 turn,	 underpins	 austerity’s	 hold	 on	 the	 everyday,	 as	 a	‘mood’	or	‘atmosphere’	(Coleman	2016),	as	well	as	conditions	its	hold	on	the	future.		Rebecca	Bramall	argues	that	part	of	austerity’s	power	arises	from	its	ability	 to	 install	 particular	 futures	 –	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘both	 the	 material	
	 19	
constraints	 that	 fiscal	 tightening	endows	the	 future	and	the	ways	 in	which	people	 living	with	 austerity	 have	 begun	 to	 imagine	 their	 own	 and	 others’	futures’	 (2016:	 1,	 emphasis	 in	 the	 original).	 Austerity	 urges	 us	 –	 and,	importantly,	 some	 of	 us	 considerably	 more	 than	 others	 –	 to	 modify	 our	anticipation	of	the	future,	to	scale	back	our	expectations	of	the	kinds	of	lives	we	 imagine	ourselves	and	our	 families	 living	 in	 the	 future,	as	many	others	(Adkins	 2015;	 Bhattacharyya	 2015;	 Coleman	 2016;	 Hitchen	 2016;	 Jensen	2012)	have	suggested.	This	urging	 is	often	 felt	 in	 the	everyday,	not	 just	 in	terms	 of	 increasing	 financial	 constraints,	 but	 also	 as	 an	 overall	mood	 of	pessimism	 and	 hopelessness,	 as	 Rebecca	 Coleman	 (2016)	 suggests.	 The	futurity	of	austerity	is,	thus,	here	seen	as	affective	as	well	as	temporal.	This	temporality,	 according	 to	 Coleman,	 is	 not	 linear;	 austerity	 futures	 do	 not	unfold	 in	 a	 linear	manner	 from	 the	 present,	 but	 instead	 it	 is	 the	 austerity	present	 that	 is	 conditioned	and	shaped	by	an	austerity	 future	 that	has	not	yet	 arrived	 –	 and	 may,	 in	 fact,	 never	 arrive.	 Austerity,	 seen	 thusly	 as	 a	future-oriented	 political	 and	 cultural	 formation,	 therefore,	 also	 has	 the	potential	 to	 significantly	 impact	 upon	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 we	 are	 able	 to	respond	 to	 its	 logics	 and	 rationalities,	 exerting	 influence	 not	 only	 on	 our	affective	responses	today,	but	also	our	political	responses	tomorrow	–	as	 I	argue	throughout	this	thesis.	Austerity’s	 capacities	 to	both	modify	 futures	 and	 shape	 the	present	functions	 partially	 through	 the	 unravelling	 of	 past	 promises	 and	 partially	through	 the	 offering	 of	 new	 expectations	 in	 their	 place.	 The	 processes	 by	which	 the	 post-Second	 World	 War	 social	 contract,	 premised	 on	 an	expectation	of	the	universality	of	the	welfare	state	and	an	assumption	about	the	 reciprocity	 of	 the	 state/citizen	 relationship,	 is	 being	 withdrawn	 or	unravelled	 are	 accelerated	 –	 although	 not	 initiated	 –	 by	 austerity	 politics.	However,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 this	 unravelling	 is	 by	 no	 means	complete,	 nor	 is	 it	 as	 straightforward	 as	 I	 have	 suggested	 so	 far.	 The	promises	embedded	in	the	post-war	(welfare)	state	have	not	been	entirely	dismantled	 and	 replaced	 by	 new,	 lower	 expectations	 of	 the	 state	 and	 the	state/citizen	 relationship.	 Instead,	 as	 Lauren	 Berlant	 (2011)	 and	 many	others	(Bramall	2016;	Latimer	2013)	coax	us	to	see,	these	expectations	live	
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on	 in	many	ways,	 continuing	 to	be	 the	object	of	 complex	attachments	 and	investments	–	even	in	situations	where	these	promises	are	the	least	likely	to	continue	 to	 deliver	 in	 the	 future,	 as	 Berlant	 (2011)	 suggests	 in	 her	conceptualisation	of	 ‘cruel	optimism.’	Indeed,	I	would	argue	that	these	two	modes	 in	 which	 austerity	 operates	 as	 a	 future-oriented	 formation	 and	 a	‘technology	 of	 power’	 (Foucault	 1979)	 can	 coexist	 –	 we	 may	 continue	 to	attach	 to	 the	 future	 in	a	relation	of	cruel	optimism,	continuing	 to	 invest	 in	the	 promises	 of	 an	 already-dismantling	 social	 contract,	 while	 at	 the	 same	time	feeling	pessimistic	in	the	present,	in	response	to	austerity’s	urging	of	us	to	modify	our	expectations.	Berlant’s	 account,	 thus,	 also	 provides	 a	 way	 of	 viewing	 austerity’s	consent-seeking	 logics	 together	 with	 the	 rationalities	 that	 have	 sought	 to	present	austerity	as	 inevitable,	and	therefore	as	beyond	both	criticism	and	politics.	 Gargi	 Bhattacharyya	 bases	 her	 argument	 about	 austerity’s	divestment	 from	 issues	 of	 consent	 on	 the	 notion	 that	 due	 to	 limited	possibilities	 for	 identification	 with	 austerity	 narratives	 and	 a	 resultant	‘shared	consciousness	of	precarity’,	 ‘there	are	limited	opportunities	to	take	active	pleasure	and	consolidation	of	self	from	the	abjecting	representations	of	unfortunate	lesser	beings’	(2015:	38).	For	her,	for	abjection	to	work	as	a	mechanism	 of	 consent-creation,	 part	 of	 the	 population	 needs	 to	 be	 stable	enough	 to	 identify	 as	 different	 from	 those	 abjected	 –	 such	 as	 the	 ‘benefit	scroungers’	referred	to	above.	However,	Berlant’s	(2011)	argument	suggests	that	 while	 precarity	 may,	 indeed,	 be	 ‘shifting	 up’	 in	 the	 context	 of	neoliberalising	 austerity,	 notions	 of	 normativity	 continue	 to	 have	 a	significant	 hold	 on	 us	 –	 and	 particularly	 on	 those	 of	 us	 for	 whom	attachments	 to	 normativity	 have	 in	 the	 past	 helped	 guarantee	 certain	(welfare)	 state	 protections.	 Thus,	 perhaps	 what	 abjection	 requires	 is	 not	actual	stability	but	 the	 façade	of	stability,	or	a	continuous	belief	 in,	and	an	attachment	 to,	 (future)	 stability.	 As	 well	 as	 embodying	 intense	individualism,	Gedalof’s	‘good	citizen	as	an	aspirational	neo-liberal	subject’,	thus,	 also	 depends	 on	 such	 attachments	 –	 to	 normative	 notions	 of	 ‘stable’	family	life	and	the	reciprocity	of	the	state	–	as	I	argue	centrally	in	Chapter	3.		
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Austerity	is,	thus,	here	seen	as	incorporating	multiple	different	kinds	of	 discursive	 and	 cultural	 logics	 and	 political	 rationalities,	 suggesting	 a	complex	web	of	attachments	to	imaginaries	of	both	a	diminished	future	and	a	future	where	the	state	will	continue	to	care	and	provide	for	us.	While	some	of	us	are	told	that	austerity	is	not	only	necessary	but	also	inevitable,	at	the	same	 time	 the	 demonisation	 of	 certain	 subjects	 and	 families	 for	 their	reliance	on	the	welfare	state	helps	ensure	support	for	welfare	retrenchment	on	the	part	of	those	who	continue	to	believe	that	they	will	remain	protected	–	a	tension	I	explore	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	4.	Given	austerity’s	capacity	to	both	 constrain	 future	 imaginaries	 and	 at	 the	 same	 time	 sustain	 them	 in	complex	 ways,	 it	 is	 no	 surprise	 that	 opinion	 polls	 assessing	 the	 public’s	approval	 of	 austerity	 measures	 reflect	 this	 complexity.	 In	 answer	 to	 the	YouGov	poll	 question	–	 ‘thinking	about	 the	way	 the	government	 is	 cutting	spending	to	reduce	the	government’s	deficit,	do	you	think	this	is	good	or	bad	for	the	economy?’	–	the	proportion	of	respondents	replying	‘good’	increased	from	 2012	 until	 the	 2015	 election	 but	 has	 been	 dropping	 since,	 with	 the	responses	 to	 whether	 the	 spending	 cuts	 are	 ‘fair’	 following	 a	 somewhat	similar	 pattern	 (Dahlgreen	 2016).	 These	 responses	 possibly	 reflect	 the	reduced	emphasis	on	austerity	 in	political	discourse	since	the	election	and	particularly	by	Theresa	May	since	she	became	Prime	Minister.	However,	as	Gedalof	 (2017)	 cautions,	 the	 discursive	 deployments	 of	 ‘hardworking	families’	and	of	national	‘crisis’	–	this	time	brought	upon	or	indicated	by	the	European	Union	referendum	–	continue	largely	unchanged	in	May’s	rhetoric,	perhaps	suggesting	the	perpetuation	of	austerity	–	discourse	and	politics	–	in	all	but	name.4		In	 relation	 to	 the	 public’s	 assessment	 of	 the	 impact	 of	 austerity,	however,	the	picture	looks	slightly	different.	The	proportion	of	people	who	say	that	the	cuts	are	having	an	impact	on	their	own	lives	has	been	steadily	decreasing	since	2011,	while	the	proportion	of	 those	who	say	they	are	not	
																																																								4 	The	 framing	 of	 the	 EU	 referendum	 as	 the	 ‘new’	 crisis	 to	 which	 the	 Conservative	Government	 has	 to	 respond	 to	 is	 suggestive	 of	 the	 tendency	 for	 neoliberalisation	 to	(re)produce	endless	crises	and,	therefore,	 to	create	the	conditions	for	an	endless	need	for	‘reform’,	as	suggested	by	Clarke	(2004),	Jones	and	Novak	(1999),	and	Peck	(2001),	among	others.	
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having	 an	 impact	 has	 been	 increasing	 (Dahlgreen	 2016).	 Further,	 the	proportion	 of	 people	 who	 think	 the	 cuts	 are	 ‘necessary’	 has	 consistently	been	higher	than	those	who	say	they	are	‘good’	or	‘fair’,	although	a	drop	in	these	 numbers	 can	 also	 be	 observed	 since	 2015	 (ibid.).	 These	 results	indicate,	 firstly,	 that	 –	 despite	 some	 concern	 about	 ‘fairness’	 –	 public	support	 both	 for	 the	 cuts	 themselves	 and	 for	 the	 Coalition’s	 narrative	 of	
necessity	 has	 remained	 relatively	 constant,	 as	 well	 as	 relatively	 high.	Secondly,	 they	 suggest	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 austerity	 is,	 perhaps,	 felt	 less	intensely	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 austerity’s	 temporality.	 If	 one	 expects	 to	 be	feeling	 worse	 in	 the	 future,	 does	 feeling	 worse	 when	 that	 future	 arrives	continue	 to	 register	 as	 an	 impact	 or	 an	 affective	 shift?	Or	 does	 austerity’s	urging	of	diminished	expectations	mean	that	feeling	worse	in	the	future	no	longer	necessarily	registers	as	a	change	–	whether	financially	or	affectively?	Gedalof	argues	that	while	‘Theresa	May	might	claim	to	be	inhabiting	a	“new	centre	ground”	[--]	this	ground	has	already	been	shifted	dangerously’	(2017:	210),	suggesting,	similarly,	that	austerity	has,	at	the	very	least,	succeeded	in	shifting	 the	ground	of	 the	political	and	discursive	 landscape	 in	such	a	way	that	makes	it	difficult	to	both	keep	track	of	and	oppose.	Following	 considerations	 similar	 to	 my	 discussion	 above,	 Bramall	asks,		 is	 there	 any	use	 in	positioning	 a	 politics	 against	 a	 scenario	 that	people	 have	 already	 taken	 on	 board	 and	 internalised?	 Can	 we	expect	 people	 to	 get	 worked	 up	 about	 something	 that	 is	 still	evidently	 happening	 to	 them,	 but	 that	 they	 don’t	 really	 ‘feel’	 –	they	don’t	construe	as	‘having	an	impact’?	(cited	in	Bramall	et	al.	2016:	126)	Although	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	answer	 is	a	 resolute	yes	–	not	only	 is	a	politics	positioned	 against	 austerity	 necessary,	 but	 it	 is,	 of	 course,	 also	 already	existing	 –	 at	 the	 same	 time	 this	 discussion	 points	 at	 the	 importance	 of	thinking	 through	what	kind	 of	 a	politics	austerity	necessitates.	This	 thesis’	focus	 is	 on	 sexual	 politics,	 but	 similarly	 in	 my	 case	 the	 ways	 in	 which	austerity	functions	to	limit	and	condition	the	future	legibility	and	legitimacy	of	sexual	and	intimate	lives,	subjects,	and	expectations	is	seen	as	crucial	for	any	 such	 politics.	 Challenging	 the	 cultural	 logics,	 subjectifying	 effects,	 and	
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political	rationalities	of	austerity	discourse	and	politics	are,	here,	positioned	as	 central	 to	 any	 efforts	 to	 counter	 them.	 The	 political	 importance	 and	urgency	of	unpacking	and	questioning	the	relationship(s)	between	sexuality,	intimacy,	 and	 austerity	 are,	 thus,	 signalled	 by	 austerity’s	 futuristic	orientation	 –	 the	ways	 in	which	 its	 regulatory	 and	discursive	mechanisms	seek	to	limit	political	action	in	the	now,	and	to	narrow	political	imaginaries	in	the	future.				
Framing	and	Methodology	As	mentioned	above,	the	central	problematic	that	this	thesis	responds	to	is:	what	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives,	 subjects,	 and	 politics	 are	 made	(im)possible,	(il)legible,	or	(il)legitimate	by	and	within	austerity	politics?	As	should	 be	 clear	 by	 now,	 key	 to	 the	 framing	 of	 this	 question	 is,	 firstly,	 the	assumption	that	sexuality	is	not	an	inner	essence,	merely	biological,	or	only	pertinent	 as	 or	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 identity	 categories	 of	 homo-,	 bi-,	 and	heterosexual.	 Instead,	 sexuality	 is	 here	 perhaps	 more	 accurately	conceptualised	as	the	sexual	–	a	dynamic	field	encompassing	 identities	and	subject	 positions,	 as	well	 as	 acts,	 behaviours,	 norms,	 and	 power	 relations	that	 intersect	with	each	other	in	multiple	ways.	The	multifaceted	nature	of	sexuality	 has	 been	 a	 long-standing	 topic	 of	 enquiry	 within	 sexuality	scholarship	 generally,	 as	well	 as	 queer	 theory	more	 specifically.	However,	despite	many	of	these	interventions	specifically	highlighting	the	constructed	and	 historically	 contingent	 nature	 of	 sexual	 identity	 categories,	 as	well	 as	developing	 alternative	 frameworks	 for	 understanding	 sexuality	 –	many	 of	which	are	examined	in	Chapter	2	–	the	field	of	sexuality	scholarship	overall	has	tended	to	remain	focused	on	identitarian	forms	and	modes	of	sexuality.	The	 first	 gap	 in	 sexuality	 literatures	 that	 this	 thesis	 intervenes	 in	 –	 and	seeks,	 in	 part,	 to	 fill	 –	 is,	 thus,	 that	 between	 the	 theoretical	 contributions	that	 have	 highlighted	 sexuality’s	 many	 modes	 of	 operation,	 and	 the	overwhelming	 emphasis	 on	 sexuality	 as	 identity	 within	 much	 of	 sexuality	scholarship.		Secondly,	 my	 central	 question	 presupposes	 a	 relationship	 between	sexuality	and	other	economic,	political,	and	cultural	processes	that	can	–	and	
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do	 –	 in	 many	 ways	 shape	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 meanings,	 behaviour,	 acts,	norms,	 and	 identities.	 The	 boundaries	 both	 of	 what	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 and	intimate	lives	and	subjects	are	possible	and	of	what	sexuality	and	intimacy	are	 understood	 to	 mean	 in	 a	 particular	 context	 are,	 thus,	 shaped	 and	influenced	 by	 that	 context.	 The	 embeddedness	 of	 sexuality	 in	 political,	economic,	and	cultural	processes,	structures,	and	arrangements,	has,	again,	been	 frequently	 examined	 within	 sexuality	 scholarship,	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	Chapter	 2.	 Despite	 the	 both	 theoretically	 and	 epistemologically	 ground-breaking	 explorations	 of	 much	 of	 this	 scholarship,	 however,	 many	approaches	 examining	 sexuality’s	 relationship	 to	 politics,	 culture,	 and	 –	perhaps	in	particular	–	the	economy	have,	nonetheless,	often	tended	to	veer	towards	centralising	questions	arising	from	an	understanding	of	sexuality	as	an	 identity	 or	 subject	 position	 alone	 (or	 primarily).5	As	 a	 consequence	 of	this	tendency,	the	many	other	ways	in	which	sexuality	functions	in	relation	to,	and	is	shaped	by,	cultural,	political,	and	economic	formations,	have	often	received	 less	scholarly	attention	than	the	exclusion	and	inclusion	of	sexual	minorities	 and	 LG(b)	 populations	 in	 and	 by	 those	 formations.	 The	 second	key	way	in	which	this	thesis	contributes	to	sexuality	scholarship	is,	thus,	by	enquiring	after	the	many	ways	in	which	sexuality	and	intimacy	are,	beyond	their	 deployments	 as	 identity,	 affected	 and	 shaped	 by	 the	 political,	economic,	and	cultural	formations	of	austerity	–	epistemologically	as	well	as	otherwise.	As	well	as	in	the	ways	in	which	the	legitimacy	and	legibility	of	sexual	lives	and	subjects	are	shaped	by	the	political,	economic,	and	cultural	context	in	 which	 they	 take	 place,	 I	 am	 also	 interested	 in	 how	 that	 context	 is,	conversely,	 affected	 by	 the	 understandings	 and	 deployments	 of	 sexuality	prevalent	within	 it.	 Sexuality	and	 intimacy	 in	 their	multiple	 forms	 interact	with	many	processes,	 structures,	and	 formations	 that	 seemingly	have	very	little	do	with	sexuality	and	these	processes,	structures,	and	formations	are,	
																																																								5	To	an	extent,	 the	 same	 can	be	 said	 about	gender	 scholarship,	where	 the	 focus	has	often	remained	 on	 the	 implications	 of	 political	 economic	 structures	 and	 processes	 for	 women	(and	men),	despite	many	contributions	pointing	out	that	the	economy	is,	in	fact,	a	gendered	
structure.	 See	 Chapter	 1,	 as	well	 as	 Brah	 et	 al.	 (2015)	 and	 Pearson	 and	 Elson	 (2015)	 for	more	detail.	
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in	 turn,	 reinforced	 and	 contested,	 made	 and	 remade,	 in	 the	 process.	 The	nation-state	 –	 as	 well	 as	 each	 of	 its	 constitutive	 parts	 –	 is	 a	 pertinent	example,	but	 so	are	policy	 framings	and	processes,	discursive	and	cultural	formations,	 and	 broader	 political	 economic	 processes	 such	 as	neoliberalisation.	 As	 Chapters	 1	 and	 2	 discuss,	 these	 processes	 have	received	plenty	of	scholarly	attention,	particularly	 in	 the	wake	of	austerity	politics	 in	 the	 UK	 and	 that	 of	 neoliberalisation	 in	 many	 other	 contexts.	Frequently	 though,	 these	 scholarly	 interventions	 have	 either	 conceived	 of	sexuality	as	identity	or	subject	formation	alone,	as	above,	or	focused	solely	on	the	cultural	sphere	and	particularly	on	media	discourse	as	the	site	within	which	 sexual	 regulation	 takes	 place	 in	 a	 context	 such	 as	 austerity	 –	 thus	risking	 reproducing	 the	 common	 delegation	 of	 sexuality	 solely	 to	 the	cultural,	rather	than	the	material,	sphere	–	as	I	discuss	centrally	in	Chapter	3.	 Thirdly,	 then,	 this	 thesis	 adds	 to	 and	 complements	 these	 literatures	 by	examining	 the	 role	 of	 sexuality	 in	 multiple	 different	 discursive	 and	regulatory	 sites,	 encompassing	 media	 and	 policy	 discourses,	 as	 well	 as	policy	implementation	and	statework.		Overall	 my	 interest	 is,	 thus,	 in	 tracking	 and	 exploring	 the	 non-identitarian	deployments	and	regulation	of	 intimacy	and	sexuality	across	a	variety	of	discursive	and	regulatory	sites	that	are	significant	for	and	within	austerity	politics.	The	selection	of	these	discursive	and	regulatory	sites	(and	my	case	studies	more	broadly)	is	directly	informed	by	my	research	question	and	the	central	argument	of	this	project	–	that	sexuality	and	intimacy	matter	to	austerity	and,	 further,	 that	 they	matter	 in	ways	 that	have	nothing	 to	do	with	 identity	 positions.	 This	 project’s	 epistemological	 orientation	 is,	 thus,	made	explicit	in	my	desire	to	question	and	decentre	what	is	most	frequently	known	and	named	as	sexuality	and,	conversely,	to	recentre	those	aspects	of	sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 that	 rarely	 are	 –	 an	 approach	 delineated	 in	 more	detail	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Since	 a	 key	 part	 of	 the	 rationale	 for	 this	 project	 is	precisely	to	explore	the	modes	and	forms	in	which	sexuality	appears	within	austerity	 politics	despite	not	being	named	as	such,	 a	 predefined	 set	 of	 case	studies	was	not	a	possible	starting	point	here.	The	process	by	which	I	chose	my	 case	 studies	was,	 therefore,	 not	 a	 straightforward	 one	 –	 although	 that	
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pertaining	 to	 Chapter	 3’s	 examination	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 within	 policy	discourse	was	 considerably	more	 straightforward	 than	 the	others.	Despite	not	 often	 focusing	 on	 sexuality,	 policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 as	 a	 method	sees	relatively	prolific	use	within	critical	sociology	and	social	policy	studies.	My	choice	to	begin	with	an	analysis	of	policy	texts	is,	thus,	a	deliberate	one,	as	policy	 is	perhaps	 the	discursive	and	regulatory	arena	most	 comfortably	associated	with	austerity	politics.		I	watched	I,	Daniel	Blake	in	the	cinema	when	it	was	first	released	in	late	2016,	just	after	the	temporal	halfway	point	of	my	thesis	and	only	a	few	weeks	before	 I	was	due	to	start	writing	 the	chapter	–	Chapter	4	–	 that	 the	film	eventually	became	a	central	part	of.	I,	Daniel	Blake	seemed	like	a	perfect	fit	 with	 Benefits	 Street	 –	 the	 other	 key	 material	 I	 had	 already	 decided	 to	examine	 in	 this	 chapter	 –	 and	 the	 way	 in	 which	 the	 reception	 of	 each	 of	these	two	media	texts	largely	mirrored	that	of	the	other	attests	to	that	‘fit.’	These	representations	highlight	something	important	about	the	two	poles	of	the	 ‘deserving/undeserving’	 binary,	 thus	 also	 illuminating	 my	 own	 early	experiences	detailed	 above.	The	 cultural	 judgements	deployed	 to	question	my	 mother’s	 ability	 to	 raise	 a	 child	 who	 did	 well	 at	 school	 sometimes	functioned	as	proof	 of	 her	 (and,	 by	proxy,	my)	deservingness,	 but	 if	 those	doing	 the	questioning	 remained	unconvinced	of	 her	 abilities,	 they	marked	us	 as	 clearly	 undeserving	 instead.	 This	 ‘jostling’	 between	 the	 two	poles	 of	the	deserving/undeserving	binary	 forms	a	central	part	of	my	 investigation	of	the	two	media	texts	in	Chapter	4.		Finally,	Chapter	5’s	focus	on	processes	of	policy	implementation	and	service	 delivery	 specifically	 in	 the	 context	 of	 neoliberal	 penalisation	stemmed	from	a	feeling	I	had	throughout	the	writing	of	earlier	chapters	that	something	 significant	 in	 relation	 to	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 was	 at	 play	 in	what	Loïc	Wacquant	 (2012)	calls	 the	growth	of	 the	 ‘penal	 state.’	From	the	growth	 of	 the	 immigration	 detention	 estate;	 to	 the	 intensification	 of	 the	benefit	 sanctions	regime	during	 the	austerity	era;	and	 to	 the	aptly	dubbed	‘Bedroom	Tax’	–	these	processes	and	practices	initiated	and	managed	by	the	state	all	seemed	to	meddle	in	the	intimate	sphere,	highlighting	the	extent	to	which	 the	 intimate	 sphere	 is	 often	 not	 quite	 one’s	 own	 when	 it	 comes	 to	
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marginalised	populations.	Despite	the	different	paths	that	I	took	to	arrive	at	the	varied	research	sites	of	 this	thesis,	however,	 in	all	 three	cases	the	case	study	was	chosen	because	it	reveals	something	new	and	different	about	the	role(s)	that	sexuality	and	intimacy	play	within	austerity	politics.	This	thesis’	use	of	three	different	case	studies	and	research	sites	–	as	well	as	methods,	as	I	explain	below	–	is,	thus,	intentional	and,	indeed,	in	some	ways	necessary	–	given	my	research	focus	and	question.	The	roundabout	ways	in	which	I	came	across	and	selected	my	three	case	 studies	 are	 a	 direct	 consequence	 of	 what	 I	 see	 the	 case	 studies	 as	illuminating	–	as	are	the	methods	that	I	use	in	my	analysis	of	them.	Similarly	to	 the	 case	 studies	 themselves,	 then,	 a	 predefined	 methodology	 and	methods	 was	 not	 a	 suitable	 starting	 point	 for	 this	 project.	 Instead,	 the	methods	employed	on	 the	 subsequent	pages	of	 this	 thesis	 follow	 from	my	choice	 of	 case	 studies	 and	 research	 sites,	 and	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 indirect	process	the	methods	used	in	each	chapter	are	different.	Although	Chapters	3,	4,	and	5	all	deal	with	discursive	and	regulatory	processes,	 they	do	so	 in	somewhat	different	ways.	Chapter	3	employs	policy-as-discourse	analysis	to	examine	 sexuality’s	 deployments	 and	 regulation	 within	 policy	 texts;	whereas	Chapter	4	uses	(and	develops)	a	figurative	methodology	to	examine	the	 role	 that	 sexualisation	 plays	 in	 the	 construction	 and	 circulation	 of	certain	common	austerity	figures,	such	as	the	 ‘benefit	scrounger.’	Although	my	 focus	 in	 Chapter	 5	 is	 also	 on	 policy,	 instead	 of	 policy	 texts	 I	 use	 UK	Supreme	Court	judgements	as	the	core	materials.	Rather	than	as	texts	per	se,	however,	the	judgements	are	approached	as	sources	of	evidence	in	regards	to	processes	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery,	 in	 the	 context	 of	what	 are	 often	 considered	 examples	 of	 punitive	 or	 penalising	welfare	 and	housing	policies.	Overall,	 then,	my	 research	question	 –	 enquiring	 after	 the	(im)possibility,	 (il)legibility,	and	(il)legitimacy	of	sexual	and	 intimate	 lives,	subjects,	 and	 politics	 within	 austerity	 –	 has	 led	 me	 to	 an	 explorative	methodological	approach,	where	the	methods	I	use	follow	the	case	studies	–	which	themselves,	in	turn,	follow	the	research	question.		
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Why	Sexual	Politics?	The	 final	 question	 (or	 set	 of	 questions)	 I	 want	 to	 sketch	 out	 in	 this	introduction	is	that	related	to	sexual	politics.	Why	centre	my	intervention	on	
sexual	 politics,	 rather	 than,	 say,	 anti-austerity	 or	 anti-neoliberal	 politics?	And	why,	 indeed,	centre	politics	at	all?	As	suggested	above,	the	question	of	sexual	 politics	 arises	 partially	 from	 my	 own	 early	 experiences	 and	particularly	 from	 my	 felt	 frustration	 about	 the	 lack	 of	 recognisable	 or	legitimate	avenues	for	political	action	and	subjectivity	in	the	context	of	the	sexual	regulation	I	both	witnessed	and	experienced	as	a	child.	This	project	has,	thus,	from	its	inception	been	motivated	by	a	desire	to	challenge,	as	well	as	 to	 examine,	 some	 of	 the	 non-identitarian	 ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	continues	 to	 be	 sutured	 to	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 operation	 of	political	 economic	 formations	 such	 as	 austerity.	 My	 central	 argument	throughout	 this	 thesis	 is	 that	 austerity	 politics	 functions	 to	 shape	 –	 and	usually	 limit	 and	 constrain	 –	 the	 legibility	 and	 legitimacy	 of	 sexual	 and	intimate	 lives	and	subjects.	Part	of	 this	 function	 is	austerity’s	 futurity	and,	more	 specifically,	 its	 orientation	 towards	 a	 future	 in	 which	 the	 possible	modes	 and	 imaginaries	 for	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives	 and	 subjects	 are	narrower	 and	 more	 constrained.	 I	 am,	 thus,	 driven	 to	 explore	 what	 I,	following	 Berlant	 (2011),	 call	 the	 political,	 by	 my	 desire	 to	 find	 ways	 to	challenge	and	refuse	austerity’s	futurity	and	the	limitations	and	constraints	it	potentially	induces	in	relation	to	sexuality	and	intimacy	–	despite	Berlant’s	acute	 reminder	 that	 ‘an	 intimate	 attachment	 to	 the	 political	 can	 [itself]	amount	to	a	relation	of	cruel	optimism’	(ibid.:	227).		2013	saw	what	is	considered	by	many	as	the	most	defining	victory	of	a	 kind	 of	 sexual	 politics	 in	 recent	 times	 in	 the	 UK:	 the	 passing	 of	 the	
Marriage	 (Same	 Sex	 Couples)	 Act,	 which	 legalised	 same-sex	 marriage	 in	England	 and	 Wales.	 The	 passing	 of	 the	 act	 by	 the	 Coalition	 Government	registered	 as	 a	 surprise	 in	 many	 quarters,	 especially	 as	 it	 was	 broadly	presented	 as	 the	 result	 of	 David	 Cameron’s	 –	 the	 then	 Prime	 Minister	 –	personal	conviction,	and	 for	many	 it	 signalled	a	new,	more	socially	 liberal,	Conservatism,	 as	 Richard	 Hayton	 and	 Libby	McEnhill	 (2015)	 discuss.	 The	positioning	of	this	moment	as	a	pinnacle	of	sexual	liberation,	or,	indeed,	as	a	
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different	 kind	 of	 Conservatism,	 drew	many	 criticisms,	 however.	 For	 some,	Cameron’s	 success	 in	modernising	 and	 liberalising	 the	 Conservative	 party	turned	 out	 to	 be	 rather	 limited	 despite	 this	 legislative	 victory	 (ibid.;	Atkinson	et	al.	2012),	 and	 for	others,	 the	act	–	and	others	 like	 it	 –	has	 the	potential	to	open	the	door	to	the	processes	of	normalisation,	regulation,	and	exclusion	 that	 tend	 to	 accompany	 state	 recognition	of,	 and	 the	granting	of	formal	rights	to,	any	particular	subset	of	the	population.	Same-sex	marriage,	the	kind	of	normative	 sexual	politics	 that	 it	 exemplifies,	 and	 the	 racialised	and	sexualised	exclusions	that	tend	to	accompany	such	a	politics,	have	most	often	 been	 critiqued	 from	 the	 perspectives	 of	 homonormativity	 (Brown	2012;	 Duggan	 2003;	 Puar	 2007,	 2013)	 and	 sexual	 citizenship	 (Brandzel	2005;	Josephson	2005;	Payne	and	Davies	2012;	Stychin	2000,	2001;	Taylor	2011)	–	approaches	examined	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	2.6	Although	I	broadly	align	myself	with	many	of	these	critiques,	rather	than	 in	 critiquing	 the	 Marriage	 Act	 per	 se	 my	 interest	 in	 this	 thesis	 is	 in	questioning	and	decentring	 the	understandings	of	sexual	politics	 that	such	political	claims	and	interventions	flow	from.7	What	I	would	characterise	as	a	colonising	 of	 the	 field	 of	 sexual	 politics	 by	 identitarian	 understandings	 of	progress	and	politics	tends	to	be	underpinned	by	a	notion	of	certainty	–	that	it	 is	 possible	 to	 know	 in	 advance	 who	 the	 subjects	 of	 sexual	 politics	 are,	what	 issues	 are	 relevant	 for	 sexual	 politics,	 and	 who	 or	 what	 the	appropriate	 targets	of	political	 action	are.	 It	 also	 signals	 a	degree	of	belief	that	 these	 factors	 will	 remain	 temporally	 constant	 and,	 consequently,	 a	conviction	 that	 political	 moments	 such	 as	 the	 passing	 of	 the	 same-sex	marriage	 act	 constitute	 a	 kind	 of	 an	 end	 point	 in	 sexual	 politics	 –	 thus	reproducing	a	 teleological	notion	of	 sexual	 liberation	and	progress.	 It	also,	finally,	 performs	 an	 exclusion	 of	 the	 many	 other	 ways	 in	 which	 the	discursive	and	regulatory	frameworks	that	seek	to	limit	and	manage	sexual	and	 intimate	 lives	 can	be	 challenged,	 appropriated,	 ignored,	 and	 refused	–	
																																																								6	See	also	Bassichis	and	Spade	(2014)	and	Burns	(2012)	on	the	connections	between	LG(b)	rights	or	sexual	citizenship	claims	and	racism,	specifically;	and	Lamble	(2014)	on	the	claims	to	punitiveness	that	can	attach	to	gay	rights.	7	However,	at	the	same	time	I	recognise	the	importance	of	marriage	rights	for	the	survival	of	many	LG(b)	subjects	and	for	the	liveability	of	many	LG(b)	lives.	
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like	my	mother	both	did	and	taught	me	to	do	throughout	my	childhood.	As	my	 own	 experiences,	 thus,	 indicate,	 I	 am	 drawn	 to	 the	 political	 by	 my	conviction	 that	 such	 things	 cannot	 be	 known	 in	 advance,	 especially	 as	sexuality’s	 deployments	 in	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 functioning	 of	political,	economic,	and	cultural	formations	change	and	shift	all	the	time.	In	this	 thesis	 I,	 thus,	 explore	 the	 question	 of	 what	 kind	 of	 political	engagements,	 subjectivities,	 and	 action	 might	 follow	 from	 centring	 non-identitarian	 understandings	 of	 sexuality	 –	 without	 determining	 the	 end	goals	of	such	a	politics	in	advance.		Finally,	the	suturing	of	sexuality	to	identity	and	rights-based	political	claims	 often	 rests	 on,	 and	 reproduces,	 the	 split	 between	 the	material	 and	cultural	 spheres	 –	 a	 split	 that	 I	 challenge	 in	more	detail	 in	Chapter	3.	The	frequent	 framing	 of	 many	 of	 the	 issues	 I	 raise	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 as	‘merely	 cultural’	 –	 to	 use	 Judith	Butler’s	 (1997)	phrase8	–	constitutes	 an	a	
priori	 dismissal,	 whereas	 here	 the	 material	 and	 cultural	 are	 considered	inseparable.	Similarly,	the	material	differences	in	my	and	my	friends’	living	conditions	during	my	childhood	were	intimately	 linked	to,	and	inseparable	from,	the	various	cultural	judgements	and	assumptions	that	my	family	was	subject	to.	In	the	first	 instance,	then,	a	sexual	politics	in	a	time	of	austerity	would	be	cognisant	of	and	invested	in	interrogating	both	materiality	and	the	cultural	 politics	 that	 attach	 to	 such	 materiality.	 The	 framing	 of	 forms	 of	sexuality	through	the	notion	of	labour	has	a	long	history	in	feminist	politics	(Carby	 1982;	 Fraser	 1996;	 Hennessy	 2000,	 2014;	 Millett	 1970),	 and	 my	analysis	 of	 sexuality’s	 deployment	 in	 austerity	 discourse	 in	 Chapter	 3	 is	indebted	 to	 this	 history.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Chapter	 3’s	 examination	 of	austerity	 discourse’s	 deployments	 of	 sexualised	 assumptions	 and	judgements	illustrates	that	such	judgements	are	never	entirely	separate,	or	separable,	from	material	concerns.		A	sexual	politics	that	stems	from	non-identitarian	understandings	of	sexuality	 would	 also	 be	 cognisant	 of	 sexuality’s	 co-constitution	with	 race,	class,	ability,	age,	and	other	forms	of	difference,	as	well	as,	crucially,	of	 the																																																									8	Butler	uses	this	phrase	in	her	well-known	debate	with	Fraser	(1997),	which	I	examine	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	3.		
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varied	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 differences	 materialise	 and	 are	 deployed	 in	relation	 to	 cultural,	 political,	 and	 economic	 formations	 –	 as	 both	my	 own	experiences	 (and	myopias)	discussed	above	and	 the	examination	of	 sexual	subjectivities	in	Chapter	4	illustrate.	In	addition,	such	a	sexual	politics	would	be	 invested	 in	materiality	 in	 another	 sense,	 in	 that	 it	would	 recognise	 the	material	requirements	necessary	for	an	intimate	and	sexual	life	–	access	to	space,	time,	and	proximity	–	as	I	explore	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5.	Finally,	as	Chapter	5	also	suggests,	such	a	sexual	politics	would	be	aware	of	the	trap	of	deploying	a	narrow	notion	of	liberation	reliant	on	the	state	as	the	granter	and	guarantor	of	rights,	but	at	the	same	time	not	refuse	or	let	go	of	the	state	entirely.	This	brief	sketch	of	sexual	politics	is	not	meant	as	a	prescriptive	or	comprehensive	set	of	demands,	but	instead	as	a	set	of	basic	conditions	that	I	see	as	the	necessary	conditions	for	any	non-identitarian	conception	of	sexual	politics	–	in	line	with	this	thesis’	overall	commitment	to	opening	the	door	to,	and	exploring	the	potential	for,	such	a	sexual	politics,	rather	than	deciding	in	advance	what	it	would	look	like.		
	
Structure	of	Thesis		The	 following	 two	 chapters	 provide	 the	 contextual,	 theoretical,	 and	epistemological	 frameworks	 for	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 thesis,	 including	 an	examination	 of	 existing	 literatures	 both	 around	 austerity	 and	 around	sexuality’s	 relationships	 with	 various	 cultural,	 political,	 and	 economic	formations.	Chapter	1	begins	with	a	discussion	of	austerity’s	discursive	and	policy	 deployments,	 and	 subsequent	 dominance,	 in	 the	 political	 field	 in	response	to	the	2007-8	financial	crisis,	conceptualising	austerity	as	a	policy	formation,	on	the	one	hand,	and	as	a	discursive	formation	that	functions	to	reproduce	 the	austerity	moment	as	one	of	exceptional	 crisis,	on	 the	other.	Secondly,	 I	 challenge	 this	 positioning	 of	 both	 the	 crisis	 and	 austerity	 as	exceptional	 and	argue,	 instead,	 that	 they	both	originate	 in	 the	 same	 set	 of	cultural	 logics,	 political	 rationalities,	 and	 economic	 reasonings.	 Framed	 in	this	 way,	 the	 crisis	 itself	 appears	 as	 a	 symptom	 of	 the	 much	 longer-term	processes	 of	 neoliberalisation	 and	 deepening	 inequality,	 and	 austerity,	 in	turn,	 as	 an	 opportunity	 to	 escalate	 or	 intensify	 these	 processes.	 The	 third	
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and	 fourth	 sections	 investigate	 and	 theorise	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	‘crisis	response’	–	framed	largely	through	austerity	discourse	and	politics	–	situating	 it	 as	 part	 of	 this	 longer	 history	 of	 neoliberalisation.	 The	 first	 of	these	 sections	 examines	 the	 response	 from	 the	point	 of	 view	of	work	 and	welfare	and	 the	second	 from	 that	of	 the	 state	–	with	gender	providing	 the	analytical	 lens	 for	 the	 discussion	 in	 both.	 In	 focusing	 on	 austerity’s	discursive	deployments	and,	in	particular,	on	the	much-researched	gendered	implications	and	underpinnings	of	 those	deployments	–	where	sexuality	 is	mostly	 absent	 –	 this	 chapter	 also	 anticipates	 the	 following	 chapter’s	discussion	 of	 the	 key	 theoretical	 and	 epistemological	 approaches	 to	sexuality	and	intimacy	that	the	rest	of	this	thesis’	chapters	both	employ	and	move	forward	in	their	analysis.	While	the	various	effects	and	impacts	of	austerity	politics	–	as	well	as	those	of	other,	related	processes	such	as	neoliberalisation	and	precarisation	–	on	women,	 sexual	minorities,	 and	other	minority	populations	have	been	relatively	well	documented	and	analysed,	as	Chapter	1	highlights,	scholarly	work	has	less	often	focused	on	the	discursive	and	regulatory	deployments	of	sexuality	 within	 the	 neoliberalising	 politics	 of	 austerity	 in	 the	 UK,	 as	 this	chapter	 has	 pointed	 out	 –	 although	 there	 are,	 of	 course,	many	 exceptions.	Indeed,	this	thesis	centrally	argues	that	it	is	precisely	as	a	result	of	the	(both	scholarly	and	broader)	tendency	to	overwhelmingly	focus	on	sexuality	as	a	set	 of	 predefined	 identity	 categories	 and	 subject	 positions	 that	 much	 gets	missed	 about	 the	 interrelatedness	 of	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 to	 austerity	politics	–	as	well	as	to	the	state,	neoliberalisation,	class,	and	so	on.	Chapter	2	focuses	on	the	key	theoretical	and	epistemological	approaches	to	sexuality,	intimacy,	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	 both	 that	 underpin	 this	 thesis’	 analysis,	beginning	 with	 a	 brief	 section	 exploring	 the	 (broad)	 questions	 of	 what	sexuality	 is;	 how	 it	 is	 conceived	 of	 in	 this	 thesis;	 and	 what	 it	 means,	 in	theoretical	terms,	to	engage	in	an	analysis	of	sexuality	and	intimacy	outside	of	 identity	 formations.	 The	 following	 three	 sections	 each	 focus	 on	 a	particular	 way	 of	 conceptualising	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 –	 as	 sexual	subjectivity,	sexual	inequality,	and	intimate	disruptions	–	foregrounding	the	subsequent	chapters’	employments	of	these	different	conceptualisations.		
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As	 this	 introduction	 has	 briefly	 discussed,	 my	 methodological	approach	in	this	thesis	is	explorative	and	the	methods	employed	in	Chapters	3,	 4,	 and	 5,	 consequently,	 different	 from	 one	 another.	 Thus,	 Chapter	 2,	 as	well	as	providing	a	theoretical	grounding	for	this	thesis,	also	introduces	the	specific	 methods	 used	 in	 the	 subsequent	 chapters.	 Since	 each	 method	follows	 from	 my	 choice	 of	 a	 particular	 research	 site	 and	 the	conceptualisation	 of	 sexuality	 deployed	 in	 relation	 to	 it,	 the	 methods	 are	introduced	and	discussed	in	relation	to	each	particular	conceptualisation	of	sexuality:	 the	 section	 on	 sexual	 subjectivity	 discusses	 the	 figurative	methodology	 employed	 in	 Chapter	 4;	 that	 on	 sexual	 inequality	 introduces	policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 –	 the	 method	 used	 in	 Chapter	 3	 –	 and	 the	section	 discussing	 intimacy	 accounts	 for	 Chapter	 5’s	method	 –	 analysis	 of	processes	of	service	delivery	and	policy	implementation.	Overall,	these	two	chapters	provide,	 firstly,	a	rationale	for	examining	the	 ‘sexual	and	intimate	life’	of	austerity	in	the	context	of	the	broader	argument	that	austerity	should	be	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 a	 longer	 process	 of	 neoliberalisation	 (Chapter	 1)	 and,	secondly,	an	unpacking	of	the	term	‘sexual	and	intimate	life’	–	what	it	means	to	 examine	 sexuality’s	 non-identitarian	 deployments	 and	 regulation	 in	relation	 to	 a	 cultural,	 political,	 and	 economic	 formation	 such	 as	 austerity	(Chapter	 2).	 Following	 these	 two	 chapters,	 Chapters	 3,	 4,	 and	 5	 form	 the	analytical	core	of	this	thesis.		Chapter	3	 focuses	on	policy	discourse,	 and	more	 specifically	on	 the	repeated	 recent	 attempts	 by	 both	 the	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	Governments	 to	 shift	 the	 definition	 of	 (child)	 poverty	 away	 from	material	and	 economic	 understandings	 and	 towards	 individual	 and	 cultural	 ones.	 I	examine	 these	 recent	attempts	 through	a	 reading	of	 three	key	policy	 texts	and	make	 the	 arguments	 that,	 firstly,	 these	 attempts	 indicate	 a	 significant	shift	 towards	 the	 culturalisation	 of	 poverty	 and,	 secondly,	 this	culturalisation	 depends	 on,	 and	 is	 underpinned	 by,	 certain	 discursive	deployments	of	sexuality	and	gender.	These	deployments,	in	turn,	place	the	(poor)	family	at	the	centre	of	poverty	discourses	–	positioning	it	both	as	the	site	for	the	reproduction	of	poverty	and,	consequently,	as	the	proper	target	of	government	action	to	interrupt	said	reproduction.	This,	in	turn,	highlights	
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familial	 gender	 dynamics,	 reproductive	 arrangements,	 and	 parenting	practices	as	key	aspects	of	the	discursive	framing	of	poverty	within	austerity	politics.	Sexual	regulation	is,	thus,	here	located	in	the	operation	of	particular	sexual	values	and	norms	within	policy	discourses,	as	well	as	in	the	ways	in	which	 these	 discourses	 encourage	 certain	 sexual	 behaviours	 and	 familial	arrangements	 and	 strongly	 discourage	 others.	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	chapter	sexuality	is	positioned	as	central	not	only	to	the	discursive	regimes	that	 culturalise,	 individualise,	 and	 familialise	 poverty	 –	 and,	 thus,	 help	maintain	 a	 division	 between	 ‘hardworking	 taxpayers’	 and	 a	 ‘benefit	scrounging’	 and	 immoral	 underclass	 –	 but	 also	 to	 citizenship	 regimes,	through	 the	 discursive	 logics	 that	 connect	 regimes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 to	imaginaries	of	the	national	future.	Finally,	by	framing	sexuality	through	the	concept	 of	 sexual	 inequalities,	 I	 argue	 that	 these	 connections	 indicate	 that	sexuality	plays	a	key	role	in	the	processes	by	which	the	material	operation	of	 both	 class	 and	 sexuality	 within	 the	 political	 economy	 is	 increasingly	obscured	in	and	by	the	discursive	logics	of	austerity	and	neoliberalism.		Following	 Chapter	 3’s	 mapping	 of	 the	 dominant	 discursive	frameworks	of	austerity,	Chapters	4	and	5	focus	more	centrally	on	reading	both	 with	 and	 against	 the	 grain,	 thus	 also	 unpacking	 some	 of	 the	
contradictions	 evident	 in	 austerity	 discourses.	 Chapter	 4	 takes	 the	sexualisation	 of	 the	 hybrid	 or	 composite	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	scrounger/recipient’	 as	 its	 primary	 focus	 and	 traces	 its	 figuration	 and	 re-figuration	 as	 a	 sexualised	 and	 racialised	 subjectivity	 across	 two	 different	media	 sites	 –	 Benefits	 Street	and	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake.	 While	 many	 others	 have	examined	the	circulation	of	specific	figures	within	various	media	sites	in	the	context	of	austerity	politics,	as	discussed	above,	my	interest	in	this	chapter	is	to	delve	deeper	into	their	circulations,	to	explore	the	ways	in	which	these	figurations	 are	 sexually	 and	 racially	 saturated	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	 their	
legibility	as	subjects	depends	on	these	processes.	Although	I	highlight	both	commonalities	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 two	 texts’	 figuration	 of	 benefit	recipients,	 my	 focus	 is,	 thus,	 particularly	 on	 how	 these	 figurations	 utilise	various	 sexualised	 and	 racialised	 discursive	 tropes	 in	 their	making	 of	 the	‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 –	 thus	 highlighting	 that	 classed	 judgements	
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depend	on	processes	of	 sexualisation	and	racialisation,	 too.	The	conceptual	tool	 of	 figurative	economies	 is	 developed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 firstly,	 to	 suggest	that	these	texts	participate	in	the	same	 figurative	economies	and,	secondly,	to	question	to	what	extent	this	means	that	both	the	stories	they	can	tell	and	the	ways	 in	which	 they	 can	be	 read	by	 audiences	 in	 the	 austerity	 era	 are,	ultimately,	 limited.	Towards	the	end	of	the	chapter	I	continue	the	previous	chapter’s	 discussion	 of	 the	 working	 class/’underclass’	 distinction,	 arguing	that	 it	 is	 reproduced	 in	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 binary.	 Finally,	 I	explore	the	question	of	whether	the	racialisation,	sexualisation,	and	general	cultural	 and	 criminal	 dysfunction	 associated	 with	 one	 half	 of	 this	 binary	function	 to	 discursively	 foreclose	 the	 possibility	 of	 its	 appearance	 as	 a	legible	political	subjectivity.		Chapter	5’s	analysis	focuses	on	state	processes	frequently	referred	to	as	increasing	penalisation	within	neoliberalising	states	and	argues	that	such	processes	tend	to	materialise	in	the	lives	of	affected	individuals	as	a	series	of	
intimate	disruptions	–	or	disruptions	to	intimate	lives,	relations,	and	spaces.	Utilising	 UK	 Supreme	 Court	 judgements	 related	 to	 three	 different	welfare	and	housing	policies	and	practices	–	the	Bedroom	Tax,	officially	the	Removal	of	 the	 Spare-Room	Subsidy	 (RSRS);	 the	 increasing	 practice	whereby	 Local	Authorities	(LAs)	house	their	social	housing	clients	outside	of	 the	LA	area;	and	‘workfare’	or	‘back	to	work’	schemes	and	benefit	sanctions	–	as	sources	of	evidence	of	the	processes	of	policy	implementation	and	service	delivery,	I	argue	 that	what	 tends	 to	be	 labelled	 ‘penality’	 is	 in	 these	 cases	 less	 about	straightforward	 punishment	 –	 or,	 indeed,	 about	 any	 kind	 of	 intentional	action	 by	 a	 coherent	 state.	 Instead,	 these	 policies	 and	 practices	 will	 be	shown,	firstly,	to	entail	naturalised	and	implicit	judgements	about	the	value	of	 intimacy	 and	 care	 and	 about	 what	 constitutes	 a	 liveable	 life;	 and	 the	resulting	 intimate	 disruptions	 in	 the	 everyday	 lives	 of	 the	 affected	individuals,	 secondly,	 to	 emerge	 from,	 and	be	 implicit	 in,	 the	processes	by	which	 the	 policies	 and	 systems	 are	 implemented.	 Overall	 this	 chapter	indicates	 that	 these	 policies	 and	 practices	materialise	 as	 punitive	 through	their	 disruption	 of	 the	 intimate	 sphere	 and,	 further,	 that	 these	 intimate	disruptions	 constitute	 a	 significant	 reconfiguration	 of	 the	 public/private	
	 36	
divide	 –	 but	 not	 in	 the	 manner	 often	 assumed	 within	 neoliberalising	contexts.	 Finally,	 I	 ask	 the	 question	 –	 where	 can	 the	 political	 be	 located	within	this	reframed	understanding	of	neoliberal	penalisation?	–	examining	whether	 any	 space	 for	 political	 action	 emerges	 in	 the	 gaps	 and	 spaces	opened	 up	 by	 the	 diffuse	 operation	 of	 state	 power	 that	 neoliberalisation	entails.	 In	 both	 Chapters	 4	 and	 5	 refusal	 provides	 the	 framework	 for	thinking	through	the	political	 in	the	context	of	austerity’s	regulation	of	 the	sexual	and	intimate	spheres.			 	
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The	Politics	of	Austerity	in	the	UK		Austerity	 initially	 –	 or	 anew,	 given	 the	 historical	 origins	 of	 the	 term9	–	gained	popularity	 in	political	 rhetoric	 in	 the	UK	 in	 the	 run-up	 to	 the	2010	general	 election.	 David	 Cameron’s	 speech	 at	 the	 Conservative	 Party	conference	 in	 Cheltenham	 in	 April	 2009	 was	 titled	 The	 Age	 of	 Austerity,	proposing	 a	 ‘never-been-done-before	 approach	 to	 the	way	 this	 country	 is	run’	 in	 response	 to	 the	 debt	 crisis,	 recession,	 and	 ‘Labour’s	 economic	incompetence’	(Cameron	2009).	‘The	age	of	irresponsibility	is	giving	way	to	the	 age	 of	 austerity’,	 Cameron	 declared,	 calling	 for	 ‘responsible	 politics’,	‘personal	 responsibility.	 Social	 responsibility.	Taking	power	 from	 the	 state	and	giving	it	to	individual	people	and	communities’	(ibid.).	Framed	largely	as	a	response	to	the	2007-8	global	financial	crisis	–	which	was	itself	conceived	of	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 previous	 Labour	 Government’s	 alleged	 financial	mismanagement	and	reckless	spending	–	austerity,	consequently,	became	a	widely	 used	 term	 in	 public,	 media,	 and	 political	 discourse	 in	 early	 2010,	setting	 the	 tone	 for	 the	 election.10	While	 the	 Conservative	 Party’s	 election	
																																																								9	Austerity	was	a	widely	used	term	in	the	UK	immediately	following	the	Second	World	War.	For	example	Bramall	 (2013;	cf.	Clarke	and	Newman	2012)	discusses	 the	historicity	of	 the	term,	highlighting	how	the	discursive	association	with	war	carries	particular	consequences	for	the	term’s	contemporary	usage.		10	While	the	Conservatives	framed	austerity	as	a	response	to	the	financial	crisis,	it	was	not	the	 first	 crisis	 response	 deployed	 in	 the	 UK.	 For	 in-depth	 analyses	 of	 the	 different	
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manifesto	 did	 not	 explicitly	 name	 austerity,	 its	 rhetoric	 reproduced	 the	tropes	 of	 reduced	 state	 spending,	 localism,	 and	 collective	 responsibility	 –	epitomised	 in	 the	 Party’s	 election	 slogan	 ‘We’re	 all	 in	 this	 together’	(Conservative	 Party	 2010).	 Key	 to	 the	 early	 popularisation	 of	 the	 term	‘austerity’	was,	thus,	its	positioning	as	exceptional	–	an	exceptional	response	to	 an	 exceptional	 set	 of	 circumstances	 created	 by	 poor	 governance,	economic	crisis,	and	a	‘broken	society’	(ibid.;	Cameron	2009).	While	the	public	rhetoric	of	the	Conservatives	focused	on	cleaning	up	the	 economic	 mess	 caused	 by	 the	 previous	 Labour	 Government(s),	 the	internal	processes	within	the	Conservative	Party	in	the	run	up	to	the	2010	election	 also	warrant	 a	mention.	With	 the	Labour	Party	moving	more	 and	more	towards	centre	ground	in	the	1990s	and	2000s	–	and	eventually	very	close	to	wholeheartedly	embracing	neoliberalisation,	as	Will	Atkinson	et	al.	(2012)	 argue	 –	 the	 Conservative	 Party	 found	 themselves	 unsuccessful	 in	electorally	 challenging	 Labour.	 This	 led	 to	 the	 adoption	 of	 an	 ‘emulation	strategy’,	 which	 combined	 neoliberal	 economic	 ideas	 with	 a	 rhetoric	 of	‘fairness’	and	‘social	justice’	(Hayton	and	McEnhill	2015:	9;	cf.	Atkinson	et	al.	2012;	 Gedalof	 2017).	 The	 party’s	 new	 modernised	 image	 included	embracing,	 even	 if	 just	 partially,	 some	 equalities	 issues	 –	 most	 notably	same-sex	marriage,	as	discussed	in	the	introduction;	as	well	as	accepting	–	to	 a	 degree	 –	 the	 concept	 of	 social	 justice,	 most	 evident	 in	 Iain	 Duncan	Smith’s	 work	 (Hayton	 and	 McEnhill	 2015).	 It,	 furthermore,	 included	 the	development	 of	 the	 ‘Big	 Society’	 agenda,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 dual	 approach	 to	welfare	 provision,	 entailing	 the	 maintenance	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 key	areas	 of	 health,	 education,	 and	 pensions,	 while	 reducing	 spending	 in	 the	area	of	 out-of-work	benefits	 (Smith	 and	 Jones	2015).	 In	 all	 of	 these	 areas,	however,	the	rhetoric	of	fairness	and	justice	has	been	accompanied	by	very	little	in	practice,	leading	Richard	Hayton	and	Libby	McEnhill	to	describe	the	Conservatives’	approach	as	‘essentially	neo-Thatcherite’	(2015:	132).11	
																																																																																																																																																						approaches	to	the	financial	crisis	in	the	UK	and	elsewhere,	see	Clarke	and	Newman	(2012),	Grimshaw	and	Rubery	(2012),	and	Pearson	and	Elson	(2015).	11	See	 Atkinson	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 and	 Skeggs	 (2004)	 on	 similar	 discursive	 deployments	 of	‘justice’	and	‘fairness’	by	the	Thatcher,	Major,	and	New	Labour	Governments.	
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Not	long	after	the	Conservative	Party’s	(partial)	election	win	in	2010	and	 the	 subsequent	 formation	 of	 the	 Coalition	 Government	 of	 the	Conservative	 and	 Liberal	 Democratic	 Parties,	 George	 Osborne,	 the	 then	Chancellor	of	 the	Exchequer,	 detailed	 the	Government’s	 initial	 programme	of	 austerity	measures	 in	 his	 2010	 Emergency	 Budget	 (HC	 Deb	 2010:	 cols	166-180).	Presenting	the	forthcoming	manifold	cuts	and	 ‘reforms’	to	social	welfare	and	other	areas	of	state	provision,	the	Budget	was,	again,	framed	as	an	exceptional	set	of	measures	to	be	undertaken,	to	lift	the	country	up	from	‘the	 ruins	 of	 an	 economy	 built	 on	 debt’	 (ibid.:	 c167).	 Osborne’s	 rhetoric	emphasised	 the	 state	 of	 crisis	 and	 emergency	 that	 the	 country’s	 economy	was	 in,	 highlighting	 specifically	 that	 the	 structural	 deficit	was	 ‘worse	 than	we	 were	 told’	 (ibid.:	 c171)	 –	 and,	 consequently,	 necessitated	 a	 stronger	response	than	what	had	been	envisioned	by	the	Party	prior	to	the	election.	While	 the	 National	 Health	 Service	 (NHS)	 and	 international	 development	were	ring-fenced,	the	social	welfare	budget	was	earmarked	for	£11	billion	of	cuts	by	2014-15	–	more	than	a	third	of	the	overall	cuts	(ibid.:	c174;	cf.	Elliot	and	 Wintour	 2010).	 The	 tone	 of	 the	 June	 budget	 speech	 was,	 thus,	considerably	 more	 negative	 than	 the	 earlier	 deployments	 of	 austerity	rhetoric,	 with	 Guardian	 commentators	 Larry	 Elliott	 and	 Patrick	 Wintour	summarising	the	budget	as	‘pain	now,	more	pain	later‘	(2010).		While	 these	 early	 uses	 of	 austerity	 rhetoric	 by	 Conservative	politicians	 focused	 on	 the	 exceptionality	 of	 both	 the	measures	 themselves	and	the	situation	they	were	intended	to	respond	to,	2013	saw	a	significant	shift	 in	austerity’s	discursive	deployments	in	the	political	 field.	 In	a	speech	delivered	at	the	Lord	Mayor’s	Banquet	in	November	2013,	Cameron	argued	that	the	past	three	years	showed	that	it	is	possible	‘to	do	more	with	less’	and	signalled	the	Conservative	Party’s	intention	to	build	‘a	leaner,	more	efficient	state	[--].	Not	just	now,	but	permanently’	(2013).	This	discursive	shift	from	austerity	as	an	exceptional	state	to	a	rhetoric	of	permanent	austerity	did	not	come	as	a	surprise	to	the	many	commentators	and	scholars	who	had	all	the	while	argued	that	austerity	measures	were,	first	and	foremost,	put	forward	and	 implemented	 for	 ideological	 reasons,	 rather	 than	 out	 of	 necessity.	Cameron’s	 2013	 speech	 –	 in	 contradiction	 to	his	 earlier	 insistence	 that	 he	
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‘didn’t	 come	 into	 politics	 to	 make	 cuts’	 (2010b)	 –	 thus,	 also	 somewhat	corresponds	 to	 the	 argument	 made	 by	 many	 critics	 of	 austerity	 (Adkins	2015;	 Bramall	 2016;	 Clarke	 and	 Newman	 2012;	 Dow	 2015;	 Evans	 2013,	2015;	 Gedalof	 2017;	 Griffin	 2015;	 Tyler	 2013;	 Wiggan	 2012)	 –	 and	 as	 I	argue	centrally	below	–	that	austerity	should	be	seen	both	as	an	ideological	programme	and	as	part	of	a	longer	process	of	neoliberalisation.	As	 I	 indicated	 in	 the	 Introduction,	 in	 this	 thesis	 the	 ‘politics	 of	austerity’	 refers	 both	 to	 the	 austerity	 policies	 themselves	 and	 the	political	
discourses	 and	 cultural	 mechanisms	 used	 to	 justify	 and	 legitimate	 them.	Welfare	 policies	 implemented	 by	 the	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	Governments	 since	 2010	 include	 the	 various	 changes	 introduced	 in	 the	
Welfare	Reform	Act	2012,	including	the	introduction	of	Universal	Credit	(UC)	–	 replacing	 seven	 separate	 means-tested	 benefits	 and	 tax	 credits12;	 the	Benefit	Cap	–	capping	the	overall	benefits	any	one	household	can	receive	at	£26,000	per	annum13;	 and	 the	Under-Occupancy	Penalty	–	aiming	 to	 force	public	 sector	 tenants	 with	 bedrooms	 that	 are	 deemed	 ‘spare’	 to	 move	 to	more	suitably	sized	properties,	or	face	a	reduction	in	their	housing	benefit.14	Personal	Independence	Payment	(PIP)	was	introduced	to	replace	Disability	Living	Allowance	(DLA),	obligating	claimants	to	undergo	a	Work	Capability	Assessment	 (WCA)	 to	prove	 their	eligibility.15	Various	 further	 changes	and																																																									12	There	have	been	significant	problems	throughout	the	pilot	programme	and	early	rollout	of	Universal	Credit,	 leading	to	its	full	 implementation	being	postponed	a	number	of	times.	In	the	current	timetable	it	is	due	to	be	implemented	in	full	in	2022.	13	In	 practice	 the	 policy	 has	mostly	 penalised	 families	 with	multiple	 children,	 as	 the	 cap	applies	 regardless	 of	 the	 number	 of	 children	 in	 the	 household.	 The	 policy	 also	disproportionately	 affects	 ethnic	 minority	 populations,	 with	 40	 per	 cent	 of	 affected	households	 containing	 someone	 who	 is	 from	 an	 ethnic	 minority	 (Sandhu	 and	 Stevenson	2015:	173).		14	The	permitted	allowance	per	household	is	one	bedroom	for	each	adult	couple,	each	other	person	over	16	years	of	age,	two	children	of	the	same	sex	under	16,	two	children	under	10	regardless	of	their	sex,	a	disabled	child	who	cannot	share	a	bedroom	due	to	their	disability,	and	any	other	child.	Exemptions	to	the	policy	include	foster	carers,	adult	children	who	are	in	 the	Armed	Forces,	as	well	as	some	people	with	disabilities	who	require	overnight	care	(Disability	Rights	UK	2015;	DWP	2012a).	The	Bedroom	Tax	regulations	form	a	central	part	of	my	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	15	These	assessments	were	previously	carried	out	by	Atos	Healthcare,	but	the	contract	was	taken	over	by	the	US	firm	Maximus	in	2015.	The	assessments	have	been	widely	discussed	in	the	media	and	frequently	criticised	for	both	their	accuracy	and	their	quality.	 In	numerous	cases	 people	 with	 terminal	 illnesses	 have	 been	 declared	 fit	 for	 work,	 and	 therefore	ineligible	 for	disability	benefits,	and	thousands	of	people	have	died	within	weeks	of	being	assessed	 (Butler	 2015;	 DWP	 2012b).	 The	 deaths	 associated	with	 sanctioning	 and	 ‘fit	 for	work’	outcomes	have	been	compiled	in	the	online	Calum’s	List	(2018).	
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cuts	to	welfare	provision	have	been	announced	since,	including	cuts	to	Tax	Credits;	a	 further	reduction	to	the	Benefit	Cap	–	to	£23,000	in	London	and	£20,000	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 country;	 and	 changes	 to	 eligibility	 for	 Housing	Benefit	 –	 as	well	 as	 the	2010	 changes	 to	Local	Housing	Allowance	 rates.16	The	Child	Poverty	Action	Group	(CPAG)	(CPAG	2013)	estimated	in	2013	that	overall	 the	 Government	 would	 be	 spending	 £16.5	 billion	 less	 on	 social	security	 and	 tax	 credits	 in	 2013-14	when	 compared	 to	 2010-11,	with	 the	majority	of	the	cuts	impacting	low-income	families.		Various	workfare	schemes,	requiring	 individuals	 to	undertake	some	form	 of	 work	 or	 training	 in	 return	 for	 their	 benefits	 –	 most	 notably	Jobseeker’s	 Allowance	 (JSA),	 Employment	 and	 Support	 Allowance	 (ESA),	and	Universal	Credit	–	were	established	by	the	Coalition	Government.17	Up	to	 14	 different	 schemes	 have	 been	 in	 operation	 since	 2010.18	Both	 the	workfare	 schemes	 and	 the	 work	 and	 training	 placements	 themselves	 are	provided	by	a	mixture	of	public,	private,	and	charity	organisations,	perhaps	highlighting	 the	 deepening	 integration	 of	 the	 private	 sector	 into	 public	sector	 provision,	 as	 I	 discuss	 in	 more	 detail	 below.	 The	 Coalition	Government	also	extended	the	benefit	sanctions	regime	initiated	by	Labour.	Sanctions	 are	 imposed	 on	 claimants	 who,	 for	 example,	 fail	 to	 attend	 an	interview	 at	 the	 Jobcentre,	 or	 in	 any	 other	 way	 violate	 their	 ‘Claimant	Commitments’	(Gov.UK	2016b,	2018b),	and	result	in	the	removal	of	welfare	support	for	a	period	of	time	between	four	and	156	weeks.	In	addition	to	the	welfare	cuts	themselves,	a	significant	degree	of	conditionality	has,	thus,	been	introduced	 into	 the	 UK’s	 social	 welfare	 system.	 Loïc	 Wacquant	 (2012)	examines	 workfare	 programmes	 and	 conditional	 welfare	 as	 examples	 of	increasingly	 disciplinary	 social	 policy	 and	 argues	 that	 this	 constitutes	 a	significant	 shift	 away	 from	protective	welfare,	which	 tended	 to	be	 granted																																																									16	Previously	LHA	rates	–	the	maximum	amount	of	housing	benefit	paid	in	different	areas	–	were	based	on	the	median	average	of	a	sample	of	rents	in	a	local	area.	In	2010	this	changed	to	 the	30th	percentile	on	 rental	prices	 in	a	 local	 area	 instead.	See	Wilson	et	al.	 (2016)	 for	more	information	on	the	various	changes	to	Housing	Benefit	since	2016,	and	Chapter	5	for	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	implications	of	these	changes.		17	Although	 the	 Coalition	 significantly	 expanded	 workfare	 provision,	 various	 forms	 of	workfare	had	already	been	in	use	throughout	the	Major	and	New	Labour	Governments.		18	Two	 of	 the	 biggest	 workfare	 programmes	 –	 Mandatory	 Work	 Activity	 (MWA)	 and	Community	Work	 Placements	 (CWP)	were	 scrapped	 in	 2015,	 but	 other	 programmes	 are	still	active	(Boycott	Workfare	2018a).		
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categorically,	 as	a	matter	of	 right.	Disciplinary	 social	policy	 tends	 to	entail	specific	behavioural	mandates,	 and	 the	Conservative-led	Governments	and	the	Department	 for	Work	and	Pensions	(DWP)	have,	 indeed,	openly	stated	that	many	of	 their	welfare	 reforms	aim	 to	bring	about	behavioural	 change	(SSAC	2014).		Apart	 from	 the	welfare	 cuts	 and	 ‘reforms’	 themselves,	 the	Coalition	Government	also	took	a	strong	stance	on	fraud	and	error	in	benefit	claims,	introducing	 stronger	 penalties	 and	 sanctions	 for	 claimants	 who	 commit	benefit	fraud.	The	DWP	regularly	publishes	data	on	benefit	fraud	and	take-up	 rates	 (Roosma	 et	 al.	 2015),	 and	 it	 has	 also	 actively	 sought	 the	 public’s	help	in	identifying	benefit	fraud,	operating	a	National	Benefit	Fraud	Hotline	and	an	online	 reporting	 form,	 as	well	 as	 running	poster	 campaigns	on	 the	topic.	Many	activist	groups	and	commentators	have	drawn	attention	to	the	significant	differences	in	how	benefit	fraud	and	corporate	tax	avoidance	are	dealt	 with	 and	 discussed	 in	 the	 media	 and	 by	 politicians,	 however,	suggesting	 that	 the	 former	 is	 a	 ‘drop	 in	 the	 ocean	 compared	 to’	 the	 latter	(Ball	2013).	Ragnar	Lundström	argues,	 relatedly,	 that	political	 attempts	 to	highlight	the	issue	of	benefit	fraud	should	be	understood,		not	 as	 attempts	 to	 combat	 fraud,	 but	 rather	 as	 attempts	 to	delegitimize	 the	 more	 general	 aim	 and	 purpose	 of	 the	 welfare	state.	[--]	They	challenge	the	deservingness	of	welfare	recipients	in	 general,	 not	 just	 the	 ones	 that	 cheat,	 and	 thereby	 they	 also	transform	 the	 conditions	 for	 public	 trust	 in	 the	 welfare	 state.	(2013:	643)	The	 increased	 and	 intensified	 focus	 on	 benefit	 fraud	 can,	 thus,	 also	 be	examined	 as	 part	 of	 an	 overall	 discursive	 emphasis	 on	 delegitimising	 and	discrediting	the	welfare	state.		In	addition	to	the	above	cuts	and	changes	to	social	welfare	provision,	many	 other	 policies	 implemented	 since	 2010	have	 also	 aimed	 at	 reducing	public	spending.	These	include,	for	example,	various	significant	cuts	to	Local	Authority	 funding	 and	 services	 (Lonergan	 2015;	Morse	 2014;	 Rubery	 and	Rafferty	 2014);	 changes	 to	 the	 funding	 structure	 of	 the	 NHS	 (Rubery	 and	Rafferty	 2014);	 cuts	 to	 legal	 aid	 (Sandhu	 and	 Stephenson	 2015);	 certain	changes	 to	 immigration	 laws	 and	 regulations	 (Gedalof	 2017;	 Lonergan	
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2015;	 Sirriyeh	 2015);	 and	 the	 proposed	 academisation	 of	 all	 schools	 in	England	(although	abandoned	in	the	end).19	There	have	also	been	significant	shifts	 from	 public	 to	 private	 (or	 to	 a	 combination	 of	 public	 and	 private)	provision	 in	 various	 areas	 of	 state	 services,	 as	 Martin	 Smith	 and	 Rhonda	Jones	(2015)	discuss.	Privatisation	has	been	a	growing	trend	for	instance	in	the	 prison	 estate,	 with	 14	 prisons	 currently	 run	 by	 private	 corporations,	holding	 approximately	 17	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 prison	 population	 (Grimwood	2014);	 and	 in	 the	 detention	 estate,	 with	 all	 but	 four	 detention	 centres	 –	officially	 called	 ‘Immigration	 Removal	 Centres’	 (IRCs)	 –	 and	 other	 short-term	 holding	 facilities	 run	 by	 private	 corporations	 (Silverman	 and	 Hajela	2015).	In	addition,	many	other	services	that	are	part	of	the	penal	capacities	of	 the	 state,	 such	 as	 the	 transportation	 of	 prisoners	 and	 detainees,	 are	provided	 by	 the	 private	 sector.20	‘Payment	 by	 results’	 contracts,	 ‘service	commissioning’,	 and	 partial	 privatisation	 are	 also	 increasing	 trends	 in	various	other	areas	of	state	provision,	such	as	workfare	(Friedli	and	Stearn	2015)	 and	 the	 women’s	 sector,	 including	 domestic	 violence	 refuges	(Vacchelli	et	al.	2015).		The	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments	have	to	date	refused	to	publish	any	data	they	hold	on	the	cumulative	impact	of	their	programme	of	welfare	 and	 public	 spending	 cuts	 and	 reforms,	 referring	 to	 modelling	difficulties	 (SSAC	 2014).	 Therefore,	 until	 the	 2017	 interim	 report	 by	 the	Equality	 and	 Human	 Rights	 Commission	 (Portes	 and	 Reed	 2017)	 on	 the	impact	 of	 tax	 and	 welfare	 reform	 between	 2010	 and	 2017	 in	 the	 UK,	generally	 available	 data	 mostly	 pertained	 to	 the	 impact	 of	 individual	policies.	 The	 EHRC	 report,	 however,	 confirms	 what	 many	 (Beatty	 and	Fothergill	2013;	Fawcett	Society	2012;	Hall	et	al.	2017;	Pearson	and	Elson	2015;	 Sandhu	 and	 Stephenson	 2015;	Women’s	 Budget	 Group	 2010)	 have																																																									19	Academies	 are	 schools	 that	 receive	 their	 funding	 from	 the	 central	 government	 rather	than	local	councils,	and	they	are	overseen	by	charitable	bodies	called	‘academy	trusts.’	The	scheme	was	 started	by	Labour	with	 the	 specific	purpose	of	 improving	poorly	performing	schools	 but	 significantly	 expanded	 by	 the	 Coalition.	 In	 2016	 the	 Government	 invited	 all	state-run	schools	to	become	academies	by	2022,	but	this	plan	was	dropped	later	in	the	year.	It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 academisation	 indicates	 a	 creeping	 privatisation	 of	 the	 state	education	sector	in	the	UK.	See	Mansell	(2017)	and	Roberts	(2017)	for	more	information.	20	For	a	more	 in-depth	discussion	of	 the	 trend	 towards	privatisation	within	 the	detention	estate,	see	Tyler	(2013).		
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argued	–	 that	 the	 impacts	of	austerity,	and	particularly	of	welfare	 ‘reform’,	have	 tended	 to	 fall	 disproportionately	 on	 the	 poorest	 and	 most	disadvantaged	 in	 society,	 with	 women,	 black	 and	 ethnic	 minority	populations,	 people	 with	 disabilities,	 and	 lone	 parents	 among	 the	 biggest	losers.	The	EHRC	report	details	that	black	households	lose	more	than	double	that	of	white	households;	women	lose	more	than	men	at	every	income	level;	and	lone	parents	on	average	lose	around	15	per	cent	of	their	net	income	–	in	contrast	 to	 losses	 between	 zero	 and	 eight	 per	 cent	 in	 other	 family	 groups	(Portes	and	Reed	2017:	3-4).	Further,	households	that	include	an	adult	with	disabilities	 in	 them	 lose	 about	 £2,500	 per	 year	 and	 those	 also	 including	 a	child	with	disabilities	about	£5,500	per	year	–	compared	to	about	£1,000	for	families	where	no	one	has	disabilities	(ibid.:	4).	Finally,	the	overall	impact	of	the	cuts	and	reforms	is	regressive:	‘in	cash	terms,	those	in	the	bottom	half	of	income	distribution,	lose	more	than	those	in	the	top	10	per	cent’	(ibid.:	3).	Additionally,	a	2013	report	by	the	Centre	for	Regional	Economic	and	Social	 Research	 suggests	 that	 the	 impact	 of	 the	 cuts	 and	 reforms	 varies	greatly	across	 the	country:	 ‘the	worst-hit	 local	authority	areas	 lose	around	four	 times	 as	 much,	 per	 adult	 of	 working	 age,	 as	 the	 authorities	 least	affected	by	 the	 reform’	 (Beatty	 and	Fothergill	 2013:	 3).	 The	most	 affected	areas	include	Britain’s	old	industrial	areas,	some	seaside	towns,	and	certain	London	boroughs,	while	much	of	 the	 south	and	east	of	England	outside	of	London	 escapes	 relatively	 lightly.	 In	 short,	 the	 more	 deprived	 the	 Local	Authority	 is	 to	 start	 with,	 the	 greater	 the	 financial	 hit	 they	 experience	 –	meaning	that	a	key	effect	of	austerity	has	been	to	widen	the	gaps	between	the	most	and	least	prosperous	local	economies	in	the	UK.		Overall,	then,	the	various	cuts	and	reforms	associated	with	austerity	have	tended	to	exacerbate	inequality	and	poverty	in	the	UK.	A	report	by	the	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation	 (JRF)	 (2017:	3)	highlights	 the	changes	 in	 the	level	of	poverty	in	the	UK	overall:	24	per	cent	20	years	ago,	20	per	cent	 in	2004,	 and	 22	 per	 cent	 in	 2015-16.	 These	 (perhaps	 insignificant)	 trends	mask	 significant	 shifts	 in	 the	 poverty	 rates	 of	 different	 groups,	 however.	While	 very	 little	 change	 has	 taken	 place	 in	 the	 poverty	 experienced	 by	working-age	households	without	 children,	 the	 last	 twenty	years	have	seen	
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considerable	 reductions	 in	 poverty	 among	 pensioners	 and	 some	 families	with	 children	 –	 as	 well	 as	 a	 set	 of	 specific	 targets	 introduced	 by	 Labour,	aiming	to	eradicate	child	poverty	in	the	UK	by	2020.	These	reductions	have	now	 started	 to	 reverse,	 however	 –	 mostly	 due	 to	 the	 austerity-related	decreases	 in	 support	 offered	 through	 the	 welfare	 system,	 as	 well	 as,	perhaps,	the	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments’	de-emphasis	on	child	poverty	reduction,	as	my	discussion	in	Chapter	3	indicates.	The	 policy	 impacts	 and	 implications	 of	 austerity	 have,	 thus,	 been	significant	and	by	now	also	increasingly	well	researched.	While	in	this	thesis	my	 focus	 is	 primarily	 on	 austerity	 as	 a	political	and	cultural	 formation,	 as	discussed	 in	 the	 introduction,	 the	policy	shifts	and	changes	detailed	above	form	 an	 important	 backdrop	 for	 my	 analysis	 throughout	 –	 as	 well	 as	providing	 the	 source	 materials	 for	 Chapters	 3	 and	 5.	 In	 the	 rest	 of	 this	chapter	 I	 provide	 more	 theoretical	 context	 for	 the	 above	 discussion.	 The	next	 section	discusses	 the	2007-8	 financial	 crisis	 and	 argues	 that	 –	 rather	than	 as	 an	 exceptional	 moment	 –	 it	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	 symptom	 of	 a	broader	 set	 of	 neoliberalising	 processes.	 The	 following	 two	 sections	examine	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	 ‘crisis	 response’	 –	 framed	 largely	through	 austerity	 discourse	 and	 politics	 –	 to	 argue	 that	 it	 originates	 and	draws	 upon	 the	 same	 set	 of	 cultural	 logics,	 political	 rationalities,	 and	economic	 reasonings	 that	 led	 to	 the	 crisis	 in	 the	 first	 place,	 thus	 situating	austerity	 within	 a	 longer	 history	 of	 neoliberalisation.	 The	 first	 of	 these	sections	 investigates	 the	 response	 from	 the	 point	 of	 view	 of	 work	 and	welfare	and	the	second	from	that	of	the	state	–	and	in	both	sections	gender	provides	an	analytical	lens	for	the	discussion.		Finally,	 in	 the	 brief	 concluding	 section	 my	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 role	 of	sexuality	–	or	rather,	the	absence	of	it	–	in	much	of	the	scholarship	on	both	the	 crisis	 and	 austerity.	 As	 this	 chapter’s	 discussion	 overall	 highlights,	gender	 –	 or,	 perhaps	 more	 accurately,	 gendering	 –	 has	 provided	 an	important	vantage	point	from	which	many	have	examined	and	critiqued	not	just	the	various	cuts	and	changes	to	state	provision	since	2010,	but	also	the	discursive	 framings	 of	 ‘exceptionality’	 that	 have	 helped	 justify	 and	legitimate	 said	 cuts	 and	 changes.	However,	more	 often	 than	 not,	 sexuality	
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has	not	 featured	 centrally	 in	 critical,	 gendered	 analyses	 of	 austerity,	 or	 of	neoliberalisation	more	 generally.	 In	 the	 final	 section	 I	 argue	 that	 –	 rather	than	 signalling	 that	 sexuality	 simply	 does	 not	 matter	 to	 the	 political	economy	–	 these	omissions	highlight	 something	 important	about	 the	ways	in	 which	 sexuality	 tends	 to	 operate	 within	 the	 discursive	 economies	 of	austerity	 and	 neoliberalism.	 Thus,	 this	 section	 also	 anticipates	 the	 next	chapter’s	discussion	of	 the	key	 theoretical	and	epistemological	approaches	to	sexuality	and	sexual	regulation	that	the	rest	of	this	thesis’	chapters	both	employ	and	move	forward	in	their	analysis.		
A	Crisis	–	or	More	of	the	same?		As	 the	 above	 discussion	 has	 highlighted,	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 austerity	discourse	has	been	its	framing	as	a	crisis-led,	extraordinary	response	to	the	extraordinary	–	or,	more	specifically,	extraordinarily	bad	–	circumstances	of	recession,	 proliferating	 public	 debt,	 and	 cultures	 of	 irresponsibility,	 both	within	 government	 and	 households.	 This	 framing	 has	 been	 contested	 by	many,	as	both	heterodox	and	feminist	economists	and	other	social	scientists	have,	 firstly,	 sought	 to	 illustrate	 that	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 crisis	 lie,	 at	 least	partially,	 within	 the	 policies	 and	 politics	 of	 previous	 Governments	 in	 the	run-up	 to	 it.	 Secondly,	 many	 of	 these	 scholars	 have	 also	 argued	 that	austerity	thus	conceived	should	be	seen	as	part	of	a	longer	process	aiming	at	the	 neoliberalisation	 of	 the	 state	 –	 as	 Cameron’s	 comments	 at	 the	 Lord	Mayor’s	 Banquet,	 quoted	 above,	 arguably	 suggest.	 These	 approaches	challenge	 not	 only	 the	 discursive	 framing	 of	 austerity	 as	 exceptional,	 but	also	 that	 of	 the	 economic	 crisis	 of	 2007-8,	 thus	 indicating	 certain	continuities	 between	 the	 austerity	 politics	 of	 the	 post-2010	 Coalition	 and	Conservative	Governments,	on	the	one	hand,	and	both	the	Conservative	and	New	Labour	years	preceding	it,	on	the	other.	In	this	section	I	examine	some	of	these	alternative	approaches	to	analysing	the	crisis,	arguing	centrally	that	the	 subjectifying	 effects,	 political	 rationalities,	 and	 cultural	 logics	 of	neoliberalisation	 are	 key	 to	 understanding	 both	 the	 crisis	 itself	 and	 the	deployment	of	austerity	discourse	and	politics	as	a	response	to	it.		
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Gender	 was,	 perhaps	 surprisingly,	 a	 central	 feature	 of	 many	mainstream	accounts	and	analyses	of	the	financial	crisis	of	2007-8.	The	risk-taking,	reckless	masculinities	of	the	banking	world	were	partially	blamed	for	causing	 the	 crisis,	 while	 women	 were	 heralded	 as	 a	 potential	 solution	 to	these	damaging	cultures	of	masculinity.	For	 instance,	a	2012	article	 in	The	
Independent	on	 Iceland’s	 recovery	 from	the	crisis	argues	 that	 this	 ‘country	ruined	 by	 testosterone-crazed	 bankers’	 was	 now	 ‘back	 on	 its	 feet.	 Why?	Because	women	 took	 over’	 (Carlin	 2012).	 Cynthia	 Enloe	 argues,	 similarly,	that	 the	 kind	 of	 masculinity	 valued	 and	 rewarded	 by	 the	 banking	 world	‘exuded	 competitiveness,	 [--]	 was	 capable	 of	 quick	 and	 agile	 decision	making,	[--]	tolerated	endless	pressure,	[and]	courted	high	risk’	(2013:	65).	She	 quotes	 statistics	 indicating	 that	 the	 more	 women	 there	 were	 in	 a	company’s	 management,	 the	 less	 its	 share	 price	 fell	 in	 2008	 (ibid.:	 69),	consequently	 suggesting	 the	 feminisation	 of	 corporate	 management	 as	 a	potential	 strategy	 of	 protection	 against	 the	 crisis.	 As	 Ruth	 Pearson	 and	Diane	Elson	point	out,	these	kinds	of	accounts	tend	to	view	the	dominance	of	men	in	decision-making	roles	within	private	sector	financial	institutions	and	the	prevalence	of	‘macho	norms	of	behaviour’	(2015:	11)	as	two	sides	of	the	same	coin,	leading	to	the	claim	that	increasing	the	number	of	women	in	key	positions	 within	 the	 sector	 would	 help	 both	 mitigate	 against	 its	 most	harmful	effects	and	prevent	further	financial	crises.	These	 kinds	 of	 arguments,	 however,	 rely	 on	 rather	 essentialist	notions	 of	 femininity	 and	 masculinity	 –	 with	 the	 latter	 supposedly	 more	closely	 aligned	 with	 the	 neoliberal	 view	 of	 the	 human	 as	 rational	 and	entrepreneurial	–	or	the	‘homo	economicus’	(Brown	2003:	25;	Tadiar	2013:	20).21	They,	further,	by	emphasising	ontology	–	albeit	a	gendered	ontology:	men	just	are	more	competitive,	risk-taking,	and	so	on	–	ignore	the	normative	and	 prescriptive	 nature	 of	 neoliberalism.	 Here	 I	 am	 pointing	 at	 the	
subjectifying	 effects	 of	neoliberalism	–	 the	 argument	made	by	many	 that	 a	
																																																								21 	See	 Prügl	 (2012)	 for	 another	 take	 on	 this	 critique,	 suggesting	 that	 the	 focus	 on	essentialised	notions	of	 gender	 functions	 to	depoliticise	 the	origins	of	 the	 financial	 crisis.	See	also	Nelson	(2015)	 for	a	review	of	various	studies	on	 the	risk-averseness	of	men	and	women,	concluding	that	men	and	women	tend	to	be	much	more	similar	in	their	responses	to	risk	than	popular	understandings	suggest.	
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central	feature	of	neoliberalism	is	that	it	prescribes	citizen-subject	conduct.	For	 Wendy	 Brown,	 for	 instance,	 neoliberalism	 is	 a	 ‘mode	 of	 governance	encompassing	but	not	limited	to	the	state,	and	one	which	produces	subjects,	forms	 of	 citizenship	 and	 behavior,	 and	 a	 new	 organization	 of	 the	 social’	(2003:	 2),	 and	 for	 Isabell	 Lorey,	 similarly,	 modern	 neoliberal	governmentality	 is	 ‘an	 art	 of	 governing	 people,	 not	 things	 or	 territories’	(2015:	 3).22 	Both	 Brown’s	 and	 Lorey’s	 (cf.	 Ong	 2007)	 theorisations	 of	neoliberalism	 as	 governmentality	 respond,	 in	 part,	 to	 what	 they	 view	 as	overly	 economistic	 accounts	 of	 neoliberalism.	 For	 example,	 David	 Harvey	argues	 that	 neoliberalisation	 ‘was	 from	 the	 very	 beginning	 a	 project	 to	
achieve	the	restoration	of	class	power’	 (2005:	16,	emphasis	 in	 the	original),	and	Pierre	Bourdieu	that	 it	 is	a	 ‘modern	repackaging	of	 the	oldest	 ideas	of	the	 oldest	 capitalists’	 (1998:	 34).	 Thus,	 while	 for	 Harvey	 and	 Bourdieu	neoliberalism	is	not	entirely	dissimilar	to	classical	Liberalism,	proponents	of	the	 governmentality	 approach	 tend	 to	 emphasise	 the	 subjectifying	 effects	and	cultural	logics	as	that	which	separates	neoliberalism	from	Liberalism.	The	 proposition	 that	more	women	 in	 charge	 could	 have	 prevented	the	 crisis	 not	 only	 assumes	 that	 women	 are	 somehow	 immune	 to	 the	subjectifying	 effects	 of	 neoliberalism,	 however,	 but	 it	 also	 fails	 to	 address	‘the	 underlying	 problem	 of	what	 some	 have	 called	 the	 “financialisation	 of	everyday	 activities”,	 in	 countries	 like	 the	 USA	 and	 the	 UK’	 (Pearson	 and	Elson	2015:	11).23	The	 ‘financialisation	of	 everyday	 activities’	 Pearson	 and	Elson	refer	to	provides	another	way	of	reading	the	origins	of	the	crisis	–	in	the	effects	of	neoliberalisation	in	and	on	the	everyday,	rather	than	solely	in	the	 behaviour	 of	 financial	 sector	 actors.	 These	 effects	 include	 the	 way	 in	which	 ‘the	 ability	 to	maintain	 even	barely	 adequate	 levels	 of	 consumption	has	 come	 to	 depend	 in	many	well-off	 countries	 on	 increases	 in	 household	debt’	(ibid.:	11)	–	and,	indeed,	nine	million	people	in	the	UK	were	in	debt	in	2013,	 and	 two	 thirds	 of	 them	 were	 women.	 These	 processes,	 further,	
																																																								22	Feminist	 scholars	 have	 developed	 the	 argument	 about	 neoliberalism’s	 subjectifying	effects	to	highlight	that	young	women,	in	particular,	tend	to	be	increasingly	both	positioned	as	 ideal	 neoliberal	 subjects	 and	 subject	 to	 intensifying	 regimes	 of	 regulation	 and	governmentality	(McRobbie	2009;	Ringrose	and	Walkerdine	2008).		23	On	the	financialisation	of	everyday	activities,	see	also	Adkins	(2015)	and	Griffin	(2015).	
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significantly	intensified	both	in	the	run	up	to	the	crisis	and	as	the	recession	unfolded,	with	 ‘pay	 day’	 lending	 –	with	 its	 extremely	 high	 interest	 rates	 –	growing	 particularly	 quickly.	 That	 the	 origins	 of	 the	 crisis	 lie	 partially	 in	practices	 such	 as	 high-interest	 lending,	 thus,	 seems	 to	 confirm	 Harvey’s	argument	that	 ‘neoliberalization	has	meant,	 in	short,	 the	financialization	of	everything’	 (2005:	 33).	 Additionally,	 however,	 it	 indicates	 something	important	 about	 the	 cultural	 dynamics	 in	 play,	 necessitating	 that	 the	question	 of	why	 debt-based	 spending	was	 able	 to	 grow	 so	 rapidly	 is	 also	explored.				 Robin	Dunford	and	Diane	Perrons	argue	 that	 the	 increases	 in	debt-based	 spending,	 as	 well	 as,	 for	 example,	 growing	 aspirations	 to	 home	ownership,	 mean	 that	 people	 are	 increasingly	 dependent	 on	 the	 ‘value-generating	activities	of	the	rich’,	such	that	they	have	a	stake	in	precisely	the	activities	that	foster	rising	inequalities,	as	well	as	in	the	‘neoliberal	system’	more	 broadly	 (2014:	 477).	 Here	 Dunford	 and	 Perrons	 are	 pointing	 at	 the	
cultural	logics	and	attachments	 that	enabled	inequalities	to	grow	rapidly	in	the	decades	preceding	the	crisis,	perhaps	confirming	Brown’s	argument	that	neoliberalism	is	‘not	only	or	even	primarily	focused	on	the	economy;	rather	it	 involves	extending	and	disseminating	market	values	to	all	 institutions	and	
social	action’	(2003:	3,	emphasis	in	the	original).	Neoliberalism’s	permeation	of	 the	 everyday,	 as	 a	 set	 of	 cultural	 values	 and	 logics	 –	 such	 as	 in	 the	commonsensical	view	of	both	economic	aspiration	and	consumerism	as	self-evident	goods	–	 thus,	provides	an	 important	aspect	of	explanations	 for	 the	origins	of	the	crisis.	It	also	indicates,	as	Henry	A.	Giroux	argues	(2004),	that	neoliberalism	is	a	cultural	project,	or	encompasses	a	cultural	logic,	as	much	as	 an	 economic	 and	 political	 one	 and,	 therefore,	 any	 struggle	 against	neoliberalism	must	also	address	its	cultural	politics.24	The	origins	of	 the	crisis	can,	 thus,	be	 thought	 through	 the	everyday	practices,	political	rationalities,	and	cultural	logics	that	legitimated	growing	inequalities	 in	 the	 run	 up	 to	 it	 –	 as	 well	 as	 in	 its	 aftermath,	 as	 I	 discuss	further	below	–	such	 that	 ‘while	 the	economic	crisis	began	 in	 the	USA	and																																																									24	On	the	cultural	politics	of	neoliberalism,	see	also	Clarke	(2004),	Duggan	(2003),	and	Tyler	(2013).	
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the	UK	in	the	banking	sector	[--],	the	underlying	cause	was	rising	inequality’	(Perrons	 and	 Plomien	 2014:	 298).25	As	 Diane	 Perrons	 and	 Ania	 Plomien	argue,	examining	‘the	fundamental	economic	and	political	restructuring	that	took	place	in	the	decades	of	neoliberal	globalization	preceding	the	financial	crisis,	particularly	that	associated	with	rising	inequalities’	(2014:	299),	 is	a	necessary	addition	to	any	analysis	of	the	role	of	the	banking	sector	itself	in	causing	the	crisis.	In	the	UK	context	this	means	considering	the	role	of	both	the	 Conservative	 and	New	 Labour	 Governments	 in	 creating	 the	 economic,	political,	and	cultural	conditions	both	for	the	crisis	itself	and	for	the	putting	forward	of	austerity	as	a	commonsensical	or	self-evident	response	to	it.	The	policies	of	these	Governments	are	–	at	least	partially	–	to	blame	for	growing	inequalities	 in	 the	decades	preceding	 the	crisis	and	 they	can,	 therefore,	be	seen	as	a	key	factor	behind	the	crisis	itself.			Considering	 the	 significant	 continuities	 between	 the	 Thatcher,	New	Labour,	 and	 Coalition	 Governments,	 then,	 the	 –	 largely	 successful	 –	reframing	 of	 the	 narrative	 by	 the	 Conservatives	 to	 one	 dominated	 by	Labour’s	 ‘reckless’	 spending	 and	 their	 alleged	 role	 in	 causing	 the	 financial	crisis	is	nothing	short	of	remarkable.	26	27	This	is	especially	the	case	since	the	Conservatives	 had,	 at	 the	 time	 of	 Labour’s	 own	 programme	 of	 economic	deregulation	pushed	them	to	go	even	further	with	it	(Atkinson	et	al.	2012).	Many	commentators	(Karamessini	2014;	Perrons	and	Plomien	2014;	Piketty	2014)	have,	 further,	 questioned	 the	 effectiveness	 of	 austerity	measures	 in	reducing	public	debt	 and	 fostering	economic	growth	and,	 consequently,	 in	combatting	the	financial	crisis	at	all	–	thus	challenging	the	very	foundations	of	 the	Coalition’s	approach	and	rhetoric.28	Penny	Griffin	notes	 that,	despite																																																									25	For	 more	 detailed	 analyses	 of	 the	 role	 of	 inequalities	 in	 causing	 the	 crisis,	 see	 also	Bhattacharyya	 (2015),	 Karamessini	 (2014),	 Rubery	 and	 Rafferty	 (2014),	 and	 Stiglitz	(2002).	26	Although	 there	 is	 some	 evidence	 that	 the	 tide	 has	 now	 begun	 to	 turn:	 according	 to	 a	YouGov	poll	(Dahlgreen	2015),	 in	November	2015	for	the	first	time	Labour	was	less	 likely	than	the	Conservative	Government	to	be	blamed	for	the	public	spending	cuts,	with	33	and	32	 per	 cent	 of	 respondents	 blaming	 the	 Conservative	 Government	 and	 the	 last	 Labour	Government,	respectively.	However,	more	than	half	of	the	respondents	still	viewed	the	cuts	as	‘necessary.’	27	See	 also	 Atkinson	 et	 al.	 (2012),	 Clarke	 and	 Newman	 (2012),	 and	 Gedalof	 (2017)	 for	further	discussions	of	this	reframing.		28	See	Chick	et	al.	 (2016)	and	Weeks	(2014)	 for	 further	economic	analyses	suggesting	 the	same,	and	Clarke	and	Newman	(2012)	for	a	discussion	of	the	many	studies	on	this	issue.	
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the	fact	that	 ‘the	global	financial	crisis	has	neither	ended	nor	is	it	resolved,	“it”	 is	 often	 thought	 about	 as	 a	 specific,	 time-bound	 and	 singular	 “event”’	(2015:	 56).	 The	 approaches	 discussed	 here	 so	 far	 indicate	 resolutely	 that	this	 is	 not	 the	 case,	 suggesting	 instead	 that	 the	 crisis	 should	 be	 seen	 as	 a	symptom	 of,	 rather	 than	 an	 exception	 to,	 the	 usual	 business	 of	neoliberalisation	–	a	set	of	processes	 that	 further	continued	 in	 the	 form	of	austerity	politics	in	the	aftermath	of	the	crisis,	as	I	argue	below.		While	I	focus	my	analysis	in	this	thesis	explicitly	on	the	‘austerity	era’	–	at	 the	 risk	of	 reinforcing	a	view	of	post-2010	austerity	as	a	 specific,	 and	perhaps	exceptional,	time	period	–	it	 is	 important	to	note	that	I	do	so	with	full	 acknowledgement	 that	 austerity	 is	 part	 of	 this	 longer	 history	 –	 and,	crucially,	that	it	also	has	a	future	life	past	its	explicit	rhetorical	deployments,	as	suggested	in	the	introduction.	As	the	following	section	argues,	the	‘crisis	response’	of	the	Coalition	Government	–	framed	centrally	through	austerity	–	 should,	 thus,	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 continuation	 of	 existing	 dynamics	 of	inequality,	 with	 the	 crisis	 itself	 appearing	 as	 ‘an	 opportunity	 to	 deepen	neoliberal	political	and	economic	relations’	(Bedford	and	Rai	2013,	cited	in	Griffin	2015:	56).	This	framing	of	both	the	crisis	and	austerity	as	originating	in	 the	 same	 set	 of	 political	 rationalities,	 cultural	 logics,	 and	 economic	conditions	 also	 helps	 explain	what	Maria	 Karamessini	 and	 Jill	 Rubery	 call	‘the	most	 ironic	outcome	of	 the	crisis’	–	 that	 the	 ‘recipe	offered	to	address	the	 aftermath	 of	 the	 financial	 collapse	 is	 simply	more	 of	 the	 same’	 (2014:	337).	 The	 post-2010	 austerity	 period	 can,	 thus,	 perhaps	 be	 seen	 as	 an	
intensification	or	an	acceleration,	but	not	as	an	initiation,	of	the	–	already	on-going	 –	 processes	 of	 welfare	 retrenchment	 and,	 more	 generally,	neoliberalisation29	–	although	there	are	also	 important	differences	 in	some	of	 the	 specific	 ways	 in	 which	 these	 processes	 have	 proceeded	 and	 been	legitimated	in	the	context	of	austerity.	Overall,	then,	while	the	policy	context	of	neoliberalising	austerity	politics	may	seem	like	‘business	as	usual’	(Griffin	2015:	51),	the	subjectifying	effects,	cultural	logics,	and	political	rationalities	
																																																								29	As	 Bhattacharyya	 states:	 ‘the	moment	 of	 the	 financial	 crisis	may	 spark	 and	 enable	 the	most	extreme	of	austerity	measures	to	be	implemented,	but	the	overall	project	of	austerity	was	not	formed	in	that	moment’	(2015:	2).	
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of	 austerity	 do	 not	 always	 correspond	 with	 those	 of	 earlier	 periods	 of	neoliberalisation	and,	therefore,	warrant	examination	in	their	own	right.			
Neoliberalising	the	Crisis	Response:	Work	and	Welfare	Neoliberalisation	 is	 often	 thought	 to	 involve	 certain	 major	 shifts	 in	 the	organisation	of	labour	markets	and	relations,	as	well	as	in	the	nature	of	both	work	and	welfare.	These	shifts	are	frequently	characterised	as	a	departure	from	Keynesianism,	where	welfare	state	entitlements	have	historically	been	tied	 to	worker	status.30	The	recent	developments	 frequently	examined	and	theorised	as	the	increasing	 flexibilisation,	 informalisation,	and	precarisation	of	labour	have	tended	to	lead	to	an	individualisation	of	risk	–	in	contrast	to	the	 Keynesian	 welfare	 arrangements	 where	 risk	 was	 shared	 more	universally.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 examine	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	 ‘crisis	response’	to	investigate	whether	such	changes	are	occurring	in	austerity	era	UK,	with	various	gendered	analyses	of	 the	 (austerity)	politics	of	work	and	welfare	providing	 the	pivot	around	which	 I	 focus	my	examination.	 I	argue,	firstly,	 that	 the	 cultural	 logics,	 political	 rationalities,	 and	 economic	reasonings	that	austerity	has	drawn	upon	are	the	same	as	those	that	led	to	the	crisis	in	the	first	place.	Secondly,	in	the	case	of	welfare	and	work,	these	logics	 have	 included	 gendered	 assumptions	 about	 responsibilities	 for	 care	and	domestic	work,	and	women’s	(and	men’s)	suitability	for	particular	kinds	of	 work	 –	 assumptions	 that	 have,	 in	 part,	 enabled	 the	 installation	 of	austerity	as	a	commonsensical	response	to	the	crisis,	as	well	as	 functioned	to	legitimate	the	growing	inequalities	that	have	both	preceded	and	followed	austerity.	 Despite	 the	 tendency	 for	 austerity	 discourse	 to	 be	 presented	 in	seemingly	 genderless	 terms,	 therefore,	 the	 implications	 and	 impacts	 on	gender	have	been	manifold.	In	the	first	year	after	the	banking	crisis	its	impacts	in	the	UK	were	felt	most	strongly	 in	 the	male-dominated	sectors	of	 industry	and	construction,	with	 job	 loss	 higher	 for	men	 than	women	 from	 early	 2008	 to	 late	 2009	 –	resulting	in	much	talk	about	‘mancession’	(Pearson	and	Elson	2015;	Rubery																																																									30	See	Grimshaw	and	Rubery	(2012)	 for	an	overview	of	many	of	 the	changes	made	by	the	Coalition	Government	and	an	assessment	of	 the	extent	 to	which	 these	 changes	 constitute	significant	shifts	in	policy	around	welfare	and	work.		
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and	 Rafferty	 2014).	 In	 contrast,	 public	 sector	 employment	 in	 the	 areas	 of	administration,	 education,	 and	 health	 –	 where	 women	 are	 more	 strongly	represented	 –	 actually	 continued	 to	 grow	 in	 the	 same	 period,	 due	 to	Labour’s	 policy	 of	 fiscal	 stimulus	 in	 response	 to	 the	 crisis	 (Rubery	 and	Rafferty	2014).	However,	as	what	started	as	a	banking	crisis	morphed	into	a	sovereign	 debt	 crisis,	 the	 tide	 began	 to	 turn	 in	 2010	 with	 the	 Coalition	Government’s	 shift	 to	 policies	 of	 fiscal	 tightening.	 The	 public	 and	 service	sectors	were	impacted	much	more	strongly	by	the	second	round	of	effects,	and	 the	burden	of	 the	recession	was	 increasingly	shifted	onto	women.31	In	2010-11,	at	the	same	time	as	men	benefited	from	modest	job	recovery,	the	biggest	 job	 losses	were	experienced	 in	 sectors	dominated	by	women,	with	women	accounting	for	all	of	 the	 increase	 in	unemployment	between	2010-12	(Pearson	and	Elson	2015).	Public	 sector	 job	 losses,	additionally,	have	a	disproportionate	 impact	 on	 racialised	 and	 minority	 ethnic	 women,	 since	they	 are	 even	more	 likely	 to	work	 in	 the	 public	 sector	 (ibid.;	 Sandhu	 and	Stevenson	 2015).	 A	 public	 sector	 pay	 freeze,	 in	 place	 between	 2011	 and	2013,	further	exacerbated	the	effects	on	women’s	earnings	(Perrons	2017).	Thus,	 while	 overall	 young	 men	 and	 migrants	 have	 been	 particularly	vulnerable	in	this	crisis,	acting	as	 ‘buffer	groups’	(Rubery	2014:	20),	 in	the	UK	the	most	intense	longer-term	effects	have	been	experienced	by	women.	As	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 decreases	 in	 women’s	 employment,	 a	number	of	different	trends	can	be	observed.	Firstly,	as	well	as	the	job	losses	themselves,	 some	 (mostly	 women’s)	 jobs	 are	 being	 transferred	 from	 the	public	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 –	where	 the	 gender	 pay	 gap	 is	 bigger	 and	 job	security	in	general	lower	–	for	instance	in	the	case	of	the	NHS	(Pearson	and	Elson	 2015;	 Rubery	 and	 Rafferty	 2014).	 Secondly,	 increases	 in	 self-employment	 and	 part-time	 employment	 for	 both	 men	 and	 women	 have	acted	 as	 somewhat	 of	 a	 buffer	 against	 even	 higher	 unemployment	 rates	(Pearson	and	Elson	2015)	–	with	a	very	 large	proportion	of	women	 in	 the	UK	working	part-time	(Karamessini	2014).	The	rise	 in	self-employment,	 in	particular,	 indicates	an	 informalisation	of	 the	 labour	market,	with	much	of																																																									31	Overall,	 an	 estimated	 900,000	 public	 sector	 jobs	 will	 be	 lost	 between	 2011	 and	 2018	(Rubery	and	Rafferty	2014:	128).		
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self-employment	 resulting	 in	a	 loss	of	 the	 rights	 to	benefits,	pensions,	 and	paid	 holidays	 (Pearson	 and	 Elson	 2015).	 Deteriorating	 job	 security	 and	working	conditions	are,	therefore,	a	likely	consequence	–	Rubery	goes	as	far	as	 to	suggest	 that	women	may	end	up	acting	as	a	 ‘reserve	army	of	 labour’	(2014:	 31;	 cf.	 Barker	 and	 Kuiper	 2014)	 against	 their	 own	 wishes	 and	interests,	as	the	standards	at	the	bottom	of	the	private	sector	labour	market	are	being	used	as	a	benchmark	to	reduce	employment	standards	across	the	board.32	These	 trends,	 thus,	 perhaps	 also	 confirm	 the	 argument	 made	 by	many	 that	 neoliberalisation	 tends	 to	 be	 associated	 with	 increasing	flexibilisation,	 informalisation,	and	precarisation	 in	 the	 labour	market,	as	 I	explore	in	more	detail	below.	More	specifically,	these	shifts	also	indicate	the	changing	 composition	 of	 the	 working	 class,	 as	 Wendy	 Bottero	 (2009)	argues,	with	 the	 increase	 in	precarious	and	 insecure	 forms	of	employment	matched	by	a	 corresponding	decline	 in	 traditional	blue-collar	occupations,	such	as	in	the	‘heavy’	industries.	Bottero’s	 argument	 is	 reflected	 in	 the	 results	 of	 the	 Great	 British	Class	Survey	(Savage	et	al.	2013),	a	2013	study	that	–	with	the	intention	of	updating	 the	 out-dated	 and	 simplistic	 separation	 between	 the	 working,	middle,	and	upper	classes	–	identified	seven	different	classes	in	the	UK:	the	elite,	 the	 established	 middle	 class,	 the	 technical	 middle	 class,	 the	 new	affluent	 workers,	 the	 emergent	 service	 workers,	 the	 traditional	 working	class,	 and	 the	 precariat	 –	 each	 consisting	 of	 different	 levels	 of	 economic,	social,	 and	 cultural	 capital	 (Bourdieu	1984,	 1986).33	The	precariat	 (15	per	cent	of	 the	 total	number	of	 respondents)	–	 separated	 from	 the	 ‘traditional	working	class’	(14	per	cent	of	the	total)	and	the	‘emergent	service	workers’	(19	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 total)	 –	 has	 the	 lowest	 concentration	 of	 all	 kinds	 of	capital,	 as	 well	 as	 other	 kinds	 of	 social	 disadvantage,	 such	 as	 not	 having	attended	 university	 (Savage	 et	 al.	 2013).	 The	 ‘emergent	 service	 workers’	have	 relatively	 high	 degrees	 of	 cultural	 and	 social	 capital,	 while	 the	
																																																								32	Bhattacharyya	suggests,	further,	that	the	‘low-wage	economy’	may	also	be	playing	a	role	in	justifying	welfare	cuts:	‘why	should	benefits	cover	“necessities”	if	such	necessities	cannot	be	covered	by	 those	receiving	wages?	 In	 the	process	of	battle	 to	 the	bottom,	 the	 terms	of	what	may	be	deemed	“necessary”	for	a	decent	life	are	rewritten’	(2015:	162).	33	See	also	Standing	(2011)	for	a	similar	classificatory	scheme.	
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‘traditional	 working	 class’,	 although	 moderately	 poor,	 are	 significantly	better	 off	 than	 the	 other	 two	 ‘working	 classes’	 in	 terms	 of	 capital34	–	 but	discussed	as	a	sort	of	 residue	of	earlier	historical	periods,	part	of	an	older	generational	 class	 formation.35	Other	 social	 disadvantages	 are	 also	 over-represented	 in	 these	 three	 classes:	 the	 ‘traditional	 working	 class’	 has	 the	highest	 proportion	 of	 women	 of	 all	 the	 classes,	 whereas	 the	 ‘emergent	service	workers’	are	most	likely	to	belong	to	an	ethnic	minority.	Bottero	 (2009)	 goes	 on	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 use	 of	 the	 term	 ‘working	
classes’,	 in	 order	 to	 better	 reflect	 this	 considerable	 diversity	 in	 the	 old	category	 of	 the	 ‘working	 class.’	 As	 the	 above	 discussion	 highlights,	 some	significant	shifts	in	class	hierarchies,	and	particularly	in	the	composition	of	the	working	classes,	are,	indeed,	evident	in	the	‘post-crisis’	landscape,	in	the	UK	as	well	as	elsewhere	–	perhaps	the	reason	behind	the	recent	explosion	in	scholarship	 examining	 the	 condition	 of	 precarity.36	The	 most	 precarious	populations	 have	 been	 discussed	 and	 theorised	 variously	 as	 a	 ‘precariat’	(Standing	2011);	a	‘sub-proletariat’	(Bourdieu	2003);	‘non-subjects’	(Tadiar	2013);	 ‘surplus	 populations’	 (Bhattacharyya	 2015);	 ‘wasted	 humans’	(Bauman	 2004);	 and	 the	 ‘dispossessed’	 (Wacquant	 2012)	 –	 perhaps	 also	paralleling	 the	Marxist	 ‘lumpenproletariat’,	 a	 term	he	used	 to	describe	 the	‘underclass’	devoid	of	class	consciousness.37	Many	feminist	and	other	critics	(Bhattacharyya	 2015;	 Bottero	 2009;	 Clarke	 2004;	 Evans	 2013,	 2015:																																																									34	The	 ‘traditional	 working	 class’	 has	 an	 average	 house	 value	 of	 £127,174	 and	 average	household	savings	of	£9,500	(£17,968	and	£1,138	for	the	 ‘emergent	service	workers’,	and	£26,948	and	£793	 for	 the	 ‘precariat’,	 respectively).	They	are	not	better	off	 than	 the	other	two	‘working	classes’	in	terms	of	income,	however.	Here	the	‘emergent	service	workers’	are	better	off,	with	an	average	household	income	of	£21,048,	compared	to	£13,305	and	£8,253	for	the	‘traditional	working	class’	and	the	‘precariat’,	respectively	(Savage	et	al	2013:	230).	35	The	 ‘traditional	 working	 class’	 is	 also	 on	 average	 older	 than	 the	 ‘precariat’	 and	 the	‘emergent	 service	workers’,	with	 a	mean	 age	 of	 66,	 compared	 to	 50	 and	 34,	 respectively	(Savage	et	al.	2013:	231).	In	geographical	terms,	the	‘traditional	working	class’	tends	to	be	concentrated	 in	 the	 old	 industrial	 areas	 outside	 the	 southeast	 of	 England,	 especially	 in	Scotland,	 Wales,	 and	 Northern	 Ireland,	 while	 the	 ‘precariat’	 is	 also	 located	 in	 the	 old	industrial	 areas	 but	 often	 away	 from	 large	 urban	 areas.	 The	 ‘emergent	 service	workers’,	conversely,	 is	 a	 resolutely	urban	grouping,	mostly	based	 in	London	and	university	 towns	around	the	UK.	36 	Lorey	 provides	 a	 useful	 distinction	 between	 precariousness	 –	 ‘a	 socio-ontological	dimension	 of	 lives	 and	 bodies’	 (cf.	 Butler	 2004a,	 2009);	 precarity	 –	 the	 ‘distribution	 of	precariousness’	 according	 to	 relations	 of	 inequality;	 and	 governmental	 precarisation	 –	 a	‘mode	of	governing’	(2015:	11-13).	37	For	more	 detail	 and	 discussions	 of	Marx’s	 term	 ‘lumpenproletariat’,	 see	 Chapter	 10	 in	Hall	et	al.	(1978),	Hemmerle	(2006),	and	Tyler	(2013).	‘Underclass’	discourse	also	provides	a	key	aspect	of	my	analysis	in	Chapters	3	and	4.		
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Federici	2008;	Lorey	2015),	however,	have	pointed	out	that	the	move	away	from	 Keynesianism	 has	 been	 less	 of	 an	 obvious	 shift	 for	 the	 populations	whose	 relationship	 to	 wage	 labour	 has	 always	 been	 precarious,	 such	 as	women	and	racialised	populations.	Lorey,	for	instance,	argues	that	–	rather	than	being	in	any	sense	new	–	precarisation	has	become	institutionalised	in	neoliberalism.	For	her,	precarity	was	always	already	incorporated	in	liberal	modes	 of	 governance	 –	 but	 tended	 to	 affect	 particular,	 marginalised	populations,	 such	 as	 women	 and	 racialised	 and	 colonised	 populations	 –	whereas	 the	 shift	 to	 neoliberal	 governmentality	 has	 meant	 the	normalisation	and	centralisation	of	precarisation	as	a	mode	of	governance.38	Despite	 its	 rather	 different	 theoretical	 register,	 Lorey’s	 argument	seems	 to	be	 reflected	 in	many	of	 the	 feminist	 analyses	of	 the	 impacts	 and	implications	of	both	the	crisis	and	responses	to	 it.	 Jill	Rubery	and	Anthony	Rafferty,	 for	 example,	 argue	 that	 ‘austerity	 policies	 are	 intensifying	 the	
underlying	 fault	 lines	 in	 the	 UK’s	 high	 inequality	 economic	 model’	 (2014:	123,	 emphasis	 mine),	 such	 that	 existing	 patterns	 and	 structures	 of	inequality	 are	 intensified	 in	 the	 current	 period	 of	 austerity,	 rather	 than	 it	leading	 to	 an	 entirely	 new	 kind	 of	 precarisation.	 Rubery	 (2014)	 suggests,	further,	that	both	the	historical	development	of	a	country’s	‘gender	regime’	and	 more	 recent	 trends	 in	 gender	 relations	 and	 policy	 affect	 the	 way	 in	which	recessions	impact	gender	relations.	Thus,	responses	to	the	crisis	are	likely	 to	 take	different	 gendered	paths	 in	different	 contexts,	 depending	on	how	 women’s	 labour	 market	 participation	 and	 the	 welfare	 state	 were	structured	 and	 organised	 prior	 to	 the	 crisis.	 Correspondingly,	 while	 the	effects	 of	 benefit	 cuts	 are	 falling	 disproportionately	 on	women	 in	 general	and	minority	 ethnic	women	 in	 particular,	 this	 trend	 also	 reflects	 a	 longer	history	–	these	groups	have	tended	to	be	more	reliant	on	benefits	and	state	
																																																								38	The	increasing	precarity	within	neoliberalising	contexts	has	also	often	been	discussed	in	relation	to	risk,	specifically.	Bourdieu	(2003),	for	instance,	argues	that	within	neoliberalism,	risk	tends	to	be	transferred	to	wage	earners,	and	Dowling,	similarly,	suggests	that	capital’s	on-going	crisis	‘is	off-loaded	onto	the	everyday	working	environments	and	the	people	that	inhabit	them’	(2016).	On	risk,	see	also	Adkins	(2015)	and	Tadiar	(2013).	
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assistance	 since	 the	 conception	 of	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	 UK,	 as	 well	 as	elsewhere.39	In	 the	 UK	 the	 decades	 preceding	 the	 crisis	 were	 characterised	 by	greater	 participation	 in	 waged	 labour	 by	 women	 –	 following	 the	 initial	organisation	 of	 post-1940s	 welfarism	 largely	 around	 a	 male	 breadwinner	model	(Orloff	2009;	Pearson	and	Elson	2015)	–	leading	some	(Lewis	2001;	Orloff	 2009)	 to	 suggest	 that	 the	 UK	 was	 moving	 towards	 a	 ‘dual	breadwinner’	 model.	 As	 Pearson	 and	 Elson	 note,	 however,	 ‘since	 the	financial	 crisis,	 this	bargain	has	been	constantly	challenged’	 (2015:	21),	as	the	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments	have	sought	to	claw	back	some	of	the	benefits	of	the	UK	welfare	state	that	enabled	women	to	participate	in	the	labour	market	in	greater	numbers.	While	the	dual	breadwinner	model	is	still	 the	most	 dominant	 one	 in	 the	 UK,	 a	 very	 large	 proportion	 of	women	work	 part	 time	 (Karamessini	 2014).	 Further,	 Rubery	 and	Rafferty	 suggest	that	 austerity	 is	 ‘drawing	 on	 traditional	models	 of	marriage	 and	 family	 to	reverse	support	for	dual	earner	households’,	incentivising	married	mothers	to	not	work,	but	at	the	same	time	not	extending	this	notion	to	lone	parents,	‘where	the	notion	that	women	as	well	as	men	should	aspire	to	paid	work	has	been	retained	and	reinforced’	 (2014:	136-137).40	This	reflects	a	narrowing	of	 the	 emphasis	 on	 increasing	women’s	 employment	 integration,	whereby	‘an	expectation	of	paid	work	is	not	matched	by	a	right	to	care’	(ibid.:	137).	Austerity,	 thus,	 indicates	 both	 continuities	 and	 breaks	 with	 the	 UK’s	 pre-crisis	gender	regime,	with	mixed	prospects	in	the	future,	as	Rubery	(2014)	suggests:	 some	 improvements	 in	women’s	 career	 opportunities,	 especially	at	 the	 top	 of	 the	 labour	 market,	 may	 be	 combined	 with	 more	 women	becoming	‘inactive’,	while	others	become	increasingly	reliant	either	on	state	assistance	or	on	precarious	employment.	However,	 women’s	 increasing	 participation	 in	 the	 labour	 market	prior	 to	 the	 crisis	was	 not	matched	 by	 a	 corresponding	 increase	 in	men’s	participation	in	care	and	domestic	 labour,	and	women	worldwide	continue																																																									39	On	these	historical	 trends	 in	welfare	provision,	see,	 for	example,	Bhattacharyya	(2015),	Pearson	and	Elson	(2015),	Rubery	and	Rafferty	(2014),	and	Sandhu	and	Stevenson	(2015).	40	On	these	diverging	trends,	see	also	Griffin	(2015),	Karamessini	and	Rubery	(2014),	and	Rubery	(2014).	
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to	spend	at	 least	 twice	as	much	 time	as	men	on	unpaid	domestic	and	care	work	 (Himmelweit	 and	 Plomien	 2014).41	As	 many	 (Bhattacharyya	 2015;	Evans	2015;	Griffin	2015;	Pearson	and	Elson	2015)	have	argued,	the	large-scale	cuts	in	social	services	and	public	care	provision	that	have	occurred	as	a	result	 of	 austerity	have,	 in	part,	 been	premised	on	 the	notion	 that	women	will	 continue	 to	 care,	particularly	 in	an	unpaid	capacity.	Various	measures	reducing	 support	 for	 children,	 pregnancy,	 and	 childcare	 have	 been	introduced,	 including	 the	 scaling	 back	 of	 subsidised	 childcare	 provision,	especially	 in	 deprived	 areas,	 with	 social	 care	 provision	 also	 under	 major	pressure	 (Rubery	 and	Rafferty	2014).	 The	Coalition	Government	 explicitly	intended	 for	 these	 ‘gaps	 in	 the	 social	 fabric’	 to	 be	 ‘filled	 by	 not-for-profit	organizations	and	volunteer	labour	as	part	of	the	“big	society”’	(ibid.:	133)	–	examined	 in	 more	 detail	 below	 –	 but	 as	 Susan	 Himmelweit	 and	 Ania	Plomien	suggest,	in	instances	where	the	demand	for	care	increases	it	tends	to	be	‘women,	more	often	than	men,	who	reduce	their	paid	employment	and	earnings,	while	men	may	increase	theirs	to	compensate’	(2014:	454).	While	most	 women	 continue	 to	 perform	 a	 ‘second	 shift’	 in	 caring	 and	 domestic	labour,	some	of	this	labour	has	also	been	transferred	to	other	women	in	the	paid	 care	 sector,	 where	 pay	 and	 employment	 conditions	 remain	 low.	 In	particular,	 it	has	 tended	 to	be	migrant	women	who	have	plugged	 the	gaps	resulting	 from	 women	 with	 high	 earnings	 seeking	 to	 offload	 their	 caring	responsibilities.42		In	 both	 the	 paid	 and	 the	 unpaid	 economy,	 therefore,	 austerity	 has	tended	to	exacerbate	existing	inequalities,	its	logics	drawing	on	the	implicit	assumption	 that	women	–	 and	particularly	 racialised,	 ethnic	minority,	 and	migrant	 women	 –	 will	 continue	 to	 perform	 the	 role	 of	 ‘reserve	 army	 of	labour’,	while	at	the	same	time	filling	the	gaps	created	by	diminishing	public	services,	such	as	in	care.	This	discussion	also	illustrates	Pearson	and	Elson’s	(2015;	 cf.	 Brah	 et	 al.	 2015;	 Evans	 2013;	 Gedalof	 2017)	 argument	 that	 the	issue	 is	not	 just	 that	 the	 impacts	of	austerity	are	 falling	disproportionately																																																									41	On	care	work	in	general,	see	also	Folbre	(2008),	Fraser	(1997),	Himmelweit	(2007),	and	Orloff	(2009).		42	See	Barker	and	Kuiper	(2014),	Himmelweit	and	Plomien	(2014),	and	Lonergan	(2015)	for	more	detailed	discussions	of	these	trends.		
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on	 women,	 but	 also	 that	 the	 economy	 is	 a	 gendered	 structure	 –	 with	 any	economic	decision	 carrying	 significant	 gendered	 implications.	 Importantly,	then,	as	Gargi	Bhattacharyya	(2015)	argues	–	and	as	I	explore	in	more	detail	in	 Chapter	 3	 –	 these	 developments	 do	 not	necessarily	 indicate	 a	 desire	 or	explicit	 governmental	 aim	 that	women	 should	 prioritise	 their	 caring	 roles	over	 their	 careers.	 Rather,	 here	 ‘deep-seated	 cultures	 of	 inequality’	 are	harnessed	 by	 ‘the	 redistributive	 project	 of	 austerity	 [--]	 as	 a	 route	 to	embedding	diminished	 standards	 of	 living’	 (ibid.:	 152).	 Thus,	withdrawing	forms	of	welfare	state	support	 that	enabled	 increasing	numbers	of	women	to	participate	in	the	(paid)	labour	market	in	the	decades	preceding	the	crisis	provides	an	avenue	for	privatising	reproductive	labour	and,	therefore,	a	way	to	 diminish	 state	 support	 and	 reduce	 the	 reach	 of	 state	 responsibilities	overall.	Perrons	 (2014)	 makes	 a	 similar	 argument	 to	 that	 of	 Pearson	 and	Elson	in	relation	to	the	many	recent	scholarly	analyses	focusing	particularly	on	the	top	of	income	and	wealth	hierarchies,	suggesting	that	attention	to	the	gendered	character	of	the	economy	would	enhance	examinations	of	growing	inequalities	 at	 the	 top	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 bottom,	 as	 the	 discussion	 above	highlights.	 As	 a	 key	 example,	 Thomas	 Piketty	 (2014)	 charts	 the	 rise	 of	contemporary	 inequality	and	argues	 that	wealth	 is	playing	an	 increasingly	important	 role	 in	 economic	 inequality,	 due	 to	 the	 long-run	 tendency	 for	wealth	 to	 grow	 faster	 than	 income	 in	 slow-growing	 economies.43	Piketty’s	argument	reflects	the	findings	of	the	Great	British	Class	Survey	(Savage	et	al.	2013),	 where	 the	 elite	 (six	 per	 cent	 of	 respondents)	 has	 the	 highest	concentration	 of	 all	 three	 types	 of	 capital,	 as	well	 as	 other	 kinds	 of	 social	advantage	 –	 standing	 particularly	 distinct	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 classes	 in	terms	of	 their	 economic	 capital,	whether	determined	according	 to	 income,	savings,	or	house	value.44		
																																																								43	Piketty	 (2014)	also	discusses	 the	differences	he	 identifies	between	 the	US	and	Western	Europe	in	this	regard.	44	For	 instance,	 the	 elite	 has	 average	 household	 savings	 of	 £142,458,	which	 is	more	 than	double	 that	 of	 the	next	wealthiest	 class,	 the	 technical	middle	 class	 (£65,844);	 and	almost	180	times	that	of	the	least	wealthy	class,	the	precariat	(£793)	(Savage	et	al.	2013:	230).	
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Within	 the	 elite,	 however,	 income	 and	 wealth	 disparities	 are	significant.	The	top	one	per	cent	and,	particularly,	the	widening	gap	between	them	and	the	rest	of	the	population	have	become	the	topic	of	much	research	(Dorling	 2015;	 Hecht	 2017;	 Piketty	 2014),	 as	 well	 as	 the	 subject	 of	 both	significant	 political	 focus	 and	 attention-grabbing	 news	 headlines.45 	The	Occupy	 movement,	 in	 particular,	 challenged	 the	 growing	 inequality	symbolised	by	 the	 increasing	wealth	of	 the	 top	one	per	cent	 through	 their	slogan	 ‘We	 are	 the	 99%.’46	Katharina	Hecht’s	 research	 on	 the	 top	 one	 per	cent	 of	 income	 earners	 illustrates	 that	 even	 those	within	 the	 top	 one	 per	cent	 experience	 what	 she	 terms	 ‘relative	 (dis)advantage:	 they	 	 are		disadvantaged	 	 compared	 	 to	 	others	 	at	 	 the	 	 top	 	while	 	being	 	aware	 	of		their	 	advantage	 	compared	 	to	 	the	 	general	 	population’	(2017:	4).	Due	to	interactions	with	the	top	0.1	per	cent,	many	of	the	high	earners	in	the	study	did	 not	 feel	 particularly	 well	 off,	 especially	 in	 comparison	 to	 those	 with	access	to	high	levels	of	wealth	and	thus	the	ability	to	not	work	–	and	instead	for	 example	 spend	more	 time	with	 their	 children.	Hecht	 (ibid.)	 goes	 on	 to	argue	 that	 the	 social	 norms	within	 the	 very	 rich	 –	 and	 especially	many	 of	their	 explicit	 desire	 and	 dedication	 to	 accumulating	wealth	 over	 income	 –	may	be	a	key	driver	of	(particularly	wealth)	inequality.	While	Hecht	points	at	the	social	norms	of	the	very	rich	in	legitimating	growing	 inequalities,	 Perrons	 suggests	 that	 the	 role	 of	wider	 social	 norms	also	warrants	attention:	As	well	as	highlighting	the	multiple	ways	in	which	inequality	and	austerity	are	gendered	in	their	effects,	a	gendered	analysis	might	have	 enriched	 Piketty’s	 accounts	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	inequalities,	and	their	legitimation,	depend	on	wider	social	norms	and	values.	(2014:	669)	She	 suggests	 that	 gender	 norms	 are	 a	 key	 factor	 behind	 the	 increasing	tolerance	of	 elite	 salaries,	 using	 the	 example	of	 care	work	 to	highlight	 the	differential	ways	in	which	value	is	accorded	to	‘women’s’	and	‘men’s’	work.	The	power	of	elite	income	earners	to	‘set	their	own	remuneration’	(Piketty																																																									45	See	 for	 example	 Egan	 (2017)	 –	 ‘Record	 inequality:	 The	 top	 1%	 controls	 38.6%	 of	America's	 wealth’	 –	 and	 Neate	 (2017)	 –	 ‘Richest	 1%	 own	 half	 the	 world's	 wealth,	 study	finds.’	46	On	the	Occupy	Movement,	see	Enloe	(2013)	and	Cherniavsky	(2017).	
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2014:	24)	depends,	as	Perrons	argues,	on	their	 ‘bargaining	capacity	within	the	 hierarchy	 and	with	 prevailing	 social	 norms	which	 vary	 over	 time	 and	space	 and	 are	 influenced	 by	 each	 country’s	 specific	 history’	 (2014:	 672).	That	contemporary	 ‘super	managers’	are	predominantly	white	and	male	 is	no	 accident,	 therefore,	 but	 rather	 reflects	 the	 broader	 social	 norms	 of	 the	current	neoliberalising	time	–	with	their	significant	gendered	and	racialised	underpinnings.	Thus,	while	orthodox	explanations	for	rising	wage	inequality	tend	 to	 emphasise	migration,	 trade,	 and	 skill-biased	 technological	 change,	among	other	factors,	it	is	equally	important	to	recognise	the	significance	of	‘social	 norms	 that	 have	 become	 more	 tolerant	 of	 greater	 inequality’	(Perrons	and	Plomien	2014:	299).	Despite	 the	 above	 changes,	 the	 gender	 pay	 gap	 has,	 in	 fact,	 been	steadily	 narrowing	 in	 the	 UK.	 As	 Dunford	 and	 Perrons	 (2014)	 point	 out,	however,	 this	 is	 in	 significant	 part	 due	 to	 men’s	 pay	 falling,	 rather	 than	women’s	pay	rising.	Karamessini	and	Rubery	(2014)	argue,	further,	that	the	narrowing	 gender	 pay	 gap	 is	 also	 misleading	 as	 an	 indicator	 of	 greater	gender	 equality	 because	 of	 the	 tendency	 towards	 the	 worsening	 of	 –	particularly,	 but	 not	 exclusively,	 women’s	 –	 employment	 conditions.	Altogether	 the	 developments	 discussed	 in	 this	 section	 indicate	 that	 the	neoliberalising	 politics	 of	 austerity	 have	 largely	 functioned	 to	 reproduce	gender	and	other	inequalities,	thus	also	highlighting	the	futility	of	 ‘equality	policies’	 that	 do	 not	 take	 into	 account	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 economy	continues	 to	 be	 structured	 around	 the	 production/reproduction	 divide,	 as	Perrons	 (2017)	 suggests.	 Equality	 measures	 and	 initiatives	 such	 as	 the	prevalent	notion	 that	 gender	equality	 is	 ‘smart	 economics’,	 or	 for	 instance	David	 Cameron’s	 proposal	 of	 mandatory	 reporting	 on	 gender	 pay	 gaps	within	 corporations,	 indicate	 the	 increasing	 incorporation	 ‘of	 co-opted,	governance-friendly	 “feminist”	 knowledge’	 into	 discourses	 of	 ‘crisis	governance’	 (Griffin	 2015:	 51).	 Such	 co-opted	 feminisms	 work	 to	 enable	‘existing	 structures	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 gendered	 privilege,	 such	 as	 the	global	 financial	 industry,	 to	 suppress	 calls	 for	 their	 overhaul	 and	 to	 re-
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entrench	 their	 power	 in	 the	 global	 political	 economy’	 (ibid.:	 50)	 –	 thus	contributing	to	the	very	inequalities	that	they	purport	to	be	addressing.47		As	 this	 section’s	 discussion	 has	 shown,	 attempts	 to	 counter	 the	developments	and	shifts	examined	here	need	to	take	into	account	the	ways	in	which	austerity	–	as	well	as	the	crisis,	as	argued	above	–	is	reproduced	in	the	everyday	–	in	the	increasing	reliance	on	and	attachments	to	debt-based	spending;	 in	 the	 individualisation	 of	 risk;	 in	 gendered	 assumptions	 about	responsibilities	 for	 care	 and	 waged	 work,	 in	 cultural	 norms	 that	 tolerate	growing	 inequalities,	 and	 in	 the	 co-optation	 of	 ‘feminist’	 knowledge	 into	neoliberal	discursive	 frameworks.	 Further,	 given	 the	 changes	 and	 shifts	 in	the	form	and	role	of	the	neoliberalising	state	–	examined	in	the	next	section	–	calls	for	a	 ‘return’	to	a	Keynesian,	redistributive	state	are	also	unlikely	to	work,	 as	 Dunford	 and	 Perrons	 (2014;	 cf.	 Bhattacharyya	 2015)	 point	 out.	Thus,	 as	 already	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 the	 cultural	 logics,	subjectifying	 effects,	 and	 political	 rationalities	 of	 neoliberalising	 austerity	need	 to	 be	 challenged,	 along	 with	 the	 actual	 policies	 that	 have	 increased	inequalities	and	pushed	more	and	more	people	towards	poverty	since	2010	–	as	this	thesis	attempts	to	do,	particularly	in	Chapters	3	and	4.		
Neoliberalising	the	Crisis	Response:	The	State	As	 well	 as	 the	 various	 shifts	 and	 changes	 associated	 with	 neoliberalism	already	 discussed	 above	 –	 the	 subjectifying	 effects,	 cultural	 politics,	flexibilisation	and	precarisation	of	 labour,	and	growing	 income	and	wealth	disparities	–	neoliberalisation	is	frequently	viewed	as	leading	to	changes	in	the	nature	and	role	of	the	state.	Processes	of	privatisation	and	localisation,	in	 particular,	 tend	 to	 be	 seen	 as	 shifting	 power	 from	 the	 state	 to	 other	actors,	 leading	 many	 to	 characterise	 neoliberalism	 as	 involving	 a	withdrawal	 or	 ‘hollowing	 out’	 of	 the	 state.48	As	 in	 the	 previous	 section,	 in	this	section	my	focus	is	on	the	Coalition	Government’s	‘crisis	response’,	but	here	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 processes	 of	 privatisation,	 localisation,	 and																																																									47	See	also	Bhattacharyya	(2015),	Calkin	(2015),	and	Gedalof	(2017)	for	further	discussions	of	such	‘co-opted	feminisms.’	48	A	 term	 used	 and	 critiqued	 by	 Clarke	 (2004),	 Jessop	 (2000),	 and	 Peck	 (2001),	 among	others.		
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‘statework’	 (Clarke	 2004:	 121).	 Gendered	 approaches	 are	 again	 utilised	 –	although	to	a	much	lesser	extent	than	above	–	to	 investigate	whether	such	changes	in	the	state’s	role	or	power	can	be	said	to	be	occurring	in	austerity	era	 UK.	 I	 argue,	 firstly,	 that	 these	 shifts	 –	 although	 significant	 –	 do	 not	indicate	decreasing	state	power,	but	 rather	changes	 in	 the	state’s	 functions	and	form,	and,	secondly,	that	various	classed	and	gendered	discourses	have	been	 deployed	 to	 justify	 these	 changes,	 with	 the	 discursive	 emphasis	 on	feminised	notions	of	responsibility	particularly	noteworthy.		At	the	same	time	as	the	Coalition	Government	began	to	legislate	and	implement	 its	programme	of	welfare	and	public	spending	cuts,	 it	 launched	its	 ‘Big	 Society’	 plan.	 As	 highlighted	 above,	 the	 idea	 was	 to	 encourage	voluntarism	and	local	initiatives	to	fill	in	the	gaps	created	by	reduced	Local	Authority	 funding	 and	 diminishing	 public	 services,	 with	 David	 Cameron	explicitly	 framing	 the	 agenda	 as	 one	 of	 transfer	 of	 power:	 ‘it’s	 about	liberation	–	the	biggest,	most	dramatic	redistribution	of	power	from	elites	in	Whitehall	 to	 the	 man	 and	 woman	 on	 the	 street’	 (2010a).	 This	 ‘power	transfer’	 entailed	 a	 vision	where	 ‘the	 centralised	 bureaucracy	 that	wastes	money	and	undermines	morale’	 is	 replaced	by	 charities,	 Local	Authorities,	public	 enterprises,	 and	 private	 companies	 to	 ‘unleash	 [--]	 community	engagement’	 (ibid.).	 As	 many	 critics	 have	 pointed	 out,	 however,	 the	implementation	 of	 the	 ‘Big	 Society’	 has	 lacked	 the	 funding	 and	 resources	necessary	for	the	realisation	of	Cameron’s	vision.	Instead,	most	of	the	non-state	actors	Cameron	suggests	should	step	up	to	fulfil	his	vision	have	faced	significant	funding	reductions	since	2010,	with	the	private	sector	emerging	as	the	only	clear	winner.	While	Cameron	tried	to	reassure	listeners	that	the	Coalition	was	 not	 just	 naively	 assuming	 ‘that	 if	 the	 government	 rolls	 back	and	does	less,	then	miraculously	society	will	spring	up	and	do	more’	(ibid.),	in	 the	 eyes	 of	 many	 commentators	 this	 is	 exactly	 what	 the	 ‘Big	 Society’	agenda	has	consisted	of.	In	the	first	two	years	of	the	programme	the	voluntary	sector	faced	‘a	major	potential	funding	gap	as	a	result	of	an	estimated	£3.3	billion	in	cuts	in	statutory	 funding’	 (Civil	 Exchange	 2012:	 8),	 indicating	 that	 the	 sector’s	ability	 to	 plug	 the	 service	 provision	 gaps	 is	 likely	 to	 be	 limited.	 Similarly,	
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Local	Authority	funding	has	been	cut	significantly,	with	average	cuts	of	10.4	per	 cent	 per	 LA	 between	 2010	 and	 2012,	 but	 some	 of	 the	most	 deprived	areas	facing	cuts	of	up	to	25	per	cent	by	2016	(Smith	and	Jones	2015:	240).	Conversely,	outsourcing,	commissioning,	and	‘payment	by	results’	provision	have	 grown	 considerably	 in	 various	 areas	 of	 public	 service	 provision	 –	prompting	 Civil	 Exchange,	 the	 think	 tank	 undertaking	 an	 audit	 of	 ‘Big	Society’,	 to	pointedly	ask,	 ‘is	 the	Big	Society	going	 to	be	 led	by	 the	private	sector?’	(2012:	9).	For	example,	the	proportion	of	NHS	care	purchased	from	private	 providers	 went	 up	 from	 4.4	 per	 cent	 in	 Labour’s	 last	 year	 in	government,	 to	 7.6	 per	 cent	 in	 2015-16	 (Full	 Fact	 2017);	 LA	 outsourcing	increased	by	58	per	cent	in	2014	(Smith	and	Jones	2015:	240);	and	90	per	cent	of	Work	Programme	prime	contracts	were	won	by	 the	private	sector,	with	 charities	 mostly	 acting	 as	 sub-contractors	 (Civil	 Exchange	 2012:	 9).	The	 increasingly	 large	 and	 complex	 contracts,	 and	 ‘payment	 by	 results’	commissioning,	especially,	tend	to	mean	that	voluntary	sector	organisations	lose	 out	 to	 the	 private	 sector	 –	 with	 its	 economies	 of	 scale	 –	 despite	 the	specialised	 expertise	 and	 experience	 smaller,	 community	 and	 voluntary	organisations	 may	 bring	 (ibid.;	 Vacchelli	 et	 al.	 2015).	 Overall,	 the	outsourcing	of	UK’s	public	services	has	doubled	to	£88	billion	since	2010	–	making	the	UK	the	second	largest	outsourcing	market	in	the	world,	second	only	to	the	US	(Smith	and	Jones	2015:	240).	These	 developments	 have	 led	many	 to	 argue	 that,	 instead	 of	 a	 ‘Big	Society’,	what	has	actually	occurred	is	‘the	loss	of	public	provision	filled	by	a	growing	 private	 sector’,	 which	 is	 ‘deeply	 integrated	 into	 the	 public	 sector	with	private	organisations	taking	over	many	functions	that	were	previously	provided	 by	 government’	 (ibid.:	 226-227).	 These	 changes	 seem	 to,	 thus,	confirm	 the	 argument	 made	 by	 many	 that	 neoliberalisation	 entails	 a	dismantling	of	parts	of	the	state	–	or	specifically	the	‘left	hand’	of	the	state	in	Bourdieu’s	(1998)	and	Wacquant’s	(2012)	terminology,	responsible	for	the	provision	of	welfare	and	other	public	services.	For	Bourdieu,	paradoxically	it	is	 states	 themselves	 that	 have	 initiated	 the	measures	 of	 deregulation	 ‘that	have	 led	 to	 their	 own	 economic	 disempowerment’	 (2003:	 14).	 Further,	however,	 often	 these	 processes	 of	 economic	 disempowerment	 are	 also	
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thought	 to	 entail	 political	 disempowerment,	 or	 the	 transfer	 of	 political	power	 from	 the	 state	 to	 other	 actors	 and	 institutions,	 as	 the	 fundamental	mission	of	a	neoliberal	state	becomes	to	 ‘facilitate	conditions	for	profitable	capital	 accumulation	 on	 the	 part	 of	 both	 domestic	 and	 foreign	 capital’	(Harvey	2005:	7),	and	its	legitimacy	comes	to	be	tied	to	‘its	ability	to	sustain	and	 foster	 the	 market’	 (Brown	 2003:	 12).	 For	 these	 scholars,	 then,	 the	neoliberal	state	 is	 increasingly	governed	by	market	rationality	–	seemingly	with	 very	 little	 scope	 for	 the	 exercise	 of	 state	 power	 outside	 of	 this	rationality.	 Here	 economistic	 and	 governmentality	 approaches	 to	neoliberalism	seem	to	also	somewhat	converge,	as	the	state	tends	to	hold	a	reduced	significance	for	proponents	of	both	viewpoints.		Wacquant	 (2012)	 argues	 that,	 in	 ignoring	 the	 state’s	 role,	theorisations	 of	 neoliberalism	 –	 whether	 of	 the	 economistic	 or	governmentality	variety	–	tend	to	obscure	what	is	new	about	neoliberalism.	He	 specifically	 critiques	 scholars	 such	 as	 Aihwa	 Ong	 (2007),	 who	 analyse	neoliberalism	as	a	set	of	diffuse	and	decentralised	techniques	of	governance,	arguing	that	these	kinds	of	definitions	are	too	broad	and	thus	applicable	to	a	wide	 range	 of	 political	 regimes	 and	 rationalities	 –	 liberal	 as	 well	 as	neoliberal	 –	whereas	 economistic	 accounts	 align	 neoliberalism	 too	 closely	with	neoclassical	economics.	Conversely,	he	argues	 that	 it	 is	 the	 ‘remaking	
and	redeployment	of	the	state	as	the	core	agency	that	actively	fabricates	the	subjectivities,	 social	 relations	 and	 collective	 representations	 suited	 to	making	the	fiction	of	markets	real	and	consequential’	(Wacquant	2012:	68,	emphasis	 in	the	original),	 that	makes	neoliberalism	different	from	classical	Liberalism.	 Central	 to	 the	 remaking	 of	 the	 state	 is	 the	 growth	 of	 what	Wacquant	 terms	 the	 ‘right	 hand’	 of	 the	 state,	 or	 the	 penal	 state	 –	corresponding	to	the	decline	of	the	social	state.49	For	him,	the	expansion	of	the	penal	capacities	of	the	state	–	exemplified	in	the	twin	neoliberal	regimes	of	workfare	 and	 prisonfare	 –	 helps	 resolve	 some	 of	 the	 key	 dilemmas	 of	neoliberalisation:	 firstly,	 by	 curbing	 some	 of	 the	 effects	 of	 increasing	precarisation,	particularly	at	the	bottom	of	the	class	structure;	and	secondly,																																																									49	On	 increasing	 penalisation	 in	 neoliberalising	 states,	 see	 also	 Harcourt	 (2010),	 Jessop	(2000),	Lorey	(2015),	Peck	(2003),	and	Wacquant	(2008).	
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by	restoring	the	authority	of	the	governing	elites	in	the	face	of	what	is	often	labelled	 ‘globalisation’	 –	 increasing	 transnational	 flows	 of	 capital,	 money,	and	 other	 goods	 across	 national	 borders,	 as	 well	 as	 restrictions	 on	 state	action	by	international	institutions	and	financial	capital.	The	trend	towards	increasing	penalisation	within	neoliberal	regimes	seems	 somewhat	 borne	 out	 by	 the	 UK	 context.	 Firstly,	 UK’s	 prison	population	has	been	steadily	growing	throughout	the	twentieth	and	twenty-first	 centuries,	with	 accelerating	 growth	 since	 the	 early	 1990s	 (Grimwood	2016).	Similarly,	the	population	held	in	immigration	detention	in	the	UK	has	significantly	increased	in	recent	decades,	with	more	than	a	tenfold	increase	in	the	capacity	of	the	detention	estate	since	the	early	1990s	(Silverman	and	Hajela	 2015;	 Bacon	 2005).	 As	 well	 as	 the	 growth	 in	 prisonfare,	 a	 similar	growth	 in	 workfare	 in	 the	 austerity	 era	 is	 suggested	 by	 increasing	conditionality	 in	welfare;	 the	 use	 of	workfare	 programmes	 themselves;	 as	well	 as	 some	 policies	 that	 appear	 to	 be	 outright	 punitive	 –	 such	 as	 the	‘Under-Occupancy	 Penalty’	 or	 Bedroom	 Tax	 and	 the	 benefit	 sanctions	regime	 –	 both	 of	 which	 form	 a	 key	 part	 of	 my	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 5.	However,	whether	 these	 shifts	 indicate	 –	 as	Wacquant	 seems	 to	 suggest	 –	that	the	UK	state	has	morphed	into	‘an	overarching,	monolithic	“neo-liberal	penal	state”’	(Lacey	2010:	782)	remains	uncertain.	Nicola	Lacey	argues	that	Wacquant’s	 approach	 is	 overly	 generalised	 and	 calls,	 instead,	 for	 analyses	that	 not	 only	 ask	what	 neoliberalism	 is,	 but	 also	 ‘how	 it	 has	 emerged	 and	what	 sorts	 of	 institutional	 structures	 are	 needed	 to	 sustain	 the	 policies,	practices	 and	 arrangements	 which	 have	 come	 to	 be	 associated	 with	neoliberalism;	when	 they	emerged;	and	where	 they	hold	sway’	(2013:	261-262,	emphases	in	the	original).	Underpinning	Wacquant’s	account	–	as	well	as	many	others	–	of	the	neoliberal	state	 is,	 thus,	a	remarkably	monolithic	or	singular	conception	of	the	state	in	general.	As	well	as	easily	leading	to	a	conflation	of	the	state	and	the	government,	such	conceptualisations	tend	to	overlook	the	complex	and	contradictory	ways	 in	which	 different	parts	 of	 the	 state	 act	 and	 operate	 –	depending	 for	 instance	on	 the	different	views	 that	 the	various	 institutions	and	 individuals	 involved	 in	 policy	 implementation	may	 hold	 on	 particular	
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policy	 issues,	 as	 both	 Lacey	 (2010)	 and	 Ruth	 Lister	 (2000)	 point	 out.	Further,	such	conceptualisations	tend	to	assume	that	the	boundaries	of	the	state	are	knowable	in	advance.	Whether	for	example	individuals	involved	in	street-level	 policy	 implementation	 or	 service	 delivery;	 local	 government	actors;	 or,	 indeed,	 the	 various	 private	 corporations	 and	 voluntary	 sector	organisations	 (sub)contracted	 to	 run	 welfare	 services,	 workfare	programmes,	prisons,	detention	centres,	healthcare	services,	and	so	on,	are	part	of	the	state	is	not	as	clear-cut	a	question	as	it	may	seem.	As	many	others	have	 pointed	 out,	 pinning	 down	 exactly	which	 institutions,	 individuals,	 or	practices	make	up	the	state	is	difficult50	–	suggesting	that	basing	arguments	about	‘diminishing	state	power’	entirely	on	state	spending,	for	example,	may	be	overly	simplistic.	Rather	than	viewing	neoliberalisation	as	leading	to	a	straightforward	
reduction	in	the	state’s	power	or	capacities	–	and	the	state	as,	consequently,	diminishing	or	 ‘hollowing	out’	 in	a	 clear-cut	manner	–	 some	scholars	have	argued	that	neoliberalisation	tends	to	mean	certain	significant	shifts	 in	the	state’s	 functions	 and	 capacities	 instead.	 John	 Clarke	 (2004)	 argues	 that	despite	 major	 changes	 in	 neoliberalising	 states,	 they	 are	 still	 intimately	involved	 in	meta	governance	–	or	governance	of	governance	–	and	 for	Bob	Jessop	 (2000),	 this	 meta	 governance	 means	 that	 neoliberal	 states	 are	actively	 engaged	 in	 shaping	 and	modulating	 the	 transfer	 of	 powers	across	
scales.	For	Jamie	Peck,	similarly,	this	 multifaceted	 process	 of	 state	 restructuring	 and	 remaking	involves	 complex	 changes	 in	 the	 relations	 between	 different	levels/scales	 and	 branches/departments	 of	 the	 state	 apparatus,	such	that	the	relationship	between	the	form	and	functions	of	the	state	 is	 often	 altered	 in	 quite	 fundamental	 ways.	 (2001:	 447,	emphasis	in	the	original)	For	these	scholars,	 then,	 the	processes	of	 localisation	and	privatisation	are	less	about	a	quantitative	transfer	of	power	from	the	central	state	apparatus																																																									50	On	such	difficulties	in	relation	to	the	state	generally,	see	Cooper	(1993,	2016a,	2017)	and	Mitchell	 (1999);	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 neoliberal	 state,	 specifically,	 see	 Jessop	 (2013),	 Lacey	(2010),	and	Peck	(2001).	See	also	Canaday’s	(2009)	insightful	analysis	of	the	manifestation	of	 these	 difficulties	 in	 the	 historical	 development	 of	 regimes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 and	citizenship	in	the	US.		
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to	local	actors	or	private	corporations	and	more	about	a	qualitative	change	in	 their	 relationships. 51 	The	 functions	 of	 neoliberal	 states	 tend	 to	 be	differently	 organised	 –	 rather	 than	 straightforwardly	 replaced	 by	 other	actors	 or	 free	 market	 logics	 –	 such	 that	 neoliberalising	 states	 overall	 are	becoming	 ‘differently	 powerful’	 rather	 than	 less	 powerful	 (ibid.:	 447,	emphasis	in	the	original).52	Thus,	while	the	moving	‘upwards,	downwards	and	sideways’	(Jessop	2000:	180)	of	specific	state	powers	and	capacities	does	indeed	mean	that	a	significant	 proportion	 of	 the	 activities	 previously	 undertaken	 by	 state	institutions	has	been	transferred	to	other	institutions	and	entities,	this	does	not	 necessarily	 entail	 a	 reduction	 in	 the	 state’s	 capacities	 or	 power.	Conversely,	 rather	 than	 the	 private	 corporations	 subcontracted	 to	 do	various	kinds	of	statework	having	simply	 taken	over	aspects	of	 the	state	–	and	acquired	a	corresponding	amount	of	state	power	–	these	organisations’	capacities	 may	 be	 modified	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 by	 the	 terms	 of	 their	relationship	 with	 the	 state	 that	 they	 cannot	 be	 said	 to	 be	 independently	powerful	 –	 as	 the	 example	 of	 ‘payment	 by	 results’	 provision	 seems	 to	suggest.	 They	 may,	 rather,	 be	 thought	 of	 as	 being	 involved	 in	 statework	themselves	 –	 an	 argument	 that,	 however,	 ‘does	 not	 imply	 an	 image	 of	 the	state	 and	 private	 organizations	 as	 a	 single	 totalized	 structure	 of	 power’	(1999:	84),	 as	Timothy	Mitchell	 points	out.	On	 the	 contrary,	 there	may	be	significant	conflicts	between	them	–	as	there	may	also	be	both	between	and	within	state	institutions,	such	as	government	departments.		This	argument,	further,	extends	to	the	economic	sphere	–	considered	by	many	the	most	clear-cut	example	of	the	state’s	diminishing	powers	under	neoliberalisation.	 As	 Bernard	 Harcourt	 (2010)	 argues,	 rather	 than	
deregulation,	 neoliberalism	 involves	 the	 re-regulation	 of	 economic	 activity,	but	masked	under	a	 façade	of	deregulation.	Peck,	 similarly,	highlights	 that																																																									51	Relatedly,	 see	 also	 Featherstone	 et	 al.	 (2012)	 on	what	 they	 term	 ‘austerity	 localism’	 –	suggesting	that	the	discourse	of	localism	is	being	deployed	in	the	austerity	context	as	part	of	 a	 broader	 anti-state	 agenda,	 to	 build	 support	 for	 diminishing	 state	 provision	 and	responsibilities.	52	Berlant	also	points	out	that	processes	of	globalisation	and	neoliberalisation	do	not	mean	that	 the	nation	 loses	 its	significance	–	 in	 fact,	 it	 is	particularly	 in	 ‘transnational	conditions	that	the	nation	becomes	a	more	intense	object	of	concern	and	struggle’	(1997:	13).			
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‘“deregulationist”	 states	 are	 often	 impelled	 to	 adopt	 strikingly	interventionist	 measures	 in	 order	 to	 mobilize	 or	 manufacture	 “markets”	where	 previously	 competitive	 forces	 were	 weak	 or	 absent’	 (2001:	 445).	Thus,	 even	 in	 the	 market	 sphere,	 neoliberalisation	 tends	 to	 involve	more	regulation	in	certain	areas	or	phases.	As	well	as	suggesting	that	the	state	appears	to	be	differently	powerful	(rather	 than	no	 longer	powerful),	 this	discussion	also	points	at	 the	uneven	and	 incomplete	 nature	 of	 neoliberalism	 itself.	 Neoliberalisation	 has	proceeded	 in	 a	 –	 sometimes	 drastically	 –	 different	 manner	 in	 different	contexts,	 due	 to	 differing	 cultural	 logics,	 institutional	 histories,	 and	 path	dependence,	 and	 it,	 furthermore,	 continues	 to	 co-exist	 with	 other	governmental,	 economic,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 projects	 and	 logics.53	Peck	(2003),	 for	 instance,	 points	 out	 that	 the	movement	 from	Keynesianism	 to	neoliberalism	has	been	unevenly	realised	both	across	different	geographical	locations	and	in	different	institutional	contexts	and	policy	areas;	and	Clarke	identifies	an	 ‘uneven	and	shifting	set	of	accommodations	–	at	 the	regional,	national	 and	 local	 levels	 –	 between	 previously	 dominant	 political-cultural	formations	 and	 that	 of	 neo-liberalism’	 (2004:	 98).54	In	 this	 thesis	 I	 frame	both	austerity	and	the	state	as	neoliberalising	–	rather	than	as	neoliberal	per	
se	–	in	order	to	foreground	the	incompleteness	and	unevenness	of	processes	of	neoliberalisation,	as	well	as	to	indicate	the	alignment	of	neoliberal	logics	with	specific	institutions,	policies,	politics,	and	cultural	formations	–	such	as	specific	parts	of	the	state	or	austerity	discourse.	This	view	of	both	the	state	and	neoliberalisation	as	uneven,	complex	and	sometimes	contradictory	sets	of	 processes	 and	 practices	 also,	 perhaps,	 allows	 for	 the	 challenging	 of	 the	cultural	 logics,	 subjectifying	 effects,	 and	 political	 rationalities	 of	neoliberalising	austerity	in	a	different	manner	than	would	be	enabled	by	an	already	 completed	 process	 of	 neoliberalisation	 and	 an	 already	 entirely	neoliberalised	state	–	as	my	discussion	particularly	in	Chapter	5	suggests.	
																																																								53	On	 these	 processes	 more	 generally,	 as	 well	 as	 path	 dependence	 specifically,	 see,	 for	instance,	Jessop	(2000),	Lacey	(2013),	and	Newman	(2014).	54	See	 also	 Gibson-Graham	 (1996)	 on	 these	 variable	 processes	 in	 relation	 to	 capitalism	more	broadly.		
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Rather	 than	 neoliberalisation	meaning	 a	 ‘withdrawal’	 or	 ‘hollowing	out’	of	the	state,	then,	we	might	consider	these	discursive	tropes	an	aspect	of	what	 Mitchell	 (1999)	 terms	 the	 ‘state	 effect.’	 He	 argues	 that	 the	 state	appears	 to	 exist	 both	 ‘as	material	 force	 and	 as	 ideological	 construct’,	 and,	further,	 that	 ‘scholarly	 analysis	 of	 the	 state	 is	 liable	 to	 reproduce	 [--]	 this	imaginary	 coherence	 and	 misrepresent	 the	 incoherence	 of	 state	 practice’	(ibid.:	 76).55 	The	 boundary	 that	 is	 imagined	 as	 a	 constant,	 immovable	division	between	the	state	and	the	non-state	–	including,	here,	the	economy,	civil	society,	and	the	family,	for	instance	–	is	a	discursive	and	cultural	effect	of	state	practices,	not	 ‘an	ontological	constant’	 (Steinmetz	1999:	26).56	The	assumption	 that	 privatisation	 and	 localisation,	 for	 instance,	 mean	 exactly	that	–	a	clear	shift	of	power,	capacities,	and	functions	from	the	public	to	the	private	and	 from	the	national	 to	 the	 local	–	 is,	 thus,	 similarly	a	 function	of	the	 discursive,	 cultural,	 and	 symbolic	 work	 that	 creates	 the	 state	 effect.	Further,	 if	 states	 in	general	 are	 cultural	 effects	as	well	 as	material	 entities	and	practices,	marked	by	 their	 imaginaries	as	much	as	 their	materiality	as	Jyoti	Puri	(2014)	argues,	then	the	ways	in	which	we	imagine	the	neoliberal	state	matter	a	great	deal	–	not	only	because	of	our	affective	attachments	to	the	 imaginaries	of	the	state,	but	also	because	these	attachments	shape	and	condition	 our	 responses	 to	 what	 we	 imagine	 the	 state	 as	 capable	 of	 and	responsible	for.57		In	 the	 austerity	 era,	 popular	disenchantment	with	 the	 state	 reflects	the	 imaginaries	 of	 a	 retreating	 or	 diminishing	 state,	 a	 state	 that	 seems	 to	ignore	 its	responsibilities	 to	 its	citizens.	The	neoliberalising	state	practices	discussed	above	also	create	 ‘a	strong	sense	of	loss:	the	loss	of	state	funded	institutions	 (voluntary	 organisations,	 advice	 centres,	 arts	 and	 cultural	provision),	public	services	(the	local	library,	hospital,	youth	centres),	public	welfare	(elder	care,	childcare)’	(2014:	153)	and	so	on,	as	Janet	Newman	and																																																									55	See	also	Anderson	(1991)	on	the	nation	as	an	imagined	community.	56	Cooper	 (2016b)	 and	 Ferguson	 and	 Gupta	 (2002)	 also	 suggest	 viewing	 the	 notion	 of	 a	coherent	and	bounded	state	as	a	discursive	and	cultural	effect.	See	also	Bevir	and	Rhodes,	who	conceptualise	the	state	‘as	a	series	of	contingent	and	unstable	cultural	practices’	(2010:	1).	57	See	Stoler	(2009)	 for	an	 insightful	analysis	of	 the	ways	 in	which	sentiments	and	affects	figured	in	colonial	statecraft.	
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John	 Clarke	 point	 out.	 In	 the	 context	 of	 this	 sense	 of	 loss,	 it	 seems	 no	surprise	that	many	community	groups	and	voluntary	organisations	have,	in	fact,	 responded	 to	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	 calls	 for	 ‘community	engagement’	 and	 a	 ‘Big	 Society’,	 for	 example	 by	 volunteering	 to	 run	libraries.	Following	the	significant	cuts	to	library	funding	since	2010,	500	of	the	 UK’s	 3,850	 libraries	 are	 now	 at	 least	 partially	 run	 by	 volunteers	 –	 up	from	only	a	handful	 in	2010	(Flood	2017;	Public	Libraries	News	2017).	As	much	 as	 these	 developments	 seem	 to	 signal	 what	 Newman	 and	 Clarke	discuss	 in	 terms	 of	 a	 ‘search	 on	 the	 left	 for	 alternative	 imaginaries	 of	 the	state’	(2014:	158),	illustrating	that	public	goods	can	not	only	be	retained	but	also	brought	under	cooperative	 forms	of	ownership,	at	 the	same	time	they	have	also	inspired	worries.		The	 successful	 volunteer	 management	 of	 libraries	 –	 as	 well	 as	 of	other	areas	of	public	 service	provision	–	may	encourage	 further	cuts,	with	cash-strapped	Local	Authorities	possibly	viewing	communities	unwilling	to	take	on	the	running	of	a	local	library	as	simply	not	trying	hard	enough,	or	as	not	really	wanting	or	needing	a	library,	as	Alison	Flood	(2017)	argues.	Smith	and	Jones	(2015)	point	out,	further,	that	little	consideration	has	been	given	to	 the	 sustainability	 of	 voluntary	 provision,	 suggesting	 also	 that	 the	 ‘Big	Society’	 approach	 is	 underpinned	 by	 a	 contradictory	 model	 of	 human	behaviour,	expecting	both	altruism	and	economic	rationality.	Stepping	in	to	run	services	previously	provided	by	the	state,	therefore,	carries	significant	–	discursive	as	well	as	other	–	consequences.	As	well	as	possibly	contributing	to	the	view	that	a	‘leaner	state’	is	possible	–	or	even	desirable	–	in	the	long-term,	as	Cameron	suggested	 in	2013,	such	 initiatives	can	potentially	aid	 in	the	fostering	of	an	extreme	form	of	individualism	–	prompting	Atkinson	and	his	 colleagues	 to	 view	 the	 ‘Big	 Society’	 plan	 as	 ‘a	 giant	 Trojan	 horse	 for	precisely	 the	 kind	 of	 individualism	 [Thatcher]	 espoused’	 (2012:	 10).	 Such	individualism	is	not	only	based	on	assumptions	of	 lowered	expectations	of	the	state	and	its	reciprocity,	however,	but	 it	also	carries	significant	classed	and	gendered	implications.		Kim	Allen	and	Yvette	Taylor	suggest	that	the	‘masking	of	a	shrinking	state	has	been	enabled	through,	and	productive	of,	new	positions	of	active	
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and	responsibilised	citizenship’	(2012:	11).	Importantly,	these	processes	of	responsibilisation	 tend	 to	 operate	 differently	 in	 the	 case	 of	 differently	
classed	 populations,	with	 ‘the	well-off	 [--]	 set	 free	 from	 state	 interference’	(Gillies	 2012:	 90),	 ‘while	 the	 poor	 are	 [--]	 responsibilised	 through	 the	removal	 of	 services	 and	 practical	 and	 economic	 support’	 (ibid.:	 92).58	The	‘Big	Society’	audit,	similarly,	identifies	a	‘”Big	Society	Gap”	in	levels	of	trust,	engagement	and	social	action	between	the	most	disadvantaged	and	affluent’	(Civil	 Exchange	 2012:	 9),	 arguing	 that	 these	 inequalities	 need	 to	 be	addressed	for	the	‘Big	Society’	to	be	successful.	As	well	as	classed,	however,	the	 discursive	 framings	 of	 the	 responsibilised	 and	 active	 citizen	 are	 also	gendered.	 In	many	 incarnations	of	 the	rhetoric	of	 community	engagement,	responsibility,	and	 ‘Big	Society’,	 it	 is	parents	and	particularly	mothers	who	are	targeted	as	(potential)	frugal	and	thrifty	citizens,	expected	to	take	action	to	boost	both	 their	household	 finances	and	 the	economy	as	a	whole.59	The	discursive	 framings	 of	 ‘thrift’	 as	 desirable	 and	 pleasurable	 activity,	 thus,	depend	centrally	on	gendered	notions	of	responsibility	and	frugality.		Somewhat	 similarly	 to	 the	 discursive	 framings	 around	 work	 and	welfare	examined	above,	then,	here	traditionalist	–	and	perhaps	increasingly	so	 –	 notions	 of	 gendered	 responsibility	 are	 centrally	 incorporated	 into	austerity	discourses	around	the	state	and	localism.	As	in	the	above	section,	here	 the	 cultural	 logics,	 subjectifying	 effects,	 and	 political	 rationalities	 of	neoliberalising	austerity	–	with	their	incorporation	of	various	gendered	and	classed	notions	–	are,	 thus,	again	seen	as	central	 to	any	politics	seeking	 to	counter	 and	 challenge	 austerity.	 Further,	 though,	 this	 section’s	 discussion	points	at	the	continued	importance	of	the	state	in	the	political	imaginaries	of	austerity.	As	Newman	and	Clarke	argue,	‘how	we	imagine	the	state,	how	we	feel	about	 it,	will	shape	the	kinds	of	politics	that	are	possible’	(2014:	153).	As	well	as	a	site	of	neoliberalising	processes	and	practices	–	albeit	in	highly	uneven,	 complex,	 and	 at	 times	 contradictory	ways	 –	 the	 state	 is	 a	 ‘site	 of	
																																																								58	Gillies	 (2012)	 makes	 her	 argument	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 responsibilisation	 of	
parents,	 using	 free	 schools	 as	 a	 key	 example	 of	 the	 classed	 nature	 of	 the	 neoliberalising	processes	of	responsibilisation	and	individualisation.		59	On	 the	 responsibilisation	 of	 parents,	 see	 De	 Benedictis	 (2012)	 and	 Jensen	 (2012);	 on	notions	of	‘thrift’,	see	Bramall	(2013),	Jensen	(2012)	and	Negra	and	Tasker	(2014).	
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possibility’	 (ibid.:	 168). 60 	Moreover,	 it	 is	 so	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	instability	 and	 incompleteness	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	 imaginaries,	 as	 it	 is	 the	contradictions,	uncertainties,	and	instabilities	within	the	state	that	–	as	well	as	 carrying	 the	 risk	 of	 increasing	 neoliberalisation	 –	 create	 ‘the	 spaces	 of	possibility	for	alternative	imaginaries	of	the	state	to	emerge’	(ibid.:	160)	–	as	I	explore	further	in	Chapter	5.			
Conclusion:	What	about	Sexuality?		This	 chapter	 has	 examined	 the	 discursive	 positioning	 of	 both	 the	 2007-8	financial	 crisis	 and	 that	 of	 the	 Coalition	 Government’s	 ‘crisis	 response’	 –	austerity	 –	 and	 challenged	 the	 common	 framing	 of	 both	 as	 exceptional.	Rather,	 I	have	 suggested	 that	 the	 crisis	 should	be	viewed	as	originating	 in	the	 same	 neoliberalising	 economic	 reasonings,	 cultural	 logics,	 and	subjectifying	effects	 that	have	subsequently	been	drawn	upon	–	as	well	as,	perhaps,	 intensified	 –	 by	 austerity	 discourse	 and	 politics.	 Alongside	 my	examination	of	austerity’s	discursive	logics	and	cultural	politics,	I	have,	thus,	situated	 its	 post-2010	 deployments	 within	 a	 longer	 history	 of	neoliberalisation.	 Additionally,	 this	 chapter	 has	 focused	 on	 investigating	neoliberalism	itself,	conceived	in	this	thesis	as	a	set	of	complex,	uneven,	and	at	times	contradictory	processes	and	practices	framed	around	an	increasing	discursive	emphasis	on	free	market	logics	–	and	a	corresponding	decreasing	emphasis	on	the	state	and	public	provision	–	with	significant	consequences	for	 work,	 welfare,	 and	 the	 state.	 Further,	 neoliberalism’s	 cultural	 politics,	and	 particularly	 the	 gendered,	 classed,	 and	 racialised	 underpinnings	 of	these	 politics,	 have	 been	 shown	 to	 significantly	 impact	 upon	 the	 ways	 in	which	austerity	has	been	deployed	in	the	UK	context.	The	rest	of	the	thesis	continues	 this	 investigation,	 suggesting	 that	 sexuality	 is	 a	 key	 aspect	 of	austerity	 politics,	 providing	 material	 both	 for	 the	 discursive	 mechanisms	that	 have	 been	 used	 to	 justify	 and	 legitimate	 austerity	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	resulting	 poverty	 and	 inequality	 –	 and	 for	 the	 regulatory	 mechanisms	deployed	within	austerity	politics	to	manage	said	poverty	and	inequality.																																																										60	On	 the	 state	 as	 a	 potential	 ‘site	 of	 possibility’,	 see	 also	 Cooper	 (1993,	 2016a,	 2016b,	2017).	
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For	a	thesis	so	fundamentally	structured	around,	and	intervening	in,	scholarship	 on	 sexuality,	 this	 chapter	 has	 said	 very	 little	 about	 sexuality,	however.	My	analysis	here	has	mostly	focused	on	gendering	 the	crisis	(and	austerity),	 with	 parts	 of	 the	 discussion	 also	 pointing	 at	 its	 racialising	 and	classing	implications	and	underpinnings.	So	why	has	sexuality	not	featured	more	centrally	 in	this	chapter?	Lisa	Duggan	(2003)	provides	a	key	account	of	the	role	of	sexuality	within	processes	of	neoliberalisation.	She	argues	–	as	do	many	others	(Bhattacharyya	2015;	Bourdieu	1998;	Dunford	and	Perrons	2014;	Gedalof	2017)	–	 that	part	of	neoliberalism’s	allure	and	power	arises	from	the	way	 in	which	 it	has	tended	to	be	presented	by	 its	proponents:	as	technical	 expertise,	 a	 commonsensical	 view	of	 the	world,	 and	 therefore	 as	
separate	 from	 politics	 and	 culture.61	This	 common	 framing	 of	 neoliberal	policies	 and	 logics	 as	 neutral,	 managerial,	 or	 simply	 the	 best	 or	 most	efficient	way	of	running	the	economy,	obscures	both	the	political	nature	of	neoliberal	 decision	 making	 and	 the	 cultural	 logics	 underpinning	 it	 –	 and	thereby	 disguises	 ‘the	 upwardly	 redistributing	 goals	 of	 neoliberalism’	(Duggan	2003:	xiv).		A	 central	 feature	 of	 these	 neoliberal	 discursive	 framings	 is	 the	dismissal	 of	 concerns	 about	 material	 inequalities	 or	 poverty	 ‘as	 “class	warfare”,	while	race,	gender	or	sexual	 inequalities	are	dismissed	as	merely	cultural,	 private,	 or	 trivial’	 (ibid.:	 xiv).	 Importantly,	 however,	 as	 Duggan	argues,	the	political	economy	and	culture	are	never	separated	in	practice,	as	neoliberalism	organises	 ‘material	 and	political	 life	 in	terms	of	race,	 gender	and	 sexuality’	 (ibid.:	 3,	 emphasis	 in	 the	original)	 –	 as	well	 as	 class.	On	 the	one	 hand,	 then,	 ‘identity	 politics’	 –	 and	 the	 sexual,	 racial,	 and	 gendered	concerns	 emanating	 from	 such	 politics	 –	 are	 branded	 infantile	 and	insignificant	 in	 neoliberal	 discursive	 framings,	 but	 on	 the	 other,	neoliberalism	depends	centrally	on	coded	hierarchies	of	class,	race,	gender,	and	sexuality	for	its	cultural	and	political	effectiveness.	The	maintenance	of	the	economy/culture	(or	material/cultural)	distinction	is,	thus,	a	key	way	in	which	 the	political	 operation	and	 logics	of	neoliberalism	are	concealed.	To																																																									61	Gibson-Graham	 (1996)	 also	 make	 a	 similar	 argument	 in	 relation	 to	 capitalism	 more	broadly.		
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Duggan’s	 argument	 I	would	 add,	 however,	 that	 another	 key	way	 in	which	sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 are	 dismissed	 from	 discussions	 of	 neoliberalism	 –	and	the	political	economy	more	widely	–	 is	their	 framing	as	 identity	alone.	As	I	argue	throughout	this	thesis,	 the	overwhelming	emphasis	on	sexuality	as	identity	is	what	obscures	the	many	roles	that	sexuality	and	intimacy	play	in	the	discursive	and	regulatory	functioning	of	austerity.	Thus,	sexuality	not	only	plays	an	important	part	in	the	discursive	frameworks	that	have	enabled	inequalities	to	flourish	in	the	austerity	era,	but	its	designation	as	an	identity	formation	alone	also	operates	as	part	of	the	(related)	discursive	frameworks	that,	 concomitantly,	work	 to	 obscure	 the	 former	 –	 an	 argument	 I	make	 in	more	detail	in	Chapter	3.		My	 point	 here	 is	 not	 that	 the	 crisis	 and	 austerity	 do	 not	 have	 any	impacts	 or	 implications	 for	 queer	 or	 LG(b)	 subjects	 –	 and,	 in	 fact,	 they	clearly	 do,	 as	 Nicola	 Smith’s	 (2016)	 study	 (aptly	 titled	 ‘Toward	 a	 queer	political	economy	of	crisis’),	for	instance,	shows.	Rather,	my	point	is	that	the	lack	 of	 consideration	 for	 sexuality	 in	 most	 of	 the	 approaches	 discussed	above	is	indicative	of	the	broader	discursive	context,	where	sexuality	is	seen	as	 an	 identity	 category	 or	 subject	 position	 alone.	However,	 sexuality	 is,	 in	fact,	 central	 to	 many	 of	 the	 above	 analyses,	 and	 the	 very	 discourses	 and	cultural	logics	that	they	tend	to	frame	through	gender	alone	will	in	Chapter	3	 be	 shown	 to	 also	 depend	 on	 sexuality.	 For	 example,	 the	 withdrawal	 of	welfare	state	support	 from	dual	earner	couples	has	 tended	 to	be	managed	through	discursive	 framings	 that	 install	 reproductive	and	heteronormative	coupledom	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 ideal	 family;	 whereas	 the	positioning	of	lone	parents	as	in	need	of	labour	market	activation	has	often	been	 justified	 with	 reference	 to	 long-standing	 discursive	 tropes	 that	position	 the	 lone	 mother	 as	 sexually	 promiscuous	 or	 immoral	 and,	therefore,	at	 some	distance	 from	said	 ideal.	Similarly,	as	Chapter	4	argues,	the	 discursive	 and	 figurative	 processes	 by	 which	 certain	 –	 poor	 and	working-class	 –	 subjects	 tend	 to	 be	 presented	 as	 immoral	 ‘scroungers’	 in	need	of	 responsibilisation	 in	 the	context	of	austerity	will	also	be	shown	to	depend	centrally	on	sexuality	for	their	reproduction.	Finally,	 in	Chapter	5	I	argue	that	the	regulation	of	the	intimate	sphere	figures	importantly	in	many	
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of	the	processes	associated	with	the	increasing	penalisation	of	social	policy	within	neoliberalising	states.		This	thesis	overall	seeks	to	provide	an	analysis	of	the	role	of	sexuality	and	 intimacy	 within	 the	 political	 economy	 of	 austerity,	 arguing	 that	 the	overwhelming	 –	 scholarly	 and	 other	 –	 tendency	 to	 view	 them	 in	 terms	 of	identity	 alone	 functions	 not	 only	 to	 mask	 their	 central	 role	 in	 austerity	politics,	 but	 also	 aids	 in	 the	 dismissal	 of	 cultural	 and	 political	 matters	 as	trivial	 or	 insignificant	 within	 neoliberal	 discursive	 frameworks.	 The	omission	 of	 sexuality	 from	most	 of	 the	 approaches	 discussed	 above,	 thus,	reveals	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 sexuality	 tends	 to	 be	 viewed	 not	 only	 as	 an	identity	category	above	everything	else,	but	also,	consequently,	as	separate,	or	 separatable,	 from	 gender	 –	 as	 well	 as	 race,	 class,	 and	 so	 on.	 Without	attention	to	sexuality’s	role	within	the	discursive	and	regulatory	functioning	of	 austerity,	 however,	 our	 understandings	 of	 both	 austerity	 and	 sexuality	itself	 remain	 limited.	 The	 next	 chapter	 examines	 the	 key	 theoretical	 and	epistemological	 approaches	 to	 sexuality,	 intimacy,	 and	 the	 regulation	 of	both	that	I	both	employ	and	develop	in	the	rest	of	this	thesis,	and	makes	two	central	 arguments	–	 firstly,	 that	 identity	 is	 far	 from	 the	only	way	 in	which	sexuality	matters	to	the	political	economy,	and	secondly,	that	sexuality	is	co-constituted	 with	 other	 categories	 of	 difference	 in	 more	 complex,	interrelated,	 and	 interdependent	 ways	 than	what	 tends	 to	 be	 assumed	 in	much	of	the	scholarship	examining	the	gendered	or	classed	implications	of	austerity	and	the	crisis.				 	
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Sexuality:	Subjectivity,	Inequality,	Intimacy	
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Introduction		In	 the	 previous	 chapter	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 post-2010	 deployments	 of	austerity	discourse	and	politics	should	be	viewed	as	part	of	a	longer	history	of	 neoliberalisation,	 and	 further,	 that	 the	 subjectifying	 effects,	 cultural	logics,	 and	 political	 rationalities	 of	 these	 deployments	 warrant	 specific	scholarly	attention.	Towards	the	end	of	the	chapter,	I	also	suggested	that	the	
lack	of	consideration	for	sexuality	 in	many	critical	gendered	approaches	to	both	austerity	and	the	2007-8	financial	crisis	reflects	the	broader	discursive	context,	 in	 which	 sexuality	 tends	 to	 be	 discussed	 primarily	 in	 terms	 of	predefined	 identity	 categories	 or	 subject	 positions.	As	 this	 thesis	 centrally	argues,	 it	 is	 precisely	 as	 a	 result	 of	 the	 overwhelming	 (both	 scholarly	 and	broader)	 tendency	 to	 view	 sexuality	 as	 sutured	 to	 the	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction	that	much	gets	missed	about	the	roles	that	sexuality	and	intimacy	play	in	the	discursive	and	regulatory	functioning	of	austerity	–	and	in	the	political	economy	more	broadly.	Thus,	sexuality	is,	in	 fact,	much	more	central	 to	 the	political	 economy	 than	what	 tends	 to	 be	assumed	by	the	critiques	that	have	blamed	‘identity	politics’	for	distracting	from	 the	 ‘real’	 issues	 of	 class	 and	 the	 economy	 –	 as	 my	 discussion	 of	Duggan’s	(2003)	work	in	the	last	chapter	highlighted,	and	as	I	argue	in	more	detail	 in	 Chapter	 3.	 This	 chapter	 follows	 from	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	
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discussion	 and	 examines	 the	 key	 theoretical	 and	 epistemological	approaches	 to	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 that	 are	 employed	and	developed	 in	the	rest	of	this	thesis.		Notwithstanding	 the	 importance	 of	 studying	 austerity’s	 gendered	implications,	 or	 its	 effects	 on	women	 or	 sexual	minorities,	 in	 this	 thesis	 I	take	 a	 rather	 different	 tack	 and	 focus	 instead	 on	 the	 –	 more	 broadly	conceptualised	 –	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 life	 of	 austerity	 politics.	 As	 the	introduction	 indicated,	 my	 aims,	 here,	 are	 two-fold:	 to	 highlight	 the	importance	of	 considering	sexuality	and	 intimacy	within	 scholarly	enquiry	into	austerity	and	other	economic,	political,	and	cultural	formations;	and	to	push	for	sexuality	scholarship	to	take	the	non-identitarian	and	non-subject	specific	 ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 operate	 and	 matter	 in	 the	present	more	seriously.	The	questions	that	guide	the	analysis	of	this	thesis	are,	 thus,	 epistemological	 as	 well	 as	 theoretical,	 in	 that	 I	 am	 particularly	interested	 in	what	we	might	 find	 out	 about	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 in	 the	austerity	present	–	were	we	not	to	a	priori	decide	exactly	what	they	are	and	look	like.	Beginning	with	an	open-ended	research	question	–	what	kinds	of	sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives,	 subjects,	 and	 politics	 are	 made	 (im)possible,	(il)legible,	or	(il)legitimate	through	and	within	austerity	politics	in	the	UK	–	means	 that	 my	 enquiry	 does	 not	 have	 a	 fixed	 starting	 point	 in	 particular	sexual	 or	 gendered	 subjects	 (such	 as	 sexual	 minorities	 or	 women),	 or	 in	particular	policy	or	other	sites	within	which	we	already	know	sexuality	 to	matter	 (such	 as	 policies	 directly	 targeting,	 or	 media	 texts	 explicitly	representing,	sexual	minorities	or	women).	 Instead,	 I	 focus	on	some	of	 the	
processes	by	which	sexuality	and	intimacy	are	folded	into	austerity	politics	–	whichever	sites	 these	processes	 take	place	 in	and	whichever	subjects	 they	may	have	an	impact	on.		This	 chapter	makes	 two	 central	 arguments	 –	 firstly,	 that	 identity	 is	
one	of	sexuality’s	many	modes	of	operation,	and	that	paying	attention	to	the	non-identitarian	 and	 non-subject	 specific	 ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	 and	intimacy	 operate	 is	 particularly	 important	 for	 understanding	 their	relationship(s)	 to	 economic,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 formations	 –	 such	 as	austerity.	 Secondly,	 I	 argue	 that	 sexuality	 is	 co-constituted	 with	 other	
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categories	of	difference	in	much	more	interrelated	and	interdependent	ways	than	what	tends	to	be	assumed.	I	begin	with	a	brief	section	that	focuses	on	the	 broader	 question	 of	 how	 sexuality	 is	 conceived	 of	 in	 this	 thesis	 –	highlighting	 specifically	 the	 theoretical	 foundations	 for	 engaging	 in	 an	analysis	 of	 sexuality’s	 non-identitarian	 forms	 –	 as	 well	 as	 examines	approaches	that	foreground	sexual	regulation.	The	following	three	sections	each	focus	on	a	particular	way	of	conceptualising	sexuality	and	intimacy:	as	sexual	subjectivity,	as	sexual	 inequality,	and	as	 intimate	disruptions	–	each	of	which	will	be	taken	up	and	further	investigated	in	subsequent	chapters	of	this	thesis.		As	the	introduction	suggested,	the	methodological	approach	I	take	in	this	 thesis	 is	 explorative	 –	 the	 methods	 employed	 in	 the	 following	 three	chapters	have	been	chosen	because	of	their	‘fit’	with	the	case	studies	and	the	research	 sites	 the	 chapters’	 analyses	 focus	 on.	 They	 follow	 on	 from	 the	particular	ways	 in	which	sexuality	(or	 intimacy)	 is	conceived	in	relation	to	the	 particular	 research	 sites,	 such	 that	 policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 is	utilised	 to	 examine	 sexual	 inequalities	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 a	 figurative	methodology	 is	employed	 to	 investigate	 the	sexualisation	and	racialisation	of	the	‘benefit	scrounger/recipient’	figuration	in	Chapter	4,	and	an	analysis	of	 processes	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery	 is	 used	 to	examine	 the	 intimate	 disruptions	 they	 engender	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 Since	 each	method	is	directly	linked	not	only	to	the	particular	research	site	but	also	to	the	 conceptualisation	 of	 sexuality	 or	 intimacy	 I	 deploy	 in	 relation	 to	 that	research	 site,	 the	 methods	 are	 introduced	 here	 rather	 than	 in	 a	 separate	chapter.	Each	of	the	final	 three	sections	of	this	chapter,	 thus,	discusses	not	only	 the	 conceptualisations	 of	 sexuality	 employed	 but	 also	 the	 methods	utilised	in	the	subsequent	three	chapters.			
Sexuality:	Procreation,	Identity,	Regulation		While	 the	 introduction	 covered	 my	 personal	 motivations	 for	 and	investments	 in	exploring	sexuality	through	a	non-identitarian	 lens	 in	some	detail,	 in	 this	 section	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 theoretical	 and	 epistemological	foundations	 for	doing	so.	My	 interest	here	 is	 in	unpacking	and	probing	on	
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the	 term	 ‘sexuality’	 itself,	 before	 moving	 onto	 the	 more	 specific	 ways	 in	which	it	is	deployed	throughout	this	thesis	in	the	rest	of	the	chapter.	I	focus,	firstly,	 on	 the	 interplay	 between	 the	 full	 array	 of	 sexual	 experiences,	practices,	 subjectivities,	 identities,	 and	 affects	 on	 the	 one	 hand;	 and	 the	dominant	 discursive	 deployments	 of	 sexuality	 as	 identities	 and/or	 as	procreation	on	the	other	–	the	latter	of	which,	I	argue,	always	fails	to	capture	the	 former	 in	 full.	Secondly,	 I	discuss	sexual	regulation	–	 the	approach	this	thesis	 loosely	 draws	 on	 throughout	 –	 making	 use	 of	 Michel	 Foucault’s	conceptualisation	 of	 disciplinary	 power.	 Finally,	 I	 briefly	 highlight	 the	overall	 orientation	 of	 this	 thesis	 towards	 examining	 discursive	 and	regulatory	sites	where	sexuality	is	not	explicitly	marked.	In	this	section	my	aim	 is	 to	 epistemologically	 and	 theoretically	 foreground	 this	 thesis’	 non-identity	 based	 analysis	 of	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy,	 focusing	 particularly	 on	approaches	 that	 emphasise	 processes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 over	 fixed	identities	or	subject	positions.	I	 begin	 with	 this	 much-quoted	 statement	 from	 Eve	 Kosofsky	Sedgwick’s	 Epistemology	 of	 the	 Closet	 regarding	 the	 variety	 in	 human	(sexual)	difference	in	order	to	highlight	its	continued	relevance	to	the	now,	as	well	as	specifically	to	my	project:	
Axiom	1:	People	are	different	from	each	other.	It	 is	 astonishing	 how	 few	 respectable	 conceptual	 tools	we	 have	for	dealing	with	this	self-evident	fact.	(1993:	247,	emphasis	in	the	original)	Indeed,	the	conceptual	tools	we	have	available	for	examining	and	theorising	sexuality,	 sexual	 difference,	 and	 intimacy	 beyond	 sexual	 orientation	 or	identity	 –	 or	 beyond	 biology	 and	 reproduction,	 depending	 on	 one’s	disciplinary	 location	 and	 attachments	 –	 continue	 to	 be	 limited.	 Sedgwick	insists	 that	 even	 people	 of	 the	 same	 gender,	 race,	 nationality,	 class,	 and	sexual	identity	or	orientation	can	have	profoundly	different	relationships	to	specific	genital	acts	and	gendered	meanings;	widely	varying	attachments	to	what	counts	as	‘the	sexual’	in	the	first	place;	as	well	as	different	views	as	to	
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the	importance	of	sexuality	to	their	self-perceived	identities.62	For	her,	these	differences	 retain	 ‘the	unaccounted-for	potential	 to	disrupt	many	 forms	of	the	 available	 thinking	 about	 sexuality’	 (ibid.:	 249).	 The	 deceptively	 simple	notion	 that	humans	differ	 greatly	 in	 their	 experiences	of,	 and	attachments	to,	 sexuality	 along	 many	 other	 axes	 than	 just	 that	 of	homosexual/heterosexual	 identification	 has	 significant	 consequences	 not	only	for	how	we	conceptualise	and	theorise	sexuality	more	broadly,	but	also	for	what	we	understand	sexual	regulation	specifically	to	comprise.		Sedgwick	 goes	 on	 to	 discuss	 sexuality	 as	 ‘the	 array	 of	 acts,	expectations,	narratives,	pleasures,	identity-formations,	and	knowledges,	in	both	 women	 and	men,	 that	 tends	 to	 cluster	 most	 densely	 around	 certain	genital	 sensations	 but	 is	 not	 adequately	 defined	by	 them’	 (ibid.:	 251).	 The	dominant	 discursive	 frameworks	 for	 comprehending	 and	 talking	 about	sexuality	 tend	 to	 suppress	 this	 full	 ‘array’	 of	 experiences,	 practices,	subjectivities,	 affects,	 and	 identities	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 they	 are	 funnelled	into	the	discrete	categories	of	the	heterosexual,	(bisexual,)	and	homosexual,	or	perhaps	 into	those	of	 the	procreative	and	non-procreative.	This	process	of	 funnelling	has	been	the	subject	of	much	queer	historical	work,	taking	its	inspiration	from	Foucault.	In	the	History	of	Sexuality	Foucault	(1998)	argues	that	 in	 the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries	discourses	around	sex	and	sexuality	 increasingly	concerned	deviant	 and	perverse	 sexuality,	positioned	in	 opposition	 to	 the	 norm	 of	 heterosexual	 coupledom.	 Four	 specific	mechanisms	 of	 knowledge	 and	 power	 centring	 on	 sex	 were	 formed:	 the	hysterisation	 of	women’s	 bodies,	 the	 pedagogisation	 of	 children’s	 sex,	 the	socialisation	of	procreative	behaviour,	and	the	psychiatrisation	of	perverse	pleasure	 –	 from	 which	 the	 figures	 of	 ‘the	 hysterical	 woman,	 the	masturbating	 child,	 the	 Malthusian	 couple,	 and	 the	 perverse	 adult’	 (ibid.:	105)	 emerged.	 In	 discussing	 the	 emergence	 of	 the	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘perverse	adult’,	 Foucault	 points	 at	 the	 emergence	 of	 homosexuality	 as	 a	 social	category.	 His	 argument	 highlights	 the	 historically	 contingent	 and	constructed	 nature	 of	 sexual	 identity	 categories	 –	 a	 notion	 subsequently																																																									62	See	also	Hoad	(2000)	on	how	what	counts	as	‘sexual’	itself	assumes	a	sameness	and	has	a	history	–	and,	thus,	needs	to	be	historicised.			
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taken	 up	 in	 many	 scholarly	 accounts	 concerning	 both	 the	 historical	 and	present	 formation	 of	 sexual	 identities. 63 	For	 instance	 Margot	 Canaday	(2009),	 following	 David	 Halperin’s	 genealogical	 approach,	 conceptualises	homosexuality	as	an	effect	of	a	cumulative	process,	whereby	a	range	of	prior	discourses	 about	 sexuality	 and	 sexual	 deviance	 are	 held	 together	 in	 an	unstable	manner.		Sedgwick	provides	an	important	modification	to	Foucault’s	narrative	about	the	development	of	modern-day	homosexuality,	however.	She	argues	that	 Foucault’s	 (as	 well	 as	 David	 Halperin’s)	 account	 of	 the	 history	 of	homosexuality	is	‘a	unidirectional	narrative	of	supersession’	(1993:	263),	in	that	 it	 presumes	 that	 the	 old	 way	 of	 organising,	 and	 model	 of,	 same-sex	relations	 is	 completely	 superseded	 by	 the	 new	 model	 –	 in	 this	 case,	homosexuality	 and	 heterosexuality	 as	 discrete	 identity	 categories	 and	subject	 positions.	 Conversely,	 for	 Sedgwick,	 different	models	may	 coexist:	for	 instance,	 the	 ‘old’	 emphasis	 on	 sexual	 acts	 over	 sexual	 identities	continues	to	live	on	in	popular	discourse	as	well	as	in	sodomy	statutes.	For	the	purposes	of	my	project,	it	is	important	to	differentiate	between	what	the	dominant	 discursive	 frameworks	 and	 the	 most	 commonly	 circulated	narratives	 have	 to	 say	 about	 sexuality,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	ways	 in	which	sexuality	is	lived	and	experienced	at	the	individual	level,	on	the	other.	That	 there	 tends	 to	be	a	 significant	distance	between	 the	 two	provides	an	important	starting	point	for	my	project.	The	ways	in	which	sexuality	is	lived	and	 experienced	 in	 the	 everyday	 –	 the	 above-mentioned	 full	 array	 of	experiences,	 practices,	 subjectivities,	 affects,	 and	 identities	 –	 is	 always	 in	
excess	of	 the	common	narratives	and	dominant	discourses	about	sexuality,	which	tend	to	either	assume	a	clear	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction	or	be	primarily	concerned	with	procreation.		Although	 the	 subsequent	 pages	 of	 this	 thesis	 mostly	 examine	
dominant	discourses	and	regulatory	processes	of	austerity	politics	in	order																																																									63	For	 historical	 analyses	 of	 the	 formation	 of	 sexual	 identities,	 see,	 for	 example,	 Halperin	(1990)	and	Katz	(1997).	See	also	Hennessy	(2000)	for	an	account	of	how	the	formation	of	sexual	identities	is	intrinsically	linked	to	capitalism	and	its	development;	and	Wittig	for	her	famous	 argument	 that	 ‘lesbians	 are	 not	 women’,	 because	 ‘“woman”	 has	meaning	 only	 in	heterosexual	 systems	of	 thought	 and	heterosexual	 economic	 systems’	 (1980:	 110)	 –	 thus	conceptualising	‘lesbian’	as	a	position	of	resistance.	
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to	 highlight	 the	 role	 that	 sexuality	 plays	 within	 them,	 they	 do	 not	 focus	explicitly	 on	 dominant	 sexuality	 discourses	 –	 ‘dominant’	 here	 referring	 to	identitarian	 understandings	 of	 sexuality.	 The	 socially	 constructed,	 and	therefore	 temporally	 and	 spatially	 contingent,	 nature	 of	 sexual	 identity	categories	can	certainly	be	seen	as	one	way	to	understand	sexual	regulation,	and	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 processes	 by	 which	 specific	 sexual	identities	are	constructed	can,	similarly,	be	examined	in	relation	to	political,	economic,	 and	 cultural	 formations	 such	 as	 neoliberalisation	 or	 austerity.	However,	my	overall	aim	in	this	thesis	is	not	just	to	stress	the	importance	of	considering	sexuality	in	scholarly	analyses	of	political	economic	formations,	but	also	to	intervene	epistemologically	in	sexuality	scholarship	to	highlight	the	many	non-identitarian	ways	in	which	sexuality	matters	in	the	present.	I	have,	therefore,	chosen	not	to	focus	on	the	potential	regulatory	interactions	between	 austerity	 politics,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 sexual	 identities	 or	gendered	 subject	 positions,	 on	 the	 other	 –	 as	 many	 of	 the	 approaches	discussed	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 do.	 Instead,	 my	 aim	 is,	 to	 borrow	 J.	 K.	Gibson-Graham’s	phrasing,	‘to	clear	a	discursive	space	for’	(1996:	xli)	–	and	perhaps	even,	à	la	 Sedgwick,	provide	 some	conceptual	 tools	 for	 theorising	about	 –	 the	 many	 non-dominant	 and	 non-identitarian	 ways	 in	 which	sexuality	operates	within	austerity’s	discursive	and	regulatory	functioning.		To	get	at	the	ways	in	which	sexuality	is,	in	its	non-identitarian	senses,	embedded	 and	 deployed	 in	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 functioning	 of	austerity,	my	focus	in	this	thesis	overall	is	on	processes	of	sexual	regulation.	I	 draw	 loosely	 on	 Foucault	 (1979)	 for	 my	 understanding	 of	 ‘sexual	regulation.’	 He	 	 argues	 that	 in	 the	 eighteenth	 and	 nineteenth	 centuries	 a	shift	 in	 regimes	 of	 punishment	 occurred	 in	 many	 Western	 societies,	involving	 the	 increasing	 use	 of	 disciplinary	 technologies	 of	 power.	Disciplinary	 power	 flows	 through	 the	 capillaries	 of	 the	 social	 body,	 as	opposed	to	the	operation	of	more	traditional	 forms	of	repressive	power	 in	the	 hands	 of	 a	 sovereign	 ruler.	 Repressive,	 sovereign	 power	 is	 here	contrasted	 with	 productive,	 normalising	 power,	 which	 operates	 on	individual	 bodies.	 Importantly,	 however,	 disciplinary	 power	 has	 not	 fully	replaced	 sovereign	 power	 but	 is,	 instead,	 operating	 alongside	 it.	 While	
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disciplinary	power	may	be	exercised	by	institutions,	including	the	state,	it	is	not	restricted	to	its	institutional	deployments:		‘Discipline’	may	be	identified	neither	with	an	institution	nor	with	an	 apparatus;	 it	 is	 a	 type	 of	 power,	 a	modality	 for	 its	 exercise,	comprising	 a	 whole	 set	 of	 instruments,	 techniques,	 procedures,	levels	 of	 application,	 targets;	 it	 is	 a	 ‘physics’	 or	 an	 ‘anatomy’	 of	power,	a	technology.	(ibid.:	215)	Disciplinary	power	is,	thus,	an	individualising	technology	of	power,	centring	on	the	individual	body	(ibid.;	Foucault	1997).64	For	 Foucault,	 the	 individual	 subject	 is	 ‘not	 the	 vis-à-vis	 of	 power;	[but]	 one	 of	 its	 prime	 effects’	 (1980:	 98).	 As	 such,	 the	 production	 of	
gendered	 subjectivity	 has	 been	 one	 key	 way	 in	 which	 his	 account	 of	disciplinary	 power	 has	 been	 taken	 up	 by	 feminist	 theorists.	 For	 example,	Sandra	Bartky’s	 (1988)	 influential	essay	deploys	a	Foucauldian	conception	of	 power	 to	 highlight	 the	 gendered	nature	 of	 disciplinary	 practices;	 Susan	Bordo	 analyses	 ‘the	 contemporary	 preoccupation	 with	 slenderness	 as	 it	functions	 within	 a	modern,	 “normalizing”	machinery	 of	 power	 in	 general,	and,	in	particular,	as	it	functions	to	reproduce	gender	relations’	(1998:	215);	and	 Jana	 Sawicki	 (1991)	 advances	 a	 Foucauldian	 analysis	 of	 how	reproductive	technologies	discipline	mothers.	Sasho	A.	Lambevski’s	(1999)	analysis	 of	 the	 microphysics	 of	 power	 that	 operate	 through	 nationalist	discourses	on	gay	men’s	bodies	to	structure	and	regulate	their	engagements	in	the	gay	scene	in	Skopje,	Macedonia,	provides	an	important	example	of	the	use	of	 the	Foucauldian	concept	of	disciplinary	power	 in	queer	scholarship.	Many	 feminist	 and	 queer	 approaches,	 however,	 as	 well	 as	 utilising	 the	Foucauldian	notions	of	disciplinary	power	and	subjectivation,	also	critique	them.	 Elizabeth	 Grosz	 (1994),	 for	 example,	 points	 out	 that	 Foucault’s	approach	does	not	adequately	account	for	the	specific	modes	of	materiality	of	racialised	and	sexed	bodies.65	
																																																								64	Conversely,	for	Foucault,	biopower	–	which	emerged	slightly	after	disciplinary	power	–	is	a	 ‘massifying’	 one,	 not	 directed	 at	 ‘man-as-body	 but	 at	 man-as-species’	 (Foucault	 1997:	243).	65	See	also	Stoler’s	(1995)	critique	of	Foucault,	focusing	on	the	colonial	origins	and	nature	of	disciplinary	power.		
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Many	 scholarly	 approaches	 such	 as	 the	 ones	 highlighted	 above	 –	despite	 in	 their	 own	 right	 being	 important	 interventions	 into	 both	 the	operation	 of	 disciplinary	 power	 and	 the	 processes	 of	 gendered	subjectivation	 –	 begin	 with	 an	 assumption	 about	 the	 consequences	 of	disciplinary	 processes	 for	 specifically	 gendered	 or	 sexualised	 bodies.66	However,	as	Sedgwick	argues	in	relation	to	gender,	a	great	‘heuristic	leap	of	feminism	 has	 been	 the	 recognition	 that	 categories	 of	 gender	 and,	 hence,	oppressions	of	gender	can	have	a	structuring	force	for	nodes	of	thought,	for	axes	 of	 cultural	 discrimination	 whose	 thematic	 subject	 isn’t	 explicitly	gendered	at	all’	(1993:	254).67	While	Sedgwick	is	specifically	concerned	with	dichotomies	such	as	nature/culture,	active/passive,	and	public/private,	her	argument	 is	 also	 of	 a	 wider	 relevance.	 In	 this	 thesis	 I	 investigate	 the	assumptions	 about,	 and	 the	 implications	 for,	 sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives,	subjects,	and	politics	embedded	in	particular	policy	and	media	sites	–	even	when	sexuality	is	not	(and	it	usually	is	not)	explicitly	mentioned	in	them	at	all.	Thus,	my	interest	here	is	not	as	much	in	texts	where,	to	use	Sedgwick’s	wording,	‘the	culturally	“marked”	[sexuality]	is	[--]	present	as	either	author	or	thematic’	(ibid.:	254).	Instead,	I	turn	to	texts	that	–	despite	their	evident	
lack	 of	 the	 explicit	 cultural	markers	 of	 sexuality,	 sexual	 identity,	 or	 sexual	subjectivity	 –	 nonetheless	 depend	 on	 particular	 understandings	 and	 value	judgements	related	to	sexual	and	intimate	lives	and	subjects	and,	thus,	have	significant	implications	for	sexual	politics.	Despite	the	above,	sexuality	does	of	course	also	pertain	to	identities	and	 subjects.	 In	 the	 dominant	 discursive	 frameworks	 available	 for	discussing	 and	 theorising	 sexuality,	 it	 is,	 further,	 frequently	 assumed	 to	pertain	more	to	sexual	minority,	LG(b),	or	queer	identities	and	subjects	than	to	straight,	heteronormative	ones.	This	does	not,	however,	mean	that	it	does	not	 matter	 at	 all	 to	 subjects	 and	 identities	 other	 than	 a	 priori	 sexualised	ones.	Key	to	my	investigations	of	sexual	or	sexualised	subjectivities	is,	thus,	
																																																								66	Smith’s	 (2002)	 investigation	 into	 sexual	 regulation	 within	 welfare	 policy	 in	 the	 US	provides	a	key	exception	to	this	tendency,	as	she	–	similarly	to	my	analysis	in	Chapter	3	–	thinks	processes	of	sexual	regulation	and	welfare	reform	together.	67	Sedgwick’s	 (1993)	 overall	 project	 is	 here	 to	 examine	 the	 structuring	 force	 that	 the	homosexual/heterosexual	binary	distinction	has	for	Western	nodes	of	thought.	
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another	deceptively	simple	notion,	this	time	by	Avery	Gordon	–	 ‘that	 life	 is	complicated’	 (1997:	5).	For	her,	 this	 ‘is	a	 theoretical	 statement	 that	guides	efforts	to	treat	race,	class,	and	gender	dynamics	and	consciousness	as	more	dense	and	delicate	 than	 those	categorical	 terms	often	 imply’	 (ibid.:	5).	The	many	 axes	 of	 difference	 often	 grouped	 under	 the	 intersectional	mantra	 of	race,	class,	and	gender,68	as	well	as	the	oppressions	resulting	from	them,	are	‘differently	structured’	(Sedgwick	1993:	253,	emphasis	in	the	original).	They	are	also	more	complexly	 interrelated	and	 interdependent	 than	 tends	 to	be	assumed	by	current	conceptual	tools	and	theoretical	models,	as	Matt	Wray	(2006)	argues.	Thus,	while	my	analysis	in	this	thesis	is	intersectional	in	the	sense	that	it	does	not	treat	sexuality	as	a	standalone	axis	of	difference,	at	the	same	time	it	does	not	examine	sexuality	as	an	identity	category	 that	neatly	intersects	with	other	identity	categories.		Judith	 Butler	 (2008)	 and	 Cathy	 Cohen	 (1997)	 have	 both,	 albeit	 in	rather	different	contexts	and	theoretical	modalities,	attempted	to	deal	with	the	 problems	 that	 arise	 from	 basing	 a	 politics	 on	 personal	 freedom	 or	 on	identitarian	 claims.	 Instead,	 they	 focus	 on	 critiquing	 state	 violence	 (in	Butler’s	case),	or	on	privileging	one’s	relation	to	power	as	a	determinant	of	political	 collectivities	 (in	 Cohen’s	 case).	 Along	 somewhat	 similar	 lines,	Davina	Cooper	suggests	that	while	we	may	not	want	to	let	go	of	attending	to	‘the	 inequalities	 associated	 with	 racializing,	 gendering,	 and	 economic	processes,	among	others’,	we	may,	in	fact,	want	to	let	go	‘of	the	compulsion	to	attach	inequality	to	identity-based	groups’	(2014:	60).	For	her,	this	might	mean	 ‘reading	 inequality	 as	 a	 problem	 of	 practices,	 spaces,	 and	 ways	 of	living,	 or	 it	 might	 mean	 recognizing	 how	 historically	 contingent	 and	incomplete	 the	 list	 of	 grounds	 actually	 is’	 (ibid:	 60).	My	analysis	 attempts,	similarly,	to	highlight	the	significant	role	that	sexuality	and	intimacy	play	in	structuring	 and	 underpinning	 inequalities	 generated	 or	 maintained	 by	austerity	 politics	 –	 whether	 these	 inequalities	 attach	 to	 particular,	 for	example	 racialised	 or	 classed,	 subjects,	 or	 instead	 to	 specific	 processes,	practices,	structures,	or	spaces.	At	times	it	is,	indeed,	judgements	about	the	value	of	differently	 lived	sexual	and	intimate	 lives	that	 lead	to	 inequalities,																																																									68	Especially	following	the	seminal	work	of	Crenshaw	(1989,	1991).	
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but	 at	 other	 times	 sexuality	 plays	 more	 of	 a	 supporting	 role	 in	 the	maintenance	of,	for	instance,	racialised	and	classed	inequalities.		As	mentioned	above,	throughout	this	thesis	my	focus	is	frequently	on	sites	 and	 texts	 that	do	not	explicitly	 name	sexuality	or	 intimacy.	This	does	not,	however,	mean	that	I	am	always	concerned	with	hidden	meanings	over	
surface	ones.	Stephen	Best	and	Sharon	Marcus	(2009)	discuss	Ann	Stoler’s	(2009)	examination	of	 imperial	violence	as	an	example	of	 ‘surface	reading’	and	conclude	 that	 for	Stoler	 the	colonial	 state’s	 interests	 in	 family	 life	and	intimacy	 are	 ‘a	 genuine	 preoccupation,	 not	 [--]	 “metaphors	 for	 something	else”’	(Stoler	cited	in	Best	and	Marcus	2009:	12).69	My	argument	in	Chapter	3	 that	 poverty	 discourses	 are	 increasingly	 familialised	 and	 privatised,	similarly,	 indicates	a	genuine	policy	preoccupation	with	 the	 family	and	 the	private	 sphere.	The	 sexual	meanings	 and	assumptions	 I	 trace	 across	 three	policy	 texts	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	not	hidden	 in	or	by	 the	 texts	 themselves	 –	although	 they	 may	 be	 less	 easily	 recognisable	 due	 to	 the	 overwhelming	tendency	to	associate	sexuality	only	or	primarily	with	particular	subjects.		In	the	case	of	Chapters	4	and	5,	the	situation	is	slightly	more	complex,	however.	 In	 the	 former,	 I	 develop	 the	 methodological	 and	 conceptual	approach	 of	 ‘figurative	 economies’	 –	 explored	 in	 more	 detail	 below	 –	 to	argue	 that	 the	 representational	 processes	 by	 which	 particular	 figurations	are	 sexualised	 and	 racialised	 gain	 meaning	 through	 their	 participation	 in	certain	 figurative	 economies.	 This	 approach	 allows	 for	 various	 other	readings	to	also	emerge,	with	the	chapter’s	discussion	pointing	at	the	ways	in	 which	 the	 texts’	 situatedness	 within	 certain	 prevalent	 figurative	economies,	 nonetheless,	 conditions	 their	 reception.	 In	 the	 latter,	 the	question	of	 intent	 is	deliberately	 left	outside	of	 the	 frame	of	analysis.	Here	my	focus	is	on	processes	of	service	delivery	and	policy	implementation,	and	the	 various	 intimate	 disruptions	 they	 engender	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 affected	individuals.	 Whether	 these	 intimate	 disruptions	 are	 a	 ‘genuine	
																																																								69	Best	 and	 Marcus’s	 focus	 on	 ‘surface	 reading’	 is	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 turn,	 particularly	 in	literary	studies,	towards	descriptive,	surface-oriented,	and/or	empirical	reading	methods	–	which	 Love	 (2010,	 2013)	 terms	 ‘the	 descriptive	 turn.’	 See	 Felski	 (2015)	 on	 ‘post-critical’	reading,	Latour	 (2004)	on	empiricism,	Sedgwick	 (2003)	on	 ‘reparative’	 reading,	and	Love	(2010,	2013)	herself	on	‘close’	reading.	
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preoccupation’	of	 the	 state	actors	 involved	 in	 these	processes,	however,	 is	not	 explored.	 Rather,	 the	 central	 argument	 of	 the	 chapter	 is	 that	 the	processes	 by	 which	 the	 state’s	 functions	 and	 form	 are	 being	 shaped	 and	shifted	 due	 to	 neoliberalisation	 (as	 I	 argued	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter)	themselves	 materialise	 as	 certain	 significant	 disruptions	 in	 the	 intimate	sphere	–	whether	 intentional	or	not.	 In	the	rest	of	 this	chapter	I	unpack	 in	more	detail	the	three	conceptualisations	of	sexuality	and	intimacy	employed	and	 taken	 forward	 in	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 thesis’	 analysis:	 sexual	 subjectivities,	sexual	 inequality,	 and	 intimate	 disruptions	 –	with	 a	 concomitant	 focus	 on	the	 three	 methods	 utilised:	 figuration,	 (policy-as-)discourse	 analysis,	 and	analysis	of	processes	of	policy	implementation	and	service	delivery.		
	
Sexual	Subjectivities:	Figuration		While	my	overall	focus	is	on	non-identitarian	forms	of	sexuality	and	sexual	regulation,	sexual	subjectivities	do	also	form	a	part	of	this	thesis’	analysis.	As	mentioned	above,	generally	the	scholarly	(and	broader)	tendency	is	to	view	as	 sexual	 subjects	 specifically	 those	 subjects	 who	 deviate	 from	heterosexuality	and	heteronormativity	–	and	whose	subjectivation	 is,	 thus,	often	thought	to	be	centrally	structured	by	sexuality.	Thus,	the	Foucauldian	notion	of	the	key	sexual	 ‘figures’	–	the	hysterical	woman,	the	masturbating	child,	the	Malthusian	couple,	and	the	perverse	adult	–	that	emerged	as	part	of	the	proliferation	of	sexuality	discourses	in	the	eighteenth	and	nineteenth	centuries,	remains	significant	in	that	the	extent	to	which	particular	subjects	are	 considered	 sexual	subjects	 tends	 to	 correlate	with	 their	distance	 from	the	heteronormative	couple.	However,	a	key	argument	this	thesis	makes	in	relation	to	sexual	subjectivities	is	that	it	is	not	just	sexual	minority,	LG(b),	or	queer	 subjects	 whose	 subjectivation	 involves	 and,	 indeed,	 depends	 on,	processes	of	sexualisation.	In	the	context	of	neoliberalising	austerity	politics,	the	 forms	of	 racialising,	 classing,	and	gendering	 that	mark	certain	subjects	as	 less	 or	more	 valuable	 –	 and	 consequently,	 as	 less	 or	more	 deserving	 –	interact	with,	and	in	many	cases	depend	on,	processes	of	sexualisation,	too.	In	this	section	I	examine	these	processes	of	sexual	subjectivation,	as	well	as	introduce	the	figurative	methodological	approach	employed	in	Chapter	4.		
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Imogen	 Tyler	 argues	 that	 the	 representational	 struggles	 that	generate	and	characterise	social	classifications	‘are	often	played	out	within	highly	 condensed	 figurative	 forms’	 (2008:	 18).	 She	 develops	 a	 figurative	methodology	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 specific	 social	 types	become	 overdetermined	 in	 excessive	 and	 caricatured	 ways	 in	 the	 public	imaginary	 –	 in	 her	 case	 in	 the	 figuration	 ‘the	 chav.’	 Figuration	 as	 a	methodology	has	generated	rich	scholarship	that	has	attended	to	figures	or	social	 types	 in	which	 social	 classifications	 from	 race	 and	 class	 to	 religion,	gender,	sexuality,	and	age	condense	–	although	not	all	scholars	working	on	the	coalescing	of	social	classifications	into	highly	condensed	‘types’	in	public	imaginaries	 use	 the	 terminology	 of	 figuration.	 Wray	 (2006)	 and	 Premilla	Nadasen	 (2007),	 for	 instance,	 employ	 the	 terminology	 of	 ‘stereotypes’	 in	their	 examinations	 of	 the	 ‘white	 trash’	 and	 ‘welfare	 queen’	 figurations,	respectively;	 and	 Ange-Marie	 Hancock	 (2004)	 conceptualises	 ‘the	 welfare	queen’	as	a	‘public	identity.’	Nonetheless,	what	is	common	in	these	accounts	is	 their	 focus	 on	 unpacking	 the	 specific	 historical	 and	 contextual	representational	dynamics	and	struggles	that	have	 led	to	the	condensation	of	 social	 classifications	 into	 particular	 excessive	 caricatures	 in	 public	imaginaries	 –	 as	 well	 as	 their	 emphasis	 on	 examining	 the	 political	 and	cultural	 consequences	 of	 the	 circulation	 of	 such	 figurations	 within	 policy	and	media	discourses.	Sara	Ahmed	focuses	on	figures	as	dense	affective	transfer	points	and	argues	that	‘the	construction	of	the	bogus	asylum	seeker	as	a	figure	of	hate	also	 involves	 a	 narrative	 of	 uncertainty	 and	 crisis,	 but	 an	 uncertainty	 and	crisis	 that	 make	 that	 figure	 do	 more	 work’	 (2004:	 122,	 emphasis	 in	 the	original).	For	her,	the	uncertainty	of	the	narratives	pertaining	to	the	‘bogus	asylum	seeker’	figuration	relates	to	the	impossibility	of	ever,	with	certainty,	being	 able	 to	 tell	 the	 difference	 between	 ‘bogus’	 and	 ‘genuine’	 asylum	seekers.	Tyler,	similarly,	points	out	that	‘ambivalence	is	the	currency	of	the	national	 abject	 insofar	 as	 it	 permits	 the	 endless	 reconfiguration	 of	 abject	others’	 (2013:	 9)	 in	 shifting	 historical	 and	 discursive	 contexts.70	Figures,																																																									70	Tyler	 (2013)	 draws	 on	 Homi	 Bhabha’s	 work	 both	 in	 her	 discussion	 of	 national	 abject	figures	and	in	her	formulation	of	a	figurative	methodology.	
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thus,	accumulate	and	are	endowed	with	–	usually	negative	–	affect	through	their	mediation	and	circulation,	which	is	further	aided	by	them	not	having	a	fixed	 reference	 point.	 Figurations	 are	 always	 in	 excess	 of	 what	 can	 be	logically	or	empirically	proven	about	particular	 subjects.	However,	despite	the	empirical	distance	between	particular	figurations	and	the	subjects	they	supposedly	pertain	to,	figures	are,	nonetheless,	a	subjectifying	force,	as	Tyler	(ibid.)	 suggests.	 Subjectivities	 are	 produced	 within	 a	 particular	 discursive	context	through	processes	of	interpellation,	whereby	subjects	are	hailed	into	place	 as	 the	 social	 subjects	 of	 particular	 discourses	 (Blackman	 and	Walkerdine	 2001).71	As	 I	 discuss	 in	 more	 detail	 below,	 dense	 figurations,	such	as	the	‘chav’	and	the	‘bogus	asylum	seeker’,	form	a	part	of	the	broader	discursive	context	within	which	subjectivation	takes	place	and	 from	which	its	discursive	resources	are	drawn.	Ahmed	 further	 points	 out	 that	 proximity	 between	 figures	 may	increase	 their	power	and	affective	 resonance.	 She	discusses	 the	discursive	‘slide’	 between	 the	 figures	 of	 the	 ‘bogus	 asylum	 seeker’	 and	 the	 ‘terrorist’	and	argues	that	the	proximity	and	potential	slippage	between	them	does	a	lot	of	work:	 ‘it	 assumes	 that	 those	who	 seek	asylum,	who	 flee	 from	 terror	and	persecution,	may	be	bogus	 insofar	as	 they	could	be	 the	very	agents	of	terror	and	persecution’	(2004:	136).	As	well	as	the	slippage	between	current	figurative	 formations,	 the	 affective	 resonance	 of	 figurations	 may	 increase	through	 their	association	with	earlier,	historical	 figures.	Tracey	 Jensen,	 for	instance,	 argues	 that	 the	 ‘skiver	 inherits	 the	 ideological	 baggage	 of	preceding	 abject	 figures;	 the	 single	 mother,	 the	 troubled	 family,	 the	unemployed,	 absent	 or	 feckless	 father’	 (2014).	 Thus,	 figures	 act	 as	 dense	focal	points	of	affective	transfer,	but,	importantly,	these	affects	animate	and	open	up	past	histories.	Ahmed	bases	her	analysis	on	Franz	Fanon’s	(2008)	often-cited	 passage	 describing	 his	 encounter	 with	 a	 white	 boy	 and	 his	mother,	 in	which	the	white	boy’s	 fear	 ‘opens	up	past	histories	that	stick	to	
																																																								71 	Blackman	 and	 Walkerdine	 (2001)	 utilise	 Louis	 Althusser’s	 conceptualisation	 of	‘interpellation’,	 as	 do	 many	 other	 scholars	 who	 examine	 and	 theorise	 processes	 of	subjectivation.	On	subjectivation,	see	also	Butler	(1990),	Hall	(1996)	and	Foucault’s	works,	as	discussed	above.	
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the	 present’	 (Ahmed	 2004:	 126).72	For	 Ahmed,	 Fanon’s	 description	 of	 this	encounter	 illustrates	 how	 histories	 of	 colonialism	 remain	 alive	 in	 the	present	because	of	the	way	in	which	they	are	reanimated	by	the	circulation	of	affects.	The	past	histories	do	not	need	to	be	named	or,	in	fact,	cognitively	recognised,	 because	 the	 affective	 circulation	alone	 ‘sticks’	 certain	histories	to	certain	bodies.	In	other	words,	some	objects	or	bodies	are	made	to	seem	more	‘fearsome’	than	others	by	the	histories	that	stick	to	them.73		In	 this	 thesis,	 figurations	 are,	 thus,	 conceptualised	 as	 dense	 focal	points	 of	 affective	 transfer	 and	 accumulation,	 as	 well	 as	 sites	 for	 the	animation	 of	 particular	 histories	 through	 the	 transfer	 of	 affect.	 Both	Hancock	(2004)	and	Tyler	 (2008,	2013)	 focus	on	 the	role	of	disgust	 in	 the	circulation	of	their	respective	figurations.	Hancock,	for	instance,	argues	that	long-standing	 perceptions	 of	 black	 women	 as	 ‘lazy’	 and	 ‘promiscuous’,	imbricated	with	misperceptions	 about	 gender,	 race,	 and	 class,	 coalesce	 in	the	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘welfare	 queen.’	 As	 both	 Nadasen	 (2007)	 and	 Hancock	(2004)	 point	 out,	 the	 figuration	 of	 the	 ‘welfare	 queen’	 plays	 into	 public	anxieties	about	undeserving	welfare	recipients.74	In	this	thesis,	similarly,	the	many	 figurations	 pertaining	 to	 benefit	 recipients	 –	 popularised	 and	intensely	circulated	within	austerity	discourse	–	are	intimately	connected	to	imaginaries	 of	 deservingness.	 The	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	 and	 other	 similar	figurations	 signify	 ‘an	underlying	 social	 crisis	or	anxiety’	 (Tyler	2008:	18).	They	 play	 into	 anxieties	 about	 welfare	 dependency	 and	 are	 frequently	deployed	 in	 policy	 and	 media	 discourses	 ‘as	 symbolic	 and	 material	scapegoats’	(Tyler	2013:	9)	for	the	‘overly	generous’	welfare	state.	As	Jensen	(2014)	 further,	 points	 out,	 it	 is	 particularly	 during	 (perceived)	 times	 of	crisis,	 when	 new	 forms	 of	 commonsense	 are	 condensing,	 that	 figurations																																																									72	See	also	Ahmed’s	(2000)	analysis	of	Lorde’s	(1984)	description	of	her	bodily	encounter	as	a	child	with	a	white	woman	–	an	encounter	that	similarly	evokes	histories	of	racism.	73	Puar	(2007)	both	engages	with	and	adds	an	important	corrective	to	Ahmed’s	account	of	the	 ‘stickiness’	 of	 affects	 such	 as	 fear,	 as	 she	 highlights	 the	 importance	 of	 the	 embodied	nature	of	encounters	that	are	imbricated	with	racialised	fear.	74	Similarly	to	the	anxieties	about	deservingness	animated	by	the	‘welfare	queen’,	the	‘chav’	figuration	 represents	 social	 anxieties	 about	 the	 feared	 social	 mobility	 of	 the	 working	classes,	 working-class	 women’s	 reproduction	 and	 sexuality,	 and	 ‘racial	 mixing’	 (Tyler	2008);	and	the	‘bogus	asylum	seeker’	animates	anxieties	about	the	permeability	of	both	the	physical	borders	of	the	nation-state	and	the	symbolic	boundaries	of	the	social	body	(Ahmed	2004;	cf.	Tyler	2013;	White	2014).	
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become	 essential	 scapegoats	 in	 national	 discourses. 75 	Considering	 the	frequent	 deployment	 of	 austerity	 rhetoric	 to	 signal	 an	 exceptional	 time	 of	national	crisis,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter,	it	is	no	wonder	that	it	is	particularly	 at	 this	 time	 that	 these	 figurations	 have	 gained	 increasing	representational	force	within	public	imaginaries.	However,	 my	 approach	 differs	 from	 most	 of	 the	 ones	 highlighted	above	in	that,	rather	than	necessarily	in	a	specific	figure,	I	am	interested	in	the	 role	 that	 sexuality	plays	 in	 the	processes	by	which	 various	 figurations	are	condensed	and	circulated	in	the	public	imaginaries	of	austerity	politics.	Thus,	while	the	above	theorists	tend	to	be	concerned	with	the	deployments	and	circulations	of	a	particular	figuration,	my	 focus	 is	on	a	 loose	cluster	of	figurations	–	those	pertaining	to	benefit	recipients,	and	frequently	deployed	within	austerity	discourses.	In	order	to	examine	the	role	that	sexuality	plays	within	 the	 consolidation	 and	 circulation	 of	 this	 cluster	 of	 figurations,	 in	Chapter	 4	 I	 use	 and	 develop	 the	 methodological	 approach	 of	 ‘figurative	economies.’	Here	I	draw	on	Ahmed’s	work	on	‘affective	economies’,	in	which	she	argues	that	‘affect	does	not	reside	in	an	object	or	sign,	but	is	an	affect	of	the	 circulation	 between	 objects	 and	 signs’	 (2004:	 120).	 Similarly,	 in	 my	analysis,	 figurations	–	or	 the	discourses	 that	cluster	around	 them	–	do	not	originate	 or	 reside	 in	 particular	 representational	 objects,	 but	 rather	circulate	 between	 them.	 Thus,	 a	 particular	 media	 text	 becomes	 one	 node	within	the	broader	figurative	economies	of	the	‘benefit	scrounger/recipient’,	rather	 than	 the	origin	or	destination	of	 the	discourses	 that	 cluster	 around	this	 hybrid	 figuration.	 Further,	 and	 akin	 to	 Ahmed’s	 argument	 about	affective	accumulation	over	time,	figurations	can	gain	representational	force	as	an	effect	of	 their	movement	between	different	 representational	objects:	‘the	more	they	circulate,	[--]	the	more	they	appear	to	“contain”	affect’	(ibid.:	120)	–	or	in	my	case,	representational	power	and	significance.		By	 extending	 figurative	 methodologies	 in	 this	 way,	 I	 am	 able	 to	examine	the	entanglement	of	the	various	benefit	recipient	characters	in	my	source	 materials	 in	 the	 figurative	 economies	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’,	‘skiver’,	 ‘chav’,	 and	 the	 single	 mother	 on	 benefits	 or	 ‘benefits-mum’																																																									75	See	the	next	section	for	a	discussion	about	‘commonsense’	knowledges.	
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simultaneously.	 Further,	 this	 approach	 allows	me	 to	 focus	 on	 the	 broader	processes	of	sexualisation	and	racialisation	that	enable	 these	characters	 to	be	 read	 as	 belonging	 to	 the	 same	 figurative	 economies	where	 the	 ‘benefit	scrounger’	and	 ‘chav’	 circulate.	As	should	be	clear	by	now,	 sexuality	 is	not	the	 sole	 social	 classification	 that	 condenses	 in	 the	 figuration	 of	 benefit	recipients	in	the	austerity	era	–	racialisation,	classing,	gendering,	and	other	processes	also	play	a	role,	to	varying	degrees.	Further,	as	highlighted	in	the	previous	 section,	 these	 processes	 are	 not	 equivalent	 to	 one	 another	 but,	instead,	 highly	 historically	 and	 contextually	 specific.	 Following	 Stoler’s	(1995,	 2002)	 and	 Anne	 McClintock’s	 (1995)	 work	 on	 the	 colonial	production	 and	 regulation	 of	 race,	 sexuality,	 and	 class,	 Beverley	 Skeggs	(1997,	2004)	 argues	 that	 a	moral	 reading	of	women’s	bodies	 and	 (sexual)	practices	initiated	the	first	class	categories.	For	Skeggs,	‘sex,	gender	and	race	difference	 were	 the	 means	 by	 which	 class	 came	 to	 be	 known,	 spoken,	experienced	and	valued’	 (2004:	37).	Class	relations,	 thus,	materialised	and	came	into	view	through	the	trope	of	respectability	in	such	a	way	that	class	judgements	are	intimately	connected	to	judgements	about	(sexual)	morality	and	 respectability	 (Skeggs	 2009a).76	She	 argues	 that	 ‘in	 any	 definition	 of	respectability,	 sexuality	 lurks	 beneath	 the	 inscription’	 (2004:	 38),	highlighting	 the	 interrelatedness	 of	 processes	 of	 classing	 to	 sexuality	discourses.	Skeggs’s	 work,	 thus,	 importantly	 highlights	 not	 only	 the	 intimate	relationship	between	class	and	sexuality	in	specific	historical	contexts,	but	it	also	 points	 at	 the	 different	 ways	 in	 which	 processes	 of	 classing	 and	sexualising	operate	and	relate	to	each	other	in	particular	discursive	contexts.	For	her,	class	and	sexuality	are	not	equivalent	and	coherent	categories.	Nor	are	 they	 knowable	 in	 advance	 –	 her	 research	 specifically	 investigates	 the	constitution	 of	 class	 as	 a	 social	 category	 through	 judgements	 of	 sexual	morality	 and	 respectability.	 Another	 example	 of	 a	 detailed	 analysis	 of	 the	different	ways	 in	which	 processes	 of	 social	 classification	 depend	 on	 other	social	 classifications	 can	 be	 found	 in	 Stuart	 Hall	 and	 his	 colleagues’	argument	that	 ‘race	 is	 the	modality	 in	which	class	 is	 lived’	(1978:	394)	 for																																																									76	On	class	and	respectability	politics,	see	also	Alexander	(1994)	and	Brown	(2015).	
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the	black	British	working	class.	Hall	et	al.	view	processes	of	racialisation	as	central	to	the	construction	of	the	black	working	class	within	the	context	of	the	 1970s	 moral	 panics	 about	 mugging.	 Both	 examples	 highlight	 the	importance	 of	 not	 deciding	 in	 advance	 what	 constitutes	 class	 or	 race,	 or	sexuality	 in	a	given	context.	As	 Juana	Maria	Rodriguez	states	 in	relation	to	her	own	work,	‘rather	than	marshal	the	well-worn	triad	of	race,	gender,	and	sexuality	 as	 knowable	 and	 coherent	 categories,	 this	 text	 is	 invested	 in	making	visible	the	ways	these	terms	are	activated	on	the	level	of	the	psychic	and	the	corporeal’	(2014:	23,	emphasis	mine).	Similarly,	in	this	thesis,	I	am	interested	 in	 examining	 the	 processes	 –	 of	 sexualisation,	 racialisation,	gendering,	and	classing	–	that	are	activated	 to	make	a	particular	 figuration	coherent	and	legible.	Finally,	 I	 want	 to	 point	 at	 the	 interplay	 between	 processes	 of	figuration	 and	 subjectivation,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 that	 between	subjectivation	 and	 identification,	 on	 the	 other.	 As	 highlighted	 above,	figurations	 play	 a	 role	 in	 processes	 of	 subjectivation	 –	 despite	 their	 (both	representational	and	affective)	excessiveness	in	comparison	to	any	particular	subjects	they	may	seek,	or	be	deployed,	to	represent.	While	figurations	are	not	directly	attributable	to	particular	subjects	or	bodies,	their	discursive	and	affective	force	may,	nonetheless,	extend	to	the	ways	in	which	certain	bodies	are	 read	 by	 others	 and,	 consequently,	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 particular	subjects	 are	 able	 to	 move	 in	 the	 world.	 Thus,	 the	 hailing	 of	 particular	subjects	into	place	as	classed	subjects,	 for	example,	 is	strongly	interrelated	to,	and	dependent	on,	the	available	discursive	schema,	of	which	the	classed	figurations	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	 or	 ‘welfare	 dependent’	 ‘skiver’,	 for	instance,	 form	 a	 key	 part.77	For	 Ahmed	 (2004),	 figures	 are	 detached	 from	particular	bodies,	but	particular	bodies	may	certainly	be	read	as	being	more	closely	associated	with	certain	 figures.	Thus,	part	of	 the	work	the	 figure	of	the	‘terrorist’,	for	example,	does,	is	the	‘could-be-ness’	that	allows	for	certain	bodies	to	be	read	as	a	priori	associated	with	terrorism.	‘Fear	sticks	to	these	bodies	 [--]	 that	 “could	 be”	 terrorist’	 (ibid.:	 135),	 with	 significant	 material																																																									77	See	Tyler	(2013)	for	multiple	analyses	of	the	ways	in	which	various	dense	figurations	are	resisted	and	refused	by	those	they	claim	to	represent.		
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consequences	for	those	repeatedly	read	in	this	way	–	from	the	state’s	power	to	detain	in	Ahmed’s	example,	to	increased	surveillance,	restricted	mobility,	and	punitive	welfare	reforms	in	the	case	of	other	figurations.78	As	 well	 as	 the	 relationship	 between	 figurations	 and	 processes	 of	subjectivation,	it	is	important	to	point	at	the	interrelatedness	of	processes	of	subjectivation	to	identity	formation.	Hall	argues	that	identities	are	‘points	of	temporary	 attachment	 to	 the	 subject	 positions	 which	 discursive	 practices	construct	 for	us’	 (1996:	6).79	For	him,	 the	ways	 in	which	particular	people	choose	 to	 represent	 or	 narrativise	 themselves	 are	 inseparable	 from	 the	ways	 in	which	 those	people	are	and	have	been	represented.	 Identities	are,	consequently,	about	‘using	the	resources	of	history,	language	and	culture	in	the	process	of	becoming	(ibid.:	4).	While	 individuals	are	unlikely	to	choose	to	 identify	 exactly	 in	 alignment	 with	 particular	 figurations,	 identities	 are,	nonetheless,	produced	within	particular	discursive	contexts	–	which	may	or	may	not	be	limited	as	to	the	ways	in	which,	for	example,	benefit	recipients	tend	 to	 be	 represented.	 In	 Chapter	 4,	 I	 examine	 two	 media	 texts	 and	question	 the	 extent	 to	which	 the	 representation	 of	 certain	 key	 characters	reflects	 the	 figurations	 that	 cluster	 around	 discourses	 of	 ‘benefit	scrounging.’	 Towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 chapter	 my	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 ways	 in	which	these	representations	affect	the	legibility	and	legitimacy	of	working-class	subjectivities	 in	the	context	of	austerity	politics,	 thus	highlighting	the	consequences	 of	 these	 discursive	 and	 figurative	 processes	 for	 both	subjectivation	and	identification.		Thus,	similarly	to	some	of	the	approaches	highlighted	above,	I	am	not	just	 interested	 in	 the	 figurations	 themselves,	 but	 also	 in	 the	 political	 and	cultural	 consequences	 of	 the	 proliferating	 representations	 of	 a	 particular	cluster	of	benefit	recipient	 figurations.	 Identities	are	not	my	starting	point,	but	 rather	 I	 arrive	at	 the	potential	 consequences	 for	 identity	 formation	by	examining	 the	 role	 that	 sexualisation	 and	 racialisation	 play	 in	 the																																																									78	See	 also	 Dermott	 and	 Pomati’s	 (2016)	 discussion	 of	 the	 policy	 implications	 of	 the	proliferating	use	of	the	‘benefit-scrounging’	lone	mother	figure;	and	Garthwaite	(2011)	and	Runswick-Cole	and	Goodley	(2015)	on	the,	often	violent,	policy	and	other	consequences	of	the	 increasing	 incorporation	of	people	with	disabilities	under	 the	discursive	 rubric	of	 the	‘benefit	scrounger’	figure.	79	On	identity	formation,	see	also	Clifford	(2000).	
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representation	of	benefit	 recipients	 in	 two	popular	and	well-known	media	texts.	 A	 figurative	 methodology	 allows	 me	 to	 emphasise	 the	 centrality	 of	sexualisation	and	 racialisation	 in	 the	 figuration	of	benefit	 recipients	 in	 the	public	 imaginaries	 of	 austerity	 politics	 –	without	making	 claims	 about	 the	(sexual)	identities	of	benefit	recipient	individuals	or	populations.	Further,	it	allows	 me	 to	 examine	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 common	 figurations	 of	 benefit	recipients,	and	particularly	their	circulation	within	the	figurative	economies	of	 austerity,	may	 limit	 and	 restrict	 the	 subjectivities	 that	 are	 available	 for	actual	 subjects	 to	 draw	 from	 in	 processes	 of	 identification.	 While	 these	subjectivities	 may	 not	 be	 commonly	 seen	 as	 sexual	 subjectivities,	 I,	nonetheless,	 conceptualise	 them	 as	 such.	 Doing	 so	 allows	 me	 to	 both	conceptually	 and	 epistemologically	 foreground	 and	 question	 the	overwhelming	 tendency	 to	 view	 as	 sexual	 subjectivities	 only	 those	 that	deviate	 from	 the	heteronorm	–	despite	 the	key	 role	 that	 sexuality	plays	 in	subjectivities	other	than	ones	predefined	as	sexual.	
	
Sexual	Inequalities:	(Policy-as-)Discourse	Analysis	In	the	previous	section	I	focused	on	how	processes	of	subjectivation	interact	with	 and	draw	 from	dense	 figurations,	made	 a	 case	 for	 conceptualising	as	sexual	subjectivities	those	subject	positions	that	depend	on	sexualisation	for	their	legibility	–	even	when	they	do	not	conform	to	the	dominant	discursive	framings	 of	 sexuality	 as	 sexual	 identity	 –	 and	 introduced	 the	 figurative	methodology	 employed	 in	 Chapter	 4.	 In	 this	 section	 I	 move	 on	 to	conceptualising	 sexual	 inequality	 and	 introducing	 the	 method	 –	 policy-as-discourse	analysis	–	that	follows	from	this	conceptualisation	and	is	used	in	Chapter	3.	Here	my	focus	is,	firstly,	on	discourse	generally	and,	secondly,	on	
sexuality	 discourses	 more	 specifically.	 I	 highlight	 heteronormativity	 and	homonormativity	 as	 key	 sites	 for	 the	 ‘putting	 into	 discourse	 of	 sex’	(Foucault	1998:	12),	focusing	particularly	on	the	co-constitution	of	sexuality	discourses	 with	 various	 social,	 cultural,	 and	 political	 formations.	 These	formations	 include,	 but	 are	 not	 limited	 to,	 the	 nation-state	 and	 its	institutions	 and	 practices,	 thus	 foregrounding	 my	 own	 analysis	 of	 the	production	 and	 reproduction	 of	 sexuality	 discourse	 within	 the	 social,	
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cultural,	political,	and	policy	formations	of	austerity.	I	then	make	a	case	for	the	 conceptualisation	 of	 sexuality,	 as	 it	 interacts	with	 and	 is	 embedded	 in	policy	 formations,	 through	 the	 framework	 of	 sexual	 inequality.	 I	 have	chosen	 this	 as	 Chapter	 3’s	 heuristic	 specifically	 to	 draw	 attention	 to	 the	operation	 of	 sexuality	within	 policy	 arenas	where	 the	 cultural	markers	 of	sexual	identity	or	subjectivity	are	not	present	or	visible.	Finally,	this	section	introduces	and	 justifies	 the	specific	method	of	policy-as-discourse	analysis	employed	in	Chapter	3.		Adam	Jaworski	and	Nikolas	Coupland	provide	a	simple	definition	of	discourse	 as	 ‘language	 use	 relative	 to	 social,	 political	 and	 cultural	formations’	 (2006:	 3).	 Not	 dissimilarly,	 Norman	 Fairclough	 considers	discourse	 as	 ‘language	 as	 a	 form	 of	 social	 practice’	 (2001:	 16)	 and	 as	‘language	 use	 conceived	 of	 as	 socially	 determined’	 (ibid.:	 18).	 Irreducibly	social	phenomena,	discourses	 influence	social	 structures	and	contribute	 to	social	 continuity	 and	 change,	 as	 well	 as	 being	 themselves	 determined	 by	social	 structures.	 Importantly,	 then,	discursive	 enunciations	 always	have	a	history,	 in	 that	 discourse	 ‘accumulates	 the	 force	 of	 authority	 through	 the	repetition	or	citation	of	a	prior,	authoritative	set	of	practices’	(Butler	1993:	19).	 A	 statement	 can	 only	 function	 authoritatively	 because	 of	 the	accumulating	 historicity	 of	 discourse	 and,	 consequently,	 ‘pre-existing	linguistic	 repertoires	 are	 constitutive	 of	 cultural	 meaning’	 (De	 Benedictis	2012:	2).	Thus,	power	relations	are	exercised	and	enacted	within	discourse,	and	dominant	orders	of	discourse	are	themselves	constituted	by	relations	of	power,	 as	 Fairclough	 (2001)	 argues	 –	 but	 it	 is	 precisely	 because	 of	 the	historicity	of	discourse	 that	 it	materialises	as	a	 site	 for	 the	enactment	and	maintenance	 (as	 well	 as	 sometimes,	 challenging)	 of	 power	 relations.	Furthermore,	 as	 Hall	 et	 al.	 (1978)	 point	 out,	 since	 a	 limited	 range	 of	explanatory	 paradigms	 for	 any	 given	 phenomenon	 exists	 within	 the	dominant	orders	of	discourse,	public	opinion	tends	to	be	constructed	out	of	the	 vocabularies	 and	 ideologies	 available	 within	 dominant	 discursive	frameworks.		
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One	of	the	key	ways	in	which	discourses	are	imbricated	with	power	is	through	the	production	and	reproduction	of	commonsense	knowledges.80	Commonsense	refers	to	that	which	goes	without	saying,	tacit	knowledge	that	has	 become	 embedded	 in	 public	 discourse	 –	 and	 often,	 consequently,	 in	public	 opinion	 –	 through	 its	 naturalisation.	 Because	 commonsense	knowledge	 has	 lost	 its	 connection	 to	 particular	 ideologies	 or	 political	preferences,	 it	 is	 ‘hard	 to	 pin	 down	 in	 the	moment	 of	 its	 formation,	 often	leaving	no	 inventory	once	 it	has	dissipated’	 (Jensen	and	Tyler	2015:	473).	Lauren	Berlant	argues,	 similarly,	 that	claims	about	 the	world	–	 in	her	case	the	 prevalent	 discourse	 of	 the	 ‘American	 Dream’	 –	 are	 at	 their	 most	powerful	when	 they	 ‘become	banal	 [--]:	no	 longer	 inciting	big	 feelings	and	deep	 rages,	 [they]	 seem	 hardwired	 into	 what	 is	 taken	 for	 granted	 in	collective	 national	 life’	 (1997:	 11).	 Because	 what	 is	 ‘common’	 about	commonsense	is	precisely	‘that	it	is	not	subject	to	tests	of	internal	coherence	and	 logical	 consistency’	 (Hall	 et	 al.	 1978:	 150),	 it	 functions	 to	 make	 the	social	world,	 and	especially	 the	power	 relations	and	hierarchies	 contained	within	it,	appear	self-evident	and	as	though	they	require	no	interpretation.	Moreover,	 individual	 experiences	 that	 run	 counter	 to	 the	 prevailing	commonsense	can,	consequently,	appear	as	exceptions	within	a	larger	truth,	as	Hall	et	al.	(1978)	suggest.		Critical	discourse	analysis	–	which	I	broadly	align	my	own	approach	with	 –	 thus	 involves	 a	 questioning	 of	 practices	 ‘that	 produce	 apparent	objectivity,	normality	and	factuality’	 (Jaworski	and	Coupland	2006:	27).	As	highlighted	in	the	previous	chapter,	neoliberalisation	has	tended	to	involve	its	 presentation	 as	 somehow	 inevitable,	 as	 beyond	 political	 debate	 and	judgement.	Thus,	many	scholarly	analyses	of	neoliberalisation,	 specifically,	have	utilised	critical	discourse	analysis	to	question	the	supposed	objectivity	and	 rationality	 of	 neoliberal	 logics.	 Critical	 discourse	 analysis	 involves	probing	 texts	 and	 discourses	 ‘in	 order	 to	 discover	 hidden	 meaning	 and	value-structures’	(ibid.:	28,	emphasis	mine).	However,	particular	meanings,	values,	and	power	structures	can	be	hidden	in	texts	for	different	reasons.	In																																																									80	On	commonsense,	or	commonsense	knowledges,	see	Bourdieu	(1984,	1998),	Fairclough	(2001),	Hall	et	al.	(1978),	Jaworski	and	Coupland	(2006),	Jensen	(2014),	and	Stoler	(2009).	
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her	 analysis	 of	 imperial	 violence,	 Stoler,	 for	 example,	 attempts	 to	‘distinguish	 between	 what	 was	 “unwritten”	 because	 it	 could	 go	 without	saying	and	“everyone	knew	it,”	what	was	unwritten	because	it	could	not	yet	be	articulated,	and	what	was	unwritten	because	it	could	not	be	said’	(2009:	3).	 Further,	 commonsense	 is	 subject	 to	 change	 over	 time.	 Therefore,	 I	 am	also	 interested	 in	 the	 shifts	 and	 changes	 that	 have	 occurred,	 or	 are	occurring,	 in	 commonsense	 notions	 about	 sexuality	 within	 the	 context	 of	austerity	politics.		Examining	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 sexuality	 involves	 asking	questions	such	as:		Why	has	sexuality	been	so	widely	discussed,	and	what	has	been	said	about	it?	What	were	the	effects	of	power	generated	by	what	was	 said?	 What	 are	 the	 links	 between	 these	 discourses,	 these	effects	of	power,	 and	 the	pleasures	 that	were	 invested	 in	 them?	What	 knowledge	 [--]	 was	 formed	 as	 a	 result	 of	 this	 linkage?	(Foucault	1998:	11)	Investigating	the	commonsense	knowledges	about	sexuality	involves	a	focus	on	their	denaturalisation,	in	order	to	make	visible	what	is	assumed,	without	questioning,	about	sexuality	in	a	particular	discursive	formation.	A	frequent	commonsensical	assumption	about	sexuality	is	its	presumed	alignment	with	particular	 identities,	 and	 relatedly,	 the	 presumed	 fixity,	 stability,	 and	separateness	 of	 such	 identities.	 This	 echoes	 Fairclough’s	 discussion	 of	power’s	 capacity	 to	 impose	 and	 maintain	 a	 particular	 structuring	 of	 a	particular	social	domain	–	in	this	case,	that	of	sexuality	–	including	‘dividing	it	 into	 parts,	 [--]	 keeping	 the	 parts	 demarcated	 from	 each	 other,	 and	 a	particular	 ordering	 of	 those	 parts	 in	 terms	 of	 hierarchical	 relations	 of	domination	 and	 subordination’	 (2001:	 10-11).	 Sexuality’s	 discursive	production	also	 involves	various	commonsensical	assumptions	about	what	those	identities	look	like,	how	desire	functions	in	alignment	with	them,	what	kinds	 of	 subjects	 inhabit	 them,	 and	 what	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 and	 intimate	behaviour	 these	 subjects	 engage	 in.	 Finally,	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	sexuality	involves	not	just	descriptive	assumptions	–	about	what	sexuality	is	–	 but	 also	 normative	 and	 prescriptive	 judgements	 –	 about	 what	 kind	 of	sexuality	is	appropriate	or	acceptable.	
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Jaworski	and	Coupland	argue	that	‘discourse	analysis	offers	a	means	of	 exposing	 or	 deconstructing	 the	 social	 practices	 that	 constitute	 “social	structure”	 and	what	we	might	 call	 the	 conventional	meaning	 structures	of	social	life’	(2006:	5).	One	such	‘conventional	meaning	structure’	of	social,	or	in	this	case	particularly	–	but,	importantly,	not	solely	–	of	sexual	life,	is	that	of	 heteronormativity.	 Foucault’s	 (1998)	 discussion	 of	 the	 status	 of	 the	monogamous,	 heterosexual,	 procreative	 couple	 as	 the	 norm	 is	 echoed	 by	many	sexuality	and	queer	theory	scholars,	who	direct	attention	to	the	ways	in	 which	 commonsense	 assumptions	 about	 heterosexuality’s	 primacy	 and	normative	status	constitute	social	structure.	Gayle	Rubin	influentially	argues	that	Western	societies	‘appraise	sex	acts	according	to	a	hierarchical	system	of	sexual	value’	(1993:	151),	in	which	marital,	reproductive	heterosexual	sex	is	valued	most	highly,	while	 the	heterogeneous	array	of	other	possible	sex	acts	and	practices	–	ranging	from	non-procreative	heterosexual	sex,	gay	and	lesbian	 sex,	 and	 masturbation,	 to	 sex	 work,	 promiscuous	 sex,	 and	 trans-generational	 sex,	 among	 others	 –	 is	 seen	 as	 less	 valuable.81	Importantly,	however,	as	Cooper	(1993)	points	out,	Rubin’s	account	pertains	primarily	to	the	subordination	of	non-heterosexual	and	non-procreative	sexual	acts	and	practices	at	the	level	of	public	discourse	–	rather	than	social	practice.		Many	 other	 scholars	 have	 pointed	 at	 the	 material	 and	 cultural	consequences	 of	 the	 pervasiveness	 of	 heteronormativity	 –	 here	 conceived	both	as	the	normativity	of	heterosexuality	vis-à-vis	non-heterosexual	sexual	acts,	practices,	and	identities,	and	as	the	normativity	of	procreative	sexuality	
vis-à-vis	 non-procreative	 sexualities.	 Rodriguez,	 for	 instance,	 points	 at	 the	procreative/non-procreative	 binary	 and	 argues	 that	 the	 non-reproductive	sexual	 pleasures	 of	 women	 of	 colour	 and	 women	 with	 disabilities	 ‘have	often	borne	the	brunt	of	eugenics	practices	and	institutionalization’	(2014:	13).	Here	she	highlights,	similarly	to	Rubin,	that	a	whole	range	of	sexual	acts	and	 practices	 have	 been	 subordinated	 by	 and	within	 heteronormativity	 –	and	not	just	ones	arising	from	or	related	to	homosexual	identities	–	but	she	also	directs	attention	at	the	often	violent	and	coercive	consequences	of	that																																																									81 	See	 also	 Butler	 (1990)	 on	 the	 ‘heterosexual	 matrix’,	 Rich	 (1980)	 on	 the	 ‘lesbian	continuum’,	 and	Warner	 (1991)	 on	 ‘queer’	 defined	 against	 notions	 of	 ‘the	 normal’	 more	generally.	
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subordination.	 Cohen,	 similarly,	 argues	 that	 heteronormativity	 is	 not	 just	about	 the	 subordination	 of	 sexualities,	 but	 it	 also	 ‘works	 to	 support	 and	reinforce	 institutional	 racism,	 patriarchy,	 and	 class	 exploitation’	 (1997).	These	 scholars,	 thus,	 foreground	 heteronormativity’s	 embeddedness	 in	other	social	structures,	cultural	formations,	and	political	life.	As	Berlant	and	Michael	Warner	argue,	A	 whole	 field	 of	 social	 relations	 becomes	 intelligible	 as	heterosexuality	[--].	Heteronormativity	is	more	than	ideology,	or	prejudice,	or	phobia	against	gays	and	 lesbians;	 it	 is	produced	 in	almost	every	aspect	of	the	forms	and	arrangements	of	social	life.	(1998:	554)	Similarly,	in	this	thesis	I	examine	heteronormativity	particularly	in	terms	of	its	 embeddedness	 within	 the	 social,	 political,	 and	 cultural	 formations	 of	austerity.	More	 recently	 many	 queer	 theorists	 have	 focused	 on	
homonormativity	 instead	 of,	 or	 in	 addition	 to,	 heteronormativity.	 Lisa	Duggan,	 for	example,	examines	 the	cultural	politics	of	neoliberalism	 in	 the	United	 States	 from	 the	 1970s	 onwards	 –	 as	 highlighted	 in	 the	 previous	chapter	 –	 and	 argues	 that	 processes	 of	 neoliberalisation	 have	 included	 an	‘emergent	 rhetorical	 commitment	 to	 diversity,	 and	 to	 a	 narrow,	 formal,	nonredistributive	form	of	“equality”	politics	for	the	new	millennium’	(2003:	44).	A	new	 form	of	 gay	politics	 that	 she	 terms	 ‘the	new	homonormativity’	(ibid.:	 50)	 accompanies	 this	 equality	 politics,	 whereby	 mainstream,	conventional	gay	representation	is	accepted	and	even	celebrated,	but	in	an	increasingly	 narrow	 form.	 Jasbir	 Puar	 (2007),	 in	 turn,	 links	 forms	 of	homonormativity	 to	 contemporary	 US	 imperialism	 and	 its	 national	 and	transnational	 political	 agendas,	 in	 order	 to	 develop	 the	 concept	 of	
homonationalism.	 For	 her,	 homonationalism	 is	 ‘a	 facet	 of	modernity	 and	 a	historical	 shift	 marked	 by	 the	 entrance	 of	 (some)	 homosexual	 bodies	 as	worthy	 of	 protection	 by	 nation-states,	 a	 constitutive	 and	 fundamental	reorientation	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 the	 state,	 capitalism,	 and	sexuality’	 (Puar	 2013:	 337).	 Both	 Puar	 and	 Duggan,	 thus,	 importantly	illustrate	 the	 embeddedness	 of	 homosexuality	 discourses	 and	 regulatory	
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practices	in	the	political,	economic,	and	cultural	formations	of	neoliberalism,	imperialism,	and	colonialism.		While	 I	 agree	 with	 scholars	 of	 homonormativity	 and	homonationalism	that	the	recent	shifts	in	the	relationships	between	nation-states,	 (neoliberal)	capitalism,	and	sexuality	deserve	attention,	at	 the	same	time	 I	 also	 find	 value	 in	 Nikita	 Dhawan’s	 (2016)	 critique	 of	 some	 of	 the	subsequent	 uses	 of	 both	 concepts. 82 	She	 expresses	 worry	 about	 the	increasing	 scholarly	 focus	on	homonormativity	 and	nationalism,	 especially	when	they	are	given	centre	stage	over	and	instead	of	continuing	to	examine	the	 persisting	 primacy	 of	 heteronormativity	 in	 many	 contexts.	 While	 she	agrees	that	queer	politics	should	not	be	limited	to	contesting	heteronorms,	she,	at	the	same	time,	argues	that	‘despite	homonationalism	and	the	folding	of	queers	 into	nation-building,	nations	–	whether	Western	or	non-Western	are	 deeply	 heteronormative.	Heterosexuality	 is	 ritually	 invoked	 to	 narrate	the	 nation	 and	 keep	 it	 together’	 (ibid.:	 57).	 Consequently,	 scholarly	approaches	that	investigate	the	relationship	between	heteronormativity	and	the	 nation-state	 continue	 to	 be	 relevant.	 For	 instance,	 Patricia	 Hill	 Collins	(1999)	and	Nira	Yuval-Davis	(1998)	–	although	explicitly	focusing	on	gender	rather	 than	 sexuality	 –	 direct	 attention	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 women’s	sexualities,	and	particularly	their	reproductive	behaviours,	are	regulated	as	part	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 nation	 building.	 Collins	 specifically	 highlights	 the	different	 ways	 in	 which	 differently	 racialised	 women	 are	 folded	 into	national	 imaginaries,	 and	 their	 sexual	 behaviours,	 consequently,	 regulated	by	the	state.	In	a	slightly	different	vein	to	Collins	and	Yuval-Davis,	queer	migration	scholars	have	pointed	at	the	embeddedness	of	regimes	of	sexual	regulation	within	migration	 regimes,	 as	well	 as	 specifically	 at	 how	 these	 interactions	figure	 in	 processes	 of	 nation-building.	 Eithne	 Luibhéid	 (2006)	 argues	 that	the	 regulation	 of	 sexuality	 –	 in	 her	 case,	 specifically	 the	 regulation	 of																																																									82	See	also	Brown’s	(2012,	2015)	critique	of	the	notion	of	homonormativity.	He	investigates	the	 ways	 in	 which	 ‘normative	 social	 attitudes	 to	 both	 heterosexual	 and	 homosexual	relations	are	changing	in	the	current	period’	and	argues	that	‘the	faultline	of	sexual	politics	in	the	UK	has	shifted	from	being	placed	(primarily)	along	the	homo/hetero	binary’	(2015:	976).	Brown’s	analysis	bears	certain	similarities	to	mine,	particularly	in	that	I	also	observe	certain	key	shifts	in	an	‘emerging	sexual	politics	of	austerity’	(ibid.:	976).	
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women’s	 bodies	 and	 sexualities	 that	 occurs	 through	 controlling	 access	 to	abortion	in	Ireland	–	together	with	its	interactions	with	state	practices	such	as	 immigration	 controls,	 functions	 to	 rebound	 the	 nation-state.	 Similarly,	scholarship	on	queer	asylum	and	migration	importantly	highlights	the	effect	the	 investment	 of	 the	 state	 in	 determining	whether	migrants	 are,	 indeed,	gay	 or	 lesbian,	 has	 both	 on	 constraining	 and	 constituting	 the	 applicants’	sexualities	and	on	reaffirming	the	boundaries	of	the	nation-state	through	the	regulation	 of	 sexuality.83	Such	 approaches	 make	 important	 contributions	specifically	 to	 understandings	 of	 how	 sexual	 identities	 are	 regulated	 in	interactions	 with	 migration	 regimes	 and	 other	 state	 processes.	 However,	they	differ	from	mine	in	that	their	focus	tends	to	remain	firmly	on	subjects	and	subjectivities	a	priori	defined	as	either	gendered	or	sexual.	Thus,	while	they	 constitute	 important	 interventions	 in	 their	 own	 right,	 their	investigative	 reach	 is	 limited	 to	 the	 consequences	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 for	particular	 subjects	 –	 usually	 women	 and/or	 sexual	 minorities	 –	 and	 the	interrelatedness	 of	 such	 regulatory	 processes	 to	 processes	 of	 nation	 or	state-building.	The	approach	I	take	is	to	not	decide	in	advance	which	subjects	will	be	affected	 by	 processes	 of	 sexual	 regulation	 in	 a	 particular	 context.	 While	heteronormativity	 forms	a	part	of	my	analysis,	particularly	 in	Chapter	3,	 it	alone	 is	 insufficient	 as	 a	 conceptual	 frame	 for	 examining	 the	 regulation	of	sexuality	within	austerity	politics.	Thus,	in	Chapter	3,	I	conceptualise	sexual	regulation	 as	 the	 creation	 and	maintenance	 of	 sexual	 inequalities	 –	 which	may	in	some	cases,	indeed,	be	the	result	of	pervasive	heteronormativity,	but	in	others	may	not.	I	do	so	in	order	to	advance	the	kind	of	scholarship	(and	politics)	 that,	 to	 paraphrase	 Dhawan	 (2016),	 is	 complex	 and	multidirectional,	 directed	 at	 regulatory	 practices	 across	 the	heterosexual/homosexual	and	the	procreative/non-procreative	divides.	As	I	explore	 in	 more	 detail	 in	 Chapter	 3,	 Clare	 Hemmings	 (2014),	 in	 her	discussion	 of	 Butler’s	 (1997)	 and	 Nancy	 Fraser’s	 (1997)	 disagreement	concerning	 the	 relationship	 between	 sexuality	 and	 the	 political	 economy,																																																									83	On	queer	asylum	and	migration,	see,	for	instance,	Lewis	(2014),	Luibhéid	(1998),	Shuman	and	Bohmer	(2014),	Spruce	(2014),	and	White	(2014).	
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argues	 that	 both	 theorists	 fail	 to	 consider	 either	 other	 sexual	 identities	(other	 than	 gay	 and	 lesbian)	 or	 other	 kinds	 of	 sexual	 inequalities.	 This	continued	 reliance	 on	 the	 homosexual/heterosexual	 opposition,	 for	Hemmings,	 ‘skews	 our	 perception	 of	 historical	 change	with	 respect	 to	 the	relationship	 between	 sexuality	 and	 political	 economy’	 (2014:	 375).	 My	approach	in	Chapter	3,	thus,	follows	such	critiques	and,	instead,	investigates	a	 particular	 policy	 site	 for	 the	 sexual	 inequalities	 that	 are	 created	 or	maintained	 within	 it	 –	 even	 though	 the	 policy	 texts	 themselves	 do	 not	explicitly	mention	sexuality.		One	 key	 way	 in	 which	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 sexuality	 in	relation	to	various	cultural,	political,	and	economic	formations	–	such	as	the	nation-state,	neoliberalisation,	and	austerity	–	has	been	examined	is	through	analyses	 of	 policies	 or	 policy	 texts.	 Cris	 Shore	 and	 Susan	 Wright	 (1997)	suggest	 that	 policies	 are	 usefully	 viewed	 as	 instruments	 of	 power	 –	 or	 in	Foucauldian	 (1975)	 terms,	 as	 technologies	of	power.84	The	primary	goal	 of	policy	 language	 is	 usually	 to	 persuade	 rather	 than	 to	 inform,	 as	 Raymond	Apthorpe	(1997)	argues,	and	they,	consequently,	tend	to	act	as	prescriptive	discursive	 devices	 rather	 than	 descriptive	 ones.	 Policy	 texts	 are	
performative	in	the	sense	that	they	seek	to	create	a	world	by	describing	it	–	or	in	the	words	of	Shore	and	Wright,	they	‘contain	implicit	(and	sometimes	explicit)	 models	 of	 society’	 (1997:	 6).	 Given	 their	 prescriptive	 nature,	policies	 do	 not	 just	 respond	 to	 problems	 that	 exist	 in	 society.	 Rather,	‘“problems”	are	“created”	or	“given	shape”	in	the	very	policy	proposals	that	are	 offered	 as	 “responses”’	 (Bacchi	 2000:	 48).	 It	 is,	 thus,	 the	
problematisation	 of	 particular	 issues	 that	 generally	 offers	 a	 useful	 starting	point	 for	 policy	 analysis,	 rather	 than	 the	 problems	 explicitly	 presented	 in	policy	texts	themselves.		‘Policy-as-discourse	 analysis’	 (Bacchi	 2000:	 52),	 thus,	 involves	uncovering	the	ways	in	which	policies	tend	to	disguise	their	own	operation	as	 technologies	 of	 power,	 as	 well	 as	 unpacking	 their	 problematisation	 of	certain	 issues	 over	 others.	 Welfare	 policy,	 and	 more	 recently	 the																																																									84	See	 also	 Carabine’s	 (2001)	 detailed	 discussion	 of	 Foucault	 in	 relation	 to	welfare	 policy	specifically.	
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constellation	 of	 welfare	 policies	 and	 ‘reforms’	 implemented	 under	 the	rhetorical	 rubric	 of	 austerity,	 has	 been	 a	 popular	 topic	 for	 policy-as-discourse	 analysis.	 Because	 the	 prescriptive	 (and	 thus	 political)	 nature	 of	policies	 and	 policy	 texts	 is	 often	 disguised	 by	 the	 legal-rational,	 objective	language	 in	which	 they	are	portrayed	 (Shore	and	Wright	1997),	policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 is	 especially	 pertinent	 to	 the	 context	 of	 neoliberal	austerity	 politics,	 where	 policy	 choices	 and	 preferences	 are	 frequently	presented	as	economic	necessity	or	simply	common	sense.85	The	emphasis	of	many	of	 these	recent	accounts	 is	on	how	policy	discourse	sets	 limits	on	what	can	be	said	and	on	how	it	defines	the	discursive	terrain	in	such	a	way	that	 complicates	 efforts	 to	 achieve	 political	 change.	 Fairclough	 (2001)	stresses,	 however,	 that	 at	 different	 times	 achieving	 political	 change	might	necessitate	either	conservative	discursive	 reproduction	or	 transformations	in	orders	of	discourse.	Thus,	it	is	important	for	policy-as-discourse	analysis	to	 pay	 attention	 to	 where	 the	 epistemic	 gain	 of	 particular	 discursive	positions	 lies	 –	 or	 in	 other	words,	who	 benefits	 from	 the	maintenance	 or	transformation	 of	 particular	 discursive	 orders,	 and	 what	 institutional	 or	ideological	arrangements	are	maintained	or	changed	by	them.86	Finally,	 policies	 have	 cultural	 and	 political	 effects	 beyond	 the	immediate	policy	arena	within	which	they	are	situated	and	which	they	seek	to	 change.	 As	 John	 Clarke	 points	 out,	 these	 cultural	 effects	 may	 include	determining	 or	 affecting	 ‘the	 meanings,	 conditions	 and	 identities	 of	citizenship’	 (2004:	 37).	 Thus,	 policy	 texts	 can	 be	 explored	 for	 the	 cultural	resources	 they	 deploy,	 the	 cultural	 effects	 they	 aim	 to	 produce,	 and	 the	cultural	conflicts	they	attempt	to	resolve.	In	Chapter	3,	I	employ	a	policy-as-discourse	 approach	 in	 order	 to	 examine	 the	 commonsensical	 assumptions	about	sexuality	embedded	in	a	set	of	policy	texts	that	problematise	poverty	as	a	cultural	issue	–	rather	than	an	economic	one.	Reading	the	policy	texts	as	political	 and	 cultural	 texts	 that	 contain	 political	 narratives	 intended	 to																																																									85	See	the	previous	chapter,	as	well	as	Clarke	and	Newman’s	in-depth	discussion	about	the	‘shape	changing’	of	austerity	discourse,	whereby	it	has,	at	least	in	the	UK,	shifted	‘from	an	economic	problem	 (how	 to	 “rescue”	 the	banks	and	 restore	market	 stability)	 to	 a	political	problem	(how	to	allocate	blame	and	responsibility	for	the	crisis)’	(2012:	300).		86	For	a	more	detailed	discussion	of	‘epistemic	gain’	in	relation	to	discourse,	see	Fairclough	(2006).		
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performatively	enact	a	particular	kind	of	social	and	sexual	world,	 I	employ	policy-as-discourse	analysis	as	my	method	in	order	to	direct	attention	at	the	ways	 in	which	 the	 problematisation	 of	 poverty	 as	 cultural	 helps	maintain	particular	 sexual	 inequalities	 –	whichever	 subjects	 those	 inequalities	may	pertain	 to.	 This	 approach	 also	 allows	 me	 to	 consider	 the	 wide-ranging	cultural	and	political	effects	of	 these	discursive	and	regulatory	processes	–	potential	shifts	in	regimes	of	citizenship,	as	well	as	significant	consequences	for	 the	 scope	 and	 nature	 of	 class	 analysis	 and	 discourse,	 in	 the	 case	 of	Chapter	3.		
Intimate	Disruptions:	Policy	Implementation	and	Service	Delivery			Apart	 from	 the	 discursive	 production	 of	 sexuality,	 the	 resultant	 sexual	inequalities,	 and	 the	 part	 that	 sexuality	 plays	 in	 the	 related	 processes	 of	figuration	 and	 subjectivation,	 this	 thesis	 is	 concerned	with,	 and	 examines,	sexuality	 as	 or	 in	 relation	 to	 intimacy.	 In	 this	 section,	 I	 foreground	 my	conceptualisation	of	 intimacy	as	both	separate	 from	and,	at	 the	same	time,	closely	 related	 to	 sexuality,	 as	 well	 as	 introduce	 the	 methodological	approach	 employed	 in	 Chapter	 5.	 I	 use	 the	 frame	 of	 intimacy	 precisely	because	it	allows	me	to	widen	my	focus,	and	enables	me	to	draw	attention	to	a	whole	range	of	intimate	practices,	relations,	and	spaces	that,	as	I	argue	in	Chapter	5,	are	disrupted	by	and	within	the	operation	of	penalising	austerity	politics.	Some	of	 these	 intimate	relations	and	practices	may	be	sexual,	and	some	 of	 them	may	 be	 familial	 –	 however,	 they	 are	 not	 necessarily	 either.	Thus,	 deploying	 intimacy	 as	my	 frame	 of	 analysis	 enables	me,	 akin	 to	 the	many	 queer	 theorists	 and	 sexuality	 scholars	 who	 use	 the	 language	 of	intimacy,	to	question	and	probe	some	of	the	assumptions	that	are	frequently	made	 about	 the	 nature	 and	 location	 of	 close,	 intimate	 relationships	 and	practices.	Finally,	 the	methodological	 shift	 I	 take	by	 focusing	not	on	policy	
texts,	but	on	the	processes	of	policy	implementation	and	service	delivery	–	as	I	explain	in	more	detail	below	–	enables	me	to	move	beyond	the	question	of	intent,	and	beyond	the	world	that	the	policy	texts	themselves	seek	to	bring	into	being.	 Instead,	my	 focus	 is	 on	 the	 implications	 that	materialise	 in	 the	intimate	sphere	as	a	result	of	the	policy	processes,	regardless	of	the	ways	in	
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which	the	intentions	of	the	policies	are	described	in	the	policy-makers’	own	language.		As	 the	 above	 two	 sections	 have	 highlighted,	 sexuality	 discourses	often	contain	implicit	judgements	about	the	value	of	differently	lived	sexual	and	 intimate	 lives.	 These	 value	 judgements	 can	 materialise	 in	 particular	sexual	inequalities	that	originate	in	certain	discursive	framings	of	sexuality,	or	 they	 can	 be	 enacted	 in	 the	 sexualisation	 of	 particular	 figurations	 and	subjectivities.	 These	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 processes	 mark	 certain	sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives	 as	 less	 or	 more	 appropriate	 and	 valuable	 than	others.	 As	 suggested	 above,	 frequently	 it	 is	 specifically	 heteronormative	coupledom	 that	 is	 seen	 as	 the	 appropriate	 site	 for	 expressing	 and	experiencing	of	 sexuality.	Conversely,	 for	 instance	 the	promiscuously	 lived	sexual	 life	 of	 a	 single	mother	 tends	 to	 be	 judged	 as	 inappropriate,	 of	 less	value,	 or	 even	 immoral.	 Thus,	 similarly	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 sexuality	 is	always	 at	 the	 individual	 level	 lived	 in	 excess	 of	 the	 dominant	 discursive	frameworks	 available	 for	 describing	 and	 categorising	 sexuality,	 lived	experience	also	exceeds	the	normative	ways	of	organising	and	talking	about	intimacies.	 Recent	 scholarship	 has,	 however,	 tended	 to	 emphasise	 certain	shifts	 in	 the	 organisation	 of	 intimacy	 at	 a	 societal	 level.	 Anthony	 Giddens	(1992)	describes	what	he	conceptualises	as	the	‘transformation	of	intimacy’	and	 argues	 that	 the	 emergence	 of	 plastic	 sexuality	 –	 freed	 from	 the	constraints	 of	 reproduction	 –	 has	 the	 potential	 to	 democratise	 sexual	 and	private	 lives.	Zygmunt	Bauman	(2003),	somewhat	similarly,	conceptualises	modern	fluid	and	dynamic	relationship	bonds	as	 ‘liquid	 love.’87	What	these	approaches	 share	 is	 an	 emphasis	 on	 the	 role	 of	 agency	 and	 choice	 in	intimate	 lives,	 as	 well	 as	 a	 tendency	 to	 characterise	 intimacies	 as	 in	 the	process	of	democratisation	or	diversification.		While	 I	 certainly	 agree	 with	 the	 above	 theorists	 that	 changes	 and	shifts	 have	 occurred,	 and	 are	 occurring,	 in	 patterns	 of	 intimacy,	 I	 do	 not	share	their	optimism	as	to	the	increasingly	democratic	or	agentic	nature	of	
																																																								87	See	 also	 Beck	 and	 Beck-Gernsheim	 (1995)	 and	Weeks	 et	 al.	 (2001),	who	make	 similar	arguments	about	the	transformation	of	intimacy	in	contemporary	Western	societies.		
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‘modern’	 intimacies.88	These	 approaches	 significantly	 underestimate	 the	continued	 primacy	 of	 certain	 normatively	 organised	 intimacies	 –	 in	particular	that	of	heterosexual	coupledom	and	the	nuclear	family.	They	also	underestimate	the	hold	that	these	normative	intimacies	continue	to	have	on	both	 individual	 and	 national	 imaginaries,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 significant	 and	persisting	ways	in	which	their	primacy	is	reproduced	and	maintained	both	within	 policy	 arenas	 and	 in	 broader	 cultural	 and	 political	 logics	 and	formations.	Berlant	(2011)	argues	that	normative	 intimacies	play	a	central	role	 in	 the	 relationships	 between	 citizen-subjects	 and	 the	 state	 under	conditions	 of	 neoliberalisation	 and	 precarisation. 89 	For	 her,	 precarious	subjects	 reinvest	 in	 normative	 intimacies	 when	 they	 no	 longer	 have	reciprocal	 relationships	 with	 the	 state,	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	investments	 are	 precisely	 what	 forecloses	 other	 political	 possibilities	 for	them	–	a	relation	she	terms	‘cruel	optimism.’	The	dissatisfaction	of	citizens	‘leads	 to	 reinvestment	 in	 the	 normative	 promises	 of	 [--]	 intimacy	 under	capital’	 (ibid.:	 170),	 thus	 enabling	 one	 ‘to	 imagine	 that	 having	 a	 friend,	 or	making	a	date,	or	 looking	 longingly	at	 someone	who	might,	 after	all,	 show	compassion	for	our	struggles,	is	really	where	living	takes	place’	(ibid.:	189).	For	 Berlant,	 these	 reinvestments	 are	 bound	 up	 in	 a	 desire	 to	 feel	 normal,	and	for	normalcy,	in	turn,	to	provide	the	basis	for	a	reliable	and	predictable	life.	 Viewing	normativity	and	normative	 intimacies,	 like	Berlant	does,	as	‘an	 evolving	 and	 incoherent	 cluster	 of	 hegemonic	 promises	 about	 the	present	 and	 future	 experience	 of	 social	 belonging’	 (ibid.:	 167,	 emphasis	mine),	also	helps	direct	attention	to	their	role	 in	regimes	of	citizenship.	As	well	as	a	formal	and	informal	institution	of	social	belonging,	citizenship,	for	Berlant,	 is	 ‘an	 affective	 state	 where	 attachments	 that	 matter	 take	 shape’	(ibid.:	 163).	 Citizenship,	 thus,	 operates	 as	 a	 guarantee	of	 social	 reciprocity	only	 in	 fantasmatic	 registers,	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 fantasies	 of	 reciprocity,	together	 with	 attachments	 to	 normative	 intimacies,	 condition	 and	 shape																																																									88	See	 also	 Taylor’s	 (2013)	 critique	 concerning	 the	 classed	 presuppositions	 underpinning	such	approaches.		89	See	also	Ahmed	on	‘how	happiness	functions	as	a	promise	that	directs	us	toward	certain	objects,	which	then	circulate	as	social	goods’	(2010:	29).	
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one’s	sense	of	belonging.	Berlant’s	theorising	of	the	fantasy	life	of	citizenship	not	only	highlights	how	social	belonging	reproduces	–	and,	indeed,	depends	
on	 the	reproduction	of	–	particular	normative	 intimacies,	but	 it	also	places	conceptualisations	 of	 sexual	 or	 intimate	 citizenship	 in	 a	 new	 light.90	Some	sexual	 citizenship	 literatures	 have	 tended	 to	 share	 the	 optimism	 of	 the	‘transformation	 of	 intimacy’	 thesis,	 in	 that	 they	 see	 citizenship	 as	 ever-
expanding,	 progressively	 including	more	 and	more	 citizen-subjects	 fully	 in	the	fold	of	the	nation.	However,	what	does	it	mean	for	celebratory	accounts	of	 sexual	 citizenship,	 if	 citizenship	 is	 about	 the	 ‘activity	 of	 performative	belonging	 to	 the	 now	 in	which	 potentiality	 is	 affirmed’	 (ibid.:	 261),	 rather	than	about	any	real	reciprocity	or	material	guarantees	for	the	liveability	of	life?	 The	 fantasy	 life	 of	 normativity	 and	 normative	 intimacies	 in	particular,	thus,	in	significant	and	enduring	ways	shape	both	individual	and	national	 imaginaries.	These	 fantasies	and	attachments	are	what	bind	us	 to	the	 nation	 in	 the	 face	 of	 decreasing	 reciprocity	 between	 the	 state	 and	 its	subjects	and	citizenship	norms	are	also,	 in	 turn,	 shaped	by	normativity,	as	Berlant	 (1997)	 argues	 centrally	 in	 her	 earlier	 work.	 As	 Tam	 Sanger	 and	Yvette	Taylor	highlight,	‘who	is	properly	proximate	to	intimacy	may	also	be	recognised	as	a	proper	citizen,	a	legal	subject,	a	welfare	recipient,	a	familial	member	and	a	coherent,	 legitimate	“partnered”	person’	(2013:	3,	emphasis	in	 the	 original).	 Gavin	 Brown	 goes	 as	 far	 as	 to	 suggest	 that	 ‘proximity	 to	“proper”	 expressions	 of	 intimacy	 and	 care	 has	 come	 to	 shape’	 norms	 of	citizenship	 ‘more	 than	 sexual	 identity	 itself’	 (2015:	 978).	 Clearly	 then,	citizenship	 as	 an	 institution	 of	 social	 belonging	 is	 involved	 in	 the	reproduction	 of	 certain	 normative	 intimacies,	 and	 heteronormativity	 in	particular	 continues	 to	 be	 central	 to	 regimes	 of	 national	 belonging.	 Amy	Brandzel	(2005)	argues	that	citizenship	is	in	itself	necessarily	normative	and	exclusive,	as	any	increases	in	inclusion	work	through	a	process	of	creating	a	
																																																								90	On	sexual	and	intimate	citizenship,	see	for	example	Brandzel	(2005),	 Josephson	(2005),	Lister	 (2007),	Payne	and	Davies	 (2012),	Richardson	 (2000),	 Stychin	 (2000,	2001),	Taylor	(2011),	and	Weeks	(1998).	
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dominant	 ‘we’,	 thus	 enacting	 further	 exclusions.91	I,	 further,	 agree	 with	Taylor	 (2013)	 that	 it	 is	 particularly	 in	 new	 citizenship	 moments,	 when	specific	new	intimacies	are	privileged,	 that	others	tend	to	be	delegitimised	or	rendered	illegible.	As	 well	 as	 significant	 to	 imaginaries	 of	 citizenship	 and	 symbolic	belonging,	 intimacy	 is	 also	 central	 to	 institutional	 practices	 and	 policy	implementation,	as	Sanger	and	Taylor	suggest	(2013).	According	to	Taylor,	‘intimate	 relationships	 are	 brought	 into	 being,	 and	 negated,	 in	 interaction	with	 institutional	 frameworks	 and	 through	 intersecting	 legal	 and	material	(im)possibilities’	 (2013:	 18).	 These	 ‘intersecting	 legal	 and	 material	(im)possibilities’	 have	 been	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 queer	 and	 sexuality	scholarship,	 as	 queer	migration	 scholars,	 for	 instance,	 have	 examined	 the	ways	 in	 which	 intimacy	 norms	 are	 created	 and	 maintained	 through	immigration	regimes	–	thus	regulating	and	conditioning	the	intimate	lives	of	those	 who	 pass	 through	 them.	 Melissa	 Autumn	White’s	 analysis	 of	 queer	migration	documents	as	archives	of	intimacy	and	trauma	illustrates	how,	in	the	 context	 of	 Canadian	 family	 reunification	 laws,	 both	 heterosexual	 and	same	 sex	 couples	 have	 to	perform	 ‘a	 normative	 (read	 “heteronormative”),	intelligible	story	of	 intimacy’	(2014:	78).	Ala	Sirriyeh’s	(2015)	examination	of	recent	changes	 in	UK	 family	reunification	 laws,	similarly,	highlights	 that	immigration	 regimes	 involve	 an	 implicit	 assessment	 of	 how	 people	 feel	about	 the	 nation.	 Importantly,	 this	 assessment	 takes	 place	 through	judgements	 about	 their	 choice	 of	 partner	 and	 relationship,	 and	 ‘a	hierarchical	ordering	of	the	value	of	their	relationship’	(ibid.:	236).92	White	goes	on	to	ask,		Given	 the	 complex	 gendered,	 sexual,	 and	 racialized	 (as	white/whitened)	 normativities	 that	 underpin	 tropes	 of	conventional	 love	 and	 romance	 in	 Western	 and	 Northern	contexts,	what	does	 it	mean	 to	document	 recognizable	 intimacy	for	 immigration	other	 than	 to	 reconsolidate,	 even	while	 fraying,	these	norms?	(2014:	79)	
																																																								91	See	 also	 critiques	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 sexual	 or	 intimate	 citizenship	 by	 Josephson	 (2005),	Lamble	(2014),	and	Stychin	(2000,	2001).	92	On	intimacy	and	immigration	regimes,	see	also	Fassin	(2010).	
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For	both,	an	affinity	to	normative	intimacy	is,	thus,	expected,	performed,	and	reinforced	 in	 encounters	 between	 individuals	 or	 couples	 and	 immigration	regimes.	Judgements	 about	 the	 value	 and	 appropriateness	 of	 particular	intimacies	 are	 also	 central	 to	 institutional	 and	 policy	 arenas	 other	 than	migration.	Welfare	 states,	 for	 instance,	play	a	key	 role	 in	 the	 regulation	of	intimacy,	 as	 well	 as,	 relatedly,	 in	 the	 formation	 and	 maintenance	 of	boundaries	between	public	and	private,	as	many	others	(Clarke	2004;	Lewis	2000;	 Lister	 2000)	 have	 argued.	 What	 is	 considered	 private	 and,	 thus,	
beyond	 both	 public	 life	 and	 state	 intervention,	 is	 profoundly	 shaped	 by	intimacy	norms	and	their	interactions	with	state	institutions,	practices,	and	policies.	Further,	the	public/private	dichotomy	has	historically	tended	to	be	maintained	 on	 account	 of	 the	most	 privileged	 subjects,	 whereas	 the	 lines	have	always	been	considerably	more	blurred	for	marginalised	populations	–	for	whom	state	intervention	has	often	been	all	too	common,	as	Susan	Boyd	(1997),	 for	 instance,	 highlights.	 When	 the	 deconstruction	 of	 the	public/private	binary	became	central	to	feminist	projects	and	scholarship	–	due	to	its	role	in	the	maintenance	and	reproduction	of	the	patriarchal	status	quo	 within	 the	 household	 –	 it	 was	 black	 feminist	 and	 feminist	 of	 colour	critiques	that	pointed	out	that	the	family	has	often	been	a	site	of	resistance	to	 women	 of	 colour.93	Thus,	 while	 the	 state	 may	 appear	 absent	 from	 the	‘private’	 sphere,	 it	 tends	 to	 be	 just	 the	 white,	 (hetero)normative	 nuclear	family,	 and	 their	 normatively	 organised	 intimacies,	 that	 are	 viewed	 as	protected	by	a	zone	of	privacy.	While	freedom	or	liberation	from	patriarchal	norms	 and	 power	 dynamics	 within	 the	 family	 may	 be	 central	 to	 liberal	feminist	projects,	it	is	often	freedom	from	state	intervention	in	the	‘private’	sphere	or	intimate	life	that	is	more	of	a	priority	in	the	lives	of	marginalised	(particularly	classed	and	racialised)	populations.	State	 interventions	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 and	 state	 regulation	 of	intimacies	are	central	to	my	analysis	in	Chapter	5.	Similarly	to	many	of	the	accounts	 above,	 I	 deploy	 the	 frame	 of	 intimacy	 precisely	 because	 it	 is																																																									93	On	more	detailed	 interventions	 in	 feminist	 challenges	 to	 the	public/private	divide,	 see,	for	example,	Alexander	(1994),	Carby	(1982),	and	Mahmood	(2005).	
	 112	
broader	 than	 that	 of	 sexuality.	What	kinds	of	 relationships	 are	 considered	‘sexual’,	 ‘familial’,	 or	 ‘intimate’,	 is	 a	 judgement	 already	 structured	 by	heteronormative	 notions	 of	 appropriately	 organised	 sexual	 and	 intimate	lives.	My	use	of	 the	frame	of	 intimacy	in	Chapter	5	 is,	 thus,	motivated	by	a	desire	 to	 avoid	 making	 such	 judgements	 in	 advance.	 Further,	 as	 the	chapter’s	 examination	 illustrates,	 to	 focus	 purely	 on	 disruptions	 to	 sexual	lives	would	mean	drawing	a	rather	arbitrary	distinction,	 since	 the	ways	 in	which	intimate	lives	are	disrupted	by	various	state	processes	knows	no	such	borders.	 The	 range	 of	 intimate	 relations,	 practices,	 and	 spaces	 that	 are	potentially	 under	 the	 purview	 of	 state	 regulation	 and	 intervention,	 thus,	exceeds	not	only	the	bounds	of	sexual	subjectivity	or	identity,	as	highlighted	above,	but	also	 those	of	 the	sexual	altogether.	While	 some	of	 the	 relations,	practices,	and	spaces	that	the	state	intervenes	in,	as	examined	in	Chapter	5,	may,	 indeed,	 be	 sexual	 in	 nature,	 others	 may	 not	 –	 friendships,	 caring	relationships,	or,	 for	 instance,	professional	relationships	may	be	 just	as,	or	even	more,	 intimate	 than	 familial	 and	 sexual	 relationships.	With	Berlant,	 I	am	here	particularly	interested	in	‘minor	intimacies’,	or	‘desires	for	intimacy	that	 bypass	 the	 couple	 or	 the	 life	 narrative’	 (1998:	 285),	 thus	 centralising	state	 intervention	 in	 intimate	relations,	practices,	and	spaces	 that	may	not	be	legible	as	intimacy	at	all,	because	they	circumvent	the	(hetero)normative	life	narrative.	My	analysis	in	Chapter	5	epistemologically	foregrounds	the	question	of	what	kinds	of	 value	 judgements	 about	 intimate	 relations,	practices,	 and	spaces	may	be	embedded	in	certain	institutional	and	policy	implementation	processes	 –	 despite	 the	 fact	 that	 these	 processes	 are	 not	 seemingly	 at	 all	concerned	 with	 the	 regulation	 of	 sexuality	 or	 family	 life.	 Whether	 the	judgements	 of	 value	 and	 appropriateness	 embedded	 in	 various	 forms	 of	state	 intervention	 are	 intentional	 or	 not,	 however,	 is	 beside	 the	 point.	Somewhat	contrary	then	to,	for	example,	Stoler’s	(2009)	investigation	of	the	colonial	 preoccupation	 with	 intimacy	 and	 family	 life	 discussed	 above	 (as	well	 as	 to	 my	 own	 analysis	 in	 Chapter	 3),	 I	 am	 here	 not	 concerned	 with	whether	the	state	seeks	 to	 limit	and	restrict	 the	 intimate	 lives	of	particular	individuals	or	populations.	Rather,	 I	 focus	on	how	these	 intimate	 lives	are,	
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regardless	of	intention,	restricted	or	limited	because	of	particular	policy	or	institutional	processes	within	austerity	politics.	However,	 the	possible	 lack	of	intention	does	not	preclude	the	significance	of	these	intimate	disruptions	for	 state	 power.	 Jyoti	 Puri	 examines	 the	 movement	 to	 decriminalise	homosexuality	in	India	and	argues	that	what	became	apparent	through	the	encounters	between	state	institutions	and	activists	is	the	‘state’s	recourse	to	sexuality	in	order	to	govern’	(2014:	344).	Somewhat	similarly,	I	consider	the	intimate	disruptions	 that	materialise	as	a	 result	of	 various	 state	processes	and	 policies	 as	 important	 everyday	 state	 practices	 that	 help	maintain	 the	cultural	myth	of	the	bounded,	coherent,	and	monolithic	state.94	Due	to	my	divestment	from	questions	of	intent,	my	focus	in	Chapter	5	is	on	the	processes	of	implementation	and	service	delivery	–	rather	than	on	the	explicit	aims	and	 intentions	of	particular	policies	 found	 in	policy	 texts.	There	is	often	a	significant	difference	between	the	two,	as	policies	transform	and	mutate	during	the	process	of	implementation	due	to,	for	example,	path	dependence	 and	 the	 actions	 and	 preferences	 of	 street	 level	 bureaucrats.95	My	 archive	 in	 this	 chapter,	 consequently,	 consists	 of	 texts	 that	 detail	 the	ways	 in	 which	 street-level	 decision	 making	 proceeded	 in	 the	 case	 of	particular	 policies	 or	 systems:	 UK	 Supreme	 Court	 judgements	 related	 to	three	high	profile	cases	from	2013,	2015,	and	2016.	For	the	same	reason,	my	methodological	approach	in	Chapter	5	is	also	somewhat	different	from	that	of	 the	previous	 two	chapters	–	 I	 examine	 the	 judgements	not	as	 texts	 that	contain	particular	 discourses,	 like	 in	 the	previous	 chapters,	 but	 instead	 as	
archives	 of	 evidence	 as	 to	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 value	 judgements	 about	intimacies	 were	 inherent	 to	 the	 processes	 of	 implementation	 and	 service	delivery	 –	 and	 as	 to	 the	 intimate	 disruptions	 that	 were	 engendered	 as	 a	result.			
	
																																																								94	See	the	previous	chapter	for	a	more	in-depth	discussion	of	the	 ‘state	effect’	 that	creates	the	notion	of	the	coherent,	bounded	state.		95	For	more	detailed	discussions	of	the	ways	in	which	the	preferences	and	actions	of	street-level	bureaucrats	can	influence	policy	implementation,	see	Cooper	(2017),	Newman	(2012,	2013,	2014),	and	Wright	(2002).		
	 114	
Conclusion	Overall,	 this	 thesis	 attempts	 –	 to	 use	 Berlant’s	 language	 –	 to	 move	 ‘away	from	 the	 domain	 of	 the	 politics	 of	 sexual	 difference’	 (1997:	 58).	 It	foregrounds	 the	 centrality	 of	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 to	 the	 regulatory	 and	discursive	processes	of	austerity	–	whichever	subjects	those	processes	may	pertain	to.	It	makes	this	move	in	a	number	of	different	ways	and	in	a	range	of	 different	 sites,	 in	 order	 to	 highlight	 a	 wide	 array	 of	 examples	 or	 case	studies	 that	 all	 –	 albeit	 rather	 differently	 –	 illustrate	 the	 significance	 of	sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 to	 the	 functioning	 of	 austerity	 politics	 in	 the	 UK.	Throughout	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 made	 two	 central	 arguments:	 firstly,	 that	there	 is	more	 to	 sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 than	 sexual	 identities	 and	 subject	positions,	 and	 that	 the	 non-identitarian	 and	 non-subject	 specific	 ways	 in	which	 sexuality	 operates	 matter	 greatly	 to	 and	 in	 its	 relationship(s)	 to	economic,	political,	and	cultural	 formations	–	such	as	austerity.	Secondly,	 I	have	 argued	 that	 sexuality	 is	 always	 co-constituted	 with	 other	 social	categories	 of	 difference	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 any	 analysis	 of	 sexuality	 in	relation	 to	a	particular	 social,	political,	or	 cultural	 formation	 is	 incomplete	without	concomitant	attention	to	the	interdependent	relationships	between	processes	 of	 sexualisation,	 racialisation,	 gendering,	 and	 classing,	 for	instance.		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 unpacked	what	 I	mean	 by	 this	 thesis’	 titular	term	‘sexual	and	intimate	life’,	by	introducing,	firstly,	the	key	conceptual	and	epistemological	 interventions	 that	 the	 rest	 of	 this	 thesis	 makes	 and,	secondly,	the	methods	it	deploys	to	make	them.	I	began	with	a	brief	section	that	 explored	 the	 overall	 approach	 this	 thesis	 takes,	 highlighting	 the	theoretical	 and	 epistemological	 foundations	 both	 for	 engaging	 in	 a	 non-identitarian	 analysis	 of	 sexuality,	 generally,	 and	 for	 investigating	 sexual	regulation,	 more	 specifically.	 I	 then	 focused	 on	 my	 conceptualisation	 of	sexuality	 and	 intimacy	 through	 the	 frameworks	 of	 sexual	 subjectivities,	sexual	 inequality,	 and	 intimate	 disruptions,	 while	 also	 introducing	 the	methods	 that	 reflect	 and	 stem	 from	 each	 conceptualisation	 –	 figuration,	policy-as-discourse	 analysis,	 and	 analysis	 of	 processes	 of	 policy	implementation	 and	 service	 delivery.	 All	 three	 conceptualisations	 are	
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intended	to	respond	to	the	central	question	this	thesis	asks	–	what	kinds	of	sexual	 and	 intimate	 lives,	 subjects,	 and	 politics	 are	 made	 (im)possible,	(il)legible,	or	(il)legitimate	through	and	within	austerity	politics	in	the	UK	–	which	I	now	turn	to	answering	in	more	detail.			 	
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Introduction	The	Child	Poverty	Act	2010	 received	 royal	 assent	 in	March	 2010,	 just	 two	months	before	 the	2010	General	Election	and	the	subsequent	 formation	of	the	Coalition	Government	between	the	Conservative	and	Liberal	Democratic	Parties.	Labour’s	flagship	policy	in	the	area	of	child	poverty,	the	Act	followed	the	Labour	Government’s	2008	announcement,	endeavouring	to	enshrine	in	legislation	the	target	of	eradicating	child	poverty	in	the	UK	by	2020,	and	was	passed	 with	 cross-party	 support.	 The	 Act	 established	 four	 separate	 child	poverty	targets	related	to	relative,	absolute,	and	‘persistent’	poverty,	based	on	household	income	statistics,	to	be	met	by	202096	–	as	well	as	required	the	UK	 government	 to	 publish	 a	 regular	 child	 poverty	 strategy	 and	 annual																																																									96	These	targets	were	to	‘reduce	the	proportion	of	children	who	live	in	relative	low	income	(in	 families	with	 income	 below	 60	 per	 cent	 of	 the	median)	 to	 less	 than	 10	 per	 cent’;	 ‘to	reduce	the	proportion	of	children	who	live	in	material	deprivation	and	have	a	low	income	to	less	than	5	per	cent’;	‘to	reduce	the	proportion	of	children	that	experience	long	periods	of	relative	 poverty,	 with	 the	 specific	 target	 to	 be	 set	 at	 a	 later	 date’;	 and	 ‘to	 reduce	 the	proportion	of	children	who	live	below	an	income	threshold	fixed	in	real	terms	to	less	than	5	per	cent’	(Kennedy	2014:	5).	
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progress	 reports,	 and	 initiated	 the	 setting	 up	 of	 the	 Child	 Poverty	Commission	 to	 independently	monitor	 governmental	 progress	 in	 reducing	child	poverty.		However,	 a	 lot	 has	 happened	 in	 child	 poverty	 policy	 since	 2010.	Apart	from	the	publication	of	the	2011	and	2014	child	poverty	strategies,	in	2012	the	Government	consulted	on	‘better	measures	of	child	poverty’	(CPU	2012),	and	in	July	2015	in	the	House	of	Commons	the	Secretary	of	State	for	Work	 and	 Pensions	 Iain	 Duncan	 Smith	 announced	 the	 Government’s	intention	 to	change	 the	way	that	child	poverty	 is	measured	and	tracked	 in	the	UK	 (HC	Deb	2015:	 cols	1504-1506).	The	plan	was	 to	 replace	 the	 child	poverty	targets	based	on	relative	and	absolute	poverty	indicators	set	in	the	2010	 Act,	 with	 a	 new	 statutory	 duty	 to	 report	 on	 indicators	 of	‘worklessness’	 and	 ‘educational	 attainment’	 instead.	 The	 Government’s	effort	 partially	 failed,	 as	 the	 House	 of	 Lords	 pushed	 for	 the	 legislation	 to	include	 a	 requirement	 to	 continue	 publishing	 the	 relative	 and	 absolute	poverty	statistics.	However,	while	 the	Welfare	Reform	and	Work	Act	2016	subsequently	passed	with	this	reporting	requirement,	these	statistics	are	no	longer	 tied	 to	 any	 official	 poverty	 reduction	 targets.	 Further,	 the	government	 is	 no	 longer	 required	 to	publish	 a	 child	poverty	 strategy	 and,	perhaps	unsurprisingly,	no	government	has	published	one	since.	The	cross-departmental	 Child	Poverty	Unit	 (CPU)	 –	 originally	 established	 in	 1999	 to	work	 on	 meeting	 Labour’s	 child	 poverty	 reduction	 targets	 –	 was	 also	scrapped	(HC	Deb	2016g:	c1322).97	Most	recently	 in	2017,	the	Department	for	 Work	 and	 Pensions	 (DWP)	 published	 a	 policy	 paper	 titled	 Improving	
Lives:	Helping	Workless	Families	–	‘the	first	in	a	series	of	initiatives	aimed	at	tackling	 the	 problems	 that	 prevent	 families	 from	 getting	 on	 in	 life’	 (DWP	2017b).	The	 austerity	 era	 has,	 thus,	 seen	multiple	 shifts	 and	 changes	 in	 the	way	 that	 child	 poverty	 has	 been	 managed	 and	 tackled	 by	 the	 successive	Conservative-led	Governments	–	as	well	 as,	 importantly,	 in	 the	way	 that	 it	has	been	defined	and	talked	about.	Both	the	Coalition	Government	and	the																																																									97	The	Unit’s	staff	had	already	previously	been	cut	to	less	than	half	–	from	24	in	2012-13	to	11	in	2016	(Kingman	2017).	
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post-2015	 Conservative	 Government(s)	 have	 attempted	 to	 shift	 the	definition	of,	or	indicators	for,	(child)	poverty,	in	a	way	that	orients	poverty	discourse	more	and	more	towards	cultural	 factors	and	away	from	material	or	 economic	ones.	This	 chapter	 examines	 these	 recent	 attempts	 through	a	reading	of	three	key	policy	texts	and	makes	two	central	arguments	–	firstly,	that	 these	 attempts	 indicate	 a	 significant	 drive	 to	 culturalise	 poverty,	 and,	secondly,	 that	 this	 culturalisation	 depends	 on,	 and	 is	 underpinned	 by,	certain	discursive	deployments	of	sexuality	and	gender.	These	deployments	position	 the	 family	 as	 the	 location	 in	 which	 ‘cultures	 of	 poverty’	 are	reproduced	and,	consequently,	also	as	the	proper	site	for	government	action	to	 interrupt	 the	 cycle	 of	 reproduction.	 Familial	 gender	 dynamics,	reproductive	 arrangements,	 and	 parenting	 practices	 are,	 in	 turn,	 in	significant	 ways	 highlighted	 as	 key	 aspects	 of	 the	 discursive	 framing	 of	poverty	 in	 the	 austerity	 context.	 I	 begin	 this	 chapter	 with	 a	 section	 that	introduces	and	further	contextualises	the	three	policy	texts	that	it	examines,	as	well	 as	 briefly	 discusses	 the	method	 –	 policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 –	 it	employs.	 This	 is	 followed	by	 four	 sections	 that	 each	 focus	 on	 examining	 a	particular	aspect	of	the	poverty	discourses	advanced	in	the	three	texts,	from	the	 increasing	 emphasis	 on	 ‘worklessness’	 to	 the	 focus	 on	 ‘troubled	families.’	In	the	final,	discussion	section	of	the	chapter,	I	explore	some	of	the	cultural	and	political	consequences	of	the	culturalisation	and	familialisation	of	poverty	–	firstly,	to	citizenship	regimes	and	secondly,	to	class	analysis	and	discourse.			
Framing	Cultural	Poverty:	Method	and	Materials	The	 three	 policy	 texts	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter	 are	 the	 Coalition	Government’s	 first	 child	 poverty	 strategy,	 published	 in	 2011	 to	 fulfil	 the	statutory	 requirement	 set	 in	 the	 Child	 Poverty	 Act	 2010,	 titled	 A	 New	
Approach	 to	 Child	 Poverty:	 Tackling	 the	 Causes	 of	 Disadvantage	 and	
Transforming	 Families’	 Lives	 (DfE	 2011);	 the	 2012	 consultation	 document	
Measuring	Child	Poverty:	A	Consultation	on	Better	Measures	of	Child	Poverty	(CPU	 2012);	 and	 the	 Conservative	 Government’s	 2017	 policy	 paper	
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Improving	Lives:	Helping	Workless	Families	(DWP	2017a).98	In	order	to	more	comprehensively	cover	some	of	 the	discursive	shifts	 that	are	not	explicitly	expressed	 in	 the	 policy	 documents	 themselves,	 at	 times	 this	 chapter	additionally	 refers	 to	 Duncan	 Smith’s	 announcement	 and	 the	 subsequent	discussion	 of	 the	 proposed	 changes	 to	 the	 child	 poverty	 indicators	 in	 the	House	 of	 Commons	 in	 July	 2015	 (HC	 Deb	 2015:	 cols	 1504-1519).99	The	Coalition’s	Child	Poverty	Strategy	2014-17	(DfE	2014)	has	not	been	 chosen	as	 one	 of	 the	 texts	 to	 be	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter,	 since	 the	 2012	consultation	 document	 and	 the	 2015	 parliamentary	 discussion	 better	capture	 the	 discursive	 and	 policy	 changes	 that	 took	 place	 between	 the	publication	of	the	2011	strategy	and	the	post-Coalition	child	poverty	policy	landscape.	The	 policy	 documents	 this	 chapter	 investigates	 all	 faced	 significant	criticism	at	the	time	of	publication	and/or	announcement,	particularly	from	charities	 working	 and	 campaigning	 on	 the	 issue	 of	 child	 poverty100 	–	suggesting	that	the	changes	indicated	by	the	documents’	framings	of	poverty	were,	 indeed,	 viewed	 by	 many	 as	 a	 worsening	 of	 the	 policy	 landscape	overall.	The	documents	not	only	altogether	reflect	the	significant	degree	to	which	poverty	discourse	has	been	culturalised	in	the	UK	in	the	austerity	era,	but	 they	 also	 capture	 some	 of	 the	 changes	 that	 have	 taken	 place	 in	 this	regard	 between	 2011	 and	 2017.	 Each	 document,	 firstly,	 introduces	 the	government’s	 approach	 to	 tackling	 child	 poverty,	 usually	 framed	 around	addressing	 ‘the	 root	 causes	 of	 poverty	 and	 not	 just	 the	 symptoms’	 (DfE	2011:	8).	 Secondly,	 various	 specific	 aspects	of	 the	approach	are	discussed,	including,	but	not	 limited	to,	 issues	such	as	work	and	worklessness,	 family	stability,	and	parenting.																																																										98	I	also	explore	the	culturalisation	of	poverty	specifically	in	relation	to	the	2017	document	in	Lehtonen	(2018).		99 	Duncan	 Smith’s	 announcement	 was	 immediately	 preceded	 by	 a	 statement	 by	 the	Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Transport,	 Patrick	 McLoughlin,	 regarding	 the	 final	 report	 of	 the	Davies	Commission	on	airport	expansion	in	the	UK,	which	was	immediately	criticised	as	a	deliberate	 tactic	 to	 divert	 attention	 away	 from	 the	 announcement	 of	 the	 proposed	 child	poverty	 measures.	 See	 comment	 made	 by	 MP	 Stephen	 Timms	 in	 the	 parliamentary	discussion	 (HC	Deb	 2015:	 c1507),	 as	well	 as	 comments	 by	MPs	Debbie	Abrahams,	David	Winnick,	Sue	Hayman,	Jeremy	Corbyn,	and	Luciana	Berger	for	further	criticisms	(ibid.:	cols	1510-1519).	100	See,	for	example,	Richardson	(2011)	and	Butler	(2016b).		
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Each	 document	 also	 includes	 a	 list	 of	 (potential)	 indicators	 for	measuring	 and	 tracking	 child	 poverty	 in	 the	 UK	 –	 although	 they	 are	 in	 a	more	 central	 role	 in	 the	 consultation	 document.	 The	 2011	 document	presents	 the	 most	 comprehensive	 and	 broad-ranging	 list	 of	 suggested	indicators,	whereas	the	much	shorter	set	of	indicators	proposed	by	Duncan	Smith	(HC	Deb	2015:	c1505)	in	2015	broadly	reflect	the	ones	consulted	on	in	2012	–	except	for	the	relative	and	absolute	income	indicators,	which	were	included	in	2012	but	scrapped	in	2015.	The	2015	proposal	included	the	new	statutory	 duty	 to	monitor	 and	 report	 on	 the	 number	 of	 children	 living	 in	‘workless	 households’	 and	 ‘long-term	workless	 households’,	 as	 well	 as	 on	the	 educational	 attainment	 of	 all	 children	 and	 ‘disadvantaged	 children’	 at	the	end	of	Key	Stage	4.	A	range	of	other	non-statutory	indicators	‘to	measure	the	 progress	 against	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 poverty’	 (ibid.:	 c1505)	 was	 also	introduced.	 Finally,	 the	 indicators	 proposed	 in	 the	 2017	 document	 are,	again,	not	dissimilar	to	those	presented	in	the	earlier	documents,	except	that	this	 time	 they	 are	 positioned	 as	 aiming	 ‘to	 track	 progress	 in	 tackling	 the	disadvantages	 that	 affect	 families’	 and	 children’s	 outcomes’	 (DWP	 2017a:	22)	–	rather	than	aiming	specifically	to	address	poverty.		Overall	 these	 three	 documents,	 as	 I	 argue	 throughout	 this	 chapter,	signal	 a	 significant	 shift	 within	 poverty	 discourse	 in	 the	 UK	 –	 away	 from	monitoring	and	addressing	 the	material	and	economic	conditions	 in	which	poor	 families	 and	 children	 live,	 and	 towards	 tracking,	 managing,	 and	intervening	in	a	range	of	behaviours,	practices,	and	cultures	that,	supposedly,	make	up	the	root	causes	of	poverty.	Poverty,	and	particularly	child	poverty,	provides	one	key	discursive	battleground	in	which	not	just	policy	discourses	but	 also	 the	 ideological	 and	 political	 preferences	 of	 governments	 are	constructed,	 reinforced,	 and	 contested.	 This	 chapter	 utilises	 policy-as-discourse	 analysis	 to	 unpack	 and	 examine	 the	 construction	 of	 (child)	poverty	 discourse	 throughout	 the	 austerity	 era,	 focusing	 on	 four	 different	aspects	 of	 poverty	 discourse	 reflected	 in	 all	 three	 documents	 –	 albeit	 to	different	 degrees:	 worklessness;	 family	 stability	 and	 parenting;	 cycles	 of	poverty	and	disadvantage;	and	the	notion	of	‘troubled	families.’	My	analysis	illustrates	 the	 degree	 to	 which	 (child)	 poverty	 is	 problematised	 (Bacchi	
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2000)	as	a	cultural	issue	in	austerity	discourse	–	as	well	as	suggests	that	the	culturalisation	 of	 poverty	 increases	 progressively	 over	 the	 course	 of	 the	three	 documents.	 Further,	 this	 problematisation	 depends	 on	 the	deployment	of	various	commonsensical	notions	about	sexuality	and	gender,	including	 assumptions	 and	 value	 judgements	 about	 caring	 work,	 familial	gender	dynamics,	reproductive	arrangements,	and	parenting	practices.	As	 well	 as	 unpacking	 the	 commonsensical	 assumptions	 about	sexuality	 and	 gender	 embedded	 in	 the	 policy	 texts,	 my	 aim	 overall	 is	 to	investigate	the	political	narratives	contained	in	the	documents	and	to	direct	attention	 to	 the	kind	of	 social	 (and	 sexual)	world	 these	narratives	 seek	 to	bring	 into	being.	As	 the	previous	chapter	suggested,	 the	political	nature	of	policies	 tends	 to	be	discursively	displaced	 ‘by	 the	objective,	 neutral,	 legal-rational	idioms	in	which	they	are	portrayed’	(Shore	and	Wright	1997:	7).	My	aim	 is,	 thus,	 to	 represent	 the	policy	documents	 as	political	 and	 ideological	devices	 –	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 as	 ‘instrument[s]	 of	 power’	 (ibid.:	 4).	 I	 am,	therefore,	 also	 interested	 in	 the	 political	 and	 cultural	 consequences	 of	 the	discursive	 shifts	 my	 analysis	 highlights.	 One	 key	 such	 consequence	 is	 the	way	 in	 which	 particular	 sexual	 inequalities	 are	 maintained	 –	 and,	 at	 the	same	 time,	disguised	–	by	 the	problematisation	of	poverty	as	cultural.	The	designation	 of	 sexuality	 to	 the	 cultural	 sphere,	 thus,	 helps	 mask	 the	interrelatedness	of	 socio-economic	or	class	 inequality	 to	 regimes	of	 sexual	inequality,	and	as	I	argue	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter,	these	regulatory	and	 discursive	 processes	 also	 have	 significant	 consequences	 for	 the	 scope	and	nature	of	class	analysis.		
Worklessness	Work,	not	welfare,	is	the	best	route	out	of	poverty	for	those	who	are	able	to	work.	(DfE	2011:	2)	Work,	 and	 an	 income,	 is	 the	 surest	 and	most	 sustainable	 route	out	of	poverty.	(CPU	2012:	3)	I	believe	work	is	the	best	route	out	of	poverty.	(Duncan	Smith	in	HC	Deb	2015:	c1505)	Work	is	the	best	route	out	of	poverty.	(DWP	2017a:	8)	
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As	 the	 above	 quotes	 indicate,	 there	 are	 striking	 similarities	 in	 all	 the	documents,	particularly	in	relation	to	the	role	of	work	in	combatting	(child)	poverty.	 Despite	 these	 similarities,	 however,	 each	 document	 presents	 its	proposed	approach	as	new.	The	2011	strategy	sets	out	 ‘a	new	approach	to	tackling	 poverty	 and	 securing	 social	 justice	 in	 this	 Parliament	 and	 the	decade	ahead’	 (DfE	2011:	2).	A	new	measure	of	child	poverty	 is	needed	 in	2012	because	‘it	cannot	be	right	that	experiences	so	vital	to	childhood,	like	seeing	 a	 parent	 go	 out	 to	 work	 or	 growing	 up	 in	 a	 stable	 family,	 are	 not	reflected	in	our	understanding	of	child	poverty’	(CPU	2012:	1),	and	in	2017,	‘a	new	approach	 to	 tackling	poverty	and	engrained	disadvantage’	needs	 to	be	developed	in	order	to	realise	the	Government’s	vision	of	a	‘fairer	Britain	where	success	is	based	on	merit,	not	privilege,	and	where	everyone	has	the	chance	 to	 go	 as	 far	 as	 their	 talents	 and	 hard	 work	 will	 take	 them’	 (DWP	2017a:	3).	In	the	earlier	documents,	the	need	for	a	new	approach	is	justified	with	reference	to	the	failings	of	the	previous	Governments:	‘we	seek	to	learn	the	lessons	of	the	previous	decade,	where	prosperity	bypassed	the	worst-off	and	welfare	dependency	took	root	across	the	country’	(DfE	2011:	2)	–	thus	reflecting	the	common	framing	in	austerity	discourse	more	generally	of	the	previous	 Labour	 Government(s)	 as	 responsible	 for	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 social	and	economic	 ills,	as	discussed	 in	Chapter	1.	 In	2017	 it	 is	needed	because,	while	 the	 Government	 has	 already	 taken	 many	 steps	 towards	 creating	 a	‘fairer	 Britain’	 or	 a	 ‘fairer	 society’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 3,	 7,	 14,	 21),	 this	 vision	cannot	be	fully	realised	as	long	as	some	families	remain	stuck	in	a	‘cycle	of	disadvantage’	(ibid.:	8).		The	political	and	societal	context	that	the	documents	intervene	in	is,	thus,	 described	 as	 a	 work	 in	 progress,	 a	 kind	 of	 society-in-the-making.	Whereas	the	previous	Labour	Government	‘entrenched	benefit	dependency’	(DfE	 2011:	 2),	 the	 Coalition	 Government	 is	 committed	 to	 addressing	 ‘the	root	causes	of	poverty’	(ibid.:	3;	CPU	2012:	1)	that	are	about	‘far	more	than	income’	(DfE	2011:	3).	 In	2017	this	process	 is	already	underway:	 ‘we	have	started	 to	 rebalance	our	 society	 in	 favour	of	ordinary	working	people,	but	now	need	to	do	more	to	turn	Britain	into	a	Great	Meritocracy’	(DWP	2017a:	3).	In	all	three	documents	‘worklessness’	is	presented	as	a	key	‘root	cause’	of	
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poverty	 and,	 consequently,	 as	 a	 key	 target	 of	 government	 intervention.	 In	the	 first	 instance,	 then,	 these	 framings	 signal	 a	 discursive	 shift	 from	‘unemployment’	to	‘worklessness’	–	the	latter	a	much	broader	category	that	includes	 not	 only	 unemployed	 people,	 but	 also	 ‘economically	 inactive’	populations,	such	as	people	with	disabilities	or	sicknesses	that	prevent	them	from	working,	full-time	carers,	students,	and,	in	some	cases,	also	pensioners.	Work	–	 and	 importantly,	 specifically	paid	work	–	 is,	 thus,	 seen	as	 the	best	route	out	of	poverty	–	 in	contrast	to	various	other	kinds	of	 labour	that	are	here	excluded	from	definitions	of	‘work.’		As	well	 as	 a	problem	 in	 its	own	right,	worklessness	 is	presented	 in	the	 three	 documents	 as	 a	 potential	 factor	 behind	 a	 whole	 host	 of	 other	issues.	 In	 the	 consultation	document	 (CPU	2012),	worklessness	 is	 the	 first	potential	measure	discussed,	but	it	is	also	referred	to	in	relation	to	all	of	the	other	measures.	For	example,	unmanageable	debt,	living	in	poor	housing	or	a	 ‘troubled	 area’	 (ibid.:	 1),	 and	 parental	 ill	 health	 can	 all	 lead	 to	worklessness.	 Similarly,	 the	 2017	 document	 presents	 poor	 health,	homelessness,	 low	qualifications,	and	 ‘other	barriers	and	disadvantages’	as	both	 ‘causes	 and	 effects	 of	 worklessness’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 9).	 Each	 separate	section	on	these	various	other	disadvantages	highlights	their	connection	to	worklessness	 as	 a	 central	 issue:	 for	 example,	 in	 relation	 to	 ‘Poor	 parental	mental	health’,	the	paper	states	that	‘there	is	strong	evidence	that	a	person’s	employment	 status	 directly	 impacts	 their	 psychological	 wellbeing’	 (ibid.:	10).	 In	 presenting	 evidence	 for	 the	 link	 –	 and	 suggesting	 a	 causal	 one	 –	between	 these	 ‘disadvantages’	 and	 being	 in	 paid	 employment,	 these	ostensibly	 separate	measures	 are	 transformed	 into	 further	 arguments	 for	the	importance	of	work	and	against	the	ills	of	worklessness.	Moreover,	the	possibility	that	these	other	issues	and	disadvantages	may,	in	fact,	be	as	(or	even	 more)	 clearly	 connected	 to	 material	 poverty	 as	 they	 are	 to	worklessness	is	not	considered.	Nor	is	the	influence	of	other	factors,	such	as	stigma,	shame,	or	stress	in	the	case	of	the	mental	wellbeing	of	unemployed	or	poor	individuals.101																																																									101	See	 Valentine	 and	 Harris	 (2014),	 Jo	 (2016),	 and	 Main	 and	 Bradshaw	 (2016)	 on	 the	influence	of	stigma,	shame,	and	stress,	respectively.	
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In	 contrasting	 ‘worklessness’	 –	 not	 unemployment	 –	 with	employment,	a	 tidy	dichotomy	 is	 created	between	 the	 two,	 suggestive	of	a	society	neatly	divided	into	those	who	work	and	those	who	do	not,	regardless	of	the	reason.	As	Nick	Bailey	suggests,	this	dichotomising	ignores	and	masks	‘the	 high	 levels	 of	 movement	 between	 categories	 and	 the	 high	 level	 of	benefits	 flowing	 to	 those	 in	 work	 without	 any	 apparent	 moral	 decline’	(2016:	 83).	Moreover,	 since	 ‘worklessness’	 encompasses	 a	 larger	 share	 of	the	population	 than	 ‘unemployment’,	 it	has	 tended	 to	be	associated	with	a	normative	aim	–	the	commodification	of	marginalised	groups	previously	not	considered	in	urgent	need	of	labour	market	‘activation’,	such	as	people	with	disabilities	and	lone	parents.102	For	instance	in	the	2011	document	a	specific	emphasis	is	placed	on	‘moving	lone	parents	into	work’	(DfE	2011:	28),	and	the	lowering	of	the	threshold	age	at	which	lone	parents	are	expected	to	look	for	paid	work	 is	highlighted	as	a	key	positive	development.103	However,	at	the	 same	 time	 the	 normative	 aim	 to	 ‘activate’	 lone	 parents	 in	 the	 labour	market,	reflected	in	all	three	documents,	is	part	of	a	longer	development	in	the	 UK,	 whereby	 lone	 parents	 are	 increasingly	 treated	 as	 workers	 rather	than	as	mothers	–	or	fathers	–	in	social	policy,	as	Damian	Grimshaw	and	Jill	Rubery	(2012;	cf.	Smith	2013)	discuss.104		Jane	 Lewis	 (2001)	 argues	 that	 policies	 intended	 to	 incentivise	 lone	parents	 –	 usually	 women	 –	 to	 find	 paid	 work	 are	 reflective	 of	 a	governmental	aim	to	intervene	in	the	number	of	workless	households,	rather	than	 about	 raising	 women’s	 employment	 as	 such.	 The	 2011	 document	 at	least	 partially	 confirms	 this	 focus,	 as	 it	 states	 that	 ‘having	 one	 or	 both	
parents	 in	 work	 can	 contribute	 to	 eroding	 intergenerational	 cycles	 of	poverty’	(DfE	2011:	24,	emphasis	mine).	Further,	as	Lewis	(2001)	highlights,	they	tend	to	be	partially	 justified	with	reference	to	the	higher	employment	rates	of	married	mothers,	but	without	taking	into	account	the	tendency	for																																																									102 	For	 further	 discussions	 of	 these	 normative	 aims	 associated	 with	 ‘worklessness’	discourse,	 see	 Connor	 (2010),	 Millar	 and	 Ridge	 (2013),	 Pantazis	 (2016),	 and	 Wiggan	(2012).		103	Since	2012	lone	parents	have	had	to	register	for	Jobseeker’s	Allowance	(JSA)	when	their	youngest	child	reaches	the	age	of	five	–	up	from	seven	in	2008,	and	16	until	then.	104	See	Connor	(2010),	Garthwaite	(2011),	Gedalof	(2017),	and	Watson	and	Philo	(2013)	on	the	 increasing	 commodification	 of	 people	 with	 disabilities	 and	 their	 inclusion	 under	 the	rubric	of	‘worklessness.’	
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married	women	to	work	short	part-time	hours,	while	continuing	to	partially	rely	 on	 the	 incomes	 of	 their	 breadwinner	 partners.	 The	 policy	 climate	surrounding	married	mothers	whose	 partners	work	 is	 overall	much	more	ambivalent	than	that	pertaining	to	lone	parents,	as	I	suggested	in	Chapter	1.	While	 policies	 such	 as	 the	 ‘free’	 childcare	 offered	 to	 families	 where	 both	parents	 work	 (discussed	 below)	 suggest	 a	 governmental	 preference	 for	married	 mothers	 to	 also	 find	 paid	 work,	 others,	 for	 instance	 recent	 tax	increases,	encourage	second	earners	–	also	usually	women	–	to	stay	at	home.	Such	policies	 not	 only	 assume	 the	male	 breadwinner/female	 carer	 binary,	but	as	Grimshaw	and	Rubery	(2012)	point	out,	they	also	fail	to	understand	that	 today’s	 married	 women	 may	 be	 tomorrow’s	 lone	 mothers,	 thus	 also	reducing	the	potential	future	labour	market	participation	of	lone	parents.	As	 another	 example	 of	 a	 policy	 that	 assumes	 the	 traditional	 family	model	–	with	a	(male)	breadwinner	at	the	helm	–	Universal	Credit	is	touted	in	all	 three	documents	as	key	 to	making	 sure	 that	 ‘work	pays’	 (CPU	2012:	13;	DWP	2017a:	15)	and	 to	enabling	 families	 in	which	one	adult	 is	 in	 full-time	 employment	 ‘to	 have	 an	 income	 that	 lifts	 them	 out	 of	 poverty’	 (DfE	2011:	 24).	 The	 new	 combined	 benefit,	 however,	makes	welfare	 payments	payable	to	the	head	of	the	household	and,	thus,	in	effect	naturalises	women’s	disadvantaged	 labour	 market	 position	 –	 as	 well	 as	 may	 lead	 to	 increased	child	 poverty	 and	 disadvantage.	 Further,	 racialised	 and	 minority	 ethnic	women	are	 likely	 to	be	even	more	affected	by	 the	way	 in	which	Universal	Credit	 is	 structured. 105 	Altogether,	 then,	 the	 framings	 of	 the	 three	documents	reflect	the	overall	discursive	landscape	of	austerity	discussed	in	Chapter	 1,	 whereby	 lone	 mothers	 and	 married	 mothers	 face	 a	 highly	divergent	policy	landscape.	Rather	than	necessarily	reflecting	an	explicit	aim	to	 traditionalise	 families,	 however,	 traditional	 models	 of	 marriage	 and	family	are	here	drawn	upon	to	withdraw	support	for	dual	earner	households	–	thus	 incentivising	married	mothers	not	 to	work	–	while	the	emphasis	on	paid	work	as	a	panacea	to	poverty	and	a	whole	host	of	other	disadvantages	
																																																								105	For	further	discussions	of	Universal	Credit,	see	Grimshaw	and	Rubery	(2012),	MacLeavy	(2011),	 Main	 and	 Bradshaw	 (2016),	 and	 Rubery	 and	 Rafferty	 (2014);	 on	 the	 impact	specifically	on	racialised	and	ethnic	minority	women,	see	Sandhu	and	Stevenson	(2015).		
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is	reinforced	in	the	case	of	lone	parents,	as	Jill	Rubery	and	Anthony	Rafferty	(2014)	argue.		The	2011	document	includes	a	concession	that	 ‘groups	such	as	 lone	parents	 and	 large	 families	 may	 face	 particular	 issues	 with	 childcare	responsibilities	 which	 can	 make	 entering	 work	 seem	 particularly	challenging’	 (DfE	 2011:	 18).	 The	 paper’s	 suggested	 solution	 to	 these	‘particular	 issues’	 is	 to	 ‘create	a	culture	 in	which	 it	 is	easier	 for	parents	 to	combine	 paid	work	 and	 family	 life.	 This	 includes	 access	 to	 family	 friendly	employment	 as	 well	 as	 affordable,	 quality	 early	 education	 and	 childcare’	(ibid.:	31).	‘An	extra	£300	million	into	childcare’	(CPU	2012:	13)	is	promised	in	the	2012	document,	and	similarly	in	2017,	the	Government’s	investment	in	free	childcare	is	highlighted,	including	a	specific	mention	of	the	‘extended	entitlement	to	free	childcare	of	up	to	30	hours’	(DWP	2017a:	15)	for	three	and	 four-year-olds.106	However,	 the	 scheme	 has	 already	 faced	 significant	criticism,	 led	 to	nursery	closures	across	 the	country,	as	well	as	resulted	 in	some	 parents	 actually	 paying	more	 than	 before	 under	 the	 new	 scheme	 of	‘free’	 childcare.107	Further,	 only	 families	where	 both	 parents	 –	 or	 the	 sole	parent,	 in	case	of	 lone	parent	families	–	work	are	eligible.	Thus,	while	 lone	parents	are	 strongly	encouraged	 to	 find	paid	work,	very	 little	 is	offered	 in	the	 documents	 to	 make	 it	 feasible	 in	 practice	 –	 echoing	 Rubery	 and	Rafferty’s	 argument	 that	 ‘an	expectation	of	paid	work	 is	not	matched	by	a	right	 to	 care’	 (2014:	 137)	 in	 the	 austerity	 context.	 Instead,	 the	 policy	frameworks	tend	to	impose	a	significant	double	burden	on	lone	parents,	as	they	continue	 to	be	 responsible	 for	 significant	amounts	of	 childcare,	while	also	being	required	to	look	for	paid	work.	As	 Chapter	 1	 highlighted,	 despite	 the	 significant	 shifts	 in	 women’s	labour	market	participation	in	recent	decades,	patterns	of	unpaid	work	have	not	 changed	 very	 much.	 As	 well	 as	 functioning	 as	 an	 expansion	 of	 the																																																									106	Extended	from	fifteen	hours	per	week	from	September	2017	onwards.	107	Contrary	 to	 the	way	 in	which	 the	scheme	worked	earlier,	nurseries	 that	sign	up	 to	 the	scheme	are	no	 longer	able	 to	make	up	the	shortfall	between	government	 funding	and	the	actual	 cost	 of	 childcare	 by	 charging	 parents	 more.	 Consequently,	 many	 nurseries	 have	closed	 and	 some	 have	 opted	 out	 altogether	 because	 they	 cannot	 afford	 to	 offer	 the	 free	places,	whereas	others	have	started	charging	parents	new,	additional,	 charges	 in	order	 to	make	up	the	shortfall.	For	more	information,	see	Ferguson	(2017)	and	Turner	(2017).	
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category	 ‘unemployed’,	 the	 focus	 on	 ‘worklessness’	 sustained	 in	 all	 three	documents	also	works	to	mask	the	significant	amounts	of	care	work	done	by	many	of	those	now	considered	within	the	rubric	of	‘worklessness.’108	In	the	documents	a	greater	emphasis	is,	therefore,	placed	on	encouraging	precisely	the	groups	of	people	who	tend	to	carry	a	disproportionate	share	of	care	and	housework	 responsibilities	 to	 find	 paid	work,	 thus	 bringing	 into	 question	their	 designation	 as	 ‘workless’	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 At	 the	 same	 time	 the	disproportionate	 allocation	 of	 unpaid	 labour	 itself	 is	 not	 in	 any	 way	addressed	–	thus	reinforcing	the	long-standing	assumption	that	women	are	available	 as	 informal	 carers.	 Further,	 whether	 it	 is,	 indeed,	 desirable	 to	attempt	 to	 coax	 carers	 and	 others	 who	 do	 significant	 amounts	 of	 unpaid	labour	into	paid	employment	instead,	is	a	question	clearly	out	of	the	remit	of	the	documents.	Overall	then,	the	separation	of	caring	work	and	other	unpaid	labour	 from	 paid	 labour	 –	with	 only	 the	 latter	 conceptualised	 as	 ‘work’	 –	relies	 on	 the	 public/private	 divide	 understood	 in	 heteronormative	 terms.	This	reliance	leads	to	not	only	the	various	other	kinds	of	labour,	but	also	the	ways	in	which	the	public	and	the	private	sphere	depend	on	each	other,	being	hidden.	Thus,	 existing	gender	dynamics	 tend	 to	be	naturalised	 rather	 than	challenged	in	the	documents’	discursive	framings.		Contrary	to	the	2011	and	2012	documents,	which	explicitly	address	poverty	and,	consequently,	set	out	to	change	the	child	poverty	indicators,	the	indicators	proposed	in	the	2017	policy	paper	are	meant	to	‘to	track	progress	in	tackling	the	disadvantages	that	affect	families’	and	children’s	lives’	(DWP	2017a:	 5,	 emphasis	 mine).	 Material	 or	 economic	 poverty	 is,	 in	 fact,	 only	fleetingly	referenced	in	the	paper,	and	only	in	terms	of	its	direct	relationship	to	work	and	worklessness	–	 signalling	 the	most	 significant	discursive	shift	
between	the	three	documents.	The	documents’	framings	(or	lack	thereof)	of	
in-work	poverty	are	a	case	in	point:	in	the	2011	document	in-work	poverty	is	 discussed	 explicitly,	 and	 it	 even	 includes	 a	 proposed	 indicator	 for	 ‘the	proportion	of	children	who	are	in	families	where	at	least	one	person	works	yet	 still	 remain	 in	 relative	 low	 income’	 (DfE	 2011:	 34).	 In	 the	 2012																																																									108	For	instance	a	study	conducted	by	MacDonald	and	his	colleagues	(2014b)	found	that	the	long-term	unemployed	people	interviewed	tended	to	engage	in	substantial	amounts	of	care	and	voluntary	work.	
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document	 it	 is	suggested	 instead	 that	 ‘income	 from	benefits	does	not	have	the	 same	 effect	 as	 income	 from	 work’	 (CPU	 2012:	 20),	 and	 in	 the	parliamentary	discussion	following	the	2015	announcement,	Duncan	Smith	responded	 to	 the	 repeated	 questions	 about	 in-work	 poverty	 by	 simply	stating	 that	 it	 rose	under	 the	previous	Government	 (HC	Deb	2015:	 c1508,	c1514).	 Despite	 these	 discursive	 differences,	 however,	 none	 of	 the	documents	 suggest	 anything	 other	 than	 more	 work,	 or	 the	 euphemistic	‘making	work	pay’,	as	solutions	to	the	increasing	rates	of	in-work	poverty	in	the	UK	–	suggestions	that	have	been	questioned	and	refuted	by	many	(Bailey	2016;	Jensen	2012;	Main	and	Bradshaw	2016).109	The	discursive	 focus	of	 the	2017	document	 is	different	 from	that	of	the	earlier	documents	–	shifted	not	just	away	from	in-work	poverty,	but	also	away	 from	 poverty	 altogether.	 Generally,	 the	 paper	 uses	 the	 term	‘disadvantage’,	 with	material	 or	 economic	 poverty	 appearing	 as	 a	 kind	 of	afterthought	 –	 a	 negative	 consequence	 that	 occurs	 in	 the	 UK	 –	 the	 to-be	‘Great	 Meritocracy’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 3)	 –	 because	 individuals	 are	 unable	 to	
overcome	 their	worklessness	 and	 ‘take	 advantage	 of	 the	 opportunities	 in	 a	fairer	Britain’	(ibid.:	3).	Despite	the	paper’s	stated	aim	of	developing	‘a	new	approach	to	tackling	poverty	and	engrained	disadvantage’	(ibid.:	3,	emphasis	mine),	poverty	appears	to	not	quite	warrant	attention	in	its	own	right.	This	shift	 in	 discursive	 framing	 works	 not	 only	 to	 move	 the	 focus	 away	 from	material	 or	 economic	 poverty	 overall,	 but	 also	 to	 individualise	 poverty	 –	thus	 reflecting	 the	 general	 shift	 towards	 the	 individualisation	 of	 poverty	discourses	 in	 recent	 years. 110 	This	 individualising	 emphasis,	 in	 turn,	functions	 to	 discursively	 delink	 both	 worklessness	 and	 poverty	 from	economic	 demand	 and	 the	 availability	 of	 job	 opportunities,	 as	 both	 John	Clarke	and	Janet	Newman	(2012)	and	Jay	Wiggan	(2012)	argue,	and,	further,	helps	maintain	‘the	myths	of	full	employment’	(Jensen	2012:	5).	Rather	than	
																																																								109	Out	of	the	14	million	people	who	live	in	poverty	in	the	UK,	eight	million	live	in	families	where	at	least	one	person	is	in	work	(JRF	2017).		110	On	 the	 increasing	 individualisation	 of	 poverty	 in	 the	 austerity	 context,	 see	 Connor	(2010),	 Jensen	 (2012),	 Main	 and	 Bradshaw	 (2016),	 Valentine	 and	 Harris	 (2014),	 and	Wiggan	(2012).	
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on	 structural	 conditions,	 the	 focus	 here	 is	 squarely	 on	 the	 behaviour	 of	‘workless’	people.		Overall,	the	documents’	discursive	framings,	thus,	sustain	a	focus	on	‘worklessness’	 over	 unemployment,	with	 the	 effect	 of	 both	 individualising	poverty	discourse	and	moving	it	further	away	from	structural	issues	such	as	labour	market	conditions	–	and	even	more	so	in	the	2017	document	where	poverty	drops	out	of	 the	frame	almost	entirely.	Social	welfare	 is	presented	as	a	key	cause	of	poverty,	and	work	–	or	more	work	–	consequently,	as	the	main	 solution	 to	 addressing	 poverty.	 Further,	 in	 emphasising	 paid	 work	above	 everything	 else,	 the	 documents’	 framings	 of	 ‘worklessness’	 tend	 to	function	to	naturalise	existing	–	unequal	–	gender	dynamics,	rather	than	to	change	 them.	 In	particular,	 lone	parents	–	 as	well	 as	other	groups	 such	as	people	with	disabilities	–	are	positioned	as	in	urgent	need	of	labour	market	activation,	 but	 without	 much	 practical	 support	 to	 enable	 them	 to	 do	 so.	Since	the	focus	is	on	workless	households	rather	than	workless	individuals,	married	 mothers	 are	 positioned	 differently	 to	 lone	 mothers	 –	 with	 the	family	appearing	as	the	focal	point	of	the	documents’	overall	framings.			
Family	Stability	and	Parenting	Effective	parenting	is	critical	to	enabling	children	to	flourish.	(DfE	2011:	8)	We	believe	children	who	grow	up	in	strong,	stable	families	with	quality	relationships	in	the	home	stand	the	best	chance	of	a	positive	future.	(ibid.:	36)	There	is	a	relationship	between	experiencing	family	breakdown	as	a	child	and	poor	outcomes	as	an	adult.	(CPU	2012:	42)	Parental	conflict	[--]	directly	impacts	on	children’s	wellbeing	as	well	as	the	adults’	parenting	practices.	(DWP	2017a:	19)	The	family	is	clearly	positioned	as	the	key	site	of	the	arguments	put	forward	in	all	three	documents	–	sometimes	from	their	subtitles	onwards:	‘Tackling	the	 Causes	 of	 Disadvantage	 and	 Transforming	 Families’	 Lives’	 (DfE	 2011)	and	 ‘Helping	 Workless	 Families’	 (DWP	 2017a).	 The	 family	 is	 where	 the	problems	associated	with	worklessness	and	‘disadvantage’	originate	and	are	reproduced,	 as	well	 as	where	 the	proposed	governmental	 interventions	 to	
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tackle	 these	 issues	 are	 centred.	 However,	 as	 I	 argue	 in	 this	 section,	 the	family	is	not	just	presented	as	the	location	where	these	processes	take	place,	but	 its	 internal	 dynamics,	 arrangements,	 and	 practices	 are,	 furthermore,	centred	as	the	focal	point	of	the	problems	the	documents’	proposals	aim	to	tackle.	 Poor	 parenting	 and	 ‘family	 instability’	 are	 viewed	 as	 key	 factors	behind	 children’s	 poor	 development	 and	 future	 prospects	 –	 and,	consequently,	 as	 root	 causes	 of	 child	 poverty	 –	 but	 at	 the	 same	 time	 the	document’s	 framings	 also	 sustain	 a	 focus	 on	 family	 form.	 Overall,	 the	documents’	 narratives	 of	 parenting	 continue	 the	 individualising	 emphasis	examined	 in	 the	 previous	 section	 –	 this	 time	 on	 parental	 and	 familial	
practices,	 arrangements,	 and	 norms	 –	 instead	 of	 focusing	 on	 economic	 or	material	living	conditions.	Firstly,	 then,	 parenting	 and	 especially	 the	 quality	 of	 parenting	 are	central	to	all	three	papers’	framings.	A	desire	‘to	see	a	culture	where	the	key	aspects	 of	 good	 parenting	 are	 widely	 understood’	 (DfE	 2011:	 38)	 is	expressed	in	the	2011	document,	and	the	difficulty	of	measuring	‘parenting	style	and	skill’	(CPU	2012:	17)	discussed	in	the	2012	document.	In	the	latest	paper	 the	 focus	 is	 more	 on	 the	 impact	 of	 parental	 conflict	 on	 parenting	ability,	 as	 ‘conflict	 is	 likely	 to	 drain	 the	 emotional	 resources	 required	 to	parent	 adequately,	putting	 children	at	 greater	 risk	of	 emotional	 and	 social	problems	(DWP	2017a:	10).	A	curiously	circular	argument	is	created	in	the	paper,	 whereby	 worklessness	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 potential	 cause	 of	‘relationship	 distress’,	 which	 is,	 in	 turn,	 presented	 as	 a	 factor	 leading	 to	parental	separation	–	which	can,	again,	lead	to	worklessness.	The	solutions	suggested	 in	 the	 paper	 for	 breaking	 this	 cycle	 are	 limited	 to	 supporting	parents	 in	 resolving	 the	 conflict	 and,	 unsurprisingly,	 in	 finding	 work.	Nonetheless,	 ‘good’,	 ‘strong’,	or	‘effective’	parenting	is	highlighted	as	key	in	all	 three	 documents,	 thus	 linking	 parenting	 practices	 and	 behaviour	 to	children’s	emotional,	behavioural,	cognitive	and	social	development.111	The																																																									111	This	emphasis	stands	 in	stark	contrast	 to	the	available	evidence:	Main	and	Bradshaw’s	(2016)	study	found	no	significant	differences	between	the	parenting	practices	of	poor	and	non-poor	 parents	 and,	 further,	 instead	 found	 strong	 evidence	 suggesting	 that	 when	resources	are	limited,	parents	are	likely	to	prioritise	their	children’s	needs	over	their	own.	Dermott	 and	 Pomati	 (2016),	 similarly,	 found	 no	 evidence	 to	 support	 the	 idea	 that	 the	parenting	practices	or	financial	decision	making	of	lone	parents	and	coupled	parents	differ	
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responsibility	 for	what	 happens	 to	 children	 later	 on	 in	 life	 is	 here	 placed	squarely	on	 the	 shoulders	of	parents,	 instead	of	 considering	 the	 impact	of	schooling,	the	wider	social	environment,	or	again	that	of	material	poverty.		More	 specifically,	 parenting	 styles	 combining	 elements	of	 discipline	and	 rule	 setting	with	 ‘warmth	 and	 sensitivity’	 (DfE	 2011:	 37)	 are	 seen	 as	constituting	‘good’	parenting	in	the	2011	document,	which	goes	on	to	quote	the	Frank	Field	report.	Val	Gillies’s	(2012)	discussion	of	the	report	suggests	that	its	focus	is	on	the	(supposed)	societal	decline	in	parental	responsibility	and	 personal	 values.	 Here	 the	 parenting	 practices	 of	 poor	 parents	 are	problematised	by	linking	them	to	notions	of	national	or	societal	moral	crisis	–	 echoing	 David	 Cameron’s	 (2011)	 ‘broken	 Britain’	 rhetoric,	 discussed	 in	more	detail	below.	In	the	2011	document,	such	‘abstract	notions	of	parental	[--]	 “warmth”’	 (Jensen	 2012:	 1)	 are,	 further,	 combined	 with	 ‘parenting	science’	(Gillies	2012:	101).	It	also	quotes	the	Graham	Allen	report,	which,	as	Rosalind	 Edwards	 and	Val	 Gillies	 (2012)	 discuss,	 argues	 that	 children	 can	develop	 faulty	 ‘brain	 architecture’	 due	 to	 bad	 parenting.	 Similarly,	 in	 the	2017	 document	 ‘exposure	 to	 parental	 conflict’	 is	 presented	 as	 potentially	having	 ‘long-term	 negative	 impacts	 on	 children’s	 early	 emotional,	behavioural,	 cognitive	 and	 social	 development’	 (DWP	2017a:	10,	 emphasis	mine).	 The	 documents’	 inclusion	 of	 harm	 to	 children’s	 cognitive	development	 as	 one	 of	 the	 potential	 consequences	 of	 parental	 conflict	 or	bad	 parenting	 echoes	 the	 recent	 trend	 of	 turning	 to	 brain	 science	 for	evidence	in	social	policy	more	widely,	and	in	arguing	for	the	importance	of	early	 intervention	 policies	 in	 particular.	 As	 Edwards	 and	 her	 colleagues	highlight,	the	notion	that	children’s	cognitive	and	neurological	development	is	intrinsically	linked	to	the	kind	of	parenting	they	receive,	especially	during	a	supposed	‘crucial	ante-	and	post-natal	window	of	“1001	days”’	(2015:	171)	functions	as	a	useful	trope	to	push	policy	into	a	particular	direction,	rather	than	necessarily	reflecting	scientific	evidence	for	such	a	link.	Altogether	 the	 documents’	 framings	 of	 parenting,	 thus,	 reflect	 the	increasing	attribution	of	the	ability	of	children	to	do	well	later	to	the	style	of																																																																																																																																																							significantly,	 thus	 questioning	 the	 entire	 basis	 for	 policy	 that	 treats	 lone	 parents	 as	 a	separate	group	requiring	specific	policy	attention.	
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parenting,	or	‘the	minutiae	of	parenting	practice’	(Gillies	2012:	105),	over	all	other	 factors. 112 	Overall,	 poor	 parents	 find	 themselves	 not	 only	 more	vulnerable	 to	austerity	–	as	discussed	 in	Chapter	1	–	but	also,	 at	 the	same	time,	‘more	accountable	than	ever	for	the	social	(im)mobility	of	themselves	and	their	children’	(Jensen	and	Tyler	2012).	In	sustaining	the	individualising	emphasis	of	 (child)	poverty	discourses	 in	general,	 this	 increasing	 ‘parental	determinism’	(Gillies	2012:	90)	in	policy-making	also	diverts	attention	away	from	 material	 poverty,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 –	 material	 and	 other	 –	 resources	needed	to	parent	‘well.’	Apart	 from	 the	 central	 focus	 on	 parenting	 itself,	 however,	 a	 wide	range	of	other	parental	behaviours	and	practices	is	included	in	each	paper’s	discussion	–	as	the	quotes	included	at	the	beginning	of	this	section	indicate.	The	third	chapter	of	the	2011	document	is	titled	‘Supporting	Family	Life	and	Children’s	Life	Chances’	(DfE	2011:	35).	It	argues	that	 ‘relationship	quality’	is	key	to	children’s	wellbeing,	whereas	 ‘intense	conflict	between	parents		–	whatever	 their	 relationship	status	–	has	been	shown	 to	be	detrimental	 for	children’s	outcomes’	(ibid.:	36).	The	2012	document	frames	its	intervention	around	 ‘family	 stability’	 instead,	 which	 is	 rather	 tautologically	 defined	 as	‘grow[ing]	 up	 in	 a	 stable	 family	 environment	 without	 experiencing	relationship	breakdown’	 (CPU	2012:	40).	The	section	examines	 the	 impact	that	lone	parenthood,	growing	up	in	a	step	family,	and	domestic	violence	can	have	 on	 children.	 The	 2017	 document	 includes	 a	 section	 on	 ‘parental	conflict’	 (DWP	2017a:	9),	 in	which	–	despite	 its	name	–	broad	connections	are	made	between	parental	conflict,	parental	separation,	worklessness,	and	cycles	 of	 disadvantage.	 Similarly	 to	 the	 earlier	 papers,	 the	 2017	 paper	argues	 that	 ‘children	 growing	 up	 with	 parents	 who	 have	 good-quality	relationships	 (whether	 they	 are	 together	 or	 separated),	 tend	 to	 enjoy	 a	wider	range	of	better	future	outcomes’	(ibid.:	9),	be	it	in	terms	of	mental	or	physical	health,	or	educational	attainment.	Thus,	in	all	three	documents	the	commonsensical	 view	 that	 a	 stable	 home	 environment	 is	 key	 to	 raising	successful	 children	 is	 promoted	 –	 but	 exactly	 what	 such	 an	 environment																																																									112	On	 this	discursive	 shift,	 see	 also	Allen	 and	Taylor	 (2012),	 Edwards	 and	Gillies	 (2012),	Jensen	(2012),	Jensen	and	Tyler	(2012),	and	Smith	(2013).	
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looks	like	is	never	quite	explicitly	defined.113	Since	each	document	includes	such	a	wide	 range	of	 issues	 in	 its	discussion,	however,	 it	 is	difficult	not	 to	draw	 the	 conclusion	 that	parental	 separation	or	divorce	 is	 in	itself	 bad	 for	children.	While	 the	 2011	 and	 2017	 papers	 go	 to	 great	 lengths	 to	 assure	 the	reader	 that	 ‘relationship	 quality’	 is	more	 important	 than	whether	 parents	stay	together,	there	is,	nonetheless,	a	strong	focus	on	two-parent	families	–	or	 at	 least	 a	 strong	 preference	 for	 parenting	 to	 be	 undertaken	 by	 two	parents.	The	2017	document	includes	a	discussion	of	the	‘benefits	to	having	a	good-quality	 relationship	between	 the	 child	and	 the	non-resident	parent	(most	 commonly	 the	 father)	 for	 children’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 10),	 as	 well	 as	 a	further	 specification	 that	 ‘we	 understand	 the	 importance	 of	 both	mothers	and	 fathers	 to	 children’s	 future	outcomes’	 (ibid.:	 20).	The	2012	paper	also	includes	a	consultation	question	specifically	about	the	role	of	fathers:	 ‘how	important	is	the	presence	of	a	father	to	a	child’s	experience	of	poverty	and	life	chances?’	 (CPU	2012:	42).	Since	this	seemingly	open-ended	question	 is	preceded	 by	 a	 number	 of	 quotes	 and	 statistics	 about	 the	 poor	 outcomes	associated	with	lone	parent	families,	this	question	can	easily	lead	the	reader	towards	 the	 conclusion	 that	 families	 without	 fathers	 are	 in	 themselves	
undesirable.	The	emphasis	in	both	documents	on	the	importance	of	fathering	–	 rather	 than	 on	 the	 (at	 least	 ostensibly)	 gender-neutral	parenting	 –	 thus	supports	the	‘absent	father’	narrative,	whereby	a	‘singular	father	figure	[is]	positioned	 as	 essential	 for	 authority	 and	 stability’	 (De	 Benedictis	 2012:	13). 114 	Further,	 it	 highlights	 single	 parenting	 in	 general,	 and	 single	mothering	 in	 particular,	 as	 undesirable	 parenting	 arrangements,	 thus	confirming	Esther	Dermott	and	Marco	Pomati’s	(2016)	argument	that	 lone	parent	families	tend	to	be	seen	as	deficient	in	the	current	policy	climate.115	
																																																								113	In	his	2015	announcement,	Duncan	Smith	proudly	asserts	that	‘family	life	has	stabilised’	(HC	 Deb	 2015:	 c1512)	 since	 the	 Conservatives	 came	 to	 power	 but,	 similarly,	 offers	 no	explanation	as	to	what	this	stabilisation	has	entailed.	114	This	 emphasis	 also	 stands	 in	 contradiction	 to	 the	 implications	 of	 certain	 austerity	policies	on	intimate	lives,	as	I	discuss	in	relation	to	the	Bedroom	Tax	in	Chapter	5.	115	On	stigmatising	discourses	of	 lone	mothers	 in	 the	austerity	context,	 see	also	Allen	and	Taylor	(2012),	De	Benedictis	(2012),	Dermott	and	Pomati	(2016),	Jensen	(2014),	and	Millar	and	Ridge	(2013).	
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These	 discursive	 emphases	 are	 reproduced	 in	 the	 two	 case	 studies	included	 in	 the	 2012	 document’s	 ‘family	 stability’	 section.	 The	 first	 case	study	is	about	Jane,	described	as	‘a	lone	parent	living	in	a	deprived	area	with	her	five	young	children’	(CPU	2012:	41).	She	has	been	struggling	financially	and	 feels	 ‘forced	 into	 debt’	 since	 her	 relationship	 with	 the	 father	 of	 her	children	ended.	It	is	mentioned	that	Jane’s	ex-partner	‘has	not	provided	any	practical	 support	 or	 paid	 her	 any	 child	 maintenance’	 (ibid.:	 41),	 but	 for	instance	 state	 help	 in	 enforcing	 child	maintenance	 payments	 or	 providing	free	 childcare	 are	 not	 explored	 as	 potential	 solutions.	 Instead,	 the	individualising	presentation	of	Jane’s	situation	can	easily	lead	the	reader	to	the	conclusion	that	her	problems	would	not	exist	–	had	she	simply	chosen	not	 to	 separate	 with	 her	 partner.	 Here,	 the	 lone	 parent	 is	 ‘positioned	 as	failing	to	give	her	children	a	stable	father	figure	by	selfishly	placing	her	will	to	parent	alone	[--]	above	them’	(2012:	13),	as	Sara	De	Benedictis	argues	in	her	examination	of	parenting	discourses	in	the	context	of	austerity	politics.		The	second	case	study,	similarly,	reproduces	a	highly	individualising	view	of	relationship	issues.	It	is	about	Robert,	who	was	‘kicked	out	of	home’	(CPU	2012:	42)	at	16	and	is	quoted	saying:		Basically,	my	mum	had	 a	 boyfriend...	 I	 think	 this	 happens	 a	 lot:	mum	has	a	boyfriend,	boyfriend	and	her	son	don’t	get	on,	end	up	rowing.	We	 got	 into	 blows	 one	 day.	 I’ve	 got	 little	 sisters	 and	 it	wasn’t	nice	for	them	to	see	that.	So,	I	left...	I	was	on	my	own,	I	was	so	lonely.	I	squatted	for	a	while,	then	lived	in	a	hostel.	(ibid.:	42)	The	 subtext	 is,	 again,	 about	 the	 mother’s	 poor	 choices	 –	 in	 this	 case	 her	choice	to	be	with	an	abusive	boyfriend	and,	therefore,	to	implicitly	prioritise	her	 own	 relationship	 over	 her	 children’s	 wellbeing.	 Specific	 cases	 or	scenarios	 are	 not	 included	 in	 the	 2011	 and	 2017	 documents,	 but	 their	discussions,	 nonetheless,	 reproduce	 the	 2012	 document’s	 focus	 on	 the	importance	 of	 avoiding	 relationship	 breakdown.	 In	 coupling	 examples	 of	violent	or	absent	 fathers	with	a	strong	emphasis	on	 the	 ills	of	 relationship	conflict	and	breakdown,	the	focus	is	centrally	on	mothers	as	responsible	for	their	children’s	poor	development	and	outcomes	–	and	particularly	on	lone	mothers	 for	risking	destabilising	the	environment	 in	which	they	raise	their	children.	
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Although	in	the	2011	document	 it	 is	stated	that	 ‘exactly	how	strong	the	correlation	is,	and	how	far	there	is	a	causal	relationship	between	family	type	 and	 child	 outcomes	 is	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 academic	 debate’,	 it	 is,	nonetheless,	also	suggested	that	 ‘what	is	clear	is	that	experiencing	multiple	
relationship	transitions	can	be	particularly	damaging	to	children’	(DfE	2011:	36-7,	emphasis	mine).	Since	this	statement	follows	the	paper’s	discussion	of	the	 many	 poor	 outcomes	 associated	 with	 children	 experiencing	 parental	separation,	 conflict,	 or	 distress,	 the	 wording	 of	 ‘multiple	 relationship	transitions’	seems	to,	specifically,	point	at	single	parents	–	usually	mothers	–	who	have	different	partners.	This	framing	echoes	Jean	Carabine’s	argument	that	 the	 ‘moral	 hazard’	 posed	 by	 lone	 mothers	 is	 ‘more	 often	 than	 not	constituted	as	sexual’	(2001:	306)	–	in	her	case	specifically	in	the	context	of	social	policy	discourses.	Her	comparative	examination	of	discourses	of	lone	motherhood	 in	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 and	 the	 1990s	 highlights	 that	 the	stigmatisation	 of	 non-normative	 family	 forms,	 and	 particularly	 of	 families	headed	 by	 lone	 mothers,	 has	 a	 long	 history	 in	 the	 UK.	 Pointing	 at	 the	frequent	discursive	attacks	on	lone	mothers	in	both	eras,	she	argues	that	the	implicit	 message	 in	 such	 attacks	 tends	 to	 be	 that	 ‘welfare	 benefits	 and	housing	 should	 only	 be	 available	 to	 “respectable”	 married	 women’	 (ibid.:	306).116	Whether	 lone	mothers	are	having	 too	many	children,	having	 them	too	 early,	 or	 having	 children	 with	 multiple	 different	 fathers	 –	 and	 thus,	implicitly,	having	sex	with	too	many	different	men	–	lone	mother	discourses	tend	 to	 reproduce	 assumptions	 about	 the	 sexual	 immorality	 and	impropriety	of	the	poor	or	working-class	lone	mother.117	While	 the	 sexual	 and	 reproductive	 decisions	 of	 single	 mothers	 are	not	 explicitly	 discussed	 in	 the	 documents	 under	 analysis	 here,	 their	framings,	nonetheless,	 carry	 long-standing	 connotations	of	 sexual	morality	and	respectability.	They	position	the	mother	who	separates	 from	her	male	partner,	 has	 more	 than	 one	 sexual	 partner,	 or	 simply	 chooses	 to	 parent	alone,	as	depriving	her	children	‘of	a	“normal”	upbringing	through	a	lack	of																																																									116	On	 class	 and	 respectability	 politics,	 see	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	 discussion	 of	 Skeggs’s	work.	117	See	 also	 Gedalof	 (2017)	 and	 Jensen	 and	 Tyler	 (2015)	 on	 discourses	 of	 sexual	 or	reproductive	‘excess.’	
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the	 nuclear	 family’	 (De	 Benedictis	 2012:	 12).	 Echoes	 of	 the	 respectability	politics	discussed	by	Carabine	are,	thus,	certainly	evident	in	the	documents	under	 discussion	 here,	 reflected	 most	 clearly	 in	 the	 positioning	 of	 lone	parent	 families	at	 some	distance	 from	 the	 ideal	 family	 type.	The	 flipside	 of	the	 documents’	 discussions	 of	 the	 ills	 of	 parental	 conflict,	 separation,	 and	single	parenting	is,	thus,	the	normative,	heterosexual,	two-parent	family	that	embodies	 what	 is	 termed	 ‘family	 stability’	 in	 the	 documents.	 The	euphemistic	 references	 to	 ‘family	 stability’,	 coupled	 with	 the	 frequent	references	 to	 the	 various	 problems	 associated	 with	 families	 that	 deviate	from	the	norm,	mean	that	heterosexual	marriage	comes	to	easily	stand	in	for	family	 stability,	 as	 Irene	 Gedalof	 (2017)	 suggests,	 such	 that	 the	 ‘stable	family’	 and	 the	 heterosexual	 nuclear	 family	 become	 readable	 as	
interchangeable	–	with	other	family	forms	and	relationship	types	measured	against	this	norm.	The	lone	mother	is	here	already	in	advance	excluded	from	definitions	 of	 ‘family	 stability’,	 and	 her	 distance	 from	 this	 ideal,	 in	 turn,	viewed	as	proof	of	the	instability	of	the	environment	in	which	she	raises	her	children.	 These	 discursive	 framings	 further	 disadvantage	 poor,	 working-class,	and	racialised	mothers	and	families,	due	to	the	way	in	which	they	tend	to	be,	similarly,	perceived	as	already	at	a	distance	from	normative	notions	of	family	life,	as	Edwards	and	Gillies	(2012)	note.	This	 section’s	discussion	highlights	 the	 increasing	 ‘familialisation	of	policy’	(ibid.:	67)	in	general,	as	well	as	more	specifically	the	centring	of	the	poor	family	as	the	subject	of	intense	judgement,	discursive	focus,	and	policy	intervention	in	the	area	of	child	poverty.	Poor	parents	are	positioned	as	the	key	 actors	 in	 preventing	 the	 future	 reproduction	 of	 the	 ‘cycles	 of	disadvantage’	 examined	 in	 the	 next	 section,	 and	 parenting	 –	 particularly	conflict-free	 parenting	 –	 highlighted	 as	 the	 indispensable	 foundation	 for	children’s	 development,	 both	 cognitive	 and	 otherwise.	 Furthermore,	however,	all	three	papers	also	position	what	they	view	as	‘good	parenting’	at	some	 distance	 from	 single	 parenting	 and/or	 mothering,	 clearly	 marking	two-parent	families	–	or	at	least	parenting	by	a	mother	and	a	father	–	as	the	preferred	 environment	 for	 raising	 children,	 whereas	 lone	 parent	 families	and	 step-families	 appear	 deficient	 in	 comparison.	 Family	 form	 is,	 thus,	
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strongly	associated	with	both	parenting	quality	and	child	poverty	–	with	the	‘stable’,	 heteronormative,	 two-parent	 family	 positioned	 as	 the	 ideal.	 As	Dermott	 and	Pomati	 argue,	 ‘current	UK	political	 discourse	places	 the	 two-parent	married	family	firmly	centre	stage’	(2016:	64)	–	both	as	a	normative	ideal	 and	 explicitly	 supported	 by	 policies.	 Overall,	 then,	 the	 family	 is	 here	not	only	centred	as	the	location	in	which	poverty	and	worklessness	can	and	should	 be	 tackled,	 but	 familial	 and	 sexual	 dynamics,	 arrangements,	 and	practices	are	also	highlighted	as	key	to	any	such	efforts.		
	
Cycles	of	Dependency,	Disadvantage,	and	Poverty		We	want	to	break	the	cycle	of	deprivation	too	often	passed	from	one	generation	to	another.	(DfE	2011:	4,	emphasis	mine)	There	can	be	no	doubt	that	child	poverty	has	undermined	the	lives	of	generation	after	generation	of	families	in	the	UK.	(CPU	2012:	12,	emphasis	mine)	We	want	to	focus	on	making	a	meaningful	change	to	children’s	lives	by	extending	opportunity	for	all,	so	that	both	they	and	their	children	can	escape	from	the	cycle	of	poverty.	(Duncan	Smith	in	HC	Deb	2015:	c1506,	emphasis	mine)	Children	in	workless	households	are	considerably	more	likely	to	repeat	the	poorer	outcomes	of	their	parents	–	an	
intergenerational	cycle	of	disadvantage.	(DWP	2017a:	8,	emphasis	mine)	As	 the	 previous	 two	 sections	 have	 established,	 the	 documents’	 framings	square	 in	on	the	 family	as	the	 focal	point	of	governmental	efforts	 to	tackle	poverty	 and	 disadvantage,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 positioning	 them	 as	secondary	 issues	 to	worklessness.	Worklessness	 can	be	 reproduced	 in	 the	family,	 both	 in	 itself,	 and	 through	 the	 reproduction	 of	 the	 various	 other	disadvantages	discussed	in	the	documents,	such	as	parental	conflict,	family	instability,	mental	and	physical	 ill	health,	substance	abuse,	 low	educational	qualifications,	 and	 poor	 housing	 or	 homelessness.	 Since	 all	 of	 these	 other	disadvantages	 are	 both	 causes	 and	 effects	 of	 worklessness,	 any	 efforts	 to	tackle	them	are	also	framed	as	potential	remedies	to	worklessness	and	vice	
versa.	 Breaking	 this	 ‘intergenerational	 cycle	 of	 disadvantage’	 is	 the	 aim	 of	the	policy	solutions	suggested	in	the	documents.	However,	it	is	particularly	
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by	preventing	the	transmission	of	the	norm	of	worklessness	that	the	cycles	of	poverty	can	be	tackled.	Work	 is,	 therefore,	 important,	and	positioned	as	key	to	governmental	efforts	to	tackle	poverty,	not	just	because	of	the	income	it	brings	 to	poor	 families,	but	also	because	of	 its	moral	value.	Further,	 it	 is	here,	 in	 the	 narratives	 about	 intergenerational	 cycles	 of	 poverty,	deprivation,	and	disadvantage,	that	the	poverty	discourses	advanced	in	the	documents	move	most	clearly	into	the	cultural	sphere.		As	 the	 quotes	 included	 above	 suggest,	 the	 argument	 that	 cycles	 of	poverty,	deprivation,	or	disadvantage	can	be	passed	on	within	families,	from	one	generation	to	the	next,	is	central	in	all	three	documents.	Specifically,	it	is	the	 overly	 generous	 welfare	 system,	 and	 the	 cultures	 of	 dependency	 and	worklessness	 created	 and	 sustained	 by	 it,	 that	 keeps	 these	 cycles	reproducing.	 The	 2011	 document	 claims	 that	 the	 previous	 Labour	Government’s	‘approach	has	been	exhausted,	not	only	failing	to	turn	the	tide	on	income	poverty,	but	worse	still,	exacerbating	the	problem	by	suppressing	incentives	to	work	and	keeping	families	in	cycles	of	entrenched	deprivation’	(DfE	2011:	4).	While	Labour	threw	‘money	at	the	symptoms’,	the	Coalition’s	strategic	 vision	 ‘is	 focused	 on	 the	 powerful	 drivers	 which	 keep	 the	 most	disadvantaged	 families	 stuck	 in	 cycles	 of	 poverty’	 (ibid.:	 12).	 The	 2012	consultation,	 similarly,	 wants	 to	 ‘free	 families	 who	 have	 been	 trapped	 on	benefits	 so	 they	 can	 live	 independently	 and	 see	 their	 lives	 transformed’	(CPU	2012:	12).	Here	 the	poverty	discourse	advanced	 in	 the	documents	 is	reoriented	 towards	 the	 ‘underlying	 problem’	 of	 welfare	 dependency,	 of	which	poverty	is	a	symptom	–	a	common	trope	in	austerity	discourse	more	generally. 118 	This	 discursive	 reorientation,	 in	 turn,	 reveals	 a	 paradox	inherent	to	the	documents’	framings	of	poverty,	as	Christina	Pantazis	(2016)	points	out	–	on	the	one	hand,	poverty	is	presented	as	a	consequence	of	the	irresponsible	behaviour	of	 individuals,	but	on	the	other,	 it	 follows	from	the	
structural	 deficiencies	 of	 the	 welfare	 system,	 which	 have	 encouraged	dependency	and,	consequently,	led	to	poverty.	This	reorientation	also	links	the	 individual	 irresponsibility	 of	 families	who	 live	 beyond	 their	means,	 to																																																									118	See	 Jensen	 (2012,	 2014),	 Jensen	 and	 Tyler	 (2015),	 and	 Wiggan	 (2012)	 for	 further	examinations	of	this	discursive	trope.		
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the	 national	 irresponsibility	 of	 the	 Labour	 Government(s),	 who	 also	 lived	beyond	 their	 means,	 thus	 connecting	 imaginaries	 of	 ‘broken	 families’	 to	those	 of	 a	 ‘broken	Britain’	 –	 as	 Tracy	 Shildrick	 and	 her	 colleagues	 (2016)	argue	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Troubled	 Families	 Programme,	 discussed	 further	below.		While	 welfare	 dependency	 is	 not	 discussed	 as	 such	 in	 the	 2017	document,	 the	phrase	 ‘for	some	families,	worklessness,	not	employment,	 is	the	norm’	(DWP	2017a:	3,	4,	7,	emphasis	mine)	is	repeated	three	times.	The	statement	‘children	in	workless	households	are	considerably	more	likely	to	repeat	the	poorer	outcomes	of	their	parents’	(ibid.:	8)	further	reinforces	the	idea	 that	 worklessness	 can	 become	 normative	 and,	 thus,	 be	intergenerationally	 reproduced	 in	 the	 family.	 The	 2011	 document	 argues,	similarly,	 that	 ‘growing	up	in	a	workless	family	often	has	persistent	effects	later	 in	 life	 and	 is	 correlated	 with	 future	 worklessness’	 (DfE	 2011:	 15).	Consequently,	 ‘poverty	can	be	such	a	destructive	 force	because	of	 its	 long-term	grip	on	families	and	communities,	holding	them	back	generation	after	generation’	(ibid.:	15).	These	claims	have	been	at	least	partially	refuted	by	a	study	 conducted	 by	Robert	MacDonald	 and	 his	 colleagues	 (2014a,	 2014b)	that	found	no	evidence	of	‘intergenerational	cultures	of	worklessness’	in	the	UK.	 Nonetheless,	 because	 of	 the	 supposed	 normative	 –	 and	 therefore	transmittable	–	nature	of	worklessness,	the	documents’	suggested	approach	to	 tackling	 poverty	 and	 engrained	 disadvantage	 is	 designed	 specifically	 to	intervene	 in	 the	 reproduction	of	 the	norm.	 Traditional	methods	 for	 dealing	with	 poverty	 are	 insufficient	 precisely	 because	 worklessness	 is	 seen	 as	normative	and	reproducible:	 ‘because	the	root	causes	are	not	financial,	our	approach	 goes	 beyond	 the	 safety	 net	 our	 welfare	 system	 provides’	 (DWP	2017a:	3).		Overall	 the	 documents’	 framings	 suggest	 that	 the	 children	 of	 poor	parents	 tend	 to	 also	 be	 poor,	not	 because	 of	 growing	 up	with	material	 or	economic	 disadvantage,	 but	 because	 they	 can	 acquire	 the	 norm	 of	worklessness	from	their	parents.119	The	specific	mechanism	through	which																																																									119	As	Dorling	argues,	in	Britain	today	children’s	life	chances	are	more	strongly	determined	‘by	where	 (and	 to	whom)	 they	were	 born	 as	 compared	 to	 any	 other	 date	 in	 the	 last	 651	
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this	 ‘acquisition’	 takes	 place	 is,	 simply,	 by	 not	witnessing	 or	 experiencing	one’s	 parents	 go	 to	work.	 The	 argument	 advanced	 in	 the	 2011	 document	suggests	 that	 ‘the	 way	 that	 disadvantage	 perpetuates	 is	 shaped	 by	 the	
experiences,	 attainment	 and	 outcomes	 of	 children	 growing	 up	 in	 socio-economic	 disadvantage	 and	 by	 the	 way	 that	 negative	 parental	 activities	experienced	 through	 childhood	 may	 repeat	 in	 adulthood’	 (DfE	 2011:	 15,	emphasis	mine).	Similarly,	 in	the	2012	consultation	 ‘seeing	a	parent	go	out	to	work’	is	credited	as	an	experience	that	is	‘vital	to	childhood’	(CPU	2012:	1,	emphasis	mine),	and	 in	his	2015	announcement	Duncan	Smith	claims	 that	work	‘provides	purpose,	responsibility	and	role	models	for	our	children’	(HC	Deb	 2015:	 c1505).	 Finally,	 in	 2017	 the	 ‘Government	wants	 the	 parents	 of	these	 children	 to	 have	 the	 chance	 to	 earn	 a	 living,	 and	 to	 overcome	 the	issues	 that	 hold	 them	 back’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 4),	 but	 in	 order	 for	 this	 to	 be	possible,	 children	 need	 to	 be	 able	 to	 ‘benefit	 from	 the	 stability	 and	 good	example	of	working	parents’	(ibid.:	3).	In	these	discursive	framings,	it	is	the	experience	 of	 witnessing	 one’s	 parents	 go	 to	 work	 that	 is	 crucial	 for	children’s	 development	 and	 future	 outcomes	 –	 and,	 importantly,	 more	 so	than	any	potential	income	generated	by	parental	labour	market	activities.		In	 the	 2011	 document	 it	 is	 claimed	 that	 the	 Government’s	 ‘welfare	reforms	will	mean	 that	work	 pays	 and	 that	we	 build	 responsibility	 and	 a	
culture	of	work’	(DfE	2011:	63,	emphasis	mine).	In	the	discussion	following	the	2015	 announcement,	worklessness	 and	poverty	 are	 also	positioned	 as	part	of	a	person’s	attitude	and	values	–	rather	than	as	a	consequence	of,	for	instance,	 unfavourable	 labour	 market	 conditions.	 Conservative	 MP	 Heidi	Allen	offered	her	support	 for	Duncan	Smith	and	gave	an	example	from	her	own	experience	as	a	small	business	owner:		when	 I	 gave	 [a	 previous	 employee]	 employment	 and	 put	 his	money	up,	he	was	still	culturally	unable	 to	 find	the	mental	drive	to	go	to	work.	[--]	I	have	seen	it	at	the	other	end	–	you	can	drag	a	horse	 to	 water	 –	 so	 I	 welcome	 what	 the	 Secretary	 of	 State	 is	trying	to	do.	(HC	Deb	2015:	c1515,	emphasis	mine)																																																																																																																																																							years’	 (2007:	 5).	 However,	 in	 his	 analysis,	 this	 is	 due	 to	 income	 and	wealth	 inequalities,	particularly	in	relation	to	housing,	rather	than	to	any	ephemeral	notion	of	culture.			
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Here	Allen	is	making	the	case	that	being	offered	work	alone	does	not	work	as	 a	 solution	 to	 worklessness,	 as	 focusing	 on	 the	 demand	 side	 leaves	 the	
cultures	of	worklessness	intact.	In	response	to	this	statement	from	the	floor,	Duncan	Smith	stated:	my	right	hon.	Friend	the	Education	Secretary	is	already	engaged	in	driving	schools	to	help	inculcate	and	teach	character	resilience	and	key	characteristics	such	as	understanding	what	it	is	to	go	to	work	and	to	get	up	in	the	morning.	(ibid.:	c1515)	This	exchange	further	highlights	the	positioning	of	worklessness	as	a	matter	of	 values,	norms,	 and	 culture,	 as	well	 as	 cements	 its	 framing	 through	paid	work	alone	–	Duncan	Smith	and	Allen	are	here	not	concerned	with	whether	people	are	‘culturally	able’,	or	have	the	mental	drive	to,	do	care	or	volunteer	work	 for	 instance.	 The	 commonsensical	 notion	 that	 for	 some	 people	worklessness	 is	 the	 consequence	 of	 laziness	 and	 a	 lack	 of	 ‘character	resilience’	 –	of	 simply	not	understanding	what	 it	means	 to	get	up	 to	go	 to	work	every	morning	–	 supports	 the	view	 that	 it	 is,	 indeed,	 something	 that	parents	can	pass	on	to	their	children.			The	 ‘intergenerational	 cycle’	 of	 disadvantage	 or	 poverty	 does	 not,	however,	just	reflect	the	reproduction	of	worklessness	from	one	generation	to	the	next.	The	many	other	disadvantages	discussed	in	the	documents	are	part	of	the	cycle:	due	to	their	causal	relationship	to	worklessness	they	form	a	 part	 of	 the	 process	 by	 which	 children	 can	 acquire	 worklessness	 and	disadvantage	from	their	parents.	In	the	2011	paper	it	is	suggested	that:	the	 disadvantages	 and	 barriers	 that	 parents	 experience	 are	 the	source	 of	 [the]	 long-term	 impact	 [of	 poverty].	 These	 barriers	have	 a	 detrimental	 effect	 on	 children’s	 progression	 and	 well-being,	 which	 can	 impact	 right	 through	 into	 their	 adulthood,	 in	turn	affecting	the	subsequent	generation.	(DfE	2011:	15)	In	 the	 2017	 paper,	 similarly,	 explicit	 references	 are	 included	 to	 the	 ‘long-term	 impact	on	 children’s	development’	 (DWP	2017a:	7)	of	 issues	 such	as	poor	parental	mental	health	and	parental	conflict,	thus	suggesting	that	these	issues	can	also	be	reflected	in	children’s	future	lives.	What	is	at	risk	of	being	reproduced	or	passed	on	here	is	not	about	material	conditions	but,	instead,	about	norms,	values,	and	behavioural	patterns	–	in	short,	about	culture.		
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Parents	–	 their	norms	and	values,	 the	 ‘quality’	of	 their	 relationship,	whether	 they	are	 together	or	not	 and,	perhaps	most	 importantly,	whether	they	have	paid	jobs	or	not	–	are,	thus,	positioned	as	centrally	responsible	for	breaking	 the	cycles	of	disadvantage	or	poverty.	The	documents’	discursive	framings	suggest	that	poor	parents	have	the	choice	to	pass	the	right	kind	of	cultural	values	and	norms	on	to	their	children	–	instead	of	the	dysfunctional	norms	 and	 values	 associated	 with	 worklessness,	 ‘low	 quality’	 parental	relationships,	 single	 parenting,	 and	 so	 on	 –	 and,	 thus,	 ensure	 that	 their	children	grow	up	to	be	responsible	future	citizens.	These	emphases	echo	the	long-standing	 notion	 of	 parents,	 but	 particularly	 mothers,	 as	 the	 moral	
guardians	or	regenerators	of	the	nation.120	The	discourses	that	position	the	poor	 or	 working-class	 lone	 mother	 at	 a	 distance	 from	 the	 ideal,	 ‘stable’,	family,	examined	above,	tend	to	also	view	her	poor	sexual	and	relationship	choices	 as	 ‘emblematic	 of	 the	 breakdown	 of	 national	 morality	 and	 social	order	 as	 a	 whole’	 (2000:	 89)	 as	 Carabine	 suggests.	 In	 current	 discursive	framings	of	poverty,	these	connotations	tend	to	materialise,	in	particular,	in	the	 connection	 forged	 between	 ‘broken	 families’	 and	 ‘broken	 Britain’,	suggesting	 that	 ‘unstable’	or	non-normative	 families	are	 to	blame	not	only	for	 societal	 moral	 decay,	 but	 also	 for	 cycles	 of	 welfare	 dependency	 and	poverty,	 and	 the	 ‘bloated’	 welfare	 state	 –	 and,	 consequently,	 even	 for	 the	economic	crisis	and	recession.		In	the	social	worlds	described	by	the	documents,	paid	employment	is,	thus,	not	just	important	to	poor	families	because	of	its	material	and	financial	value,	 but	 also	 –	 or,	 in	 fact,	 primarily	 –	 because	 of	 its	moral	 and	 cultural	value.	 The	 reproduction	 of	 the	 cycles	 of	 dependency,	 worklessness,	 and	poverty	is	a	consequence	of	the	parental	transmission	of	the	wrong	kinds	of	cultural	 norms	 and	 values	 to	 children	 –	 who	 can	 acquire	 worklessness	simply	 by	 not	 witnessing	 their	 parents	 go	 to	 work.	 The	 emphasis	 on	 the	potential	cultural	 transmission	of	poverty,	rather	than	on	the	reproduction	of	material	 disadvantage,	 again,	 helps	 push	material	 poverty	 further	 away	from	the	documents’	discursive	framings.	If	a	key	aim	is	that	parents	are	in																																																									120	On	 the	 positioning	 of	 mothers	 as	 central	 to	 societal	 and	 national	 morality,	 see	 for	example,	Alexander	(1994),	Collins	(1999),	and	Yuval-Davis	(1998).		
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paid	employment	–	regardless	of	the	level	of	material	poverty	they	may	still	experience	–	 in-work	poverty	 is	also	pushed	entirely	out	of	view,	as	Bailey	(2016)	suggests.	Further,	 these	 framings	 function	 to	 link	 the	dysfunctional	cultures	 of	 poor	 families	 to	 notions	 of	 societal	 moral	 crisis	 and	 ‘broken	Britain.’	 Centrally,	 then,	 a	 key	 discursive	 effect	 of	 the	 culturalisation	 of	poverty	 is	 the	 separation	 of	 poor	 individuals	 and	 communities	 from	 the	often-touted	 ‘hardworking	 families’	 and	 ‘taxpayers’,	 with	 poor	 people	labelled	 ‘as	 “other”,	 set	 apart	 from	 mainstream	 society	 as	 a	 result	 of	allegedly	 dysfunctional	 values,	 attitudes	 and	 behaviour’	 (Pemberton	 et	 al.	2016:	 31).	 The	 argument	 that	 there	 is	 something	 culturally	 distinct	 about	(poor,	 working-class)	 benefit	 recipient	 populations	 that	 sets	 them	 apart	from	the	rest	of	society	has	a	long	history	in	UK	politics,	as	evidenced	by	the	continued	discursive	construction	of	a	poor	 ‘underclass’,	which	I	discuss	in	more	detail	in	the	next	section.			
	
From	‘Troubled	Families’	to	the	‘Underclass’		It	has	been	estimated	that	there	are	around	120,000	families	in	England	with	multiple	problems.	(DfE	2011:	39-40)	Under	the	first	[Troubled	Families]	programme,	more	than	116,000	families	in	England	saw	significant	improvements.	(DWP	2017a:	16)	As	well	as	emphasising	work	as	a	panacea	not	only	to	poverty,	but	also	to	a	whole	 host	 of	 other	 problems	 and	 disadvantages,	 the	 solutions	 and	strategies	 offered	 in	 the	 2011	 and	 2017	 documents	 focus	 strongly	 on	
specialist	 or	 targeted	 support	 for	 families	most	 in	 need.121	Most	 obviously	this	 includes	 the	Troubled	Families	 Programme	 established	 in	 2012,	 but	 a	range	 of	 other	 targeted	 support	 is	 also	 highlighted	 as	 part	 of	 the	Governments’	 efforts	 to	 reduce	 (child)	 poverty.	 This	 focus	 reflects	 the	common	 tendency	 in	 poverty	 discourses	 to	 separate	 the	 most	 poor	 or	disadvantaged	 groups	 from	 others,	 thus	 sustaining	 a	 view	 of	 deprivation	and	poverty	as	both	distinct	from	mainstream	society	and	self-perpetuating,	
																																																								121	Potential	 solutions	 are	 not	 discussed	 in	 the	 2012	 document	 due	 to	 its	 status	 as	 a	consultation	document.			
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as	 Gillies	 (2012)	 argues.	 Importantly,	 this	 discursive	 separation	 is	 usually	based	on	supposed	cultural	differences	between	different	groups	of	poor	or	disadvantaged	 people,	 and	 it,	 consequently,	 both	 depends	 on	 and	reproduces	the	discursive	culturalisation	of	poverty.	The	idea	of	a	culturally	
distinct	group	of	poor	people	has	a	long	history	in	the	UK	–	it	is	reflected,	for	example,	 in	 the	 long-standing	 separation	 between	 the	 ‘deserving’	 and	‘undeserving’	poor,	and	in	the	historical	English	‘Poor	Laws’	(Pemberton	et	al.	2016;	MacDonald	et	al.	2014b;	Wiggan	2012);	in	Eugenic	thinking	(Gillies	2012;	MacDonald	et	al.	2014b);	and	even	in	the	1940s	Beveridge	Report	that	provided	 the	 blueprint	 for	 the	 welfare	 state	 in	 the	 UK.122	The	 notion	 of	 a	dysfunctional,	 immoral,	 and/or	 criminal	underclass	 –	 centrally	 reproduced	in	 the	 poverty	 discourses	 under	 analysis	 here	 –	 is,	 thus,	 in	 no	way	 new	 –	and,	 in	 fact,	 it	 could	 be	 argued	 that	 this	 notion	 was	 built	 into	 the	 very	foundations	of	the	welfare	state	in	the	UK.		Both	documents’	discussions	of	the	proposed	solutions	to	the	issues	they	 raise	 are	 peppered	 with	 references	 to	 the	 importance	 of	 paid	employment	for	family	stability	and	children’s	futures.	The	2011	document	includes	a	section	titled	‘Translating	Our	Vision	into	Reality	and	Next	Steps’,	arguing	centrally	that	‘both	the	policy-making	and	delivery	landscape	must	change	to	ensure	there	is	a	stronger	focus	on	incentivising	behaviours	that	benefit	 children’	 (DfE	 2011:	 63).	 ‘Incentivising’	 in	 the	 document’s	 framing	overall	 refers	 primarily	 to	 incentivising	 work	 by	 removing	 ‘financial	disincentives	 to	work	 from	within	 the	 tax	 and	 benefits	 system’	 (ibid.:	 23).	Similarly,	 in	 the	 2017	 document’s	 section	 ‘Next	 steps	 for	 action’	 the	emphasis	 is	 on	 helping	 families	 tackle	 the	 issues	 they	 face	 that	 ‘prevent	[them]	 from	getting	back	on	 their	 feet’	 (DWP	2017a:	15),	 so	 that	 they	 are	able	 to	 ‘move	 into	work	 and	 go	 as	 far	 as	 their	 talents	 and	hard	work	will	take	 them’	 (ibid.:	 15)	 and,	 thus,	 ‘take	 advantage	 of	 the	 opportunities	 in	 a																																																									122	Although	Beveridge’s	 recommendations	 are	 usually	 viewed	 as	 a	 key	 example	 of	 social	welfare	 provision	 based	 on	 the	 principle	 of	 universalism,	 as	 Romano	 (2017)	 points	 out,	Beveridge	 did	 not,	 in	 fact,	 do	 away	 with	 conditionality	 and	 the	 less-eligibility	 principle	entirely.	 Thus,	 the	 Beveridge	 Plan	 has	 also	 been	 interpreted	 ‘not	 as	 a	 break	 with	 but	 in	terms	 of	 a	 continuity	 with	 the	 liberal	 past’	 (ibid.:	 43,	 emphasis	 in	 the	 original)	 –	 a	 past	where	 the	 deserving/undeserving	 distinction	 played	 a	 central	 role.	 See	 also	 Pearson	 and	Elson	(2015)	and	Wiggan	(2012).	
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fairer	Britain’	(ibid.:	21).	Here	the	focus	is	squarely	on	paid	employment	as	the	best,	and	perhaps	only,	route	out	of	not	 just	worklessness,	but	also	the	many	other	disadvantages	discussed	earlier	 in	 the	paper	–	and,	ultimately,	poverty	and	the	‘cycle	of	disadvantage.’		The	 2017	 document’s	 list	 of	 suggested	 solutions	 includes	 the	 next	phase	of	the	Troubled	Families	Programme,	which	will	be	used	to	‘encourage	a	greater	emphasis	on	 tackling	worklessness	and	 issues	associated	with	 it’	(DWP	2017a:	16).	Employment	and	Support	Allowance	(ESA)	claimants	will	have	 access	 to	 a	 Personal	 Support	 Package,	 ‘which	 is	 tailored	 to	 people’s	individual	needs	to	support	them	on	a	journey	towards	employment’	(ibid.:	15).	 Similarly,	 ‘Jobcentre	 Plus	 will	 go	 further	 to	 reflect	 the	 importance	 of	work	with	all	relevant	local	partners’	(ibid.:	18),	and	employment	is	also	to	be	placed	 ‘at	the	centre	of	the	recovery	 journey	where	work	is	assessed	to	be	 a	 good	 option	 as	 part	 of	 therapeutic	 treatment	 for	 [an]	 individual’	experiencing	 drug	 or	 alcohol	 dependency	 (ibid.:	 19).	 The	 2011	 document,	similarly,	makes	work	‘a	goal	for	those	dependant	on	drugs	and	alcohol’	(DfE	2011:	29),	and	both	also	claim	that	work	‘improves	people’s	[--]	mental	and	physical	health’	 (ibid.:	23).	A	 slight	difference	between	 the	 two	documents	lies	 in	 their	 discussions	 of	 people	 with	 disabilities,	 however.	 In	 2011	 the	Government	 wants	 ‘to	 ensure	 that	 disabled	 people	 who	 can	 work	 are	supported	 to	 do	 so,	 while	 providing	 unconditional	 support	 to	 those	 who	need	 it	 most’	 (DfE	 2011:	 29)	 –	 whereas	 in	 2017,	 ‘unconditional	 support’	drops	 out	 of	 the	 framing:	 ‘this	 Government	 is	 determined	 to	 do	 more	 to	support	 workless	 families	 with	 disabilities’	 (DWP	 2017a:	 18).	 While	 the	papers’	 earlier	 discussions	 of	 the	 many	 ‘other	 disadvantages’	 perhaps	suggested	 that	 these	 issues	 are	 important	 to	 tackle	 in	 and	 of	 themselves,	when	it	comes	to	the	solutions,	however,	the	focus	is	almost	exclusively	on	getting	people	(back)	to	work.	Since	 the	 availability	 of	 work	 is	 not	 discussed,	 and	 questions	 of	demand	do	not	enter	the	equation,	as	above	the	presented	solutions	paint	a	highly	 individualising	 picture	 of	 poverty.	 This	 individualising	 emphasis	 is	repeated	in	the	documents’	discussions	of	service	provision:	for	instance	in	relation	 to	 long-term	 debt,	 ‘building	 financial	 capacity	 –	 the	 ability	 to	
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understand	 and	 manage	 money’	 (DfE	 2011:	 32)	 is	 presented	 as	 a	 key	solution	in	the	2011	document.	In	relation	to	drug	dependency,	similarly,	it	is	 stated	 that	 the	 Government	 wants	 to	 better	 incentivise	 ‘recovery	outcomes’	(ibid.:	30),	which	might	 include	 ‘payment	by	results’	provision	–	some	of	 the	common	problems	of	which	were	discussed	 in	Chapter	1.	The	2017	document’s	discussion	of	 issues	such	as	homelessness,	poor	physical	and	 mental	 health,	 problem	 debt,	 and	 substance	 abuse	 also	 lacks	 any	mention	 of	 universally	 accessible	 governmental	 services	 designed	 to	address	them	–	although	the	recent	increases	in	some	of	them	can,	in	fact,	be	attributed	 to	 governmental	 cuts	 and	 reforms	 to	welfare	 and	 other	 service	provision.123	The	documents’	highlighting	of	the	harm	that	these	issues	pose	to	children,	while	at	the	same	time	not	mentioning	any	potential	structural	or	 economic	 –	 or,	 indeed,	 governmental	 –	 causes	 for	 them,	 thus,	 has	 the	discursive	 effect	 of	 framing	 both	 the	 issues	 themselves,	 and	 the	 potential	solutions,	in	highly	individualising	terms.		The	2011	document’s	framing	makes	a	separation	between	different	groups	 of	 poor	 people	 explicit	 by	 arguing	 that	 the	 previous	 Government’s	focus	 on	 the	 relative	 income	 measure	 as	 the	 main	 poverty	 indicator	 had	‘unintended	consequences’,	as	‘it	did	not	distinguish	between	those	families	furthest	from	the	poverty	line	and	those	just	below	the	line’	(DfE	2011:	19).	The	Coalition	wants	to,	instead,	focus	specifically	on	‘families	with	multiple	problems’	 (ibid.:	 4,	 21,	 39,	 40,	 56,	 59)	 –	 or	 variously	 on	 ‘the	 most	disadvantaged’	(ibid.:	4,	12,	36,	39,	43,	50,	54),	 ‘the	most	vulnerable’	(ibid.:	36,	 44,	 55,	 61),	 ‘the	 neediest’	 (ibid.:	 10),	 ‘fragile’	 (ibid.:	 4),	 or	 ‘chaotic	 or	crisis-ridden’	 (ibid.:	 63)	 families.	 While	 most	 of	 the	 offered	 solutions	 are,	indeed,	about	 ‘targeted	support	 for	 those	 in	disadvantaged	circumstances’,	or	 about	 ‘specialist	 intensive	 engagement	 with	 families	 facing	 entrenched																																																									123	For	 example,	 the	 increase	 from	 2011	 to	 2016	 in	 the	 number	 of	 households	 with	dependent	 children	 living	 in	 temporary	 accommodation	 quoted	 in	 the	 2017	 document	(DWP	2017a:	13)	is,	at	least	in	significant	part,	a	consequence	of	the	recent	changes	to	Local	Housing	 Allowance	 rates	 and	 the	 introduction	 of	 the	 Benefit	 Cap	 (Rugg	 2016).	 Similarly,	while	 concern	 is	 expressed	 for	 children	 who	 have	 to	 change	 schools	 because	 of	 their	families	 moving	 into	 temporary	 accommodation	 (DWP	 2017a:	 13),	 the	 practice	 of	 Local	Authorities	moving	 social	 housing	 clients	 far	 away	 from	 their	 homes	 –	 particularly	 from	London	into	areas	of	the	UK	with	lower	housing	costs	–	is	rapidly	increasing	because	of	the	combined	effect	of	various	governmental	cuts	and	reforms	(Halpin	2014;	The	Independent	2015),	as	I	discuss	in	more	detail	in	Chapter	5.	
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and	multiple	problems’,	the	document	does	also	mention	universal	support	services,	recognising	‘that	all	families	need	help	at	certain	times,	such	as	at	the	birth	of	 a	 child’	 (ibid.:	 21).	 Further,	 it	 is	 even	 suggested	 that	 universal	provision	may	be	necessary	‘to	de-stigmatise	services’	(ibid.:	63).	However,	such	 concerns	 are	 not	 present	 in	 the	 2017	 document,	 where	 the	Government’s	 approach	 is	 framed	 purely	 around	 tackling	 ‘the	 complex	issues	 that	 some	 families	 face’	 (DWP	2017a:	15,	 emphasis	mine).	Here	 the	focus	is	on	providing	help	that	enables	particular,	problem	–	or	‘troubled’	–	families	 to	 get	 back	 to	 work,	 which	 will,	 according	 to	 the	 documents’	framing,	 also	 enable	 them	 to	 tackle	 any	 other	 issues	 they	may	be	 facing	 –	such	as	material	poverty.	Thus,	 in	 addition	 to	 the	 overwhelming	 emphasis	 on	work,	 targeted	help	 is	 strongly	 prioritised	 in	 both	 documents	 over	 universal	 support	services.	 In	 fact,	 work	 (or	 more	 work)	 is	 the	 only	 solution	 consistently	offered	to	everyone	below	the	poverty	line	in	the	documents,	whereas	most	of	 the	other	solutions	discussed	are	extended	only	 to	 the	most	precarious,	‘needy’,	or	‘chaotic’	families	–	although,	importantly,	work	is	also	central	to	the	 solutions	 offered	 to	 them.	 The	 Troubled	 Families	 Programme	 is	positioned	 as	 central	 to	 the	 2017	 paper’s	 approach.	 The	 discussion	 first	highlights	 the	 improvements	 already	 made	 during	 the	 first	 phase	 of	 the	programme	and	then	examines	its	next	steps,	including	a	greater	emphasis	on	tackling	worklessness.	This	new	focus	is	problematic	especially	given	the	low	 success	 rates	 of	 the	 programme	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 addressing	worklessness	–	and,	further,	even	more	so	in	relation	to	helping	families	find	work	 that	 lifts	 them	 out	 of	 poverty,	 as	many	 others	 (Hayden	 and	 Jenkins	2014;	 Levitas	 2012,	 2014)	 have	 discussed.124	Ruth	 Levitas	 also	 points	 out																																																									124	Levitas	(2014)	also	discusses	the	many	difficulties	in	reading	and	interpreting	the	data	that	 the	 Government’s	 claims	 of	 the	 programme’s	 success	 are	 based	 –	 for	 instance,	what	counts	as	 a	 family	being	 ‘turned	around’	differs	greatly	 from	area	 to	area,	 and	even	 from	family	to	family.	However,	the	available	numbers	indicate	low	levels	of	success	even	using	the	Government’s	own	–	rather	lax	–	indicators	of	success.	For	example,	only	35	per	cent	of	families	 worked	 with	 (or	 24	 per	 cent	 of	 those	 identified	 and	 only	 18.7	 per	 cent	 of	 the	estimated	 total)	 had	 been	 ‘turned	 around’	 by	 October	 2013	 (ibid.:	 4).	 Further,	 the	programme	was	successful	 in	 terms	of	getting	someone	 into	continuous	work	only	 in	 the	case	of	2.3	per	cent	of	the	families	worked	with	(or	1.5	per	cent	of	those	identified	and	only	1.2	 per	 cent	 of	 the	 estimated	 total).	 Levitas	 further	 points	 at	 the	 Government’s	 usage	 of	‘unofficial	 data’	 and	 disclaimers	 ‘to	 avoid	 the	 ethical	 scrutiny’	 that	 official	 governmental	
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that	‘the	amount	of	money	taken	away	from	the	poorest	families	as	a	result	of	cuts	in	benefits	and	other	support	far	outweighs	the	amount	invested	in	the	 TFP’	 (2014:	 1),	 highlighting	 the	 disconnect	 between	 governmental	efforts	to	address	poverty,	and	the	governmental	causes	of	said	poverty.	At	times	the	attribution	of	success	 in	the	programme	is,	 further,	based	on	the	reduced	 cost	 of	 various	 social	 issues	 to	 the	 taxpayer,	 rather	 than	 on	 any	meaningful	change	in	people’s	lives.	As	 well	 as	 its	 low	 success	 rates	 (based	 on	 its	 own	 criteria),	 the	programme	has	also	been	criticised	 for	 the	methodological	and	conceptual	issues	 inherent	 in	 its	 design.	 Levitas	 (2012),	 for	 example,	 criticises	 the	rather	dubious	methods	by	which	the	available	data	was	interpreted	that	led	to	 the	 figure	 of	 120,000	 troubled	 families.	 The	 programme,	 moreover,	makes	a	curious	discursive	move	from	‘families	that	have	troubles,	through	families	 that	are	“troubled”,	 to	 families	 that	are	or	cause	 trouble’	 (ibid.:	5).	The	 shift	 from	 ‘criteria	 of	 multiple	 deprivation	 to	 those	 of	 anti-social	behaviour’	(ibid.:	10)	evident	in	the	programme’s	implementation	reflects	a	move	from	structural	 indicators	to	ones	that	more	easily	 individualised,	as	Gedalof	 (2017)	 points	 out.	 Further,	 this	 discursive	move	 has	 the	 effect	 of	strongly	 correlating	 poverty	 and	 disadvantage	 with	 societal	 harm	 and	criminality,	 thus	 associating	 poor,	 ‘problem’	 families	 with	 a	 generic	
dysfunctionality.	The	use	of	sanctions,	such	as	the	threat	of	losing	a	tenancy,	as	a	key	mechanism	to	bring	about	change	in	the	programme	also	signals	the	increasingly	 disciplinary	 nature	 of	 governmental	 interventions	 targeting	poor	 populations,	 whereby	 the	 success	 of	 social	 policy	 measures	 is	measured	more	and	more	by	their	impact	on	criminal	justice	agendas	rather	than	 on	 poverty	 or	 material	 wellbeing,	 as	 detailed	 by	 Sue	 Bond-Taylor	(2014).	 This	 shift	 in	 emphasis	 masks	 the	 societal	 and	 economic	 factors	behind	 crime,	 positioning	 it	 –	 similarly	 to	 poverty	 itself	 –	 as	 a	 matter	 of	individual	 and	 cultural	 dysfunction.	 It	 also	 highlights	 a	 central	 tension	within	 poverty	 prevention	 policy	 –	 between	 the	 stated	 aim	 of	 reducing	poverty	 and	 the	 historical	 tendency	 for	 such	 policy	 to	 also	 have	 a																																																																																																																																																							data	is	subject	to	(ibid.:	6),	thus	also	making	it	difficult	to	assess	the	validity	of	the	numbers	themselves.		
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concomitant	 purpose	 in	 managing,	 containing,	 and	 regulating	 poor	people.125	The	documents’	strong	focus	on	the	poorest	and	most	disadvantaged	families,	 around	 whom	 a	 variety	 of	 social	 and	 economic	 problems	supposedly	coalesce,	is,	thus,	strongly	reminiscent	of	the	notion	of	a	not	just	poor,	 but	 also	 dysfunctional	 and	 criminal,	 ‘underclass.’126	This	 notion	 was	popularised	 in	 the	 UK	 in	 the	 1980s	 through	 the	 work	 of	 Charles	Murray,	who	claimed	 to	have	 identified	a	differentiated	poor	group	 ‘with	a	distinct	set	of	cultural	values	concerning	worklessness,	illegitimacy	and	criminality’	(Pantazis	 2016:	 11).	 However,	 as	 Tracey	 Jensen	 points	 out,	 ‘underclass’	discourse	 has	 not	 suddenly	 reappeared	 in	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	rhetoric,	but	instead,	‘it	has	been	continually	spoken	and	re-spoken	through	an	 ever-expanding	 palimpsest	 of	 categories’	 (2012:	 5)	 –	 from	 ‘chaotic’,	‘dysfunctional’,	 and	 ‘problem’	 families	 throughout	 the	 Blair,	 Brown,	 and	Cameron	Governments,	to	the	terminology	of	the	‘troubled	family’	prevalent	in	 the	 2017	 paper	 under	 examination	 here.	 It	 also	 reanimates	 the	 much	older	separation	between	the	deserving	and	undeserving	poor,	‘holding	the	undeserving	 responsible	 not	 only	 for	 their	 own	 predicament,	 but	 also	 for	that	 of	 the	 “bloated”	 welfare	 state’	 (ibid.:	 6)	 and,	 further,	 for	 the	 moral	malaise	 supposedly	 afflicting	 the	 nation	 as	 a	 whole,	 as	 suggested	 in	 the	previous	section.	As	many	 others	 (ibid.;	 Jones	 and	Novak	 1999;	 Pantazis	 2016)	 have	pointed	 out,	 a	 key	 feature	 of	 ‘underclass’	 discourse	 is	 its	 flexibility	 or	elasticity	–	both	in	terms	of	the	shifting	array	of	moral	failings	that	it	can	be	associated	 with	 and	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 various	 groups	 of	 people	 it	 can	 be	deployed	 to	mark	and	 stigmatise.	Thus,	 it	 is	no	 surprise	 that,	 for	 example,	the	 lone	 parents	 and	 people	 with	 disabilities	 who	 find	 themselves	increasingly	 vilified	 by	 governmental	 discourse	 and	 policy,	 are	 also	increasingly	seen	as	part	of	an	undeserving	poor	underclass.	The	elasticity	of	 the	 concept	 is	 also	 evident	 in	 the	 Troubled	 Families	 Programme	 itself,																																																									125	See	Jones	and	Novak	(1999)	and	Lewis	(2000)	for	more	in-depth	discussions	of	this	dual	purpose.		126	For	 further	 examinations	 of	 ‘underclass’	 discourse,	 see	 Clarke	 (2004),	 Jensen	 (2012),	Shildrick	et	al.	(2016),	and	Tyler	(2013).	
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which	has	allowed	–	and,	in	fact,	encouraged	–	Local	Authorities	to	use	their	own	 criteria	 for	 identifying	 ‘troubled	 families’	 in	 their	 area.	 Further,	 since	the	 governmental	 estimates	 of	 the	 number	 of	 troubled	 families	 have	 been	used	 by	 Local	 Authorities	 as	 targets	 in	 order	 to	 qualify	 for	 the	 attached	funding,	 the	 available	 evidence	 also	 points	 to	 families	 being	 at	 times	included	 on	 rather	 flimsy	 grounds	 (Levitas	 2014).	 The	 expansion	 of	 the	category	 of	 ‘troubled	 families’	 is,	 thus,	 built	 into	 the	 very	 design	 of	 the	programme	 –	 evident	 also	 in	 the	 recent	 discursive	 shift	 from	 120,000	troubled	families	to	400,000	families	‘at	risk’,	as	Shildrick	et	al.	(2016)	point	out	 in	their	analysis	of	the	programme.	Further,	 they	suggest	that	this	also	highlights	a	central	paradox	in	‘underclass’	discourse,	as	on	the	one	hand	a	key	 discursive	 danger	 evident	 both	 in	 the	 programme	 itself	 and	 in	 the	discourse	more	generally	is	that	all	families	in	poverty	become	synonymous	with	 trouble.	On	 the	other	hand,	 the	discourse	works,	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 to	invisibilise	 the	majority	of	poor	people,	 as	poverty	comes	 to	be	associated	with	just	the	‘underclass.’	Gedalof	suggests	that	discourses	of	the	‘troubled	family’	also	carry	a	flipside	–	 the	normative	 family	discussed	above:	 ‘if	 the	normative	 family	 is	never	 problematized,	 all	 this	 means	 is	 an	 intensified	 surveillance	 of	 the	troubled	family	by	agents	of	the	state,	with	its	objectifying	and	abjectifying	effects’	 (2017:	 135).	 The	 ‘hardworking	 taxpayers’	 frequently	 positioned	 in	opposition	 to	 the	 ‘underclass’,	 thus,	 indicate	 a	 discursive	 association	with	broader	 notions	 of	 normativity	 –	 cultural	 as	 well	 as,	 perhaps,	 sexual	 –	 in	such	 a	 way	 that	 suggests	 that	 the	 cultural	 and	 criminal	 dysfunctions	associated	 with	 the	 ‘underclass’	 are	 never	 very	 far	 removed	 from	assumptions	of	sexual	immorality	and	impropriety.	Finally,	as	Imogen	Tyler	(2013)	 points	 out,	 ‘underclass’	 rhetoric	 also	 carries	 a	 citational	 history	linked	 to	 eugenic	 thinking.127 	This	 citational	 history	 has	 contemporary	consequences,	 most	 notably	 in	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 the	 contemporary	vilification	 of	 poor,	 working-class	 mothers	 tends	 to	 be	 particularly																																																									127	See	also	McClintock’s	(1995)	discussion	of	the	colonial	discourse	of	‘degeneracy’,	which	combined	 sexual	 and	 racial	 judgements	 and	was	 applied	 to	 a	 range	 of	 immoral	 ‘others’–	racialised	 and	 colonised	 populations,	 as	 well	 as	 urban	 poor	 and	 working-class	 groups,	particularly	women.	
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stigmatising	 and	 pathologising	 in	 the	 case	 of	 racialised	 working-class	mothers,	 as	 Carabine	 (2001)	 suggests.	 It	 has	 also	 led	 some	 to	 argue	 that	‘underclass’	 discourse	 functions	 to	 racialise	 the	 white	 working-class.128	While	 I	 do	 not	 agree	 that	 the	white	working-class	 is	 in	 itself	 in	 some	way	racialised	through	its	characterisation	as	an	‘underclass’,	these	connotations	can	 certainly	 materialise	 as	 present	 concerns	 and	 worries	 about	 racial	
contamination	or	‘mixing’	–	as	I	explore	in	more	detail	in	the	next	chapter.129	Despite	 the	 shifting	 and	 mutating	 nature	 of	 ‘underclass’	 discourse,	what	 remains	 constant,	however,	 is	 the	notion	 that	 those	at	 the	bottom	of	the	economic	hierarchy	are	also	at	the	bottom	of	moral	and	cultural	–	as	well	as,	perhaps,	sexual	–	hierarchies	and,	importantly,	at	least	partially	so	due	to	their	own	poor	choices	and	dysfunctional	‘lifestyles.’	A	representation	of	the	poorest	and	most	disadvantaged	families	as	culturally	distinct	from	the	rest,	afflicted	by	a	whole	 range	of	 economic,	 cultural,	 and	moral	dysfunctions	–	and,	therefore,	in	need	of	specialist	government	intervention	–	is	sustained	in	 all	 the	 documents	 investigated	 in	 this	 chapter.	Whereas	work	 (or	more	work)	is	presented	as	the	only	–	and	an	adequate	–	solution	to	the	poverty	of	the	masses,	it	alone	is	not	enough	to	prevent	the	reproduction	of	the	cycles	of	disadvantage	and	poverty	 for	 those	at	 the	very	bottom	of	 the	economic	hierarchy,	 since	 the	 root	 causes	 of	 this	 reproduction	 lie	 elsewhere.	Consequently,	 the	 Troubled	 Families	 Programme	 and	 the	 targeted,	multifaceted,	and	localised	help	it	offers	to	‘crisis-ridden’	families	is	a	central	pillar	of	the	policy	solutions	offered	in	the	2017	document.	Notwithstanding	the	 many	 problems	 identified	 with	 the	 programme’s	 selection	 of	participants,	 funding	 structure,	 implementation,	 and	 rates	 of	 success,	 it	participates	centrally	in	the	discursive	economies	of	the	‘underclass’	–	with	the	 effect	 of	 both	 minimising	 the	 extent	 to	 which	 poverty	 appears	 as	 a	
																																																								128	See,	for	example,	Nayak	(2009)	and	Rooke	and	Gidley	(2010)	for	arguments	along	these	lines.		129	As	Wiegman	argues	in	her	discussion	of	the	scholarly	trends	that	have	examined	‘white	trash’	 and	 other	white	working-class	 groupings	 as	 racialised,	 the	 consequences	 of	 such	 a	move	are	to	disarticulate	‘racism	from	institutionalized	practices	of	discrimination	based	on	a	 group’s	 designated	 racial	 status	 and	 [to	 craft]	 for	 poor	 whites	 a	 position	 structurally	comparable	to	that	of	a	racial	minority’	(2012:	184).	
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problem	in	the	first	place	and	maximising	the	extent	to	which	it	appears	as	a	problem	of	culture.		
	
Citizenship,	Class	and	the	Politics	of	Sexual	Inequality	The	 previous	 four	 sections	 have	 each	 focused	 on	 a	 specific	 aspect	 of	 the	poverty	discourses	put	 forward	 in	 the	 three	policy	documents	 released	by	the	Coalition	and	Conservative	Governments	in	2011,	2012,	and	2017.	While	my	discussion	has	also	identified	a	number	of	discursive	shifts	between	the	documents,	 the	 general	 tendencies	 towards	 the	 individualisation,	
familialisation,	and	culturalisation	of	poverty	are	sustained	across	all	three.	These	 discursive	 framings	 not	 only	 suggest	 that	 poverty	 can	 be	 culturally	reproduced	within	 families	 from	one	 generation	 to	 the	next,	 but	 they	 also	function	 to	 separate	 the	 poorest	 and	 most	 disadvantaged	 from	 the	 rest.	Poverty	 discourses,	 thus,	 help	 create	 and	 maintain	 a	 discursive	 split	between	 a	 morally	 and	 culturally	 deficient	 and	 dysfunctional	 ‘underclass’	and	 the	 ‘hardworking	 taxpayers’	 positioned	 just	 below	 (and	 above)	 the	poverty	line.	Further,	however,	this	discursive	split	also	functions	along	the	lines	of	sexual	morality	and	respectability,	suggesting	that	sexuality	plays	a	key	role	in	the	separation	of	the	‘underclass’	from	the	rest	–	most	obviously	in	 the	 positioning	 of	 the	 ‘stable’,	 (hetero)normative,	 family	 as	 the	 ideal	 –	from	which	lone	and	step	parent	families,	as	well	as	poor,	working-class,	and	racialised	 families	 more	 generally,	 are	 seen	 to	 deviate.	 Finally,	 the	 moral	decline	associated	with	the	‘underclass’	is	also	discursively	linked	to	notions	of	 societal	 and	 national	 moral	 decline	 –	 exemplified	 in	 the	 rhetoric	 of	‘broken	 Britain.’	 In	 this	 final	 section	 of	 the	 chapter	 I	 explore	 some	 of	 the	political	and	cultural	consequences	of	these	discursive	framings	–	firstly,	on	citizenship	regimes	and,	secondly,	on	class	analysis.		As	 detailed	 above,	 ‘family	 stability’	 –	 with	 all	 of	 its	 normative	connotations	–	is	put	on	a	pedestal	in	(child)	poverty	discourses.	However,	this	 is	 the	 case	 not	 only	 because	 a	 ‘stable’	 family	 is	 viewed	 as	 a	 good	environment	 for	 children	 to	 grow	 up	 in,	 but	 also	 because	 such	 an	environment	 is	 seen	 as	 good	or	 necessary	 for	 children’s	 development	 and	future	outcomes	–	and,	consequently,	for	national	futures.	In	this	discursive	
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framing,	 stable	 families	 are	 needed	 in	 the	 now,	 in	 order	 to	 create	 in	 the	
future	 both	 functional	 and	 moral	 citizens	 and	 a	 stable	 nation.	 Jack	Halberstam	 argues	 that	 the	 notion	 of	 the	 ‘normal’	 that	 underpins	respectability	 politics	 is	 ‘upheld	 by	 a	 middle-class	 logic	 of	 reproductive	temporality’	 (2005:	 4).130 	The	 poverty	 discourses	 examined	 above	 fold	familial	 futures	 into	 national	 futures	 precisely	 through	 such	 a	 logic	 of	
reproductive	 temporality,	 whereby	 the	 familial	 script	 of	 reproductive	generationality	 also	 protects	 imaginaries	 of	 the	 nation’s	 future.	 The	‘hardworking	 taxpayers’	 are,	 here,	 recognised	 as	 appropriately	 ‘activating	their	own	(and	their	families’)	futures’	(Allen	and	Taylor	2012:	4),	whereas	the	dysfunctional	‘underclass’	are	judged	for	failing	to	do	so.	By	reproducing	their	 own	 dysfunctional	 cultures	 instead,	 they,	 thus,	 also	 endanger	 the	national	future.	Lauren	Berlant	(1997)	argues,	further,	that	the	reproductive	family	 that	 is	 centralised	 in	 such	 imaginaries	 is	 more	 often	 than	 not	imagined	 as	 white	 –	 thus	 indicating	 the	 importance	 of	 processes	 of	
racialisation	to	imaginaries	of	deservingness.	Heterosexual	 coupledom	 and	 the	 nuclear	 family	 are,	 thus,	 here	 not	only	 positioned	 as	 the	 norm	 that	 generates	 both	 familial	 and	 national	stability,	 but	 also	 configured	 through	 a	 temporal	 logic.	 Further,	 in	 these	imaginaries,	 it	 is	 the	child	 as	well	 as	 the	 nation	 that	 is	 imagined	 as	 under	threat	–	and,	consequently,	in	need	of	protection.	Particularly	through	their	emphasis	 on	 the	 importance	 of	 ‘good’	 parenting,	 the	 poverty	 discourses	investigated	above	place	 the	 child	at	 the	 centre	of	 their	demand	 that	poor	parents	 (re)produce	 appropriate	 futures	 –	 ‘a	 direct	 call	 to	 arms	 to	 the	productive	 and	 reproductive	 citizen	 to	 safeguard	 “our	 children”	 (and	 thus	the	future	itself)’	(Smith,	N.	2016:	245).131	The	poverty	discourses,	thus,	also	make	 claims	 for	 and	 by	 future	 citizens	 –	 highlighting,	 as	 Sharon	 Pinkney	argues,	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 ‘the	 child	 becomes	 a	 stand-in	 for	 a	complicated	 set	 of	 anxieties	 and	 desires	 about	 national	 identity’	 (2000:	113).	It	is	only	by	reproducing	(in)	the	stable	family	norm	that	poor	parents	can	ensure	that	their	own	children	turn	out	to	be	functional	and	responsible																																																									130	On	reproductive	temporalities,	see	also	Edelman	(2004).	131	On	the	figure	of	the	child	in	such	discursive	framings,	see	also	Breslow	(2016).	
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citizens	–	and	that	they	go	on	to,	 in	turn,	reproduce	that	very	norm	in	and	for	 their	 own	 children.	 The	 poverty	 discourses	 examined	 above	 make	explicit	the	centrality	of	a	reproductive	generationality	to	imaginaries	of	the	national	 future,	 thus	 also	 tying	 the	 survival	 of	 the	nation	 to	 ‘personal	 acts	and	identities	performed	in	the	intimate	domains	of	the	quotidian’	(Berlant	1997:	4).		If	 citizenship	 is	 where	 attachments	 to	 the	 nation	 take	 place,	 as	Berlant	 (2011)	 argues,	 then	 these	 imaginaries	 of	 a	 national	 future	 that	depend	on	‘family	stability’	in	the	quotidian	domain	are	central	to	the	ways	in	 which	 national	 belonging	 is	 forged.	 Further,	 since	 citizenship	 also	‘provides	an	index	for	[--]	witnessing	the	processes	of	valorization	that	make	different	 populations	 differently	 legitimate	 socially	 and	 under	 the	 law’	(Berlant	 1997:	 20),	 the	 discursive	 processes	 that	mark	 the	 poorest	 of	 the	poor	 as	 not	 only	 culturally	 dysfunctional,	 but	 also	 poor	 because	 of	 this	dysfunctionality	–	and	therefore	as	undeserving	of	state	assistance	–	are	also	key	to	the	question	of	who	is	symbolically	and	socially	included	in	the	fold	of	the	 nation.	 While	 many	 (Connor	 2010;	 Duggan	 2003;	 Weeks	 2011)	 have	argued	 that	 neoliberalisation	 or	 austerity	 has	 tended	 to	 mean	 the	centralisation	of	paid	work	and/or	consumerism	within	citizenship	regimes	–	and	I	agree,	to	a	degree	–	it	would,	at	the	same	time,	be	a	mistake	to	ignore	the	 role	 that	 these	 familial,	 reproductive,	 and	 generational	 norms	 play	 in	such	 regimes.	 Berlant	 argues	 that	 citizenship	 has	 become	 increasingly	privatised,	producing	an	 ‘intimate	public	 sphere’,	whereby	citizenship	as	a	condition	 of	 social	membership	 is	 ‘produced	 by	 personal	 acts	 and	 values,	especially	 acts	 originating	 in	 or	 directed	 toward	 the	 family	 sphere’	 (1997:	5).	For	her,	citizenship	is	no	longer	directing	personhood	towards	public	life,	but	 instead	 ‘contemporary	 nationalist	 ideology	 recognizes	 a	 public	 good	only	 in	 a	 particularly	 constricted	 nation	 of	 simultaneously	 lived	 private	world’	(ibid.:	5).	In	her	argument,	the	national	is,	thus,	not	displaced	by	the	intimate	public	sphere	but,	instead,	resignified	in	privatised	terms.		Gargi	 Bhattacharyya	 argues	 that	 discursive	 processes	 such	 as	 the	ones	 examined	 above	 are	 not	 centrally	 about	 an	 intentional	
retraditionalisation	 of	 gender	 roles,	 as	 austerity	 ‘is	 not	 a	 project	 that	
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requires	 a	 particular	 approach	 to	 gender	 roles	 or	 the	 status	 of	 women’	(2015:	150).	Rather,	 for	her,	austerity	 requires	a	 remaking	of	 the	 terms	of	reproductive	 labour.	 However,	while	 a	 ‘return’	 to	 traditional	 gender	 roles	may	 not	 be	 the	 purpose	 of	 the	 poverty	 discourses	 examined	 above,	particular	 nostalgic	 and	 traditionalist	 imaginaries	 of	 the	 family	 are	positioned	in	them	in	such	a	way	that	they	come	to	dominate	the	fantasy	life	of	 the	 nation.	 Jensen’s	 argument	 that	 the	 family	 is	 increasingly	 implicated	‘within	 the	 blueprint	 of	 the	 nation’	 (2010:	 3)	 certainly	 resonates	with	 the	poverty	 discourses	 examined	 above.	 As	 citizens	 are	 encouraged	 to	 take	responsibility	not	just	in	relation	to	their	own	but	also	to	the	nation’s	future,	it	is	specifically	in	the	familial	–	or	the	private	or	intimate	–	sphere	that	this	responsibilisation	 is	 expected	 to	 take	 place.	 In	 these	 discursive	 framings,	‘broken	 Britain’	 can	 only	 be	 mended	 through	 appropriate	 familial	 (and	sexual)	 acts	 in	 the	 private	 sphere	 –	 not	 through	 policy	 or	 political	interventions	alone.		As	imaginaries	of	citizenship	and	the	nation	come	to	be	configured	in	increasingly	 cultural,	 familial,	 and	 privatised	 terms,	 the	 economic	 and	material	conditions	of	citizenship	tend	to	also	be	separated	from	questions	of	 culture	 and	 subjectivity,	 as	 Berlant	 (1997)	 suggests.	 The	 privatisation,	familialisation,	 and	 culturalisation	 of	 poverty,	 thus,	 also	 lead	 to	 a	displacement	of	class	–	or,	perhaps	more	accurately,	the	displacement	of	the	material	 and	 economic	 meanings	 of	 class.	 The	 argument	 that	 the	culturalisation	 of	 poverty	 and	 ‘underclass’	 rhetoric	 lead	 to	 an	 ‘evasion	 of	socioeconomic	class’	(Jensen	2010:	2);	‘substitution	of	class	politics’	(Jensen	2012:	5);	‘discrediting	and	vanquishing	the	category	“class”’	(Atkinson	et	al.	2012:	 8);	 or	 to	 class	 being	 ‘obscured’	 (Valentine	 and	 Harris	 2014:	 84)	 or	‘spoken	euphemistically’	(Skeggs	2004:	44),	is	well	rehearsed	in	scholarship	examining	 discourses	 of	 austerity	 and	 neoliberalism.	 Sometimes	 such	arguments,	 however,	 also	 claim	 that	 the	 displacement	 of	 class	 occurs	together	with	an	increasing	emphasis	on,	or	a	prioritising	of,	other	 ‘axes	of	difference’	 (Valentine	 and	 Harris	 2014:	 84)	 or	 ‘identity	 and	 difference’	(Crompton	and	Scott	2005:	191).	In	these	arguments,	the	decline	of	class	is	linked	variously	to	the	increasing	prominence	of	identity	categories,	such	as	
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gender	 and	 sexuality;	 of	 identity	 politics	 generally;	 or,	 rather	 vaguely,	 of	
culture	 –	 and,	 further,	 both	processes	 are,	 in	 turn,	 connected	 to	 a	 growing	factionalism	or	identitarianism	in	the	left	more	generally.	In	the	remainder	of	this	chapter	I	argue	that	–	rather	than	on	an	over-emphasis	on	sexuality	and	gender	as	 identities	–	the	displacement	of	class,	 in	fact,	depends	on	an	
under-emphasis	on	sexuality	and	gender	as	a	key	part	of	regimes	of	material	inequality.	The	increasing	framing	of	poverty	in	cultural,	familial,	and	privatised	terms,	examined	throughout	this	chapter,	has	significant	–	policy,	as	well	as	other	–	consequences	for	the	subjects	and	populations	deemed	undeserving	in	and	by	these	discursive	framings.	Many	of	the	policy	changes	detailed	in	Chapter	 1	 have	 been	 justified	 with	 direct	 reference	 to	 the	 argument	 that	poverty	 is	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 dysfunctional	 cultures	 and	 behaviour	 of	poor	people	 themselves.	Above	 I	have	also	argued	 that	 sexual	 judgements,	assumptions,	 and	 norms	 play	 an	 important	 role	 in	 the	 ‘culturalisation	 of	poverty’	thesis.	The	processes	by	which	poverty	and	class-based	inequalities	are	 increasingly	 culturalised,	 individualised,	 and	 familialised	 –	 and,	consequently,	 frequently	 hidden	 from	 view	 altogether	 –	 cannot	 be	 fully	understood	without	paying	attention	 to	 the	role	 that	sexuality	plays	 in	 the	discursive	regimes	that	blame	poor	people	for	their	own	predicaments	–	as	well	as	for	the	moral	and	economic	malaise	afflicting	the	nation	as	a	whole.	Sexuality	is,	thus,	here	conceived	as	central	to	the	discursive	and	regulatory	mechanisms	 that	 have	 been	 deployed	 time	 and	 time	 again	 to	 justify	 the	material	inequalities	generated	by	and	within	austerity	politics	–	rather	than	marginal	or	peripheral	in	the	sense	suggested	by	the	arguments	that	blame	identity	politics	for	the	displacement	of	class.		Thus,	 in	 the	 context	 of	 austerity,	 the	 imaginaries	 of	 deservingness	that	 have	 deemed	 certain	 people	 and	 populations	 less	 deserving	 of	 state	assistance	depend	on	and	reproduce	various	commonsensical	assumptions	about	 gender	 and	 sexuality.	 The	 demonisation	 of	 lone	 parent	 and	 other	‘troubled’	 families	 in	 these	 imaginaries	has	much	 to	do	with	sexuality	–	as	well	 as	 with	 class	 for	 instance.	 Sexual	 inequality	 is,	 thus,	 built	 into	 the	discursive	regimes	that	culturalise,	individualise,	and	familialise	poverty,	as	
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well	as	into	the	welfare	and	other	policies	that	are	justified	with	reference	to	these	discursive	 framings.	 It	 is,	 therefore,	 the	very	discursive	 regimes	 that	work	to	invisibilise	socioeconomic	inequality	that	also	depend	integrally	on	sexuality	for	the	reproduction	and	maintenance	of	said	inequality.	Thus,	the	argument	 that	 class	 as	 a	 socio-economic	 category	 of	 difference	 is	 being	
displaced	 by	 culture	 or	 identity	 only	 works	 if	 sexuality	 and	 gender	 are	treated	as	identity	categories	alone,	thereby	ignoring	their	operation	as	part	of	regimes	of	material	inequality.132		Many	 others	 have	 critiqued	 the	 common	 discursive	 separation	 of	sexuality	from	the	political	economy	–	‘a	move	that	enables	the	“private”	and	feminized	 realm	of	 social	 reproduction	not	only	 to	be	broken	off	 from	 the	“public”	and	masculine	realm	of	political	and	economic	power,	but	also	to	be	removed	from	inquiry	altogether’	(Smith,	N.	2016:	234).133	The	assumption	that	 the	 economy,	 or	 the	 political	 economy,	 can	 be	 easily	 separated	 from	matters	related	to	sexuality,	gender,	and	intimacy	is	often	based	on	a	prior	assumption	that	sexuality	is	a	wholly	cultural	category	that	bears	very	little	relevance	 to	 issues	 of	 economic	 (re)distribution	 and	 (in)equality.	 As	 Clare	Hemmings	 argues,	 ‘culture	 sticks	 to	 sexuality’	 (2011:	 117),	 in	 such	 a	way	that	sexuality	tends	to	be	‘associated	with	superficiality	and	“leisure”	rather	than	the	serious	business	of	politics’	(Hemmings	2018:	15).	Such	arguments	presume	 ‘that	 the	distinction	between	material	and	cultural	 life	 is	a	 stable	one’	(Butler	1997:	267),	as	well	as	ignore	the	ways	in	which	this	distinction	itself	functions	as	‘a	kind	of	ruse	of	capitalist	liberal	discourse	–	a	ruse	that	obscures	 the	 intricate	 imbrications	 of	 relations	 of	 race,	 gender,	 sexuality,	and	 class	 in	 the	 institutions	 of	 capitalist	 modernity’	 (Duggan	 2003:	 83,	emphasis	in	the	original).		Curiously,	however,	as	Clare	Hemmings	(2014)	points	out,	many	such	critiques	 continue	 to	 rely	 on	 the	 homosexual/heterosexual	 distinction	 in	making	 the	 case	 for	 the	 inclusion	 of	 sexuality	 in	 analyses	 of	 the	 political	
																																																								132	Such	 arguments	 of	 course	 also	 ignore	 the	 many	 ways	 in	 which	 sexual	 (and	 other)	identities	may	themselves	act	as	the	basis	of	various	material	inequalities.	133	For	various	different	incarnations	of	this	argument,	see	also	Berlant	(1997,	2011),	Butler	(1997),	Duggan	(2003),	Halberstam	(2005),	and	Hemmings	(2011,	2014,	2018).	
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economy.134 	At	 the	 same	 time	 as	 they	 in	 insightful	 ways	 critique	 the	separation	 of	 sexuality	 from	 the	 political	 economy,	 for	 instance	 by	highlighting	 the	 close	 connections	 between	 relations	 of	 production	 and	heteronorms	 –	 or,	 increasingly,	 homonorms	 –	 they,	 nonetheless,	 tend	 to	prioritise	the	material	and	economic	inequalities	that	arise	as	a	result	of	this	relationship	for	sexual	minorities.	Hemmings	specifically	examines	the	well-known	 debate	 between	 Judith	 Butler	 (1997)	 and	 Nancy	 Fraser	 (1997),	briefly	 mentioned	 in	 Chapter	 2,	 where	 they	 both	 –	 despite	 their	disagreements	–	 continue	 to	 ‘read	sexuality’s	 relation	 to	political	 economy	through	a	heterosexual/homosexual	divide’	 (Hemmings	2014:	376).	Butler	and	Fraser	(and	many	others)	not	only	ignore	the	many	other	ways	in	which	sexuality	is	sutured	to	the	political	economy,	but	they	also	place	the	weight	of	this	relationship	squarely	on	the	shoulders	of	sexual	minorities	–	as	if	all	material	 sexual	 inequalities	 could	 be	 resolved	 by	 ensuring	 that	 LG(b)	 and	queer	 subjects	 are	 not	 (disproportionately)	 represented	 in	 the	 working	classes.	135	As	 I	have	argued	above,	 the	creation	and	maintenance	of	 the	sexual	inequalities	 that	 materialise	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	 problematisation	 of	poverty	as	a	 cultural	 and	 familial	 issue	does	not	depend	on,	or	 reproduce,	the	 homosexual/heterosexual	 distinction.	 Instead,	 it	 is	 based,	 at	 least	partially,	 on	 a	 heterofamilial,	 reproductive,	 and	 generational	 logic	 that	positions	 those	 outside	 of	 it	 –	 whether	 gay	 or	 straight	 –	 as	 culturally	dysfunctional	 and	 sexually	 improper	–	 and,	 therefore,	 as	undeserving.	 This	logic	weds	the	private	and	sexual	lives	of	poor,	racialised,	benefit-receiving,	and/or	working-class	populations	to	the	fantasy	life	of	the	nation	in	such	a	way	that	the	sexual	inequalities	that	they	may	experience	as	a	result	appear	to	be	of	their	own	making.	Class	politics	is	here	not	so	much	being	displaced	by	the	 increasing	prominence	of	 identity	or	cultural	politics	–	or,	 indeed,	a																																																									134	Arguably,	 and	 to	 an	 extent,	 this	 is	 the	 case	 for	 instance	 with	 Butler	 (1997),	 Duggan	(2003),	and	Smith,	N.	(2016).	135	Brown	 offers	 a	 further	 way	 of	 reading	 the	 relationship	 between	 class	 and	 ‘identity	politics’,	 as	 she	 suggests	 that	 class	 resentment	 may	 be	 ‘displaced	 onto	 discourses	 of	injustice	other	than	class’,	in	such	a	way	that	‘other	markers	of	social	difference	may	come	to	 bear	 an	 inordinate	 weight;	 indeed	 they	 may	 bear	 all	 the	 weight	 of	 the	 sufferings	produced	by	capitalism	in	addition	to	that	attributable	to	the	explicitly	politicized	marking’	(1995:	60).		
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politics	of	redistribution	by	a	politics	of	recognition,	 to	use	Fraser’s	(1996,	1997)	terms	–	but	instead,	the	material	operation	of	both	class	and	sexuality	within	 the	 political	 economy	 is	 obscured	 by	 the	 designation	 of	 both	 as	cultural.	Thus,	the	 ‘problem’	with	identity	politics	is	not	that	it	has	led	to	a	displacement	 of	 class,	 but	 rather	 that	 identities	 have	 come	 to	 bear	all	 the	discursive	 and	 political	 weight	 produced	 by	 the	 various	 vectors	 of	 power	they	represent	–	in	such	a	way	that	the	operation	of	these	vectors	of	power	outside	of	the	realm	of	identity	is	both	obscured	and	easily	ignored.	Overall	then,	 the	 ‘culturalisation	 of	 politics’	 that	 many	 (Clarke	 2004;	 Imre	 2014;	Tyler	 2013)	 have	 discussed	 and	 lamented,	 is	 at	 least	 partially	 the	consequence	of	an	under-emphasis	on	sexuality	–	as	well	as	race,	class,	and	gender	 –	 as	 part	 of	 regimes	 of	material	 inequality,	 rather	 than	 that	 of	 an	
over-emphasis	on	the	identities	that	attach	to	these	markers	of	difference,	or	on	identity	politics	more	generally.			
Conclusion	This	chapter	has	examined	the	(child)	poverty	discourses	advanced	in	three	key	 policy	 texts	 published	 during	 the	 Coalition	 and	 Conservative	Governments.	Firstly,	I	 investigated	the	discourses	of	worklessness;	 ‘family	stability’	 and	 ‘good’	 parenting;	 and	 ‘cycles	 of	 disadvantage’	 put	 forward	 in	the	 documents,	 arguing	 that	 they	 not	 only	 function	 to	 culturalise	 poverty,	but	 also	 support	 the	 long-standing	 notion	 of	 a	 culturally	 dysfunctional	‘underclass’	 –	 distinct	 both	 from	mainstream	 society	 overall	 and	 from	 the	
respectable	 working	 poor	 especially.	 Secondly,	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 family	 is	positioned	 in	 the	 documents	 both	 as	 the	 key	 site	 where	 poverty	 is	reproduced	 and,	 consequently,	 as	 the	 appropriate	 target	 of	 government	intervention.	Overall,	the	documents’	framings	culturalise,	individualise,	and	
familialise	 poverty	 to	 a	 significant	 degree	 –	 discursive	 processes	 that	centrally	 depend	 on	 the	 deployment	 of	 particular	 commonsensical	assumptions	 and	 judgements	 about	 sexuality.	 Within	 austerity	 politics,	sexual	 inequality	 is,	 thus,	 sustained	 by	 a	 heterofamilial,	 generational,	 and	reproductive	 logic	 that	 marks	 those	 deemed	 outside	 of	 this	 logic	 as	 also	outside	of	cultural	and	sexual	respectability.	These	discursive	framings	link	
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the	 familial	 and	 sexual	 lives	 of	 poor,	 working-class,	 and	 benefit-receiving	populations	 to	 the	 future	 fate	 of	 the	 nation,	 with	 citizenship	 increasingly	understood	as	produced	through	personal	acts	and	values	 in	the	quotidian	or	private	sphere.		The	 ‘culturalisation	 of	 poverty’	 thesis	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter	 is	frequently	 associated	 with	 the	 –	 popular	 and	 scholarly	 –	 view	 that	 class	politics	are	in	decline.	Rather	than	class	politics	being	displaced	by	cultural	or	identity	politics,	however,	I	have	argued	that	the	discursive	designation	of	both	class	and	sexuality	into	the	cultural	sphere	functions	to	obscure	both	of	their	material	 operation	within	 the	 political	 economy.	 Sexuality	 has,	 thus,	here	 been	 shown	 to	 play	 a	 central	 role	 in	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	processes	that	justify	and	sustain	material	inequalities	in	the	austerity	era	–	perhaps	 revealing	 the	 untenability	 of	 the	 cultural/material	 distinction	overall.	The	next	chapter	examines	two	popular	media	texts	–	I,	Daniel	Blake	and	 Benefits	 Street	 –	 and	 argues	 that	 they	 both,	 despite	 their	 many	differences,	participate	in	the	figurative	economies	of	the	‘benefit	scrounger’	–	 a	 figuration	 that,	 in	 turn,	 depends	 centrally	 on	 sexualisation	 and	racialisation	 for	 its	 legibility.	 Continuing	 this	 chapter’s	 discussion	 of	 the	working	class/’underclass’	distinction,	the	next	chapter	also	focuses	on	the	political	consequences	of	the	discourses	and	figurations	it	examines,	arguing	that	the	possibility	of	the	‘benefit	scrounger’	appearing	as	a	legible	political	subjectivity	 is	 foreclosed	by	her	designation	as	a	member	of	 the	culturally	dysfunctional,	as	well	as	sexualised	and	racialised,	‘underclass.’	
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Introduction	The	 camera	 pans	 across	 an	 average-looking	 residential	 street	 in	 the	 UK,	lined	 with	 two-storey	 Victorian	 houses.	 ‘Unemployed,	 unemployed,	unemployed’,	exclaims	a	young	black	woman	–	 later	named	as	Black	Dee	–	as	 she	 points	 at	 house	 after	 house.	 The	 camera	 zooms	 in,	 the	 view	alternating	between	heaps	of	rubbish,	piled	high	in	between	the	parked	cars	and	the	trees	lining	the	road,	and	children	–	playing	on	the	road,	cycling	on	the	pavement,	and	jumping	over	the	fences	separating	the	small	front	yards	from	one	another.	We	are	introduced	to	Mark	–	‘a	father	of	two	who’s	never	had	a	paid	 job’	–	and	Becky,	a	young	couple	 living	on	 the	street	with	 their	two	children,	Casey	and	Callum.	Mark	and	Becky	are	having	money	trouble,	and	Callum	has	missed	nursery	again:	
Becky:		 Do	 you	 know	who	writ	 to	me	 today?	 D’you	 know	who	sent	mummy	a	letter?	Your	school.		
Callum:	 Me	not	feeling	too	well.	Me	not	going	to	nursery.		
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Becky:	 Why?	
Callum:	 Because.	‘Many	of	 the	parents	on	 James	Turner	Street	 are	on	benefits’,	 explains	 the	voiceover,	‘On	James	Turner	Street,	kids	are	everywhere.	Many	are	raised	by	single	 parents.	 Despite	 their	 ups	 and	 downs,	 Becky	 and	 Mark	 are	 still	together.	And	around	here,	that’s	not	always	a	given.’		--		Single	mum	Katie	has	arrived	late	to	her	Jobcentre	appointment.	She	and	her	two	children,	Dylan	and	Daisy,	have	 recently	been	moved	up	 to	Newcastle	by	 their	 London	 council,	 from	 temporary	 accommodation	 in	 London	 –	 a	homeless	 hostel	 in	which	 they	 stayed	 for	 two	 years	 –	 and	 Katie	 does	 not	know	Newcastle	very	well.	Because	Katie	has	missed	her	appointment,	 the	Jobcentre	 employee	 recommends	 her	 for	 a	 sanction.	 ‘My	 kid	 has	 to	 go	 to	school	 tomorrow.	 I’ve	 got	 about	 twelve	 quid	 in	 my	 purse’,	 Katie	 tells	 the	Jobcentre	 manager,	 who	 accuses	 her	 of	 ‘making	 a	 scene’	 and	 asks	 her	 to	leave.	An	older	man	who	has	been	waiting	in	the	queue	for	his	appointment	–	Daniel	Blake	–	gets	up	to	defend	Katie	and	is	also	asked	to	leave.			--			These	scenes	–	the	opening	scene	for	the	third	episode	of	Channel	4’s	2014	documentary	 series	 Benefits	 Street	 and	 an	 early	 scene	 from	 director	 Ken	Loach’s	 2016	 film	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake,	 respectively	 –	 provide	 in	 many	 ways	strikingly	different	portrayals	of	benefit	recipients	 in	austerity	Britain.	The	latter	a	feature	film,	the	former	a	documentary	series;	the	latter	criticised	by	Daily	Mail	 blogger	 Toby	 Young	 (among	 others)	 for	 its	 ‘absurdly	 romantic	view	 of	 benefit	 claimants’	 (2016),	 the	 former	 attracting	 a	 storm	 of	complaints	both	from	the	viewing	public	to	media	regulator	Ofcom	(Ofcom	2014)	and	from	some	of	the	people	portrayed	in	the	show	(Plunkett	2014;	Sommers	2015)	for	its	demonisation	of	welfare	recipients.	Both	portrayals,	however,	also	highlight	something	important	in	relation	to	the	emergence	of	
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the	 figuration	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 as	 a	 highly	 salient	 and	widely	 known	 figuration	 in	 public	 discourse.	 More	 specifically,	 as	 this	chapter	argues,	both	portrayals	illustrate	that	it	is,	in	particular,	through	the	figure’s	sexualisation	and	racialisation	that	it	becomes	legible	or	knowable	at	all	 within	 the	 broader	 figurative	 and	 representational	 possibilities	 of	 the	austerity	era.	This	chapter	takes	the	sexualisation	and	racialisation	of	the	hybrid	or	composite	 figure	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 as	 its	 primary	 focus,	and	 traces	 its	 figuration	 and	 re-figuration	 as	 a	 sexually	 and	 racially	saturated	subjectivity	across	 two	media	sites	–	Benefits	Street	and	 I,	Daniel	
Blake.	While	many	others	have	 tracked	 the	circulation	of	 specific	austerity	figures	 across	 various	different	discursive	 arenas	 –	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	(Garthwaite	 2011;	 Valentine	 and	 Harris	 2014),	 the	 ‘welfare	 dependent’	‘skiver’	 (Jensen	 2014),	 ‘benefits	 broods’	 families	 (Jensen	 and	 Tyler	 2015),	and	 ‘the	chav	mum’	 (Tyler	2008),	 to	mention	a	 few	key	examples	–	as	 the	previous	chapters	have	highlighted,	my	interest	in	this	chapter	is	to	explore	and	 delve	 deeper	 into	 how	 these	 figures	 and	 their	 recent	 proliferation	 in	media	 and	 political	 discourses	 highlight	 the	 emergence	 of	 a	 new,	 or	 re-configured,	 sexual	 subjectivity.	 In	 particular,	 in	 this	 chapter	 I	 argue	 that	these	 figurations	are	sexually	and	racially	 saturated	 to	such	an	extent	 that	they	only	become	 legible	as	subjects	 through	 these	processes.	Thus,	 rather	than	examining	the	racialisation	or	sexualisation	of	a	particular,	pre-existing	classed	 figuration,	 this	 chapter	 unpacks	 some	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 this	composite	figuration	only	becomes	legible	as	a	classed	subjectivity	through	its	racialisation	and	sexualisation.	I	begin	with	a	section	that	introduces	and	further	contextualises	the	two	media	 texts	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter,	 as	well	 as	 briefly	 discusses	 the	figurative	method	employed,	and	the	conceptual	tool	of	figurative	economies	developed,	in	it.	The	rest	of	the	chapter	is	divided	into	six	parts,	the	first	four	of	 which	 investigate	 the	 take-up	 of	 specific	 aspects	 of	 austerity	 discourse	within	 the	 media	 texts’	 representations.	 These	 sections	 draw	 on	 the	previous	 chapter’s	 examination	of	 the	discourses	of	 ‘worklessness’,	 ‘family	stability’,	 and	 ‘cycles	 of	 poverty’,	 examining	 both	 their	 affirmation	 and	
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contestation	within	 the	 context	 of	Benefits	 Street	and	 I,	Daniel	Blake,	 with	the	third	section	focusing	specifically	on	the	representation	of	immigration	and	racialisation	within	them.	I	suggest	various	different	potential	readings	of	 the	 texts,	 focusing	 specifically	 on	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 their	 circulation	within	 the	 broader	 figurative	 economies	 of	 austerity	 influences	 how	 they	can	be	read	by	audiences	in	the	current	political	moment.	The	second	to	last	section	 of	 the	 chapter	 ties	 these	 various	 discursive	 threads	 together	 in	 a	discussion	of	the	multiple	and	varied	media	and	political	responses	to	these	two	depictions	of	benefit	recipients,	 tending	to	 focus	almost	exclusively	on	the	 truthfulness	 of	 their	 representations.	 The	 final	 section	 continues	 the	previous	chapter’s	discussion	of	 the	working	class/‘underclass’	distinction,	arguing,	 firstly,	 that	 it	 is	 reproduced	 in	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	binary,	 and	 secondly,	 that	 the	 racialisation,	 sexualisation,	 and	 cultural	dysfunction	associated	with	one	half	of	 this	binary	 function	to	discursively	foreclose	the	possibility	of	its	appearance	as	a	legible	political	subjectivity.			
Figurative	Economies:	Method	and	Materials	The	first	season	of	Benefits	Street	was	filmed	in	Birmingham	and	originally	aired	 in	 2014,	 resulting	 in	 Channel	 4’s	 highest	 viewing	 figures	 since	 2012	(Collier	2014)	–	as	well	as	in	much	public	discussion	and	media	debate.	The	production	 company,	Love	Productions,	 was	 accused	 of	 exploitation	 in	 the	making	 of	 the	 series,	 and	 many	 saw	 it	 as	 ‘poverty	 porn’	 (Burrell	 2014;	Jensen	2014;	Nelson	2014;	Runswick-Cole	and	Goodley	2015).	Yet,	Ofcom’s	(2014)	investigation	concluded	that	broadcasting	regulations	had	not	been	broken.	 Following	 Benefits	 Street,	 many	 other	 TV	 channels	 have	 tried	 to	replicate	Channel	4’s	success	with	documentary	and	reality	television	series	such	as	Saints	and	Scroungers	and	The	Council	on	BBC;	and	The	Big	Benefits	
Handout,	Benefits	Britain:	Life	on	the	Dole,	On	Benefits:	Breadline	Brummies,	and	Undercover	Benefits	Cheat	on	Channel	5.	Channel	4	itself	followed	with	a	second	season	of	Benefits	Street,	filmed	in	Stockton-on-Tees,	as	well	as	other	series	such	as	How	to	Get	a	Council	House,	Benefits	Britain	1949,	and	Britain’s	
Benefit	Tenants.	The	success,	popularity,	and	salience	of	reality	TV	focusing	on	the	lives	of	welfare	claimants,	as	well	as	of	‘austerity	TV’	more	broadly,	is	
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also	reflected	in	the	many	references	to	Benefits	Street	and	other	shows	like	it	 in	 parliamentary	 discussions	 and	 debates	 (discussed	 below);	 in	 the	widespread	 media,	 particularly	 tabloid,	 coverage	 of	 the	 Benefits	 Street	participants’	 lives	 after	 the	 series;	 as	 well	 as	 in	 the	 scholarly	 interest	generated	 by	 the	 series	 itself	 (Jensen	 2014;	 MacDonald	 et	 al.	 2014a;	Runswick-Cole	and	Goodley	2015).	
I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 was	 released	 in	 2016	 to	 much	 critical	 acclaim.136	Director	 Ken	 Loach’s	 most	 successful	 UK	 release	 ever	 (Wade	 2016),	 the	drama	film	attracted	a	significant	amount	of	political	debate,	as	well	as	both	positive	 and	 negative	 media	 attention.	 Continuing	 Loach’s	 well-known	critical,	social	realist	filmmaking	style	–	aiming,	in	his	own	words,	 ‘to	show	[the]	 truth;	 to	elucidate	 it,	 to	 tease	 it	out’	 (quoted	 in	Kermode	2014)	–	 the	film’s	 dramatic	 effect	 arises	 directly	 from	 the	 struggles	 of	 the	 ordinary	people	 portrayed	 in	 it,	 similarly	 to	 his	 1966	 Cathy	 Come	 Home.	 I,	 Daniel	
Blake	was	widely	represented	as	a	political	 intervention	 into	 the	effects	of	the	current	dismantling	of	 the	UK	welfare	system	under	austerity.	Perhaps	the	 most	 preeminent	 sympathetic	 representation	 of	 benefit	 claimants	available	 in	 the	mainstream	 in	 the	 UK,	 it	 also,	 similarly	 to	Benefits	 Street,	elicited	some	scholarly	interest	(O’Brien	2017;	Smith,	J.	2016;	VandenBosch	2017),	as	well	as	numerous	references	to	its	portrayal	of	the	welfare	system	in	 parliamentary	 discussions	 and	 debates.	 Much	 of	 this	 debate	 and	discussion	 focused,	 specifically,	 on	 the	 authenticity	 of	 the	 film’s	representation	 of	 benefit	 claimants	 and	 the	 benefits	 system,	 with	 Loach	himself	defending	his	research	for	the	film’s	fictionalised	portrayal	as	being	as	‘rigorous	as	any	piece	of	journalism’	(quoted	in	Seymour	2017).		Reality	TV	 is	often	coded	as	a	 form	of	 ‘low	art’,	 in	 contrast	 to	more	traditional	forms	of	‘high	art’	–	represented	by	films	such	as	I,	Daniel	Blake	–	also	suggesting	a	gendered	coding	of	the	former	as	feminine	and	the	latter	as	masculine,	as	others	(Holmes	and	Jermyn	2014;	Weber	2014)	have	argued.	While	the	feminisation	of	reality	TV	perhaps	also	indicates	it	is	less	worthy	of	 scholarly	 inquiry,	 recent	 years	 have	 seen	 an	 explosion	 in	 scholarly																																																									136	Palme	D’Or	2016,	BAFTA	–	Best	British	Film	2017,	and	Cesar	Award	–	Best	Foreign	Film	2017.	
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interest	 in	 examining	 reality	 TV.137	It	 has	 been	 suggested	 that	 reality	 TV’s	allure	 arises	 precisely	 from	 ‘its	 combination	 of	 real	 people	 and	 surreal	experiences’,	or	the	‘analytic	of	artifice	and	authenticity’	it	employs	(Weber	2014:	 4).	 Beverley	 Skeggs	 and	 Helen	 Wood	 argue,	 similarly,	 that	 in	 the	cultural	environment	of	reality	TV	‘viewers,	participants	and	producers	are	less	 invested	 in	 absolute	 truth	 and	 representational	 ethics,	 and	 more	interested	in	the	space	that	exists	between	reality	and	fiction,	in	which	new	levels	of	representational	play	and	reflexivity	are	visualised’	(2011:	6).	The	media	furore	that	followed	the	release	of	Benefits	Street,	however,	suggests	that	at	 least	a	significant	proportion	of	both	viewers	and	participants	were	extremely	 concerned	 with	 ‘absolute	 truth’,	 as	 much	 of	 the	 debate	 the	programme	 generated	 related	 specifically	 to	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 its	representations	–	similarly	to	I,	Daniel	Blake.		In	 this	 chapter	 I	 examine	 these	 two	 media	 texts	 together,	 not	 to	suggest	that	they	are	similar	as	media	texts,	but	to	highlight	the	salience	of	particular	 kinds	 of	 representations	 and	 figurations	 of	 benefit	 recipients	 in	the	public	arena	of	austerity	politics.	Both	I,	Daniel	Blake	and	Benefits	Street	depict	 the	 lives	 of	 people	 who	 receive	 various	 kinds	 of	 welfare	 benefits,	highlighting	their	personal	struggles	with	poverty	and	unemployment.	Both	are	examples	of	media	culture	that	 ‘involves	hegemonic	processes	of	sense	making’	(Negra	and	Tasker	2014:	2),	whereby	‘fictions	of	the	human	subject	are	 produced	 and	 circulated’	 (Blackman	 and	Walkerdine	 2001:	 6).	 These	fictions,	 particularly	 prominent	 ones,	 also	 have	 critical	 discursive	 and	political	consequences,	 for	 instance	 in	 the	significant	role	 that	 they	play	 in	setting	the	discursive	terms	for	how	people	are	able	to	relate	to	themselves	and	 others,	 as	 suggested	 in	 Chapter	 2.	 Although	 Benefits	 Street	 is	 a	documentary	series,	featuring	real	people	in	receipt	of	social	welfare,	and	I,	
Daniel	 Blake	 is	 a	 fictional	 account	 of	 people	 navigating	 the	 UK’s	 benefits	system,	they	both	 involve	such	 ‘fictions	of	 the	human	subject’,	 in	the	sense	that	various	editorial	and	directorial	choices	were	necessarily	made	in	order																																																									137	On	reality	TV,	including	analyses	of	specific	reality	TV	programmes,	see	for	instance,	Hill	(2015),	 Imre	 (2014),	 Jensen	 and	 Ringrose	 (2014),	 Ouellette	 (2014),	 Ringrose	 and	Walkerdine	 (2008),	 Skeggs	 (2005,	 2009b,	 2010),	 Skeggs	 and	 Wood	 (2011),	 Springer	(2014),	and	Stephens	(2014).	
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to	construct	clear,	recognisable,	and	compelling	narratives	out	of	messy	and	complex	 individual	 lives.	 For	 this	 reason,	 I	 use	 the	 terminology	 of	‘characters’	and	‘narratives’	in	relation	to	both	texts	–	in	order	to	foreground	the	constructedness	of	 the	stories	 they	put	 forward	about	 their	subjects,	as	well	 as	 to	 signal	 my	 interest	 in	 these	 manufactured	 stories,	 rather	 than	necessarily	in	the	actual,	lived	lives	of	the	Benefits	Street	participants.		My	 juxtaposing	of	 these	 two	media	 texts	 that,	admittedly,	 represent	very	different	genres	is,	thus,	intended	to	explore	the	similarities	–	as	well	as	the,	 perhaps	 more	 obvious,	 differences	 –	 evident	 in	 their	 representations	and	figurations	of	the	‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’,	as	well	as	to	investigate	the	 texts’	 consequent	 cultural	 and	 political	 resonance.	 The	 analysis	 that	follows,	 thus,	 includes	moments	of	both	highly	 critical	 and	more	generous	readings	 of	 the	 two	 media	 texts.	 While	 the	 violent	 nature	 of	 the	representations	of	Benefits	Street	and,	conversely,	the	sympathetic	nature	of	those	of	I,	Daniel	Blake,	may	be	obvious	to	many	viewers,	in	this	chapter	my	aim	 is	 to	 highlight	 that	 in	 both	 texts	 ‘a	wrestle	 of	 different	 frameworks	of	visibility’	 (Sedgwick	 2003:	 140,	 emphasis	 in	 the	 original)	 is,	 nonetheless,	evident.	 It	 is	 precisely	 the	 supposed	obviousness	 of	 the	 reading	 of	Benefits	
Street	as	a	violent	portrayal,	and	of	I,	Daniel	Blake	as	a	sympathetic	one,	that	masks	some	of	the	other	representational	frameworks	at	play	in	both.	Thus,	I	 pay	 attention	 to	 both	 reproductions	 and	 contestations	 of	 the	 common	austerity	 discourses	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter	 in	 the	 two	 media	texts,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 indicating	 that	 it	 is	 not	 surprising	 that	 only	
some	 of	 these	 reproductions	 and	 contestations	 have	 been	 taken	 up	 in	 the	significant	 media	 debates	 that	 followed	 their	 releases.	 Specifically,	 while	
Benefits	Street	was	accused	of	–	or	celebrated	for,	depending	on	the	political	viewpoint	 of	 the	 critic	 –	 reproducing	 the	 most	 violent,	 demonising	discourses	about	benefit	scroungers;	 I,	Daniel	Blake	was	praised	–	or	again,	blamed	–	 for	 its	 contestation	of	 these	 same	discourses	and,	 thus,	 for	more	sympathetically	portraying	benefit	recipients.	The	‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	figuration	is	a	salient	image	‘of	the	Other’	that	 ‘constantly	return[s]	and	[is]	told	and	retold	within	the	cultural	sphere’,	 particularly	 ‘at	 times	 when	 the	 invisible	 normative	 image	 is	
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threatened,	or	at	times	of	flux,	resistance,	change	and	upheaval’	(Blackman	and	Walkerdine	2001:	166).	While	the	truth	claims	made	by	Benefits	Street	and	I,	Daniel	Blake	are	different	due	to	the	different	genres	they	represent,	they,	nonetheless,	frequently	participate	in	the	same	figurative	economies	–	those	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger.’	 As	 Chapter	 2	 detailed,	 my	conception	of	‘figurative	economies’	here	draws	on	Sara	Ahmed’s	(2004)	use	of	 ‘affective	 economies’,	 indicating	 that	 figurations	 do	 not	 originate	 in	particular	 representational	 objects,	 but	 are,	 instead,	 reinforced	 and	reproduced	between	 them.	 Specific	 cultural	 objects,	 such	 as	 I,	Daniel	Blake	and	 Benefits	 Street,	 become	 specific	 points	 within	 multiple	 figurative	economies,	 rather	 than	 the	 origin	 or	 destination	 of	 the	 discourses	 that	cluster	 around	 the	 ‘benefit	 scrounging’	 figurations.	 Consequently,	 I	 also	question	 whether	 the	 texts’	 circulation	 within	 the	 broader	 figurative	economies	of	austerity	politics	limits	and	conditions	the	stories	they	can	tell,	and	thus	influences	the	ways	in	which	they	can	be	read	by	audiences	in	the	current	political	moment.	The	claim	to	truthfulness	and	authenticity	that	has	attached	 to	 both	 texts,	 specifically,	 indicates	 their	 embeddedness	 in	 the	figurative	economies	of	austerity	that	limit	what	can	publicly	be	said	–	and	heard	–	about	benefit	recipients	in	the	current	time.		Since	this	chapter	specifically	aims	to	highlight	the	emergence	of	new	or	 reconfigured	 sexual	 subjectivities	 in	 the	 figuration	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’,	 much	 of	 its	 analysis	 focuses	 on	 examining	 the	deployment	of	sexuality	–	as	well	as	race	–	in	representations	of	this	figure.	I	highlight	 commonalities	 and	 differences	 in	 the	 texts’	 figuration	 of	 benefit	recipients,	 focusing	 particularly	 on	 how	 these	 figurations	 utilise	 various	sexualised	 and	 racialised	 discursive	 tropes	 in	 their	making	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	recipient/scrounger.’	 These	 discourses	 at	 times	 both	 reproduce	 and	challenge	the	conceptualisation	of	 ‘worklessness’	through	paid	work	alone;	the	 framing	 of	 the	 ‘stable	 family’	 through	 a	 (hetero)normative	 notion	 of	reproductive	futurity;	and	the	common	discursive	trope	of	‘cultural	poverty’	–	 with	 the	 chapter,	 thus,	 centrally	 intervening	 in	 and	 complicating	 the	various	 austerity	 discourses	 investigated	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.	 Further,	and	 as	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter,	 my	 argument	 in	 this	 chapter	 also	
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foregrounds	 the	 interrelatedness	 of	 processes	 of	 sexualisation	 to	 other	processes	 of	 social	 categorisation	 –	 thus	 highlighting	 that	 intervening	 in	sexuality	also	enables	a	different	view	and	analysis	to	emerge	of	processes	of	classing	and	racialising.	My	 use	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 figurative	 economies	 here	 enables	 me	 to	make	the	argument	that	because	of	their	circulation	in	these	economies,	the	texts’	 representations	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 only	 becomes	legible	as	such	because	of	his	or	her	sexualisation	and/or	racialisation.	This	framework	 of	 legibility	 will	 also	 be	 shown,	 to	 a	 considerable	 extent,	 to	determine	which	side	of	this	hybrid	figuration	–	benefit	recipient	or	benefit	scrounger	 –	 a	 particular	 representation	 falls,	 as	 well	 as,	 consequently,	 to	significantly	 influence	 the	 kinds	 of	 responses	 these	 representations	 (can)	elicit.	Thus,	 I	also	argue	 that	 the	political	and	cultural	consequences	of	 the	two	media	 texts	 are	 conditioned	by,	 or	hinge	on,	 the	 figurative	 economies	within	which	they	circulate.			
Worklessness	and	Narratives	of	the	‘Good	Life’		Has	the	Secretary	of	State	managed	to	watch	programmes	such	as	‘Benefits	Street’	and	‘On	Benefits	&	Proud’?	If	so,	has	he,	like	me,	been	 struck	 by	 the	 number	 of	 people	 on	 them	who	manage	 to	combine	 complaining	 about	 welfare	 reform	 with	 being	 able	 to	afford	to	buy	copious	amounts	of	cigarettes,	have	lots	of	tattoos,	and	watch	Sky	TV	on	the	obligatory	widescreen	television?	Does	he	understand	the	concerns	and	irritation	of	many	people	who	go	to	 work	 every	 day	 and	 pay	 their	 taxes	 but	 cannot	 afford	 those	kinds	of	luxuries?	(Philip	Davies,	Conservative	MP	for	Shipley,	in	HC	Deb	2014a:	c579)	Each	 episode	 of	 Benefits	 Street	 opens	 with	 the	 voiceover	 introducing	 the	main	site	of	the	documentary	series	–	James	Turner	Street	in	Birmingham	–	as	‘not	your	average	street.	There	are	99	houses,	13	nationalities,	and	most	of	 the	 residents	 are	 claiming	 benefits’,	 followed	 by	 central	 character	 and	self-proclaimed	 ‘mum	 of	 the	 street’	White	 Dee’s	 retort:	 ‘probably	 five	 per	cent	 of	 people	 on	 this	 street	 are	 working.’	 While	 the	 accuracy	 of	 Dee’s	
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estimate	has	been	refuted,138	this	opening	sequence,	nonetheless,	 functions	to	 establish	 James	 Turner	 Street	 as	 a	 highly	 exceptional	 space	 that	 can,	consequently,	be	juxtaposed	with	the	‘hardworking	taxpayers’	of	the	rest	of	the	 country	 –	 as	 MP	 Philip	 Davies	 does	 in	 the	 above	 quote.	 The	representation	of	James	Turner	Street	as	a	workless	space	is	reinforced	and	consolidated	 throughout	 the	 series	 with	 voiceover	 statements	 such	 as	‘without	 work	 in	 the	 morning,	 some	 on	 the	 street	 stay	 up	 all	 night’	 –	following	 footage	 of	 children	 playing	 in	 the	 road	 after	 dark	 –	 and,	 ‘it’s	8.30am.	For	those	who	have	a	job,	it’s	time	to	go	to	work’,	both	from	episode	3.	Much	of	 the	 content	of	 the	 series	 also	 focuses	on	work,	whether	 it	 is	 in	following	 the	 characters	 in	 their	 job	 searching	 efforts;	 in	 highlighting	 the	uniqueness	of	 the	residents	who	are	 in	paid	employment	(such	as	Ewan,	a	council	IT	worker);	or	in	representing	other	aspects	of	the	characters’	lives	
through	their	lack	of	paid	employment,	such	as	in	the	discursive	connection	made	 by	 the	 voiceover	 in	 the	 excerpt	 included	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	chapter	 between	 the	 family	 receiving	 benefits,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 both	Callum’s	misbehaviour	and	Becky’s	seeming	inability	to	control	him,	on	the	other.		While	Benefits	Street	does	not	 reveal	much	about	White	Dee’s	work	history,	a	vague	allusion	is	made	to	her	being	on	anti-depressants.	Together	with	the	series’	overwhelming	emphasis	on	worklessness,	the	fact	that	this	allusion	 is	not	explored	 further	easily	gives	 the	 impression	that	White	Dee	and	many	other	characters	are	on	benefits	only	or	primarily	because	of	not	being	 in	 work.	 Sickness	 and	 disability	 benefits	 are	 not	 focused	 on	 in	 the	series,	 whereas	 repeated	 references	 are	 made	 to	 ‘signing	 on’,	 and	 the	storylines	 of	 many	 characters	 include	 them	 fulfilling	 various	 Jobcentre	requirements.	These	omissions	and	emphases	suggest	that	most	people	on	benefits	are,	in	fact,	in	receipt	of	Jobseekers’	Allowance	(JSA),	and	they,	thus,	function	 to	 strengthen	 the	 discursive	 connections	 between	 social	 welfare	and	worklessness.139	The	inclusion	of	sickness	and	disability	benefits	in	the																																																									138	In	2008-9,	39	per	cent	of	adults	on	the	street	were	working,	more	than	the	35	per	cent	claiming	JSA	or	disability	and	sickness	benefits	(Baker	2014).	139 	In	 fact,	 a	 very	 small	 proportion	 of	 UK’s	 overall	 welfare	 spending	 goes	 towards	unemployment-related	 benefits:	 for	 example	 in	 2016,	 this	 proportion	 was	 one	 per	 cent;	
	 171	
programme’s	 discursive	 framings	would	 disrupt	 both	 these	 imaginaries	 of	
undeservingness	 and	 the	 casting	 of	 benefit	 recipients	 as	 ‘workless	scroungers.’	Arguably	this	disruption	is	made	intentionally	in	I,	Daniel	Blake,	which	 focuses	 centrally	 on	 Daniel’s	 stressful	 and	 distressing	 quest	 to	 be	recognised	as	deserving	of	Employment	Support	Allowance	(ESA)	following	a	major	heart	 attack	 that	 ended	his	 life-long	 career	 as	 a	 carpenter.	 Scenes	portraying	 his	 frustrating	 experience	 with	 the	 ‘healthcare	 professional,	hired	 by	 the	 Department	 of	 Work	 and	 Pensions’	 at	 his	 Work	 Capability	Assessment	(WCA)	and	him	waiting	for	an	afternoon	on	hold	to	a	DWP	call	centre,	 thus,	 deliberately	 place	 in	 question	 the	 audiences’	 expectations	 of	the	responsibilities	of	the	UK	welfare	state	within	the	austerity	context.	Despite	 its	 central	 focus	 on	 Daniel’s	 journey	 to	 get	 his	 illness	recognised	 by	 the	 state,	 the	 film	 does	 also	 deploy	 the	 discourse	 of	‘worklessness’	–	albeit	in	a	less	explicit	way	than	its	reproduction	in	Benefits	
Street.	Katie,	the	single	mum	who	develops	a	friendship	with	Daniel	during	the	film,	has	been	unemployed	for	a	while	but	has	aspirations	to	go	‘back	to	the	 books’	 and	 finish	 her	 course	 at	 the	 Open	 University.	 Her	 financial	struggles	seem	to,	at	least	for	the	most	part,	stem	from	her	being	sanctioned	and	from	being	moved	a	 long	distance	away	from	her	extended	family	and	support	network	–	an	increasing	practice	that	is	explored	in	more	detail	 in	the	next	chapter.	As	Katie	is	unable	to	financially	support	her	children,	she	ends	up	going	 to	 the	 food	bank	 for	groceries,	 shoplifting	 for	 tampons,	 and	briefly	 forays	 into	 sex	 work,	 throughout	 all	 of	 which	 the	 film’s	 narrative	could	 be	 read	 as	 sustaining	 its	 focus	 on	 Katie’s	 longing	 for	 a	 return	 to	university	 and	 a	 paid	 job.	 In	 portraying	Katie’s	 desire	 as	 directed	 at	 a	 life	and	a	future	in	which	she	has	a	‘proper’	job,	the	film’s	narrative	aligns	with	the	discourse	of	‘worklessness’,	as	well	as	reveals	Katie’s	attachment	to	this	particular	 imaginary	 of	 the	 ‘good	 life’	 (Berlant	 2011).	 For	 Katie,	 the	 only	
imaginable	 route	 out	 of	 poverty	 is	 one	of	 paid	 employment	 and,	 thus,	 any	
																																																																																																																																																						with	 42	 per	 cent	 going	 towards	 pensions;	 18	 per	 cent	 towards	 family	 benefits,	 income	support,	and	tax	credits;	16	per	cent	towards	incapacity,	disability,	and	injury	benefits;	13	per	 cent	 towards	 personal	 social	 services	 and	 other	 benefits;	 and	 ten	 per	 cent	 towards	housing	benefits	(ONS	2016).		
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future	in	which	she	raises	her	children	while	continuing	to	receive	benefits	is	discursively	foreclosed.		While	 a	 future	and	a	good	 life	 in	which	Katie	 is	 able	 to	 sustain	and	support	 her	 family	 on	 benefits	 is	 an	 impossible	 dream	 and	 desire	 in	 the	narrative	 structure	 of	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake,	 for	 many	 of	 the	 residents	 of	 James	Turner	Street	finding	a	paid	job	is	a	distant	and	unlikely	–	and	in	some	cases,	also	an	undesirable	–	possibility.	Citing	a	variety	of	different	reasons	for	why	they	are	unlikely	to	find	paid	employment	anytime	soon	–	from	histories	of	drug	 or	 alcohol	 abuse,	 time	 spent	 in	 prison,	 and	 lack	 of	 work	 permits,	 to	mental	 health	 issues	 and	 learning	 difficulties	 –	 many	 of	 the	 residents	 of	James	 Turner	 Street	 explicitly	 affirm	 the	 futility	 of	 maintaining	 an	attachment	 to	an	 imaginary	of	 the	 ‘good	 life’	 in	which	paid	employment	 is	valued	 above	 all	 other	 activities.	 Thus,	 while,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 the	overarching	narrative	purported	by	the	series	tends	to	support	the	notion	of	worklessness;	on	the	other	hand,	the	narratives	of	many	characters	function	to,	 in	 fact,	highlight	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 ‘worklessness’	discourse	masks	and	covers	over	structural	issues	with	the	labour	market,	as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	For	many	of	the	residents	of	James	Turner	Street,	finding	paid	 employment	 that,	 for	 example,	 pays	 enough	 to	 cover	 the	 cost	 of	childcare	is,	in	reality,	an	unlikely	possibility	in	the	labour	market	conditions	that	they	face.	Reading	these	two	texts	together,	it	is,	thus,	the	James	Turner	residents’	–	 at	 times	 explicit,	 at	 times	 implicit	 –	 acknowledgement	 of	 the	hollowness	of	this	particular	‘good	life’	narrative	that	also	reveals	the	cruel	nature	of	Katie’s	sustained	optimistic	attachment	to	that	same	narrative.140			White	 Dee,	 the	 self-appointed	 mum	 of	 James	 Turner,	 provides	 a	particularly	 interesting	 juxtaposition	to	Katie’s	desire	for	a	 future	 in	which	she	no	longer	receives	benefits.	White	Dee	states	that,	while	she	is	 ‘not	too	old	to	dream’,	at	this	point	in	her	life	all	of	her	dreams	are	for	her	children.	Apart	from	raising	her	two	children,	Gerrard	and	Caitlin,	she	is	portrayed	in	the	 series	 as	 the	 person	 whom	 everyone	 goes	 to	 whenever	 they	 are	 in	trouble	 –	 a	 sort	 of	 part	 one-woman	 neighbourhood	 watch,	 part	 social																																																									140	This	reading,	perhaps,	also	challenges	feminist	positions	that	centralise	women’s	labour	market	participation	in	their	framings	of	equality	politics	–	some	of	which	were	discussed	in	Chapter	1.	
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worker,	part	dispute	mediator.	She	spends	her	time	taking	care	of	the	many	needs	 of	 various	 neighbours	 of	 hers	 (most	 often	 Fungi,	 a	 recovering	 drug	addict),	 solving	 disputes	 between	 them,	 and	 helping	 them	 with	 benefits	forms	and	other	dealings	with	government	agencies	–	or,	in	other	words,	her	days	 are	 filled	with	 various	 kinds	 of	 informal	 care	and	 social	work.	While	both	 Katie	 and	 White	 Dee	 are	 single	 mothers	 of	 two,	 and	 both	 are	 on	benefits,	it	is	precisely	the	kind	of	life	led	by	White	Dee	–	full	of	(care)	work	and,	yet,	supported	by	benefits	–	that	is	unimaginable	either	as	a	long-term	life	 situation	 or	 a	 future	 prospect	 in	 Katie’s	 narrative	 framing	 –	 although	some	of	 the	 film’s	depictions	of	 reciprocal	 care	 relations	do	 challenge	 this	reading	 of	 Katie’s	 story,	 as	 I	 explore	 in	more	 detail	 below.	 In	 some	ways,	then,	White	Dee’s	narrative	stands	in	contrast	both	to	that	of	Katie’s,	with	its	affirmation	of	the	‘good	life’	as	centrally	striving	to	avoid	worklessness;	and	to	 the	overall	 focus	Benefits	Street	maintains	on	paid	employment	–	or	 the	search	 for	 it	 –	 as	 the	 main	 aspect	 of	 most	 of	 its	 characters’	 lives	 and	narratives.		Thus,	while	Benefits	Street	does	not	explicitly	depict	Dee’s	activities	as	care	work,	 this	 representation,	nonetheless,	highlights	a	potential	 frame	through	which	to	view	social	welfare	and	the	kinds	of	lives	that	are	enabled	by	it	–	or	indeed,	that	are	imaginable	in	the	discursive	context	of	austerity.	Juxtaposing	White	Dee’s	story	with	Katie’s	also,	then,	allows	us	to	imagine	a	different	 kind	 of	 potential	 future	 for	 Katie	 –	 perhaps	 one	 in	 which	 Katie	faces	a	fairer	benefits	system,	is	not	sanctioned,	and	gets	to	live	closer	to	her	family	in	London.	Were	this	kind	of	a	vision	of	the	‘good	life’	enabled	by	the	narrative	 structure	 of	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake,	 would	 Katie	 still	 long	 for	 paid	employment	 as	 the	 answer	 to	her	problems?	Or	would	her	desire	become	
politically	oriented	instead,	perhaps	towards	a	welfare	system	that	does	not	impose	 sanctions	 that	 are	 likely	 to	make	 people	 destitute,	 or	 a	 state	 that	does	not	send	people	to	live	on	the	other	side	of	the	country,	far	away	from	their	families?	And	indeed,	what	other	kinds	of	political	imaginaries	–	other	than	those	focusing	on	questions	of	redistribution	–	might	be	opened	up	by	this	reading	more	generally?	Perhaps	it	is	precisely	because	the	discourse	of	‘worklessness’	has,	in	the	context	of	austerity	politics,	become	so	closely	tied	
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together	with	any	possible	visions	of	the	‘good	life’	that	a	representation	in	which	Katie	 is	 both	 a	 deserving	benefit	 recipient	 and	not	wishing	 for	 paid	employment,	 is	unimaginable.	 In	 contrast,	Benefits	Street	 can	 represent	 its	characters	as	not	perpetually	longing	and	searching	for	paid	employment	–	but	 only	 because	 they	 have	 already	 been	 marked	 as	 undeserving	 benefit	
scroungers.	This	 discussion,	 thus,	 also	 reveals	 something	 important	 about	 the	relationship	 between	 –	 and	 slippage	 across	 –	 the	 ‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	 pairing.	 The	 two	 can	 only	 ever	 be	 separated	retrospectively	 or	 in	 projecting	 to	 the	 future,	whereas	 in	 the	 present	 they	are	always	in	danger	of	being	read	as	one	and	the	same.	In	other	words,	the	figure	of	the	deserving	benefit	recipient	only	ever	fully	exists	in	the	past	or	the	 future,	whereas	 in	 the	present	 she	 is	always	 in	danger	of	 slipping	 into	the	frame	of,	and	being	read	as,	a	‘scrounger’	instead.	Daniel’s	story	suggests	that	 the	 UK	 welfare	 state	 can	 no	 longer	 be	 relied	 on	 to	 provide	 care	 in	moments	 of	 sickness	 and	 disability,	 but	 his	 clear	 positioning	 as	 deserving	can	only	be	sustained	because	he	was	previously	consistently	employed	and	only	 recently	 became	 ‘workless.’	 Katie,	 similarly,	 can	 appear	 as	 deserving	because	 the	audience	knows	 that	eventually	 she	will	 come	off	benefits	and	become	a	financially	productive,	tax-paying	member	of	society	–	although	as	the	discussion	below	highlights,	 this	 is	only	one	possible	reading	of	Katie’s	story.	 Further,	 whether	 she	 will	 still	 be	 in	 poverty	 is	 of	 course	 also	 a	different	 issue,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	 discussion	 of	 in-work	poverty.	Conversely,	White	Dee	can	easily	be	read	through	the	‘benefit	scrounger’	frame,	as	throughout	her	narrative	in	Benefits	Street	she	does	not	express	 any	 desire	 to	 find	 paid	 employment	 –	 with	 her	 representation	perhaps	 conforming	 more	 closely	 to	 the	 stereotype	 highlighted	 by	 Philip	Davies	MP	at	 the	beginning	of	 this	section	–	while	her	engagement	 in	care	work	can	be	ignored	in	the	programme’s	framing.		As	 long	 as	 the	 discursive	 frame	 of	 the	 deserving	 benefit	 recipient	cannot	 acknowledge	 the	work	 of	 child	 and	neighbour	 care	 that	 both	Katie	and	White	Dee	are	engaged	in,	these	two	characters	(and	many	others	 like	them)	 remain	 discursively	 stuck	 in	 a	 narrative	 jostling	 between	 the	 two	
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poles	of	the	‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	pairing.	Conversely,	as	long	as	the	legibility	of	the	‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	figure	depends	on	reproducing	the	 ‘worklessness’	 discourse,	 either	 reaffirming	 it	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	‘scrounger’)	 or	 promising	 to	 transcend	 it	 in	 the	 future	 (in	 the	 case	 of	 the	deserving	 benefit	 recipient),	 the	 discursive	 framing	 of	 this	 figure	 cannot	allow	 for	 different	 visions	 of	 the	 ‘good	 life’	 to	 emerge	 and	 be	 seen	 as	legitimate.	 Importantly,	 these	 discursive	 framings	 –	 of	 the	 scroungers	 of	
Benefits	Street	as	uninterested	in	becoming	a	 ‘contributing’	(with	only	paid	work	ever	counting	as	a	‘contribution’)	member	of	society,	and	of	the	benefit	recipients	 of	 I,	Daniel	Blake	 as	 needing	 to	 continuously	 assure	 the	 viewer	that	their	being	on	benefits	is	only	temporary	–	also	position	the	viewer	in	particular	ways.	Perhaps	different	points	of	entry	to,	and	identification	with,	the	 discursive	 framings	 of	 both	 texts	 would	 be	 available	 to	 viewers	 who	have	undergone	or	are	undergoing	similar	experiences	themselves.	Thus,	it	is	specifically	 their	circulation	 in	 the	 figurative	economies	of	austerity	 that	helps	 position	 both	 Benefits	 Street	 and	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 as	 sites	 for	 the	potential	 reproduction	 of	 both	 the	 worklessness	 discourse	 and	 these	common	imaginaries	of	(un)deservingness.			
Family	Stability,	Care,	and	the	Loss	of	the	Male	Breadwinner	Episode	5	of	Benefits	Street	focuses	on	Hannah	and	Simba,	who	live	together	with	 Hannah’s	 two	 kids	 from	 a	 previous	 relationship	 but	 are	 now	 having	relationship	 trouble.	 Zimbabwean	 Simba	 did	 not	 apply	 for	 a	 new	 visa	 on	time	 and	 is	 now	without	 a	work	 permit,	 as	well	 as	 ineligible	 for	 benefits.	Simba	 has	 started	 drinking	 and	 smoking	 more	 than	 before,	 and	 Hannah	wants	to	move	out.	However,	in	order	to	have	the	time	to	find	a	new	place,	her	 kids	 need	 to	 move	 in	 with	 their	 father	 for	 a	 while.	 Hannah	 is	heartbroken	about	not	living	with	her	kids,	and	Simba	is	furious	at	Hannah	for	 leaving	 him,	 as	 well	 as	 at	 mutual	 friend	 Tich	 for	 helping	 Hannah	 out	during	the	breakup.	While	Hannah’s	story	gets	a	happy	ending	–	she	is	able	to	find	a	new	house	fairly	quickly	in	her	sister’s	neighbourhood	and	does	not	have	 to	 part	with	 her	 kids	 after	 all	 –	 the	 episode	 ends	with	 an	 altogether	more	 melancholic	 note:	 the	 voiceover	 exclaims	 ‘there’s	 a	 saying	 “when	
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poverty	 comes	 in	 at	 the	 door,	 love	 flies	 out	 of	 the	 window”,	 and	 James	Turner	street	can	be	a	rocky	road	for	relationships’,	as	the	camera	zooms	in	on	 a	 used	 pregnancy	 test	 left	 on	 the	 road.	 The	 discursive	 links	 between	receiving	 social	 welfare,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 ‘broken’	 relationships	 or	‘unstable’	families,	accidental	pregnancies,	and	non-normative	family	forms,	on	 the	 other,	 are	 made	 painstakingly	 clear	 throughout	 the	 series,	 thus	strongly	 conforming	 to	 the	 ‘family	 stability’	 discourse	 examined	 in	 the	previous	chapter.		Most	of	the	Benefits	Street	characters	who	have	kids	are	either	single	mothers,	or	parents	who	are,	 for	various	 reasons,	not	allowed	 to	 see	 their	children.	 In	addition	 to	Hannah	and	Simba,	whose	relationship	we	witness	breaking	 down	 in	 the	 fifth	 episode,	 among	 the	 few	 couples	Benefits	Street	introduces	the	audience	to	are	Becky	and	Mark,	mentioned	above,	and	Ana	and	Abdul,	 a	 couple	whose	wedding	 is	 one	of	 the	 central	 storylines	 in	 the	second	episode.	Ana	is	a	Polish	Mormon,	and	Abdul	an	Algerian	Muslim,	and	as	a	result	of	the	cultural	differences	between	them,	Ana	explains,	they	have	to	 ‘mix	 things’	 and	 ‘sacrifice	 a	 little	 bit.’	While	 Ana	 and	 Abdul	 themselves	seem	 happy,	 there	 is	 a	 rumour	 going	 around	 in	 the	 neighbourhood	 that	Abdul	 is	 paying	 Ana	 to	 marry	 him,	 and	 some	 of	 their	 neighbours	 are	suspicious	of	 their	 relationship.	Becky	 thinks	 that	 their	 relationship	 is	 ‘not	about	 love,	 it’s	 about	money	 innit’,	 and	White	Dee	suspects	 the	couple	are	getting	married	 ‘for	 a	 green	 card,	 is	 that	what	 they	 call	 it	 nowadays?’	The	question	of	the	authenticity	of	Ana	and	Abdul’s	relationship	is	not	in	any	way	resolved	in	the	episode	and	is,	thus,	left	hanging	in	the	air,	for	the	audience	to	 grapple	 with.	 The	 placement	 of	 their	 narrative	 in	 the	 episode	 that	centrally	 focuses	 on	 issues	 around	 immigration	works	 to	 further	 position	their	 relationship	 as	 entangled	 in	 issues	 of	 (in)authenticity,	 conjuring	 up	images	of	‘sham’	marriages	(Gedalof	2017)	and	‘bogus’	immigrants	(Ahmed	2004).	Becky	and	Mark,	on	the	other	hand,	are	depicted	in	Benefits	Street	as	one	of	the	few	parent	couples	who	have	not	broken	up	and	are	raising	their	kids	together:	‘this	is	a	street	where	many	kids	are	raised	by	single	parents.	Mark	 and	 Becky	 are	 one	 of	 the	 few	 couples	 trying	 to	 make	 a	 go	 of	 it	
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together.’	 The	 representation	 of	 their	 relationship	 focuses,	 firstly,	 on	 their	struggles	 to	 control	 and	 parent	 their	 children,	 particularly	 four-year-old	Callum,	and,	secondly,	on	Mark’s	job-hunting	efforts.	We	see	Mark,	who	has	never	had	a	paid	 job,	go	off	 to	a	CV-writing	workshop	and	proudly	 tell	his	son:	‘when	daddy’s	finished,	he’ll	be	able	to	go	out	and	work.’	He	eventually	finds	a	job,	but	as	it	is	commission-only,	he	soon	finds	himself	working	long	hours	without	any	financial	compensation	at	all	and	ends	up	quitting	the	job	after	 just	 two	 days.	Mark’s	 repeated	 failure	 to	 find	 a	 job	 is	 punctuated	 by	footage	of	him	 idly	cycling	around	and	doing	tricks	on	his	bike.	 In	another	scene	 at	 the	 food	 bank,	 after	 Mark	 fails	 to	 obtain	 the	 family’s	 food	 bag	because	the	voucher	is	in	Becky’s	name,	he	tells	the	camera	he	feels	like	‘the	unluckiest	 guy	 in	 the	 planet.’	 Afterwards,	 Becky	 is	 on	 the	 phone	 to	 social	services,	and	we	hear	her	say:	 ‘no	he’s	a	full-time	dad	as	well’,	presumably	answering	 a	 question	 enquiring	 about	 Mark’s	 job.	 This	 answer	 to	 an	unspecified	question	cements	Mark’s	narrative	as	one	of	recurrent	failure	–	and	importantly,	here,	not	 just	 failure	to	find	a	 job,	but	also	failure	to	fulfil	the	traditional	role	of	the	breadwinner	father.		While	 these	 three	 relationships	 are	 overall	 depicted	 in	 somewhat	different	ways,	one	key	element	of	similarity	is	their	positioning	as	at	some	
distance	from	the	ideal	(parent)	couple	of	a	male	breadwinner	and	a	female	caregiver.	 Ana	 and	 Abdul’s	 relationship	 is	 potentially	 ‘fake’,	 Hannah	 and	Simba’s	 is	 broken,	 and	 Mark	 fails	 repeatedly	 to	 be(come)	 the	 male	breadwinner	 to	 his	 caretaker	 wife.	 However,	 as	 well	 as	 one	 of	 the	 few	couples	‘trying	to	make	a	go	of	it	together’,	Becky	and	Mark’s	family	is	also	the	only	prominently	 featured	one	on	 the	 show	 that	 is	 entirely	white.	The	other	 two	 couples	 are	 not	 only	 racialised,	 but	 also	 depicted	 as	 mired	 in	struggles	 with	 immigration	 authorities.	 Further,	 and	 importantly,	 these	struggles	are	presented	as	part	of	their	positioning	as	couples	and	families,	thus	 suggesting	 that	 their	 family	 life	 is	 somehow	 also	 destabilised	 as	 a	consequence	 –	 although	 not	 in	 the	 way	 that	 families	 are	 frequently	destabilised	 and	 broken	 apart	 as	 a	 result	 of	 immigration	 laws	 and	regulations,	 such	 as	 the	 recent	 changes	 to	 UK	 family	 reunification	 laws	(Sirriyeh	2015).	Thus,	despite	the	similarities,	the	couples	do	not	all	appear	
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to	be	at	the	same	distance	from	the	imaginary	ideal	of	the	normative	family	–	while	 Becky	 and	Mark	 are	 at	 least	 trying	 to	 parent	 together,	 Hannah	 and	Simba’s	relationship	is	already	broken	because	of	his	mistake	in	relation	to	reconfirming	his	immigration	status,	and	Ana	and	Abdul’s	relationship	may	not	 be	 real	 in	 the	 first	 place.	Here,	 common	 imaginaries	 of	 immigrants	 as	deceitful,	 and	 of	 their	 relationships	 as	 always	 potentially	 ‘fake’,	 combine	with	the	‘family	stability’	discourse	to	mark	the	racialised,	(part-)immigrant	families	as	even	further	from	the	ideal.141	Nonetheless,	 it	 is	 only	 by	 reading	 these	 relationships	 in	 relation	 to	the	 ideal,	 heteronormative	 male	 breadwinner/female	 caregiver	 paradigm	that	 the	narratives	of	 failure	 and	 inauthenticity	 become	visible	 in	 the	 first	place.	As	a	 result	of	 these	 framings,	 the	representation	of	 the	 three	parent	couples	 on	 James	 Turner	 Street	 come	 to	 be	 discursively	 connected	 to	 the	narratives	 of	 the	 single	 parents	 on	 the	 street,	 in	 that	 they	 all,	 to	 varying	degrees,	appear	as	deviations	from	the	ideal	family	form.	Apart	from	White	Dee	and	a	couple	of	other	single	mothers,	the	other	parents	represented	in	the	 series	 are	 mostly	 currently	 unable	 to	 see	 their	 children.	 For	 example	Fungi	 –	White	 Dee’s	 friend	 and	 recurrent	 character	 –	 has	 three	 kids	with	different	mothers	but	 is	not	on	 talking	 terms	with	his	oldest	daughter	and	not	allowed	to	see	his	youngest	child,	who	was	adopted	at	 the	age	of	 four.	Another	 character	 Sam	 is	 a	mother	 of	 two,	 but	 she	 has	 not	 seen	 her	 kids	since	she	started	taking	heroin.	The	camera	follows	her	on	a	midnight	trip	to	the	ATM	to	withdraw	her	benefits	as	soon	as	they	are	paid	into	her	account.	These	portrayals	confirm	not	only	the	previous	chapter’s	argument	that	the	‘family	stability’	discourse	is	rarely	positioned	very	far	from	the	judgement	or	stigmatisation	of	non-normative	family	 forms,	but	also	that	both	tend	to	be	 discursively	 linked	 to	 notions	 of	 generic	 cultural	 dysfunctionality	 and	criminality.		The	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 and	 her	 family,	 thus,	 appear	 in	
Benefits	Street	not	just	as	continuously	failing	to	attain	the	ideal	family	form,	but	also,	as	a	result,	as	always	already	an	‘unstable’	family.	In	I,	Daniel	Blake,																																																									141	See	White	 (2014)	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 some	 of	 the	 implications	 of	 the	 encounters	 non-normative	 couples	 have	 with	 immigration	 regimes	 and	 authorities	 to	 prove	 the	‘authenticity’	of	their	relationships.	
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Katie,	also	a	single	mother,	is	depicted	as	desperately	trying	to	stabilise	the	environment	 in	which	her	 children	 are	 growing	up	 after	 being	 sanctioned	and	 left	 without	 a	 support	 network.	 She	 does	 not	 mention	 her	 children’s	fathers	much,	apart	 from	referring	 to	 ‘a	bit	of	 trouble’	with	Dylan’s	 father,	which	led	to	her	living	in	the	homeless	hostel	in	London	in	the	first	place.	In	Katie’s	 discursive	 framing,	 similarly	 to	 the	 Benefits	 Street	 narratives,	 the	male	 breadwinner/female	 caregiver	 paradigm	 only	 appears	 as	 a	 loss	 –	 in	Katie’s	 case	 a	 loss	 that	 took	 place	 before	 the	 film’s	 narrative	 began.	 It	 is	Daniel’s	entry	into	the	family’s	life	that,	at	least	initially,	fills	the	space	left	by	this	loss	and,	thus,	also	stabilises	Katie’s	life.	She	is	happy	for	Daniel	to	help	out	with	odd	jobs	in	her	new	house,	and	her	kids	seem	to	enjoy	his	company	as	well.	As	Katie	struggles	more	and	more	to	cope,	Daniel	becomes	a	bigger	and	bigger	part	of	the	family’s	life.	In	one	particularly	powerful	sequence	of	scenes,	Daniel	helps	Dylan	and	Daisy	cover	their	windows	with	bubble	wrap	and	use	tea	light	candles	for	warmth.	While	Daniel	does	not	exactly	attempt	to	be	a	‘breadwinner’	for	Katie	and	her	children,	it	is,	nonetheless,	only	with	his	 help	 and	 support	 that	 Katie	 begins	 to	 believe	 in	 her	 ability	 to	 make	things	work.	This	rather	normative	framing	in	which	Katie’s	 life	gets	a	new	lease	because	 of	 the	 entry	 of	Daniel	 into	 her	 life	 is,	 to	 an	 extent,	 reproduced	 in	Daniel’s	dealings	with	others.	He	accepts	packages	 for	his	neighbour	China	and	calls	him	‘son’,	as	well	as	remembers	fondly	the	caring	relationship	he	had	 with	 his	 partner	 before	 her	 death:	 ‘she	 was	 crazy,	 hard	 work.	 And	 I	loved	 her	 to	 bits.	 I’m	 lost	 without	 her	 really.’	 Thus,	 early	 on	 in	 the	 film,	moments	 of	 everyday	 intimacy	 and	 care	 appear	 as	 rather	 conventional	 –	arguably	echoing	Lauren	Berlant’s	 (2011)	discussion	of	normative	notions	of	 the	 ‘good	 life.’	 For	 her,	 it	 is	 precisely	 ‘proximity	 to	 the	 fantasy	 life	 of	normativity’	 that	 ‘remains	 to	 animate	 living	 on,	 for	 some	 on	 the	contemporary	 economic	 bottom’	 (ibid.:	 167);	 in	 the	 film	 it	 is	 Daniel	 –	 an	older,	 white	 male	 figure	 –	 who	 repeatedly	 offers	 help	 and	 support	 to	 his	younger	 –	 feminised	 and	 racialised	 –	 friends.	 Further,	 Katie	 and	 Daniel’s	relationship	suffers	a	break	when	Katie,	out	of	financial	desperation,	enters	into	 sex	 work.	 Daniel	 finds	 out,	 storms	 into	 the	 house	 in	 which	 Katie	 is	
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preparing	 to	 see	 a	 client,	 and	 attempts	 to	 persuade	 her	 to	 leave.	 Katie	refuses,	goes	back	into	the	house,	and	her	relationship	with	Daniel	is	put	on	hold.	 Katie’s	 entry	 into	 sex	 work	 is	 not	 mentioned	 in	 the	 film	 after	 this	episode	–	as	the	film’s	narrative	folds	in	on	Daniel’s	deteriorating	health	and	financial	 situation	 and	 somewhat	 leaves	 Katie’s	 struggles	 behind,	 the	audience	is	 left	 to	decide	for	themselves	whether	Katie	stays	 in	this	 line	of	work.		Her	 entry	 into	 sex	 work	 can,	 certainly,	 be	 read	 as	 an	 error	 of	judgement,	an	act	of	sheer	desperation,	or	a	momentary	blip	in	an	otherwise	clear	path	 towards	proper	paid	employment	and	a	 life	without	 reliance	on	benefits	–	and	perhaps	her	reconciling	of	her	relationship	with	Daniel	at	the	end	of	 the	 film	 confirms	 this	 reading.	Katie’s	 choice	 of	work	here	 appears	
oppositional	 to	 her	 intimate	 relationship	 with	 Daniel,	 as	 it	 is	 precisely	Daniel’s	judgement	and	call	for	her	to	return	to	the	safety	and	normativity	of	respectable	 femininity	 that	 endangers	Katie’s	 efforts	 to	 financially	 support	herself	 and	 her	 children.	 In	 this	 reading,	 Katie’s	 ability	 to	 leave	 the	destitution	 she	 has	 been	 thrown	 into	 by	 sanctioning	 and	 the	 loss	 of	 her	support	networks	is,	thus,	jeopardised	by	her	intimate	attachment	to	Daniel	–	in	what	is	perhaps,	to	use	Berlant’s	language,	the	clearest	confirmation	of	the	cruelty	of	such	attachments	in	the	film’s	narrative.	However,	moments	of	
complex,	relational,	and	reciprocal	care	later	on	in	the	film	at	least	somewhat	complicate	the	film’s	earlier	sustained	attachments	to	normative	 ‘good	life’	fantasies.		China	helps	Daniel	fill	in	an	online	appeal	form	after	he	has	struggled	to	 do	 it	 by	 himself	 at	 a	 public	 library,	 warning	 him:	 ‘Dan	 they’ll	 fuck	 you	around,	 make	 it	 as	 miserable	 as	 possible.	 No	 accident.	 That’s	 the	 plan!	 I	know	 dozens	 who’ve	 just	 given	 up.’	 Following	 the	 argument	 with	 Katie,	Daisy	 brings	 Daniel	 food	 as	 he	 sits	 alone	 in	 his	 flat,	 having	 sold	 all	 of	 his	possessions	to	pay	his	bills.	Finally,	Katie	walks	Daniel	to	the	appeal	hearing	that	 concludes	 the	 film.	 These	 later	 scenes	 reverse	 the	 earlier	 scenes’	normative	intimacies,	positioning	Daniel	as	the	one	who	needs	and	accepts	help	 and	 care	 from	 Katie	 and	 China.	 Over	 the	 course	 of	 the	 film,	 the	characters	 learn	 to	 supplement	 the	 diminishing	 care	 provided	 by	 the	
	 181	
welfare	state	with	their	own	relational	care	practices.	While	such	practices	certainly	carry	the	danger	of	confounding	the	neoliberalising	removal	of	the	state	from	its	responsibilities	to	care	and	provide	for	its	citizens,	at	the	same	time	 they	also	 challenge	dominant	 representations	of	benefit	 recipients	 as	both	singularly	dependent	(Shakespeare	2000)	and	decidedly	irresponsible	–	as	 explored	 in	 the	 previous	 chapter.142	Perhaps	 this	 reading	 of	 I,	 Daniel	
Blake,	in	turn,	also	suggests	a	different	viewpoint	as	to	the	normative	ethos	of	Benefits	Street’s	 representation	 of	 families,	 intimacy,	 and	 care.	 After	 all,	Becky	and	Mark’s	repeated	failings	in	relation	to	the	normative	family	ideal	sit	within	 the	broader	 context	 of	 James	Turner	 Street,	where	 the	 family	 is	part	of	a	vast	network	of	neighbours	and	friends	that	is	repeatedly	shown	to	care	for	and	about	each	other.	At	the	same	time	though,	 this	care	does	not	extend	 in	 quite	 the	 same	 way	 to	 Ana	 and	 Abdul,	 who	 continue	 to	 be	 the	subject	of	the	neighbours’	suspicion	and	hostility	–	thus	perhaps	suggesting	the	more	 enduring	 grasp	 that	 ‘the	moral	 pressure	 to	 identify	with	 a	 small	cluster	of	privatized	normal	identities’	(Berlant	1997:	192)	has	on	racialised	and/or	immigrant	families.		Thus,	 while	 both	 portrayals	 do,	 indeed,	 confirm	 the	 previous	chapter’s	 argument	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘family	 stability’	 discourse	 –	with	 its	close	 discursive	 proximity	 to	 particular,	 normative,	 family	 forms	 –	 many	moments	in	both	also	allow	for	different	kinds	of	readings	to	emerge	of	the	practices	 and	 relations	 of	 care	 and	 intimacy	 between	 the	 characters.	 As	above,	 it	 is	 the	 figurative	 economies	 of	 austerity	 that	 position	 the	 texts	 as	part	of	 the	discursive	networks	 that	condemn	benefit-receiving	 families	as	always	already	unstable,	and	therefore	as	undeserving	of	state	assistance	–	also	 functioning,	perhaps,	 to	hide	 some	of	 the	more	critical	ways	 in	which	both	 portrayals	 challenge	 notions	 of	 benefit	 recipients	 as	 irresponsible,	needy,	 and	dependent.	Tellingly,	Daniel	 is	 the	only	 character	 in	either	 text	that,	 at	 least	 initially,	 refuses	 to	 take	 part	 in	 these	 reciprocal	 networks	 of	care,	clinging	onto	his	belief	that	the	state	will	provide	care	and	support	in																																																									142 	This	 part	 of	 the	 chapter's	 analysis	 and	 argument,	 particularly	 in	 relation	 to	 the	challenges	I,	Daniel	Blake’s	narratives	present	to	discursive	framings	of	dependence	and	the	universality	of	the	welfare	state,	arose	from,	and	is	indebted	to,	discussions	and	joint	work	with	my	colleague	Jacqueline	Gibbs.	See	Gibbs	and	Lehtonen	(2019)	for	more	detail.		
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his	time	of	need.	The	other	characters	–	Katie	and	China,	as	well	as	many	of	the	 James	Turner	Street	 residents	–	 take	 to	 these	practices	of	 friendly	and	neighbourly	 care	 more	 readily,	 perhaps	 revealing	 that	 their	 faith	 in	 the	reciprocity	of	the	state	was	never	certain	in	the	way	that	Daniel’s	was.	After	all,	 a	 blind	 faith	 in	 the	 universality	 of	 welfare	 provisions	 is	 an	 attitude	historically	afforded	to	few,	and,	thus,	perhaps	it	is	no	surprise	that	the	lone	mothers	 and	 racialised	 and/or	 immigrant	populations	depicted	 in	 the	 two	texts	already	intimately	know	the	conditionality	of	state	support	–	as	well	as	the	need	to	supplement	it	with	their	own	relational	care	practices.		
Race,	Immigration,	and	Mothers	of	the	Nation	The	opening	scene	of	the	second	episode	of	Benefits	Street	introduces	White	Dee	as	Irish,	while	her	son	Gerrard	‘has	a	Jamaican	father,	but	on	this	road	that’s	 nothing	 special.’	 The	 voiceover	 continues,	 ‘many	 of	 the	 78	 occupied	homes	have	someone	born	overseas	in	them.’	The	episode	in	general	focuses	on	 issues	 around	 immigration	 and	 multiculturalism,	 positioning	 James	Turner	Street	as	a	long-established	multiracial	and	multicultural	community	–	 as	 well	 as	 introducing	 a	 number	 of	 new	 entrants	 to	 the	 street,	 such	 as	recently	 arrived	 Romanian	 families	 and	 workers,	 and	 a	 group	 of	Gypsies/Travellers	who	have	set	up	camp	in	a	small	park	at	the	end	of	the	road.	White	 Dee	 comments	 on	 the	 new	 arrivals	with	 sharp	 insight:	 ‘times	change	innit,	you	know	back	in	the,	you	know,	fifties	and	sixties,	it	was	the	Jamaicans	and	the	Irish	that	were	classed	as	the	immigrants,	it’s	just	now	it’s	the	 Polish	 and	 Romanians.’	 She	 goes	 on	 to	 discuss	 the	 Gypsies/Travellers	with	Fungi,	joking	that	since	she	is	Irish	her	family	are	‘probably	related	to	half	of	 them.’	The	episode	–	 the	one	with	 the	clearest	 theme	out	of	 the	six	episodes	in	the	first	season	–	thus,	firmly	establishes	James	Turner	Street	as	a	–	both	culturally	and	racially	–	mixed	space.	Further,	it	is	in	this	episode’s	representations	that	the	‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	figure	is	most	clearly	established	 as	 co-constituted	 by	 the	 concurrent	 processes	 of	 racialisation	and	sexualisation.	While	 the	 vast	majority	 of	 the	 storylines	 of	Benefits	Street	 focus	 on	benefits,	or	at	least	on	the	lives	of	people	who	are	on	benefits	–	as	suggested	
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by	the	series’	title	–	the	second	episode	features	many	that	have	very	little,	or	 nothing	 at	 all,	 to	 do	with	 social	welfare.	 The	 newly	 arrived	 Romanians	include	a	group	of	14	men	who	share	a	house	on	the	street.	The	men	were	initially	promised	well-paid	work:	they	‘came	with	hopes	of	the	good	life	but	found	only	slave	labour’,	the	voiceover	states,	explaining	that	the	men’s	boss	is	 keeping	 their	 passports.	 The	 group	 are	 also	 yet	 to	 receive	 any	 financial	compensation	 for	 their	 labour.	After	 reporting	 their	boss	 to	 the	police,	 the	group	 splits,	 fearing	 retribution	 from	 the	boss’s	men	–	 some	 return	home,	some	head	to	London,	and	one	or	 two	remain	 in	Birmingham.	Many	 in	the	group	express	their	desire	to	just	work	and	send	money	to	their	families,	a	few	 even	 specifically	 highlighting	 their	 disinterest	 in	 charity	 or	 state	handouts.	While	 this	 storyline	 does	 follow	 the	 lives	 of	 people	who	 live	 on	James	 Turner	 Street,	 the	 geographical	 focal	 point	 of	 the	 series,	 it	 is	otherwise	 rather	 far	 removed	 from	 the	 world	 of	 social	 welfare.	 This	discursive	jump	from	‘benefits	street’	to	‘immigration	street’,143	thus,	creates	a	strong	connection	between	the	world	of	benefits	and	that	of	immigration,	suggesting	that	they	are	commonly	found	adjacent	to,	or	intermingled	with,	each	other	–	and,	importantly,	in	this	case	perhaps	both	geographically	and	culturally.		In	 contrast	 to	 the	 Romanians,	 the	 Gypsies/Travellers	 who	 have	moved	 their	 caravans	 to	 the	 park	 at	 the	 end	 of	 the	 street	 are	 never	interviewed	 or	 even	 properly	 seen	 on	 camera	 –	 their	 arrival	 is	 framed	entirely	 through	 the	 residents’	 (mostly	 negative)	 reactions	 to,	 and	discussions	of,	them.	While	most	of	the	episode’s	storylines	focus	broadly	on	immigration	–	as	in	the	story	of	the	newly	arrived	Romanians,	as	well	as	that	of	Ana	and	Abdul,	discussed	above	–	the	Gypsies/Travellers	are	not	framed	
either	as	benefit	recipients	(which	they,	of	course,	may	be)	or	as	immigrants	(which	they	are	less	likely	to	be).	Instead,	members	of	this	community	–	who	tend	 to	 already	 be	 ‘widely	 perceived	 as	 workless,	 parasitical	 welfare	dependants,	 a	 drain	 on	 local	 and	 state	 resources	 who	 cheat	 the	 system’	(Tyler	 2013:	 133)	 –	 are	 discursively	 positioned	 as	 more	 generic	 cultural																																																									143	The	 name	 of	 the	 suggested,	 but	 subsequently	 abandoned,	 follow-up	 series	 by	 Love	
Productions,	the	company	that	produced	Benefits	Street.		
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and/or	racialised	outsiders	or	intruders	to	the	street,	feared	and	despised	by	many	 of	 the	 residents,	 exemplified	 by	 Becky’s	 suggestion	 that	 her	neighbours	 should	 ‘close	 their	 windows.’	 A	 similar	 statement	 by	 Fungi	 –	‘they’re	tramps’	–	is	ambiguously	placed	in	the	episode’s	narrative	and	could	refer	either	 to	 the	Gypsies/Travellers	or	 to	 the	Romanians.	This	ambiguity	perfectly	illustrates	the	episode’s	continuous	movement	between	narratives	about	 immigration,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 references	 to	 racial	 and	 cultural	difference,	on	 the	other;	 in	 this	example	 the	newly	arrived	–	non-British	–	Romanians	without	work	permits	are	placed	in	close	discursive	association	with	the	–	most	likely	British	–	Gypsies/Travellers.	Parts	of	the	episode	also	explicitly	 focus	 on	 the	 multiracial	 nature	 of	 the	 James	 Turner	 Street	community,	 with	 the	 voiceover	 highlighting	 the	 prevalence	 of	 mixed-race	residents	 –	 such	 as	 in	 the	 comment	made	 about	White	 Dee’s	 son	 Gerrard	mentioned	at	the	beginning	of	this	section.	The	 discursive	 proximity	 between	 benefits,	 immigration,	 and	 racial	difference	 established	 in	 this	 episode	 is	 completed	 with	 a	 final	representational	move.	In	addition	to	the	frequent	instances	throughout	the	series	 in	which	the	camera	 lingers	on	piles	of	rubbish	 lining	the	streets,	 in	this	episode	references	to	–	both	literal	and	figurative	–	dirt	are	multiplied.	Amongst	 the	 James	 Turner	 residents’	 negative	 reactions	 to	 the	Gypsies/Travellers	now	occupying	 the	 small	 plot	 of	 land	 at	 the	 end	of	 the	street	 is	 Becky’s	 statement	 that	 they	 are	 ‘dirty’,	 as	 well	 as	 being	untrustworthy	 and	 (potential)	 criminals.	 Some	members	 of	 the	 Romanian	family	 that	 has	 recently	moved	onto	 the	 street	 have	 started	 a	 scrap	metal	business	and	now	spend	their	days	looking	for	bits	of	metal	they	can	sell	on.	We	see	members	of	 the	 family	 rummaging	 through	bags	of	 rubbish,	 to	 the	dismay	of	some	of	the	street’s	other	residents,	who	claim	that	the	family	are	even	taking	things	not	meant	for	the	bin	–	creating	a	discursive	connection	between	 criminality	 and	 ‘dirtiness.’	 The	 street’s	 rubbish	 collection	 day	arrives,	 but	 because	 the	bin	bags	 left	 on	 the	 street	 have	been	opened	 and	foraged	 through,	 the	 rubbish	 collection	 trucks	 refuse	 to	 take	 them.	 Some	residents	 are	 furious	 both	 at	 the	 Romanians	 for	 the	 part	 they	 played	 in	causing	 the	problem	and	at	 the	council	 for	refusing	 to	pick	up	the	bags.	 In	
	 185	
the	 end,	 the	 residents	 decide	 to	 take	 action	 themselves,	 re-bagging	 the	rubbish	and	defiantly	arranging	them	in	a	wall	the	middle	of	the	road,	until	we	eventually	see	the	trucks	return	to	dismantle	the	barricade	of	bin	bags.		What	 the	 overwhelming	 concentration	 on	 dirt	 and	 rubbish	 as	 key	elements	 in	 the	 narratives	 of	 the	 this	 episode	 does,	 is	 to	 establish	 a	 close	discursive	 connection	 between	 immigration	 and	 racialisation	 with	 dirt	 or	
dirtiness	–	and,	thus,	the	narrative	proximity	between	benefits,	immigration,	and	racial	difference	is	completed	by	the	addition	of	 ‘dirt.’	As	the	residents	express	 their	 worries	 and	 anxieties	 about	 the	 new	 entrants	 and	 their	‘dirtiness’,	they,	at	the	same	time,	fight	for	the	literal	dirt	to	be	removed	by	the	 council.	 Their	 –	 openly	 expressed	–	disgust	 for	 the	 rubbish	 left	 on	 the	street,	 is	 juxtaposed	with	 their	 –	poorly	 concealed	–	disgust	 for	 the	newly	arrived	 Romanian	 immigrants	 and/or	 the	 ‘dirty’	 Gypsies/Travellers.	 Here,	as	 Imogen	 Tyler	 argues,	 ‘a	 physical	 experience	 of	 disgust	 slides	 into	contempt	 and	 judgements	 of	 value’	 (2013:	 22,	 emphasis	 mine)	 to	 create	
moral	 disgust.	 Further,	 through	 the	 establishment	 of	 the	 discursive	proximity	between	benefits,	immigration,	and	racialisation,	on	the	one	hand,	and	‘dirt’,	on	the	other,	the	poor,	working-class/’workless’	neighbourhood	of	James	 Turner	 Street	 also	 appears	 as	 a	 space	 through	 which	 not	 only	immigrants	and	immigration,	but	also	racial	difference,	 ‘mixing’,	and	finally	‘dirt’,	 enter	 the	 UK.144	Here	 the	 James	 Turner	 Street	 residents’	 battle	 to	remove	 the	 rubbish	 from	 ‘their’	 street	 also	 comes	 to	 stand	 in	 for	 an	imagined	national	struggle	to	keep	immigrants	–	and,	 in	particular,	racially	undesirable	ones	–	out.	The	discursive	comingling	of	dirt,	racial	difference,	immigration,	 and	 ‘benefit	 scroungers’,	 thus,	 also	 establishes	 a	 discursive	connection	between	 the	porous	borders	of	 the	 country	as	a	whole,	 and	 its	working-class/’workless’	spaces	as	particularly	porous.	Of	 course	 the	 positioning	 of	 Benefits	 Street	 as	 a	 kind	 of	 discursive	
border	 zone,	 through	which	 all	 manner	 of	 undesirable	 elements	 enter	 the	UK,	can	only	emerge	in	the	programme’s	framing	if	we	expect	the	UK	to	be	a																																																									144	These	 emphases	 and	 narrative	 proximities	 echo	 Stoler’s	 (2002)	 discussion	 of	 the	colonial	 fears	 about	 the	 proximity	 of	 poor	 white	 populations	 to	 colonised	 ones	 –	 and	specifically	about	the	degeneracy	and	criminality	that	would	occur	in	white	populations	as	a	result	of	‘racial	mixing.’	
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racially	and	culturally	homogenous	–	white	and	British	–	space	 in	 the	 first	place.	In	other	words,	the	episode’s	narrative	focus	on	the	exceptionality	of	James	 Turner	 Street	 in	 terms	 of	 how	 commonly	 its	 residents	 are	 either	themselves	 from	 abroad	 or	 descended	 from	 someone	 from	 abroad,	 only	makes	sense	if	we	assume	that	the	rest	of	the	country’s	population	is	not	like	this.	 Thus,	 and	 as	 the	 previous	 chapter	 suggested,	 rather	 than	 the	 white	working-class	 populations	 of	 James	 Turner	 Street	 themselves	 being	racialised	 through	 the	 programme’s	 discursive	 emphasis	 on	 the	 proximity	between	 benefit-receiving,	 racialised,	 and	 immigrant	 populations,	 instead	this	emphasis	highlights	something	 important	about	the	 ‘boundary-making	strategies	within	whiteness	that	both	police	and	produce	its	racial	authority	and	 coherence’	 (Wiegman	 2012:	 185).	 The	 programme’s	 linking	 of	immigration	 and	 racial	 difference,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 and	 the	 residents’	
cleansing	of	the	street	of	undesirable	elements,	on	the	other,	thus,	not	only	echoes	Paul	Gilroy’s	argument	that	‘intrusions	by	immigrants,	incompatible	blacks	and	fascinating,	threatening	strangers	have	come	to	symbolise	all	the	difficulties	involved	in	the	country’s	grudging	modernisation’	(1992:	xxvi).	It	also	 suggests	 that	 poor,	 working-class,	 and	 benefit-receiving	 white	populations	 feature	 centrally	 in	 anxieties	 about	 the	 imagined	 threats	 that	racial	 ‘mixing’	 and	 immigration	 pose	 to	 the	 nation	 both	 symbolically	 and	economically.		These	 discursive	 connections,	 furthermore,	 have	 specific	consequences	 for	 those	 who	 are	 seen	 as	 playing	 particularly	 key	 roles	 in	potentially	 making	 spaces	 such	 as	 James	 Turner	 more	 susceptible	 to	 the	many	threats	to	the	imagined	cultural	and	racial	homogeneity	of	the	nation.	The	 often-invoked	 positioning	 of	 women	 and	 particularly	 of	 mothers	 as	guardians	 or	 reproducers	 of	 the	 boundaries	 of	 national	 and	 racial	 groups,	discussed	in	Chapter	3,	is	here	deployed	in	the	service	of	a	narrative	that	ties	together	 anxieties	 about	 immigration	 and	 loss	 of	 imagined	 racial	homogeneity,	with	worries	about	working-class/’workless’	spaces	as	under	particular	threat	of	cultural	and	racial	infiltration.	Poor,	working-class	–	and	here,	implicitly,	white	British	–	women	are,	thus,	discursively	foregrounded	as	potential	 ‘transmitters’	of	racial	and	cultural	difference	into	the	space	of	
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the	nation,	and	their	reproductive	decisions	also,	consequently,	come	to	be	intimately	 tied	 together	 with	 the	 imagined	 collective	 fate	 of	 the	 nation.	Against	 this	 discursive	 background,	 Benefits	 Street’s	 open	 and	 detailed	discussion	 of	 the	 racial	 composition	 of	many	 of	 the	 families	 living	 on	 the	street;	its	recurring	explicit	references	to	siblings	with	different	fathers;	and,	in	 particular,	 the	 narrative’s	 lingering	 on	 White	 Dee’s	 children	 not	 only	having	different	fathers	but	also	Gerrard’s	father	being	foreign;	can	be	read	as	deployments	of	this	discourse.		While	immigration	and	racial	difference	do	not	feature	as	explicitly	in	
I,	 Daniel	 Blake,	 it	 does	 reproduce	 a	 few	 similar	 discursive	 references.	Daniel’s	neighbour	China	is	one	of	the	very	few	non-white	characters	in	the	film,	and	the	scenes	in	which	he	features	are	all	either	about	his	relationship	with	Daniel,	as	mentioned	above,	or	about	his	new	illegal	venture	smuggling	brand	 sneakers	 from	 China.	 Named	 in	 a	 way	 that	 curiously	 equates	 his	identity	with	 his	 criminal	 activity	 –	 although	 it	 is	 unclear	whether	 this	 is,	indeed,	 the	 origin	 of	 his	 name	 –	 China,	 thus,	 and	 similarly	 to	 Katie,	 finds	other	ways	to	supplement	the	income	he	gets	from	his	poorly	paid	job	and	the	welfare	system,	choosing	not	to	place	all	his	faith	either	in	the	crumbling	welfare	state	or	in	the	promises	of	proper	paid	employment.	The	film	also	–	although	 much	 less	 explicitly	 –	 acknowledges	 that	 Katie’s	 children	 Dylan	and	Daisy	not	only	have	different	fathers,	but	also	that	Daisy’s	father	is	not	white.	This	acknowledgement	could	appear	either	as	an	innocent	detail	in	a	realistic	representation	of	a	liberal,	multicultural,	and	multiracial	Britain,	or	as	a	discursive	nod	 to	 the	 framings	 in	which	 the	reproductive	decisions	of	the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 are	 seen	as	potentially	 threatening	 to	 the	racial	 homogeneity	 of	 the	 nation	 –	 depending	 on	 the	 viewer’s	 discursive	baggage.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 both	 Daisy	 and	 China,	 then,	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 makes	minor	visual	or	discursive	allusions	to	some	of	the	same	discursive	framings	
Benefits	 Street	 reproduces	 more	 explicitly,	 associating	 blackness	 with	criminality	 and	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 mum	with	 her	 ‘gaggle	 of	mixed	 race	 children’,	 as	 Tyler	 (2008:	 26)	 argues	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 ‘chav	mum’	figuration.		
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Given	 the	 increasing	 prevalence	 of	 a	 racial	 politics	 that	 pits	 white	working-class	populations	against	racial	and	ethnic	minorities	in	a	battle	for	both	 cultural	 and	 economic	 resources	 (Sveinsson	 2009),	 the	 discursive	framings	 of	 I,	Daniel	Blake	 certainly	allow	 for	 the	more	 sinister	 reading	 of	the	 roles	 of	 Daisy	 and	 China	 to	 emerge.	 Thus,	 the	 ‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	 figure	 is,	 at	 least	 to	 a	 degree,	 established	 in	 the	discursive	 landscapes	 of	 both	 texts	 as	 either	 racialised	 or	 an	 immigrant	herself,	 or	 as	 culturally	 or	 geographically	 proximate	 to	 racialisation	 and	immigration	–	and	thus	with	the	potential	to	threaten	the	coherence	of	both	whiteness	 and	 the	 nation.	 However,	 while	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 is	 mostly	populated	 by	 white	 British	 characters,	 Benefits	 Street	 overall	 portrays	 a	much	 more	 mixed	 environment.	 The	 narratives	 explored	 above	 are	complemented	by	others,	such	as	the	street’s	 ‘50p	man’	Smoggy,	who	goes	from	house	to	house	selling	small	amounts	of	household	essentials	for	fifty	pence,	and	S.B.,	an	aspiring	model	and	mother	of	 two	–	both	black	British.	While	 the	 overall	 narrative	 of	 the	 series,	 indeed,	 overwhelmingly	reproduces	various	common	negative	discursive	 tropes	about	 immigration	and	racial	difference,	as	discussed	above,	 these	are	not	 the	only	discursive	connotations	made	 in	 relation	 to	 racialisation	 and	 immigration.	 Thus,	 it	 is	certainly	 also	 possible	 to	 view	 Benefits	 Street	 through	 a	 more	 benign	discursive	 lens	of	cultural	and	racial	heterogeneity	–	exemplified	by	White	Dee’s	statement	in	episode	2:	‘we’ve	got	Jamaican,	we’ve	got	Irish,	we’ve	got	English,	and	we’ve	got	Polish.	It’s	like	one	great	big	family.’		
Cultural	Poverty	and	Family	Responsibility	I	am	not	sure	whether	the	Prime	Minister	is	a	follower	of	‘Benefits	
Street’	on	Channel	4,	but	if	he	is,	he	will	know	that,	sadly,	there	is	a	street	 like	 that	 in	every	constituency	 in	 the	 land.	 (Simon	Hart,	Conservative	MP	for	Carmarthen	West	and	South	Pembrokeshire	in	HC	Deb	2014c:	c851)	Like	 many	 Members,	 I	 have	 watched	 at	 least	 two	 episodes	 of	‘Benefits	 Street.’	 When	 a	 Sure	 Start	 worker	 worked	 alongside	some	parents,	it	was	incredibly	inspiring	to	see	how	empowered	the	mother	was.	[--]	The	way	to	do	that	is	not	by	punishing	them	
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or	 withdrawing	 benefits,	 but	 by	 getting	 alongside	 people,	showing	 them	 that	 we	 are	 on	 their	 side	 and	 understand,	 and	giving	 them	 the	 necessary	 skills.	 I	 very	 much	 hope	 that	 the	children	from	that	family	will	grow	up	happier,	healthier	and	able	to	contribute	to	society,	and	that	 they	will	not	need	that	kind	of	support	when	they	are	parents.	Investment	in	the	early	days	is	so	important	and	can	make	such	a	difference	to	children’s	outcomes.	(Fiona	O’Donnell,	Labour	MP	for	East	Lothian	 in	HC	Deb	2014d:	cols	341WH-342WH)	As	 this	 chapter	 has	 argued,	Benefits	 Street	 relies	 on	 various	 discourses	 of	
exceptionality	 to	 make	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipients/scroungers’	 it	 represents	legible	 as	 such,	 especially	 in	 its	 depiction	 of	 James	 Turner	 Street	 as	 an	exceptionally	‘workless’,	‘dirty’,	and	racially	and	culturally	mixed	space.	This	exceptionality	functions	to	set	James	Turner	and	other	spaces	like	it	–	such	as	 council	 estates,	 traditional	 working-class	 neighbourhoods,	 and	Gypsy/Traveller	 sites	 –	 apart	 from	 the	 rest	 of	 the	 UK,	 which	 can	 then,	 in	comparison,	 appear	 as	 culturally	 and	 racially	 much	 more	 homogenous,	orderly,	and	‘proper’	–	or	in	other	words,	as	embodying	white	middle-class	morality	and	values.	On	the	other	hand,	the	spatially	restricted	focus	of	the	show	 also	 operates	 to	 position	 the	 street	 as	 a	 cultural	 model	 version	 of	‘benefits	 Britain’	 as	 a	 whole.	 By	 representing	 the	 welfare-claiming	population	through	a	geographically	limited	prism,	Benefits	Street,	thus,	also	offers	 a	 suggestive	 illustration	 of	 what	 is	 going	 on	 under	 the	 surface	
everywhere,	 signalling	 the	 culturally	 distinct	 nature	 of	 benefit-receiving	populations	from	the	rest.	MP	Simon	Hart’s	quote	above	usefully	highlights	both	discursive	frameworks:	firstly,	by	suggesting	that	the	exceptionality	of	James	Turner	Street	is	replicated	in	many	geographical	locations	throughout	the	country	and,	secondly,	by	hinting	at	the	potentially	omnipresent	nature	of	 benefit-claiming	 ‘lifestyle’	 or	 ‘culture.’	 Benefits	 Street,	 thus,	 also	reproduces	 the	 ‘cultural	 poverty’	 discourse,	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	chapter,	 in	 narrative	 form,	 as	 well	 as	 discursively	 ties	 it	 together	 with	narratives	 about	 appropriate	 parenting	 and	 reproduction,	 as	 I	 discuss	below.	‘On	 James	 Turner	 Street,	 kids	 are	 everywhere.	 Many	 are	 raised	 by	single	parents’,	states	the	voiceover	in	the	third	episode	of	Benefits	Street.	In	
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the	opening	sequence,	as	well	as	at	various	points	throughout	the	series,	we	see	children	running	around	on	the	street,	playing	in	piles	of	rubbish.	After	one	such	montage,	 the	voiceover	exclaims:	 ‘kids	 learn	a	 lot	about	 life	 from	the	grown-ups	of	James	Turner	Street’,	as	the	camera	pans	to	Fungi	and	his	friends	 drinking	 and	 being	 rowdy	 while	 interacting	 with	 a	 group	 of	 kids.	Later	on	we	see	Fungi	playing	with	Becky	and	Mark’s	son	Callum,	as	well	as	giving	White	Dee’s	son	Gerrard	some	tips	on	causing	trouble.	These	scenes	position	 Fungi	 –	who	 the	 series	 introduces	 as	 ‘a	 recovering	drug	 addict’	 –	
both	 as	 a	 friendly,	 familiar,	 and	 almost	 paternal	 presence	 to	 some	 of	 the	street’s	children	and	as	a	stereotypical	‘bad	influence’	on	them.	Although	he	is	 close	 to	many	 of	 his	 neighbours’	 kids,	 he	 is	 not	 allowed	 to	 see	 his	 own	children.	 He	 ‘has	 held	 onto	 some	 mementos	 of	 their	 time	 together’,	 the	voiceover	explains,	and	the	viewers	see	a	box	full	of	postcards,	toys,	trinkets,	and	drawings.	On	the	walls	of	Fungi’s	living	room	are	notes	he	has	put	up	for	himself:	 a	 newspaper	 cutting	 that	 states	 ‘we	 must	 think	 of	 kids,	 not	ourselves’	and	a	hand-written	note	that	reads	‘no	more	smoking	or	u	wont	ave	kids	ever	xmas.’	In	 episode	 4,	 an	 appointment	 for	 Fungi	 to	 see	 one	 of	 his	 sons	 has	been	set	up.	In	the	morning	of	the	appointment,	White	Dee	goes	to	bang	on	Fungi’s	 front	door	but	he	does	not	wake	up,	making	her	concerned	that	he	will	not	go	–	although	it	is	not	clear	whether	this	would	be	by	choice	or	by	accident.	 Eventually	 he	 wakes	 up	 but	 finds	 out	 that	 the	 adoptive	 parents	have	called	the	meeting	off,	without	explaining	why.	Towards	the	end	of	the	episode	Fungi	goes	to	see	Donna,	the	mother	of	his	oldest	child,	and	his	‘first	love.’	On	the	way	back	from	her	house	he	talks	about	how	upset	he	is	that	he	is	 no	 longer	 part	 of	 the	 family	 and	 says,	 ‘all	 that	 just	 for	 a	 fucking	 bit	 of	heroin.’	These	heart-breaking	scenes	stand	in	contrast	to	Fungi’s	frequently	rowdy	behaviour,	emphasising	the	price	he	has	to	pay	now	for	mistakes	he	has	made	in	the	past.	Earlier	in	episode	1	we	are	told	that	Fungi	was	abused	as	a	kid	and	has	been	on	Diazepam	since	he	was	16	years	old.	He	has	also	been	to	prison	many	times	–	a	 ‘second	home’	to	some	of	 the	James	Turner	Street	 residents,	 explains	 the	 voiceover.	 Fungi’s	 complex	 story	 appears	 to	somewhat	 conform	 to	 the	 ‘cultural	 poverty’	 discourse	 examined	 in	 the	
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previous	chapter,	whereby	the	abuse	and	dysfunctionality	he	experienced	as	a	child	has	led	to	him	being	at	risk	of	passing	on	the	wrong	kinds	of	cultural	values	to	his	own	children.	Although	in	his	case	the	state	has	intervened	and,	thus,	prevented	him	from	doing	so,	he	is,	nonetheless,	depicted	as	adding	to	the	 general	 dysfunctionality	 of	 the	 street,	 and	 thereby	 creating	 a	 negative	environment	for	its	many	children.		In	 episode	 3	 ‘Fungi	 is	 entertaining	 his	 drinking	 buddies,	 and	 it	clashes	with	 an	 important	 day	 for	Mark	 and	Becky’,	who	 are	preparing	 to	welcome	a	Sure	Start	worker	coming	to	advise	them	on	parenting	their	kids.	As	the	adviser	arrives,	Mark	is	outside	with	the	kids	and	some	of	the	street’s	other	 residents,	 one	 of	 who	 shows	 the	 crowd	 and	 the	 camera	 his	 stab	wound.	The	adviser	quizzes	Becky	and	Mark	on	whether	they	commonly	sit	outside	 with	 the	 children	 and	 says,	 ‘sometimes	 exposing	 children	 to	 that	type	of	environment	does	influence	them	as	well,	doesn’t	it’,	after	which	we	see	 another	 resident	 drunkenly	 swearing	 at	 a	 group	 of	 kids.	 These	 short	scenes,	together	with	Fungi’s	close	but	ambiguous	relationship	with	Callum,	function	 to	 reframe	 Becky	 and	Mark’s	 struggle	 to	 discipline	 Callum	 as	 an	attempt	 to	 parent	 him	 in	 a	 culturally	appropriate	manner.	 The	 Sure	 Start	worker’s	disapproval	of,	and	concern	 for,	 the	street’s	 influences	on	Callum	and	 Casey	 signals	 the	 inappropriateness	 of	 James	 Turner	 Street’s	environment	 and	 culture	 for	 raising	 children.	 In	 this	 way,	 the	 narrative	begins	with	Becky	and	Mark	facing	set	of	practical	parenting	issues,	to	then	morph	into	a	pursuit	for	the	correct	parenting	culture	and	values	–	a	pursuit	stacked	 against	 the	 street’s	 many	 bad	 influences.	 The	 ‘cultural	 poverty’	argument	 is,	 thus,	 reflected	 in	 Becky	 and	Mark’s	 positioning	 as	 facing	 the	choice	 either	 to	 reflect	 appropriate	 (middle-class)	 cultural	 values	 in	 their	parenting,	or	to	pass	the	street’s	cultural	dysfunctions	onto	their	children.		In	I,	Daniel	Blake,	it	is	Daniel	who	stands	in	for	the	paternalistic	state,	embodied	by	the	Sure	Start	adviser	in	Benefits	Street.	His	assistance	around	the	house	and	with	the	kids	helps	stabilise	Katie’s	situation,	but	also	seems	to	push	her	along	on	a	path	of	appropriate	parenting.	He	brings	the	children	handmade	 wooden	 toys	 and	 gets	 Dylan	 –	 who	 is	 both	 hyperactive	 and	isolated,	both	misbehaves	and	withdraws	–	engaged	in	woodcarving.	Daisy	
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points	out	that	 ‘no	one	listens	to’	him,	 ‘so	why	should	he	listen	to	them?’	–	but	 it	 is	 Daniel’s	 grandfatherly	 touch,	 introducing	 him	 to	 the	 gentle	 but	masculine	activity	of	woodcarving,	that	helps	him	concentrate	like	he	never	has	 before.	Daniel’s	 support	 is	 presented	 through	 a	 framework	 of	middle-class	 parenting	 that	 combines	 elements	 of	 warmth	with	 discipline,	 as	 the	previous	 chapter	 discussed,	 and,	 thus,	 mirrors	 the	 assistance	 Becky	 and	Mark	receive	 from	the	Sure	Start	employee.	Both	parents	are	helped	along	by	 stand-ins	 for	 the	 paternalistic	 state,	 coaxing	 the	 poor,	 working-class	parents	to	take	on	the	responsibility	of	making	sure	that	their	children	are	parented	appropriately	–	and	that	they,	consequently,	grow	up	to	be	‘able	to	contribute	 to	 society’,	 as	 MP	 Fiona	 O’Donnell	 underlines	 in	 the	 quote	included	 in	 the	 beginning	 of	 this	 section.	Without	 these	 interventions,	 the	parents	 would	 risk	 passing	 on	 their	 own	 cultural	 dysfunctions	 to	 their	children,	preventing	their	future	success.		Katie’s	 vague	 allusion	 to	 Dylan’s	 father	 further	 accentuates	 the	discourse	of	‘cultural	poverty’,	as	well	as	specifically	the	importance	of	early	
intervention.	As	mentioned,	she	only	refers	to	him	once	during	the	film	–	as	a	‘bit	of	trouble’	–	crediting	him	with	causing	her	and	her	children	to	live	in	a	homeless	hostel,	and	the	audience	are	left	to	fill	in	the	gaps	of	the	narrative.	The	 potentially	 violent	 masculinity	 that	 Katie	 and	 her	 kids	 have	 escaped	from	is	mirrored	 in	the	storyline	of	S.B.	 in	episode	4	of	Benefits	Street.	She	left	 the	violent	 father	of	her	oldest	 child	Terrell	 two	years	ago,	 and	now	a	couple	 from	her	 church,	Delroy	 and	his	wife,	 are	helping	her	home-school	Terrell.	Delroy	calls	Terrell	 ‘a	difficult	boy’	and	thinks	that	the	trauma	that	he	has	experienced	as	a	result	of	his	 father’s	violent	behaviour	has	 ‘left	an	imprint	on	his	mind.’	The	struggles	of	Katie	and	S.B.	mirror	each	other:	both	are	 positioned	 as	 responsible	 for	 making	 sure	 that	 these	 ‘difficult	 boys’	overcome	the	imprints	left	on	their	brains	by	their	violent	fathers.	In	order	to	ensure	that	the	boys’	cultural	as	well	as	cognitive	development	proceeds	appropriately	 –	 without	 perpetuating	 the	 dysfunctional	 and	 violent	behavioural	norms	of	their	fathers	–	both	S.B.	and	Katie	attempt	to	replace	the	 destructive	masculinity	 of	 the	 boys’	 fathers	with	 the	more	 gentle	 and	paternalistic	 middle-class	 masculinity	 embodied	 by	 Delroy	 and	 Daniel.	
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Delroy	 underscores	 this	 reading	 with	 his	 statement	 that,	 in	 helping	 with	Terrell’s	 education,	 they	 ‘have	 to	 try	and	 let	him	know	 that	not	 all	 fathers	are	the	same.’	In	this	framing,	the	misbehaviour	and	unruliness	of	Dylan	and	Terrell	becomes	an	early	 sign	of	 the	 ‘faulty	brain	 architecture’	 that	bad	parenting	can	 result	 in,	 according	 to	 the	 recent	 surge	 in	 arguments	 concerning	 the	importance	 of	 early	 intervention	 for	 children’s	 cognitive	 development,	 as	discussed	in	the	previous	chapter.	Here	the	focus	is,	thus,	on	improving	the	minutiae	 of	 parenting	 practice,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 material	 conditions	 in	which	 poor	 families	 live.	 The	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 figure	 is	positioned	 as	 responsible	 for	 her	 children’s	 emotional,	 cognitive,	 and	cultural	 development	 –	 a	 responsibility	 that	 also	 ensures	 that	 the	 future	imaginaries	 of	 the	nation	 are	protected	 from	 the	dysfunctional	 cultures	 of	poor,	working-class	populations.	These	framings	of	‘cultural	poverty’	offer	a	straightforward	 vision	 of	 intergenerational	 cultural	 transmission,	 without	paying	attention	 to	 the	 complex	ways	 in	which	 the	 traumas	of	 racism	and	capitalism	 can	 live	 on	 in	 collective	 cultural	 memory,	 affecting	 subsequent	generations,	 as	 others	 (Cvetkovich	 2003;	 Gordon	 1997)	 have	 suggested.	While	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake’s	 embeddedness	 in	 the	 figurative	 economies	 of	austerity	that	blame	poor	parents	for	the	potential	cultural	transmission	of	poverty	to	their	children	is	certainly	more	subtle	than	that	of	Benefits	Street,	both	 reproduce	 enough	 of	 these	 discursive	 framings	 to	 be	 legible	 within	them.	 While	 this	 chapter	 has	 so	 far	 focused	 on	 specific	 aspects	 of	 the	austerity	discourses	that	are	sustained	–	albeit	to	different	degrees	–	in	the	two	media	 texts’	 representations,	 I	now	move	on	to	pulling	 these	different	threads	together	in	a	discussion	of	the	varied	media	and	political	responses	to	both.	
	
The	Authenticity	of	the	‘Benefit	Recipient/Scrounger’	Amongst	 the	many	media	 responses	 to	 I,	Daniel	Blake	was	Young’s	 (2016)	scathing	 review	 of	 the	 film	 in	 the	 Daily	 Mail.	 The	 core	 of	 his	 critique	 is	directed	at	what	he	perceives	as	the	film’s	 inauthenticity:	 ‘I’m	no	expert	on	the	 welfare	 system,	 but	 several	 aspects	 of	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 don’t	 ring	 true’	
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(ibid.).	He	 picks	 the	 film’s	 depiction	 of	 the	welfare	 system	apart	 bit	 by	 bit	and	is	particularly	critical	of	its	portrayal	of	benefit	recipients:	The	 two	 protagonists	 are	 a	 far	 cry	 from	 the	 scroungers	 on	Channel	4’s	Benefits	Street,	who	I	accept	aren’t	representative	of	all	 welfare	 recipients.	 But	 Loach	 has	 erred	 in	 the	 opposite	direction.	For	a	 filmmaker	who	styles	himself	a	 ‘social	 realist’,	he	has	 an	 absurdly	 romantic	 view	 of	 benefit	 claimants.	 Daniel	 is	 a	model	 citizen.	 At	 no	 point	 do	 we	 see	 him	 drinking,	 smoking,	gambling,	or	even	watching	television.	No,	he	is	a	welfare	claimant	as	imagined	by	a	member	of	the	upper-middle	class	metropolitan	elite.	He	listens	to	Radio	4,	likes	classical	music	and	makes	wooden	toys	 for	 children	—	 the	kind	of	 over-priced	 ‘artisanal’	 tat	 sold	 in	‘alternative’	toyshops	in	Islington,	where	Loach	lives.	Katie,	too,	is	a	far	 cry	 from	 White	 Dee,	 the	 irresponsible	 character	 in	 Benefits	Street.	(ibid.)	The	benchmark	of	authenticity	against	which	Young	assesses	the	depiction	of	 welfare	 claimants	 in	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 is	 their	 representation	 in	 Benefits	
Street.	 Juxtaposing	 Katie	 with	 White	 Dee,	 Young	 suggests	 that	 Loach’s	portrayal	is	too	far	removed	from	reality	to	elicit	sympathy,	 let	alone	to	be	convincing.	Mark	 Steel	 (2016)	 responds	 to	 his	 review	 in	The	 Independent,	specifically	taking	him	up	on	the	charge	of	inauthenticity.	Steel,	in	turn,	goes	on	 to	 blame	 Benefits	 Street	 for	 inauthenticity,	 likening	 Young’s	 complaint	that	 the	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 characters	 are	 a	 ‘far	 cry’	 from	 those	 on	 Benefits	
Street,	to	complaining	that	David	Attenborough’s	films	about	orangutans	are	misleading	because	they	do	not	resemble	the	ones	in	The	Jungle	Book.		This	 back	 and	 forth	 debate	 about	 the	 truthfulness	 of	 the	representations	of	 I,	Daniel	Blake	is	mirrored	 in	 the	well-publicised	debate	between	Work	and	Pensions	Secretary	Damian	Green,	and	both	Ken	Loach	himself	 and	 Leader	 of	 the	 Opposition	 Jeremy	 Corbyn.	 In	 a	 response	 to	 a	parliamentary	question,	Green	stated	that	the	 film	 ‘is	a	work	of	 fiction	and	not	a	documentary.	It	bears	no	relation	to	the	modern	benefits	system.	As	I	understand	 it,	 it	 is	 monstrously	 unfair	 to	 jobcentre	 staff’	 (HC	 Deb	 2016c:	c677).	Loach	responded	in	a	comment	to	the	Press	Association:	‘if	they	don't	know	what	they	are	doing	to	people	they	are	incompetent	and	shouldn't	be	in	Government.	If	they	do	know	what	they	are	doing	then	they	are	not	fit	to	
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be	in	Government’	(Ferguson	2016).	Corbyn,	in	turn,	took	a	dig	at	Green	the	following	day	during	Prime	Minister’s	Questions:		Could	 I	 recommend	 that	 the	 Prime	 Minister	 support	 British	cinema,	and	takes	herself	along	to	a	cinema	to	see	a	Palme	d’Or-winning	film,	‘I,	Daniel	Blake’?	While	she	is	doing	so,	perhaps	she	could	take	the	Work	and	Pensions	Secretary	with	her,	because	he	described	 the	 film	 as	 ‘monstrously	 unfair’	 and	 then	went	 on	 to	admit	that	he	had	never	seen	it,	so	he	has	obviously	got	a	very	fair	sense	of	judgment	on	this.	(HC	Deb	2016d:	cols	881-882)	These	 debates	 are	 reflected	 in	 many	 other	 references	 to	 the	 film	 in	parliamentary	 debates	 and	 discussions.	 Opposition	 MPs	 have	 praised	 the	film	 for	 its	 ‘cold	 and	 sobering	 view	of	 the	 reality	 that	 so	many	people	 are	experiencing’	(MP	Mhairi	Black	in	HC	Deb	2016a:	c304)	and	for	epitomising	‘what	is	wrong	with	the	social	security	system’	(MP	Debbie	Abrahams	in	HC	Deb	2016f:	c296),	while	Conservative	MPs	and	Government	Ministers	have	argued	the	film	is	grossly	inaccurate.145	Parliamentary	references	to	Benefits	
Street,	 in	 turn,	 are	 almost	 a	 mirror	 image	 of	 ones	 to	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake.	Conservative	commentators	and	politicians	have	used	its	representations	as	justifications	for	further	welfare	cuts	and	conditionality,	as	in	the	examples	included	 throughout	 the	 above	 discussion,	 whereas	 opposition	 MPs	 have	tended	to	dismiss	the	series’	portrayal	as	both	untrue	and	unfair.146		The	 documentary	 status	 of	 Benefits	 Street	 has	 been	 frequently	presented	 as	 proof	 of	 the	 authenticity	 of	 its	 representations,	 whereas,	conversely,	many	have	suggested	that	I,	Daniel	Blake’s	status	as	a	fiction	film	undermines	 the	 claims	 of	 those	who	 see	 it	 as	 an	 accurate	 representation.	Despite	 their	 different	 genres,	 discussions	 around	 both	 texts	 have,	 thus,	tended	to	revolve	around	their	truthfulness.	I	have	presented	these	debates	in	some	detail	because	they	highlight	in	an	interesting	way	what	is	at	stake	in	the	various	and	varied	responses	to	these	two	texts.	The	austerity	agenda	in	 many	 ways	 depends	 on	 the	 reproduction	 of	 negative	 portrayals	 of	undeserving	‘benefit	scroungers’,	whereas	critics	of	this	agenda	tend	to	rely																																																									145	See,	 for	 example,	 comments	 by	 Parliamentary	 Under-Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Welfare	Delivery	Caroline	Nokes	(HC	Deb	2016b:	c417).	146	See,	for	example,	comments	by	MP	Diane	Abbott	(HC	Deb	2014e:	cols	389-390);	MP	John	MacDonnell	(HC	Deb	2014b:	cols	671-672);	and	MP	Peter	Dowd	(HC	Deb	2016e:	c495WH).	
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on	 depicting	 benefit	 recipients	 in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 their	 need	 for	 state	assistance	 appears	 to	 be	 no	 fault	 of	 their	 own,	 thus	 positioning	 them	 as	clearly	deserving	–	with	both	sides	claiming	a	greater	degree	of	authenticity	for	their	purported	representation.		However,	 as	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 show	 throughout	 this	 chapter,	 the	representations	sustained	in	these	two	texts	are	not	quite	as	easily	polarised	or	 oppositional	 as	 these	 debates	 suggest.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	while	Benefits	
Street	 tends	 to	 be	 known	 as	 exemplary	 ‘poverty	 porn’	 that	 demonises	benefit	claimants,	the	series’	discursive	framings	do	not	always	support	such	a	 reading,	with	many	 scenes	 and	 character	 arcs	 quite	 actively	 challenging	such	a	view.	On	the	other	hand,	although	I,	Daniel	Blake	is	generally	viewed	as	 a	 very	 sympathetic	 representation	 of	 benefit	 recipients,	 illustrating	 the	
systemic	 failings	 evident	 in	 the	 UK’s	 welfare	 system	 instead,	 the	 film’s	framings	 frequently	 also	 draw	 on	 the	 same	 discursive	 tropes	 as	 Benefits	
Street	does.	Despite	their	many	differences,	the	two	texts,	thus,	participate	in	the	same	figurative	economies	–	albeit	to	differing	degrees.	This	argument	is	not	intended	to	criticise	Ken	Loach’s	directorial	decisions,	or	to	suggest	that	my	 analysis	 somehow	 reveals	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 to	 be	 a	 portrayal	 just	 as	demonising	 as	 Benefits	 Street,	 but	 rather	 to	 indicate	 that	 the	 texts’	participation	 in	 the	 same	 figurative	 economies	 is	 necessary	 –	 in	 order	 for	their	representations	of	benefit	recipients	to	be	legible	as	such.	My	 use	 of	 the	 somewhat	 awkward	 phrase	 ‘benefit	scrounger/recipient’	 throughout	 the	 above	 analysis	 is,	 thus,	 intended	 to	illustrate	the	close	discursive	proximity	of	imaginaries	of	deservingness	and	undeservingness.	 In	 my	 framing,	 the	 deserving	 benefit	 recipient	 is	 only	recognisable	as	such	if	she	either	aspires	to	have	a	paid	job,	a	‘stable’	family,	and	to	parent	her	children	according	to	appropriate	(middle-class)	cultural	norms,	or	 if	 she	 has	 already	met	 these	 conditions	 of	 deservingness	 in	 the	past.	The	undeserving	scrounger	is,	in	contrast,	only	legible	as	such	if	she	is	has	 no	 such	 aspirations	 or	 no	 such	 past.	 Consequently,	 the	 former	 is	 also	always	in	danger	of	slipping	into	the	frame	of	the	latter,	if	the	viewer	is	not	quite	convinced	that	her	future	aspirations	or	past	achievements	do	enough	to	make	her	appear	as	deserving.	Further,	 in	both	texts	 it	 is	 the	characters	
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that	are	marked	as	different	from	the	norm	–	whether	through	processes	of	racialisation	 or	 sexualisation,	 or	 because	 of	 family	 form	 –	 who	 tend	 to	always	be	at	a	higher	risk	of	being	read	as	a	scrounger	instead	of	a	deserving	and	respectable	benefit	recipient.	Thus,	it	is	Daniel	–	the	older	white	male	–	who	 appears	 as	 the	 most	 obviously	 wronged,	 and	 therefore	 as	 the	 most	clearly	 deserving,	 subject	 in	 all	 the	 representations	 discussed	 above,	whereas	the	single	mothers,	racialised	and	immigrant	characters,	and	those	who	 engage	 in	 criminal	 or	 morally	 dubious	 activities,	 are	 always	 a	 step	behind.		Neither	text,	furthermore,	challenges	the	centrality	of	the	discourses	of	‘worklessness’,	 ‘family	stability’,	 ‘cultural	poverty’,	and	the	positioning	of	immigration	and	 racial	difference	or	 ‘mixing’	 as	 a	 threat,	 to	 imaginaries	of	social	 welfare.	 Consequently,	 they	 also	 leave	 intact	 the	 unimaginability	 of	alternative	 visions	 of	 the	 ‘good	 life.’	 Desiring	 anything	 other	 than	 to	 gain	paid	 employment,	 to	 attain	 the	 (hetero)normative	 family	 ideal,	 and	 to	parent	one’s	children	according	to	established	middle-class	norms,	remains	outside	 of	 the	 discursive	 frame	 for	 all	 wishing	 to	 appear	 as	 deserving	subjects	 –	 thus	 also	 invisibilising,	 for	 instance,	 the	 informal	 unpaid	 care	work	 that	 many	 of	 the	 characters	 discussed	 above	 do.	 These	 discourses,	thus,	 carry	 significant	 representational	 power,	 and	 neither	 media	 text	examined	here	provides	an	exception	to	their	recurrent	reproduction	within	the	figurative	economies	of	austerity	politics.	Further,	as	I	argue	centrally	in	the	 next	 and	 final	 section	 of	 this	 chapter,	 that	 the	 legibility	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	recipient/scrounger’	figuration	depends	so	centrally	on	the	reproduction	of	these	 –	 frequently	 racialised	 and	 sexualised	 –	 austerity	 discourses	 has	significant	consequences	for	the	possibility	of	this	figuration	appearing	as	a	normatively	intelligible	political	subjectivity.		
	
The	Political	Subjectivities	of	Austerity	
I,	Daniel	Blake	presents	its	narrative	climax	when	Daniel’s	frustration	at	the	welfare	system	reaches	its	peak.	Angry	and	fearful	for	his	future,	Daniel	has	another	 altercation	 at	 the	 Jobcentre,	 after	which	 he	 storms	 out	 and	 spray	paints	 ‘I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 demand	 my	 appeal	 date	 before	 I	 starve’	 on	 the	
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Jobcentre	 wall.	 Daniel	 sits	 beneath	 his	 political	 battle	 cry	 as	 passers-by	express	surprise	and	sympathy	for	his	act,	but	eventually	he	is	taken	away	by	 the	police	and	given	a	 formal	warning.	After	 this	narrative	peak,	Daniel	becomes	withdrawn	 and	 isolated	 but	 reconciles	with	Katie	 just	 before	 his	WCA	 appeal	 date	 finally	 arrives.	 At	 the	 appeal,	 after	 an	 initial	 promising	meeting	with	his	welfare	rights	adviser,	Daniel	becomes	anxious	and	goes	to	the	bathroom	to	calm	himself	down.	A	short	while	later,	someone	runs	out	of	 the	 bathroom	 shouting	 for	 an	 ambulance	 –	 Katie	 panics	 and	 runs	 in	 to	find	Daniel	collapsed	on	the	floor	from	another	heart	attack.	The	film	ends	with	his	 ‘pauper’s	funeral’	–	the	cheapest	early	morning	slot	–	where	Katie	reads	Daniel’s	appeal	speech	as	the	eulogy:	I	 am	 not	 a	 client,	 a	 customer,	 nor	 a	 service	 user.	 I	 am	 not	 a	shirker,	 a	 scrounger,	 a	 beggar,	 nor	 a	 thief.	 I’m	 not	 a	 National	Insurance	Number	or	a	blip	on	the	screen.	I	paid	my	dues,	never	a	penny	short	and	proud	to	do	so.	I	don’t	tug	the	forelock,	but	look	my	neighbour	 in	the	eye,	and	help	him	if	 I	can.	 I	don’t	accept	or	seek	charity.	My	name	is	Daniel	Blake.	I	am	a	man,	not	a	dog.	As	such	I	demand	my	rights.	I	demand	you	treat	me	with	respect.	I,	Daniel	Blake,	am	a	citizen,	nothing	more	and	nothing	less.	As	Katie	speaks	his	words	at	the	funeral,	Daniel	gets	to	make	one	final	claim	for	his	needs	to	be	recognised	by	the	state.	Challenging	his	positioning	as	a	dependent,	 irresponsible	 subject,	 Daniel	 reminds	 us	 that	 he	 is	 entitled	 to	support	and	respect	from	the	state.	In	this	final	reminder	that	he	is	a	citizen	–	 nothing	more	 and	 nothing	 less	 –	who	 demands	 his	 rights,	 and	 does	 not	‘accept	 or	 seek	 charity’,	 the	 film	 ends	with	 a	 rather	 singular	 or	 simplistic	claim	to	justice.		Daniel’s	 claims	 to	 citizenship,	 and	 to	 having	 paid	 his	 dues,	 as	 the	legitimate	bases	for	his	entitlement	to	the	state’s	care	and	support,	position	
him	 at	 the	 centre	 of	 both	 the	 film’s	 narrative	 arc	 and	 its	 imaginaries	 of	deservingness.	 As	 an	 older	 white	 male	 with	 a	 long	 and	 legitimate	 work	history	in	manual	labour,	but	now	unable	to	work	due	to	an	illness	that	is	no	fault	of	his	own,	Daniel	 appears	as	 a	 clear	victim	of	 the	draconian	welfare	system	that	has	caused	his	plight	and	suffering	throughout	the	film.	There	is	nothing	 ambivalent	 about	 the	 life	 he	 has	 lived,	 and	 his	 right	 to	 care	 and	
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support	 from	the	state	was	never	uncertain.	Although	his	storyline	ends	 in	death,	 the	 film	 gives	 him	 the	 chance	 to	 explicitly	 enact	 resistance	 and	 to	exercise	his	political	voice	twice:	firstly,	when	he	spray	paints	his	battle	cry	on	the	wall	of	 the	 Jobcentre	 for	everyone	to	see	and,	secondly,	when	Katie	reads	 his	 appeal	 speech	 at	 his	 funeral.	 Daniel,	 thus,	 embodies	 a	 legible	political	 subjectivity	 even	 after	 his	 death,	 eliciting	 a	 sympathetic	 affective	response	 from	those	who	witness	 it	–	 in	 this	case	both	 the	by-passers	and	funeral	 guests	 in	 the	 film	and	many	 of	 the	 film’s	 audiences.	 Contrastingly,	this	kind	of	recognisable	and	legitimate	political	subjectivity	is	not	available	to	sexualised	Katie	or	racialised	China	in	the	film’s	narrative	framing	–	nor	is	it	 available	 to	 the	 residents	 of	 James	 Turner	 Street.	 As	 if	 to	 further	accentuate	 this	 point,	 Katie’s	 positionality	 is	marginalised	 or	 negated	 one	last	time	in	the	final	moments	of	the	film,	as	Daniel’s	prewritten	words	are	substituted	for	anything	she	might	have	to	say	at	the	end	of	her	journey.		These	emotive	scenes,	thus,	confirm	the	film’s	depiction	of	Daniel	as	an	ideal	working-class	and	benefit-claiming	subject.	They	also	highlight	and	foreground	a	nostalgic	attachment	to	the	proper	working	classes	of	the	past.	While	Daniel’s	past	work	history	positions	him	as	a	clearly	deserving	benefit	recipient,	 the	 patchy	 or	 non-existent	 work	 histories	 –	 and	 degrees	 of	attachment	to	having	one	in	the	first	place	–	of	other	characters	in	both	texts	position	 them	 as	 always	 at	 risk	 of	 being	 read	 as	 undeserving	 scroungers	instead.	My	point	here	is	not	to	suggest	that	Daniel	is	somehow	too	squeaky	clean	to	be	a	benefits	claimant,	like	Young	does	in	his	review,	but,	instead,	to	highlight	how	our	–	 the	 film’s	viewers’	–	attachment	to	him	as	a	 legitimate	and	 deserving	 welfare	 claimant	 possibly	 hinges	 on	 his	 portrayal	 as	
differentially	 entitled	 to	 other	 characters	 in	 the	 film.	 Our	 nostalgic	attachment	 to	 an	 image	 of	 a	 clear-cut	 and	 legitimate	 working-class	subjectivity	 of	 the	past,	 thus,	 also	 plays	 a	 part	 in	 the	 affective	 imaginaries	that	saw	the	film	labelled	as	‘the	film	that	made	everyone	cry’	(Yuan	2016).	I,	
Daniel	 Blake	 ends	 with	 a	 claim	 to	 the	 imaginary	 of	 a	 clearly	 deserving	citizen,	also	potentially	positioning	the	viewer	 in	a	differential	relationship	to	 the	 film’s	 other	 characters	 –	 as	 well	 as	 prising	 open	 the	 question	 that	
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haunts	both	texts	under	examination	here:	does	the	injustice	of	the	austerity	framework	only	become	legible	when	a	subject	like	Daniel	is	centred	in	it?		Would	 the	 film	have	 the	 same	 effect	 –	 or	 affect	 –	 if	 it	was	Katie	 or	China	 who	 was	 centralised	 in	 its	 narrative	 structure?	 Would	 a	 disabled	benefits	 claimant	who	has	 never	worked,	 a	migrant	worker	with	 no	work	permit,	 or	 a	 racialised	 single	mother	 on	 a	 zero	 hours	 contract	 in	 the	 care	industry,	 elicit	 the	 same	 kinds	 of	 responses	 from	 the	 film’s	 viewers?	 And	further,	would	these	characters	have	access	to	the	same	kind	of	visible	and	recognisable	political	voice	and	action	Daniel	does?	These	questions	point,	firstly,	 at	 the	 difficulty	 of	 sustaining	 an	 identification	with,	 and	 a	 political	attachment	to,	class	categories	in	an	era	of	flexibilisation	and	precarisation	of	 labour,	 as	many	 others	 (Gibson-Graham	1996;	 Skeggs	 and	Wood	 2011;	Standing	 2011;	Weeks	 2011)	 have	 suggested.	 Secondly,	 they	 indicate	 that	this	nostalgic	attachment	–	apart	 from	its	role	 in	 turning	cinemagoers	 into	‘sobbing	 wrecks’	 (Yuan	 2016)	 –	 also	 helps	 sustain	 the	 working	class/’underclass’	 distinction.	While	 the	 former	 becomes	 the	 target	 of	 our	sympathetic	 sobbing,	 the	 latter	 remains	 the	 subject	 of	 much	 more	ambivalent	 attachments	 in	 the	 figurative	 economies	 of	 austerity.	 The	ambiguous	 relationship	 that	 both	 Katie	 and	 China	 have	 to	 imaginaries	 of	deservingness,	 thus,	 risks	not	only	rendering	 them	less	deserving,	but	also	potentially	making	these	racialised	and	sexualised	characters	(only)	legible	as	 members	 of	 a	 criminal	 and	 immoral	 –	 and,	 importantly,	 apolitical	 –	underclass.	In	the	film	Daniel	 is,	 thus,	surrounded	by	people	who	do	accept	and	seek	 charity	 and	 who	 have	 not,	 perhaps,	 always	 ‘paid	 their	 dues.’	 The	breaking	 down	 of	 Katie	 and	 Daniel’s	 close	 relationship	 is	 in	 the	 film’s	narrative	 structure	 directly	 linked	 to	 his	 judgement	 of	 her	 choice	 to	participate	 in	 sex	work.	 Similarly,	 Daniel	 disapproves	 of	 China’s	 choice	 to	engage	in	criminal	activity	to	supplement	his	income.	Both	China	and	Katie’s	responses	to	their	dire	financial	situations	–	both	criminal,	and	both	subject	to	Daniel’s	judgement	–	stand	in	stark	contrast	to	Daniel’s	political	response	–	 a	 vocalised	 and	 visible	 act	 of	 resistance.	While	Daniel	waits	 alone	 in	 his	flat,	 having	 sold	 all	 of	 his	 possessions	 to	 pay	 his	 bills,	 Katie	 and	 China,	 it	
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could	 be	 argued,	 continue	 on	 their	 chosen	 paths	 of	 sex	 work	 and	 crime	without	 qualms.	 For	 them,	 the	 possibility	 of	 embodying	 a	 normatively	intelligible	political	subjectivity	is	discursively	foreclosed	by	the	positioning	of	both	of	their	storylines	within	a	framework	of	–	both	sexual	and	criminal	–	 dysfunctionality	 and	 immorality.	 The	 dire	 discursive	 position	 of	 these	sexualised	 and	 racialised	 characters,	 perhaps,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 highlights	not	 only	 the	 limited	 narrative	 possibilities,	 but	 also	 the	 limited	 political	possibilities,	 that	 are	 available	 for	 the	 precarious	 working	 classes	 of	neoliberalising	austerity	politics.	On	the	other	hand,	however,	perhaps	Katie	and	China’s	choices	could	also	be	viewed	as	a	kind	of	a	refusal	–	a	refusal	to	remain	 in	 the	dichotomous	 framework	of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	that	they	are	both	otherwise	discursively	stuck	in.		Tina	Campt’s	analysis	of	images	of	black	colonial	subjects	focuses	on	quotidian	 practices	 ‘honed	 by	 the	 dispossessed	 in	 the	 struggle	 to	 create	possibility	within	the	constraints	of	everyday	life’	(2017:	4).	These	everyday	practices	 do	 not	materialise	 as	 resistance	 in	 easily	 recognisable	ways	 but,	instead,	 refuse	 the	 very	 terms	 of	 the	 dispossession	 that	 makes	 them	necessary	 in	 the	 first	 place.	 Perhaps	 Katie	 and	 China’s	 activities	 could	 be	read	 as	 examples	 of	 such	 quotidian	 practices	 of	 survival	 –	 despite	 being	labelled	 as	 both	 criminal	 and	morally	 questionable	 by	Daniel’s	 judgement.	After	all,	it	is	Katie’s	entry	into	sex	work	that	enables	her	to	buy	her	children	new	school	shoes	and,	 therefore,	 to	mitigate	at	 least	some	of	 the	effects	of	the	 state	 practices	 that	 have	 led	 to	 her	 dire	 financial	 situation.	 Similarly,	China’s	 smuggling	business	allows	him	not	only	 to	 supplement	 the	measly	income	 he	 receives	 from	 his	 zero	 hours	 job,	 but	 also	 potentially	 to	 steer	clear	 of	 the	 dehumanising	 ethos	 of	 the	 welfare	 system.	 Both	 take	 rather	
creative	action	to	survive,	refusing	to	accept	the	conditions	of	precarity	and	dispossession	 engendered	 by	 their	 engagements	 with	 state	 institutions.	Both	also	actively	refuse	the	terms	to	which	they	have	been	reduced	by	the	state	–	or	‘undermine	the	categories	of	the	dominant’	in	Campt’s	(ibid.:	32)	language	–	perhaps,	therefore	also	challenging	the	argument	made	by	many	(Bhattacharyya	 2015;	 Gilbert	 2011)	 that	 increasing	 precarity	 and	 the	
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concomitant	 need	 to	 focus	 on	 survival	 alone	 ensures	 that	 dissent	 is	automatically	suppressed	within	neoliberalising	conditions.147		This	reframing	of	Katie	and	China’s	criminal	activities	as	creative	and	nimble	practices	of	both	survival	and	refusal	also	helps	present	the	choices	of	the	James	Turner	Street	residents	who	have	turned	to	crime	in	a	different	light.	 While	 the	 series’	 inclusion	 of	 scenes	 of	 shoplifting	 resulted	 in	significant	 criticism	 (Ofcom	 2014),	 is	 the	 residents’	 choice	 to	 engage	 in	criminal	 activity	 in	 itself	 that	 surprising	 –	 given	 the	 proliferation	 of	 state	practices,	such	as	sanctioning,	that	can	make	one	destitute?	In	their	seminal	work	on	 the	politics	of	mugging,	Stuart	Hall	et	al.	position	crime	both	as	a	means	of	survival	and	as	a	refusal	of	the	traditional	role	of	the	‘reserve	army	of	 labour’	 (1978:	 370).	 In	 somewhat	 similar	 terms	 to	 Campt’s	 analysis	 –	although	she	does	not	explicitly	discuss	crime	–	they	consider	the	possibility	that	crime	can	be	a	refusal	of	the	structure	of	the	system	that	has	consigned	the	 black	worker	 to	 the	 position	 of	 unskilled	 labourer.	While	Hall	 and	 his	colleagues	do	not	consider	crime	itself	to	be	a	political	act,	they	argue	that	in	some	circumstances	it	can	provide	a	class	consciousness,	or	give	‘expression	to	the	experience	of	permanent	exclusion’	(ibid.:	391).	My	intention	here	is	not	 to	 claim	 that	 the	 exclusion	 and	 precarity	 experienced	 by	 benefit	claimants	is	comparable	to	the	exclusion	and	dispossession	experienced	by	black	subjects	within	a	logic	of	racial	subordination,	which	both	Campt	and	Hall	et	al.	are	concerned	with.	Instead,	these	scholars’	works	are	useful	here	specifically	 because	 they	 allow	 Katie	 and	 China’s	 choices,	 as	 well	 as	potentially	 those	 of	 the	 Benefits	 Street	 residents,	 to	 become	 legible	 in	
political	terms.	Chris	 Jones	and	Tony	Novak	 (1999)	argue	 that	 the	demonisation	of	the	‘underclass’	has	historically	fulfilled	an	essential	economic	and	political	purpose.	The	separation	of	the	respectable	working	class	from	the	immoral																																																									147	At	the	same	time	though,	we	may	think	of	Katie	and	China	as	 ‘reluctant	subjects’	in	the	sense	 suggested	 by	 Gibson-Graham	 (2006).	 Their	 research	 participants	 ‘could	 not	 easily	identify	with	the	alternative	subject	positions	it	availed.	Most	of	them	got	up	in	the	morning	wanting	a	job	–	and	if	not	wanting	one,	feeling	they	needed	one	–	rather	than	an	alternative	economy’	(ibid.:	xxxvi).	Thus,	my	argument	here	is	not	about	Katie	and	China’s	intentions,	or	an	 explicit	 desire	 to	 ‘undermine	 the	 categories	 of	 the	 dominant’,	 but	 rather,	 that	 their	actions,	in	themselves,	constitute	a	refusal.		
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and	 criminal	 ‘residuum’	 is	 necessary	 especially	 at	 times	 when	 poverty	grows,	to	dissuade	large-scale	working-class	identification	and	mobilisation.	The	 political	 purpose	 of	 the	 ‘underclass’/working	 class	 distinction	 is	reproduced	 over	 and	 over	 again	 in	 the	 figurative	 economies	 of	 austerity,	consigning	 the	 populations	 that	 do	 not	 have	 access	 to	 the	proper	working	class	 status	 of	 the	 past	 to	 the	 position	 of	 the	 undeserving,	 criminal,	 and	dysfunctional	‘underclass’	instead.	My	discussion,	thus,	points	at	some	of	the	ways	 in	 which	 distinctions	 are	 made	 not	 only	 between	 deserving	 and	undeserving	 welfare	 claimants,	 but	 also	 between	 the	 legitimate	 working	class	 and	 the	wretched	 ‘underclass.’	 The	 separation	 of	 the	 latter	 from	 the	former	 is	 based	on	 the	 cultural	markers	 of	 respectability	 and	normativity,	which,	 to	 a	 significant	 degree,	 depend	 on	 processes	 of	 sexualisation	 and	racialisation.	Further,	‘respectability’	is,	here,	seen	as	bound	to	an	idealised	image	of	the	legitimate	and	proper	working	class	of	the	past	–	as	well	as	to	particular	 imaginaries	 of	 what	 counts	 as	 political	 action,	 and	 who	 as	 a	political	 subject,	 such	 that	 the	 ‘underclass’,	 consequently,	 appears	 through	an	a	priori	depoliticised	discursive	framing.		Thus,	Katie	and	China’s	everyday	practices	of	refusal	provide	us	with	a	way	not	only	of	challenging	these	imaginaries	of	(a)politicisation,	but	also	of	 imagining	 alternative	 regimes	 of	 entitlement	 and	 citizenship,	 given	 the	continuous	 erosion	 of	 reciprocal	 state-citizen	 relationships	 within	neoliberalising	 austerity	 politics.	 When	 the	 state	 unilaterally	 withdraws	support	 from	 (some	 of)	 its	 subjects,	 perhaps	 ‘paying	 one’s	 dues’	 could,	 in	fact,	 consist	 of	 the	 many	 alternative	 care	 relations	 and	 practices	 that	 the	characters	 in	 both	 representations	 establish	 with	 one	 another.	 When	‘entitlement’	loses	its	meaning	because	of	the	continuous	depletion	of	state	services	and	support,	perhaps	it	could	be	reconfigured	to	mean	entitlement	to	 participate	 in	 various	 alternative	 practices	 of	 survival	 instead.	 Indeed,	‘demanding	respect’	from	a	state	that	no	longer	respects	you	or	your	needs,	could	amount	to	refusing	the	very	terms	of	this	crumbling	relationship,	like	Katie,	 China,	 and	many	 of	 the	Benefits	 Street	 characters	 arguably	 do.	 This	reading,	thus,	also	suggests	a	different	way	of	reading	Daniel’s	political	acts	–	which,	after	all,	are	not	met	with	recognition	by	the	state.	His	defiant	act	of	
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writing	 on	 the	 Jobcentre	wall	 –	 the	 narrative	 climax	 of	 the	 film	 –	 appears	much	 less	significant,	even	 ironic,	due	to	the	patronising	tone	of	 the	police	officers	 who	 caution	 him	 –	 revealing,	 ultimately,	 the	 futility	 of	 Daniel’s	continued	belief	 in	 the	 care	 and	 reciprocity	 of,	 and	his	 demand	of	 respect	from,	a	state	that,	decidedly,	does	not	care.	Kathi	Weeks	calls	for	a	‘politics	of	and	against	work’	to	supplement	or	replace	 traditional	 class-based	 politics	 that	 require	 identification	 with	particular,	 pre-established,	 class	 categories	 and	argues	 that	 such	a	politics	‘has	 the	 potential	 to	 expand	 the	 terrain	 of	 class	 struggle	 to	 include	 actors	well	 beyond	 that	 classic	 figure	 of	 traditional	 class	 politics,	 the	 industrial	proletariat’	(2011:	17).	J.	K.	Gibson-Graham,	similarly,	call	for	a	class	politics	that		 might	not	necessarily	invoke	the	emancipatory	agency	of	a	mass	collective	 subject	 unified	 around	 a	 set	 of	 shared	 ‘interests’	 but	could	arise	out	of	momentary	and	partial	identifications	between	subjects	constituted	at	the	intersection	of	very	different	class	and	nonclass	processes	and	positions.	(1996:	53-54)	My	discussion	of	the	politics	of	figuration	present	in	both	I,	Daniel	Blake	and	
Benefits	 Street	 has,	 hopefully,	 illuminated	 some	 of	 the	 tensions	 precisely	between	 that	 classic	 politicised	 figure	 of	 the	 industrial	 proletariat	 –	embodied	by	Daniel	–	and	the	many	members	of	the	contemporary	working	classes	who	do	not	 quite	 as	 easily	 sit	within	 this	 traditional	 conception	of	class	politics.	The	potentiality	evident	in	both	representations	for	those	who	are	not	as	readable	as	part	of	the	classic	legitimate	working	class	to	appear	as	 undeserving	 members	 of	 the	 criminal	 and	 dysfunctional	 ‘underclass’	instead,	 thus,	 also	masks	 some	 of	 the	ways	 in	which	 these	 characters	 are	already	engaged	not	only	 in	various	 forms	of	work,	but	also	 in	a	politics	of	
refusal	 in	 relation	 to	 work.	 Thus,	 while	 they	 grapple	 with	 everyday	precarity,	they	also	maintain	‘an	active	commitment	to	the	everyday	labor	of	creating	an	alternative	future’	(Campt	2017:	116).			
Conclusion	In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	 examined	 two	 media	 texts	 –	 I,	 Daniel	 Blake	 and	
Benefits	Street	–	that	both	created	a	significant	amount	of	media	and	political	
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discussion	and	debate	upon	their	release,	as	well	as	that	exemplify	‘austerity	TV’,	 in	 that	 their	 representations	 of	 benefit	 recipients	 are	 central	 to	 the	figurative	 economies	 of	 austerity	 politics.	 Beginning	with	 an	 investigation	into	 the	ways	 in	which	 the	 common	 austerity	 discourses	 examined	 in	 the	previous	chapter	are	reproduced	or	challenged	within	both	texts,	I	focused	on	discourses	of	 ‘worklessness’,	 ‘family	 stability’,	 and	 ‘cultural	 poverty’,	 as	well	as	highlighted	the	ways	in	which	immigration	and	racial	difference	tend	to	 be	 presented	 as	 threats	 to	 the	 racial	 and	 cultural	 homogeneity	 of	 the	nation.	 The	 figuration	 of	 the	 ‘benefit	 recipient/scrounger’	 was	 shown	 to	depend	on	these	discourses	and,	consequently,	on	processes	of	sexualisation	and	 racialisation,	 to	 such	an	extent	 that	her	 legibility	within	 the	 figurative	economies	 of	 austerity	 depends	 on	 these	 processes.	 Imaginaries	 of	deservingness	are	here	tied	to	a	temporal	 logic	that	suggests	that	a	benefit	recipient	 can	 only	 appear	 as	 clearly	 deserving	 if	 she	 desires	 paid	employment,	a	‘stable’	and	normative	family,	and	to	pass	the	correct	cultural	values	on	to	her	children	–	or	if	she	has	already	attained	these	conditions	in	the	past.	Imaginaries	of	undeservingness,	in	contrast,	suggest	other	kinds	of	desires,	as	well	as	an	uneasy	attachment	to,	and	an	 identification	with,	 the	figure	of	the	classic,	legitimate,	and	politicised	working	class	of	the	past.		Central	 to	 this	 chapter’s	 analysis	 has	 been	 the	 question	 of	whether	we	need	the	fantasy	of	Daniel	Blake	precisely	because	of	the	commonness	of	less	 sympathetic	 representations	 of	 benefit	 recipients,	 or	 whether	 we	gravitate	 towards	 these	nostalgic	and	 fantasmatic	 representations	because	we	recognise	them	and,	consequently,	see	them	as	more	worthy	than	others.	I	have	argued	that	the	many	characters,	and	particularly	the	racialised	and	sexualised	 ones,	 whose	 desires	 do	 not	 conform	 to	 these	 established	imaginaries	 of	 deservingness	 are	 rendered	 illegible	 and/or	 illegitimate	through	our	sustained	attachments	to	the	more	recognisable	ones	–	who	are	also,	 consequently,	 easier	 to	 sympathise	 with.	 Further,	 this	 process	 also	masks	 the	 politics	 of	 refusal	 that	 already	 underpin	 many	 of	 these	 non-conforming	 desires.	 In	 the	 next	 chapter	 I	 discuss	 state	 processes	 and	policies	 that	 are	 frequently	 characterised	 as	 examples	 of	 neoliberal	penalisation	 and	 reframe	 them	 as	 intimate	 disruptions	 instead,	 arguing	
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centrally	 that	 these	 disruptions	 materialise	 as	 a	 consequence	 of	 the	fragmented	 and	 complex	 manner	 in	 which	 the	 neoliberalisation	 of	 policy	implementation	and	service	delivery	tends	to	proceed.	Continuing	both	this	and	 the	 previous	 chapters’	 discussions	 of	 the	 political	 imaginaries,	 action,	and	subjectivities	available	within	the	context	of	austerity	politics,	I	go	on	to	argue	 that	 another	 kind	 of	 politics	 of	 refusal	 is	 also	 possible	 within	 the	processes	 by	 which	 neoliberalising	 state	 power	 is	 being	 dispersed	 and	fragmented.			 	
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Intimate	Disruptions:		
Austerity	Politics	and	Spaces	for	Political	Action	
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Introduction	In	 2014	 Titina	 Nzolameso’s	 five	 children	were	 placed	 into	 three	 different	foster	families,	and	care	proceedings	were	begun	(Nzolameso	v	Westminster	
City	 Council	 [Secretary	 of	 State	 for	 Communities	 and	Local	Government	 and	
another	 intervening]	 [2015]	 UKSC	 22,	 [2015]	 PTSR	 549).	 The	 decision	 to	place	Nzolameso’s	children	into	care	was	not	the	result	of	an	assessment	of	her	parenting	abilities,	or	of	the	environment	in	which	she	was	raising	her	children,	 but	 instead	 followed	 a	 two-year	 legal	 battle	 she	 had	 engaged	 in	with	 her	 local	 council,	 City	 of	Westminster.	 In	 2012	 Nzolameso	 had	 been	evicted	 from	her	home	 in	Westminster	because	she	could	no	 longer	afford	her	rent	after	facing	a	significant	reduction	in	her	housing	benefit,	following	the	 implementation	 of	 the	 changes	 to	 the	 Local	Housing	 Allowance	 (LHA)	rates	 earlier	 that	 year	 (discussed	 below).	 After	 she	 refused	 the	 council’s	offer	 of	 social	 housing	 in	 Milton	 Keynes	 because	 of	 its	 distance	 from	 her	social	 and	medical	 support	 networks	 in	Westminster,	 the	 council	 initially	placed	 her	 and	 her	 family	 in	 bed	 and	 breakfast	 accommodation	 in	 the	neighbouring	 borough	 (Kensington	 and	 Chelsea)	 while	 the	 case	 was	
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reviewed	by	 the	council	 and	 then	heard	by	 two	different	 courts.	However,	the	 council	 eventually	 decided	 to	 stop	 providing	 her	 with	 temporary	accommodation	after	her	court	appeals	 failed.	Since	the	children’s	services	department	could	not	accommodate	 the	whole	 family	 together,	Nzolameso	was	left	with	no	other	option	but	to	request	her	children	be	placed	into	care,	while	she	herself	found	temporary	accommodation	with	friends.		The	many	 and	 varied	 disruptions	 to	 Nzolameso	 and	 her	 children’s	private	 and	 intimate	 lives	 appear	 not	 so	 much	 as	 the	 calculated	 and	intentional	 actions	 of	 a	 coherent	 state	 actor,	 or	 even	 necessarily	 as	 the	intended	 consequences	 of	 particular	 policies,	 but	 instead	 as	 the	 inevitable	
effects	of	the	processes	by	which	decision	making	proceeded	in	her	case	–	as	
(by-)products	of	the	decision-making	process	itself,	as	it	were.	This	chapter	focuses	on	such	intimate	disruptions	that	emerge	as	a	consequence	of	three	different	 recent	 welfare	 and	 housing	 policies	 and	 practices:	 the	 Bedroom	Tax	 –	 officially	 the	 Removal	 of	 the	 Spare-Room	 Subsidy	 (RSRS);	 the	increasing	 practice	 whereby	 Local	 Authorities	 house	 their	 social	 housing	clients	outside	of	the	LA	area;	and	‘workfare’	or	‘back	to	work’	schemes	and	benefit	sanctions.	These	policies	(and	others	like	them)	are	often	discussed	as	 examples	 of	 the	 increasing	 conditionality	 in,	 or	 penalisation	 of,	 social	welfare	 in	 neoliberal	 or	 neoliberalising	 states,	 as	 Chapter	 1	 detailed.	However,	 what	 tends	 to	 be	 labelled	 ‘penality’	 is	 in	many	 cases	 less	 about	straightforward	 punishment	 –	 or,	 indeed,	 about	 any	 kind	 of	 intentional	action	by	a	coherent,	agentic	state.	As	I	argue	throughout	this	chapter,	these	policies	 and	 practices,	 firstly,	 entail	 naturalised	 and	 implicit	 judgements	about	the	value	of	intimacy	and	care,	and	about	what	constitutes	a	liveable	life.	Secondly,	the	resulting	intimate	disruptions	in	the	everyday	lives	of	the	affected	individuals	emerge	from,	and	are	implicit	in,	the	processes	by	which	state	power	is	being	reconfigured	under	neoliberalising	austerity	politics.	Although	 some	 of	 the	 policies	 discussed	 here	 do	 also	 control	 and	manage	 the	 intimate	 sphere	 rather	 explicitly	 (think	 for	 example	 of	 the	Bedroom	Tax	and	 its	explicit	 regulation	of	who	–	of	what	age,	gender,	and	familial	 relation	 –	 has	 the	 right	 to	 their	 own	 bedroom),	 I	 am	 here	 more	interested	 in	how	 the	processes	by	which	 these	policies	 are	 implemented,	
	 209	
and	 these	 practices	 executed,	 themselves	 produce	 disruptions	 in	 intimate	lives.	In	other	words,	my	analysis	pertains	primarily	to	how	the	operation	of	state	 power	 through	 its	 supposed	 devolution	 to	 local	 actors	 and	 private	corporations	 –	developments	 frequently	 considered	part	 and	parcel	 of	 the	processes	 of	 neoliberalisation	 as	 Chapter	 1	 discussed	 –	 engender	 various	and	varied	disruptions	to	the	intimate.	As	will	be	shown	below,	in	particular	these	disruptions	commonly	arise	in	the	gaps	and	distance	between	national	policy	aims	on	the	one	hand;	and	the	local	resources	and	abilities	available	for	realising	them	on	the	other.	Thus,	my	analysis	also,	in	part,	responds	to	Nicola	Lacey’s	call	for	‘mid-level	institutional	account[s]’	of	neoliberalism	to	‘fill	 the	 explanatory	 space	 between	 the	 macro	 account	 [--]	 and	 the	 micro	examples’	 (2010:	 781).	 Finally,	 following	 the	 preceding	 chapter’s	examination	 of	 how	 the	 gendered	 and	 sexualised	 discourses	 of	 austerity	materialise	at	 the	 levels	of	 figuration	and	subjectification,	 this	chapter	also	points	at	their	salience	at	the	level	of	service	delivery.		This	 chapter	 is	divided	 into	 six	parts,	 the	 first	one	of	which	 further	introduces	and	contextualises	 the	 three	policies	and	practices	examined	 in	it,	 as	 well	 as	 briefly	 discusses	 its	methodological	 approach.	 The	 following	three	 sections	 each	 examine	 a	 different	 aspect	 of	 the	 ways	 in	 which	disruptions	 are	 engendered	 in	 the	 intimate	 sphere	 by	 the	 operation	 of	neoliberalising	 state	 power,	 utilising	 three	 key	 UK	 Supreme	 Court	judgements	as	their	source	materials.	The	first	one	focuses	on	the	Bedroom	Tax	 cases	 and	 discusses	 the	 judgements	 of	 value	 inherent	 in	 the	 policy’s	implementation,	 whereby	 different	 kinds	 of	 intimate	 relations,	 practices,	and	needs	are	deemed	less	or	more	valuable.	The	second	uses	the	concept	of	
liveable	 lives	 to	 argue	 that,	 as	 well	 as	 various	 judgements	 of	 value,	 these	policies	 and	 practices	 entail	 judgements	 about	what	 constitutes	 a	 liveable	(intimate)	 life,	 discussing	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 judgement	 related	 to	 the	increasing	practice	of	out-of-council	housing	placements.	The	 third	section	examines	the	Supreme	Court	judgement	on	workfare	and	benefit	sanctions,	arguing	 that	 these	 state	 practices	 materialise	 as	 significant	 everyday	
disruptions	 in	 the	 lives	 of	 affected	 individuals.	 The	 second	 to	 last	 section	pulls	 these	various	 threads	 together	 to	argue	 that	 the	 intimate	disruptions	
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analysed	 throughout	 the	chapter	constitute	a	significant	reconfiguration	of	the	public/private	divide	in	two	separate	but	related	ways.	The	final	section	investigates	whether	any	space	for	political	action	emerges	in	the	gaps	and	spaces	 opened	 up	 by	 the	 diffuse	 operation	 of	 state	 power	 that	neoliberalisation	 entails,	 asking	 the	 question:	 where	 can	 we	 locate	 the	
political	within	this	reframed	understanding	of	neoliberal	penalisation?		
	
Intimate	Disruptions:	Method	and	Materials	The	 main	 source	 materials	 of	 this	 chapter	 consist	 of	 UK	 Supreme	 Court	judgements	on	three	high	profile	cases	relating	to	the	Bedroom	Tax,	out-of-council	 housing	 placements,	 and	workfare	 schemes.	 The	 legal	 judgements	are	here	used	as	evidence	of	the	decision-making	processes	and	structures	relevant	to	each	case.	Thus,	my	aim	is	not	to	assess	the	validity	of	the	Court’s	decision	making,	or	 to	argue	 that	 the	Supreme	Court	 itself	 is	 implicated	 in	penalising	welfare.	Rather,	these	documents	are	treated	as	rich,	descriptive	accounts	 of	 the	 ‘statework’	 (Clarke	 2004:	 121)	 involved	 in	 each	 case.	 The	first	 judgement	 (R	[Carmichael	and	Rourke]	and	Others	v	Secretary	of	State	
for	Work	 and	 Pensions	 [2016]	 UKSC	 58,	 [2016]	 1	 WLR	 4550)	 deals	 with	seven	 separate	 cases	 regarding	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	 –	 also	 known	 as	 the	‘Under-Occupancy	Penalty’	or	the	‘Removal	of	the	Spare	Room	Subsidy.’	The	second	 judgement	(Nzolameso)	concerns	the	recently	popularised	practice,	of	London	councils	in	particular,	of	moving	social	housing	clients	out	of	the	geographical	 council	 area,	 mostly	 to	 other	 parts	 of	 London	 but	 also	considerably	further.	The	third	judgement	(R	[Reilly]	v	Secretary	of	State	for	
Work	and	Pensions	[2013]	UKSC	68,	[2014]	AC	453)	relates	to	back-to-work	or	workfare	schemes	and	benefit	sanctions.	The	Bedroom	Tax	was	 introduced	as	part	of	 the	Welfare	Reform	Act	
2012	 and	 aims	 to	 force	 public	 sector	 tenants	 with	 bedrooms	 that	 are	deemed	 ‘spare’	 to	 move	 to	 more	 suitably	 sized	 properties.	 Originally	labelled	 the	 ‘Under-Occupancy	Penalty’,	quickly	dubbed	 the	 ‘Bedroom	Tax’	in	 media	 discourse,	 and	 eventually	 changed	 to	 the	 ‘Removal	 of	 the	 Spare	Room	Subsidy’	(RSRS)	in	official	parlance,	the	tax	only	applies	to	council	and	housing	 association	 tenants,	 as	 housing	 benefit	 for	 people	 living	 in	 the	
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private	rented	sector	 is	calculated	according	to	different	rules	(see	below).	Unless	the	tenant	 is	able	to	move	to	a	smaller	property,	having	one	or	two	bedrooms	more	than	the	permitted	allowance	results	in	a	14	or	25	per	cent	reduction	 in	 housing	 benefit,	 respectively.	 The	 permitted	 allowance	 for	 a	household	is	one	bedroom	for	each	adult	couple,	any	other	person	over	16	years	of	age,	two	children	of	the	same	sex	under	16,	two	children	under	10	regardless	of	their	sex,	a	child	with	disabilities	who	cannot	share	a	bedroom	due	to	the	disability,148	and	any	other	child.	Exemptions	to	the	policy	include	foster	carers,	adult	children	who	are	 in	 the	Armed	Forces,	as	well	as	some	people	 with	 disabilities	 who	 require	 overnight	 care	 (Shelter	 2017).	 The	Supreme	 Court	 judges	 dismissed	 five	 of	 the	 seven	 claims	 brought	 to	 the	Court,	while	two	that	related	to	differences	in	the	ways	in	which	adults	and	children	 with	 disabilities	 were	 affected	 by	 the	 policy	 were	 successful	(Carmichael).	The	 council	 practice	 of	moving	 social	 housing	 clients	 out	 of	 the	 LA	area	 is	 not	 prescribed	 by	 any	 particular	 UK-wide	 policy	 but	 has	 arisen	 in	recent	 years	due	 to	multiple	 factors.	 Firstly,	 the	 introduction	of	 a	national	cap	for	Local	Housing	Allowance	rates	in	2011	together	with	other	changes	to	housing	benefit	rates,149	as	well	as	the	introduction	of	the	Benefit	Cap	and	the	Bedroom	Tax,	have	 resulted	 in	many	 social	housing	 clients	 residing	 in	privately	rented	accommodation	no	longer	being	able	to	afford	their	rent	–	particularly	 in	 London	 and	 other	 high-rent	 areas.	 Secondly,	 the	 significant	increases	 in	 private	 rents	 caused	 by	 the	 housing	 crisis,	 together	 with	 the	considerable	 decreases	 in	 central	 government	 funding	 to	 councils	 since	2010,	 again	 particularly	 in	 low	 income	 areas	 and	 in	 London	 (Innes	 and	Tetlow	 2015),	 have	 together	 led	 to	 many	 councils	 finding	 it	 increasingly	difficult	 to	 house	 all	 the	 homeless	 households	 who	 meet	 the	 criteria	 for	
																																																								148	This	allowance	was	expanded	to	include	adult	couples	that	cannot	share	a	bedroom	due	to	disability	as	a	result	of	the	Supreme	Court	case	under	discussion	here.	149	Particularly	 the	changes	 to	Local	Housing	Allowance	(LHA)	rates	 introduced	as	part	of	the	2010	emergency	budget.	Previously	LHA	rates	were	based	on	the	median	average	of	a	sample	of	 local	rents.	Since	2011,	LHA	rates	are	 instead	set	as	the	30th	percentile	on	 local	rental	prices.	See	Gov.UK	(2016a)	and	Wilson	et	al.	(2016)	for	more	information.	
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statutory	homelessness	in	their	area.150	Finally,	the	Localism	Act	2011	made	it	easier	for	councils	to	discharge	their	duty	to	a	homeless	person	by	offering	them	 accommodation	 in	 the	 private	 rented	 sector. 151 	Altogether	 these	factors	have	resulted	in	many	LAs	increasingly	using	out-of-council	housing	placements	 as	 a	 solution	 to	 tackling	 homelessness	 in	 their	 areas.	 The	Supreme	Court	ruling	(Nzolameso)	requires	that	LAs	provide	more	detailed	evidence	 of	 having	 adequately	 considered	 both	 the	 circumstances	 of	 the	homeless	person	or	family	and	the	housing	available	within	the	council	area	before	making	the	assessment	that	it	is	not	‘reasonably	practicable’	to	house	them	within	the	LA,	as	well	as	that	they	give	more	information	regarding	the	decision	to	the	client.		‘Workfare’	refers	to	governmental	policies	that	require	individuals	to	undertake	some	form	of	work	or	training	 in	return	for	their	benefits,	most	notably	 Jobseeker’s	 Allowance	 (JSA),	 Employment	 and	 Support	 Allowance	(ESA),	and	Universal	Credit	(UC).	Both	the	workfare	schemes	and	the	work	and	 training	 placements	 themselves	 are	 provided	 by	 a	 mixture	 of	 public,	private,	and	charity	organisations,	and	up	to	14	different	schemes	have	been	in	 operation	 since	 2010.152	In	many	 of	 the	 schemes	welfare	 claimants	 are	required	 to	work	 in	 for-profit	 organisations	 such	 as	 Asda	 and	 Poundland,	
																																																								150	When	an	 individual	 or	household	 approaches	 a	 local	 council	 for	 housing,	 the	 council’s	first	task	is	to	assess	whether	they	meet	the	criteria	for	statutory	homelessness,	or	in	other	words,	whether	the	council	owes	them	the	homelessness	duty.	In	order	for	the	council	to	be	responsible	for	housing	the	individual	or	household,	they	have	to	be	eligible	for	assistance,	unintentionally	 homeless,	 and	 fall	 within	 a	 specified	 priority	 need	 group.	 This	 includes	households	with	dependent	children,	pregnant	women,	and	people	with	mental	illnesses	or	physical	 disabilities,	 among	 others	 (Gov.UK	 2018a).	 Importantly,	 the	 practice	 under	examination	 here	 only	 pertains	 to	 people	 and	 households	 who	 are	 accepted	 by	 councils	either	 as	 statutory	 homeless,	 in	 which	 case	 the	 council	 has	 a	 statutory	 duty	 to	 find	accommodation	 for	 the	 household;	 or	 as	 particularly	 vulnerable	 despite	 not	meeting	 the	criteria	 for	 statutory	 homelessness,	 in	 which	 case	 councils	 tend	 to	 offer	 temporary	accommodation	 for	 a	 limited	 period	 (usually	 28	 days).	 While	 this	 chapter	 focuses	specifically	on	the	practice	of	Local	Authorities	offering	out-of-council	housing	to	statutory	homeless	 households,	 the	 various	 homelessness	 rules	 and	 policies	 no	 doubt	 also	 have	implications	for	the	intimate	lives	of	those	not	considered	statutory	homeless.	151	Previously	a	homeless	person	had	the	right	to	refuse	an	offer	of	accommodation	in	the	private	 rented	 sector	 and	 opt	 instead	 for	 remaining	 in	 temporary	 accommodation	 and	staying	on	the	council’s	social	housing	waiting	list.	Since	the	Localism	Act,	refusing	an	offer	of	privately	rented	accommodation	counts	as	becoming	‘intentionally	homeless’	and	results	in	 the	 council	 no	 longer	 having	 a	 duty	 to	 house	 the	 person	 or	 family.	 See	 Ministry	 of	Housing,	Communities	and	Local	Government	(2018)	for	more	information.	152	See	 (Boycott	Workfare	 2018a)	 for	 a	 list	 of	 all	 the	 programmes	 that	 have	 been	 active	during	the	Coalition	Government	era.	
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and	the	placement	of	claimants	is	often	subcontracted	to	corporations	such	as	 Ingeus,	 an	 American	 provider	 owned	 by	 Deloitte	 that	 runs	 one	 of	 the	biggest	workfare	schemes.	Workfare	policies	are	related	to	benefit	sanctions	in	that	failure	to	participate	in	a	training	or	employment	scheme	is	the	most	frequently	occurring	‘failure’	that	results	in	a	sanction	(Beatty	et	al.	2015)	–	meaning	the	stopping	of	benefit	payments	for	a	period	of	time	between	four	weeks	 and	 three	 years.	 Although	 both	 benefit	 sanctions	 and	 workfare	schemes	were	 already	 in	use	under	 the	previous	 administration,	 their	 use	significantly	increased	during	the	Coalition	Government	era.	Similarly	to	the	case	discussed	 above,	 the	 Supreme	Court	 case	 related	 to	workfare	 (Reilly)	ruled	 that	 the	 Government	 had	 not	 provided	 sufficient	 information	 to	 the	claimants	 either	 on	 the	 placements	 themselves,	 or	 in	 regards	 to	 the	consequences	of	refusing	a	placement.	Because	 the	 primary	 concern	 of	 this	 chapter	 is	 the	 intimate	disruptions	that	materialise	as	a	result	of	changes	and	shifts	in	the	operation	and	 reach	 of	 state	 power	 –	 and	 not,	 for	 example,	 the	 operation	 of	 the	UK	Supreme	 Court	 –	 I	 use	 these	materials	 as	 sources	of	 evidence.	 Rather	 than	focus	on	them	as	legal	documents	as	such,	I	instead	highlight	their	value	as	rich	 descriptive	 accounts	 of	 the	 decision-making	 practices	 and	 structures	through	which	state	power	functions	within	the	intimate	or	private	sphere.	While	in	Chapter	3	I	examined	policy	texts,	for	the	purposes	of	this	chapter	an	 analysis	 of	 the	 intention	 of	 particular	 policy	 frameworks	 would	 be	insufficient,	since	very	few	of	the	intimate	disruptions	examined	here	derive	directly	from	the	letter	of	the	policies.	Although	some	of	them	may,	 in	fact,	correspond	exactly	with	the	intention	of	the	policy	makers	who	devised	the	policies,	the	question	of	intent	is	not	central	to	the	analysis	that	follows.	My	examination,	 thus,	 also	 illuminates	 a	 key	 tension	 identified	 by	 Cris	 Shore	and	 Susan	Wright,	 who	 argue	 that	 ‘on	 closer	 examination	 [--]	 it	 becomes	unclear	what	 constitutes	 “a	policy”’	 (1997:	 4).	 Is	 it	 the	written	documents	produced	 by	 governmental	 actors	 and	 institutions,	 outlining	 the	 aims	 and	intentions	 of	 particular	 policy	 frameworks?	 Or	 is	 it	 the	 processes	 of	implementation	or	service	delivery	themselves,	or	even	the	experiences	that	people	have	with	street-level	bureaucrats?		
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In	 this	 chapter	 I	 focus	 on	 the	 latter	 two	 specifically	 to	 make	 the	argument	 that	 it	 is	 in	 the	 fragmented	 processes	 of	 policy	 implementation	and	 service	 delivery	 that	 these	 policies	 and	 practices	 materialise	 as	significant	 disruptions	 in	 intimate	 lives,	 rather	 than	 necessarily	 in	 their	stated	 aims.	 As	 Chapter	 1	 highlighted,	 policies	 frequently	 transform	 and	mutate	 during	 the	 process	 of	 implementation	 due	 to,	 for	 instance,	 path	dependency	and	 the	 interactions	between	street-level	bureaucrats	and	 the	people	 accessing	 a	 particular	 service.	 Thus,	 policy	 is	 not	 just	straightforwardly	 ‘implemented’,	 but	 rather,	 subject	 to	 interpretation	 at	various	 points,	 for	 example	 by	 individual	 front-line	 workers	 who	consequently	‘re-create	official	policy’	in	their	work	(Wright	2002:	236).	Be	it	 Jobcentre	 Employment	 Officers,	 council	 Housing	 Officers,	 or	 the	employees	of	a	subcontracted	private	provider,	street-level	bureaucrats	are,	consequently,	 involved	 in	 policy-making	 processes	 –	 and	 arguably	 as	centrally	 as	 top-level	 politicians.	 Thus,	 I	 argue	 that	 the	 actions	 of	 these	street-level	bureaucrats	may,	in	fact,	constitute	statework,	thus	highlighting	that	the	trends	towards	privatisation	and	localisation	within	neoliberalising	states	 do	 not	 entail	 as	 much	 a	 quantitative	 transfer	 of	 power	 from	 the	central	state	to	other	actors,	as	a	qualitative	change	in	their	relationships,	as	I	 argued	 in	Chapter	1.	For	example,	 the	employees	of	private	corporations	involved	 in	making	 recommendations	 for	 benefit	 sanctioning	 are	 here	 not	seen	as	taking	over	the	state’s	functions	–	and	the	process	therefore	leading	to	a	decrease	in	the	state’s	power,	and	a	corresponding	increase	in	that	of	the	private	corporation.	Rather,	 they	are	viewed	as	being	centrally	 involved	 in	statework,	 albeit	 in	 a	 partial	 and	 fragmented	manner.	 The	 analysis	 in	 this	chapter,	 thus,	 also	 investigates	 the	 changing	 nature	 of	 state	 power	 in	 the	context	of	neoliberalising	austerity	politics.		Melissa	 Autumn	White	 argues,	 following	 Zygmunt	 Bauman	 (2007),	that	‘what	renders	bureaucracy	effective	is	its	capacity	to	mask	rather	than	obliterate	 moral	 concerns’	 (2014:	 89,	 emphasis	 in	 the	 original).	 In	 this	chapter	 I	 investigate	 some	 such	 moral	 concerns	 that	 are	 hidden	 by,	 but	nonetheless	 central	 to,	 processes	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	delivery.	These	processes	entail	significant	value	judgements	about	intimate	
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relations,	 practices,	 and	 spaces	 –	 or,	 in	 other	 words,	 about	 the	 conditions	
necessary	 for	an	 intimate	 life,	or	what	makes	a	 liveable	life	 –	despite	being	seemingly	not	 at	 all	 concerned	with	 the	 regulation	of	 sexual	or	 family	 life.	They	 are	 involved	 in	 arbitrating	 between	 necessary	 and	 unnecessary,	 or	proper	 and	 improper,	 intimacies,	 as	 well	 as	 consequently	 in	 rendering	certain	 intimacies	 visible	 and	 others	 invisible.	 By	 adopting	 the	 conceptual	frame	 of	 ‘intimate	 disruptions’	 I	 am	 able	 to,	 firstly,	 highlight	 the	 range	 of	intimate	relations,	practices,	and	spaces	that	are	potentially	disrupted	by	the	policies	 examined	 in	 this	 chapter,	 as	 well	 as	 to,	 secondly,	 circumvent	 the	issue	of	intent.	Thus,	my	methodological	approach	in	this	chapter	has	been	chosen	 specifically	 because	 it	 allows	 me	 to	 centre	 the	 disruptions	themselves	 –	which	may	or	may	not	be	 contradictory	 to	 the	 language	 and	intentions	of	actual	policies,	but	which	nonetheless	emerge	or	materialise	as	a	 consequence	 of	 particular	 policy	 implementation	 processes.	 Finally,	 as	 I	argue	 towards	 the	 end	 of	 the	 chapter,	 the	 ubiquity	 of	 such	 intimate	disruptions	suggests	that	changes	and	shifts	in	the	public/private	divide	are	central	 to	 processes	 of	 neoliberalisation	 and	 austerity	 –	 with	 significant	consequences	for	how	political	action	against	them	might	be	conceived.		
Judgements	of	Value	In	 all	 seven	 cases	 brought	 to	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 in	 2016,	 the	 affected	household’s	 rent	 had	 been	 covered	 in	 full	 by	 housing	 benefit	 prior	 to	 the	introduction	of	the	Bedroom	Tax	–	after	which	each	household	was	assessed	as	having	one	or	 two	 ‘spare’	 rooms	and	 faced	a	 reduction	 in	 their	housing	benefit	 as	 a	 result.153	Some	of	 the	households	were	 already	 in	 receipt	 of	 a	Discretionary	Housing	Payment	(DHP)	–	discussed	in	more	detail	below	–	at	the	time	of	the	Supreme	Court	case.	The	Supreme	Court	dismissed	five	of	the	cases,	three	of	which	are	briefly	introduced	here:	those	of	‘A’,	JD,	and	James	Daly.	‘A’	lives	in	a	three-bedroom	house	with	her	son,	who	was	born	as	the	result	of	a	rape	by	a	man	she	had	been	in	a	brief	relationship	with.	He	had	been	 ‘exceptionally	 violent’	 (Carmichael:	 4577)	 and	 made	 serious	 threats																																																									153	The	 information	 in	 this	 and	 the	 following	 two	 sections	 regarding	 the	 Supreme	 Court	judgements	derives	from	Carmichael,	Nzolameso,	and	Reilly,	respectively,	unless	otherwise	specified.		
	 216	
against	 her,	 as	 a	 result	 of	which	 her	 property	 had	 been	 specially	 adapted	under	a	sanctuary	scheme	to	provide	a	higher	level	of	security,	and	she	also	receives	 on-going	 security	 monitoring.	 JD	 is	 the	 full-time	 carer	 for	 their	adult	daughter,	AD,	who	has	disabilities,	and	they	live	together	in	a	specially	constructed	 three-bedroom	property.	 James	Daly’s	 son,	Rian,	who	also	has	disabilities,	 is	 cared	 for	 by	 his	 separated	 father	 and	 mother	 in	 separate	houses,	for	three	and	four	days	out	of	weeks,	respectively.	Rian	has	a	room	at	each	of	the	parents’	houses,	and	it	was	the	one	at	his	father’s	house	that	was	 considered	 ‘spare.’	 The	 Supreme	 Court	 dismissed	 these	 three	 cases	because	it	saw	that	‘cases	of	need	for	reasons	unconnected	with	the	size	of	the	property	should	be	dealt	with	through	the	DHP	scheme’	(ibid.:	4570).154		The	Supreme	Court,	 conversely,	 ruled	 in	 favour	of	 two	of	 the	seven	cases	brought	 to	 it	 in	2016:	 those	of	Mrs	Carmichael	 and	 the	Rutherfords.	Mrs	Carmichael	needs	various	pieces	of	equipment	related	to	her	disabilities	in	her	bedroom,	meaning	that	there	is	not	enough	space	for	her	husband	–	who	 is	also	her	 full-time	carer	–	 to	share	the	same	bed	or	bedroom.	Susan	Rutherford	and	her	partner	are	 full-time	carers	 for	her	grandson,	Warren,	who	also	has	disabilities.	Respite	care	is	provided	by	carers	who	stay	in	the	Rutherfords’	‘spare’	room	two	nights	a	week.	The	Supreme	Court	judgement	discusses	these	two	cases	in	relation	to	the	exemptions	already	provided	in	the	 Bedroom	Tax	 policy	 for	 children	who	 cannot	 share	 a	 bedroom	with	 a	sibling	 due	 to	 the	 need	 to	 have	 disability-related	 equipment	 in	 their	bedroom	and	 for	 adults	who	need	 an	 extra	 bedroom	 for	 overnight	 carers.	The	 Court	 agreed	 that	 the	 policy’s	 differential	 treatment	 of	 adults	 and	children	 with	 disabilities	 (who	 need	 either	 the	 sole	 use	 of	 a	 bedroom	because	 of	 disability-related	 equipment,	 or	 an	 extra	 room	 for	 overnight	respite	carers)	 is	not	reasonable	and,	 therefore,	accepted	that	the	needs	of	these	 claimants	 should	 be	 met	 through	 exemptions	 in	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	policy	itself,	rather	than	through	DHPs.		
																																																								154	The	 other	 two	 dismissed	 cases	 were	 that	 of	 Richard	 Rourke,	 who	 stores	 equipment	related	to	his	and	his	stepdaughter’s	disabilities	in	their	third	bedroom;	and	Mervyn	Drage,	who	 has	mental	 health	 difficulties,	 including	 obsessive-compulsive	 disorder,	 and	 lives	 on	his	own	in	a	three-bedroom	flat.	He	does	not	sleep	in	any	of	his	bedrooms,	as	they	are	all	full	of	papers	that	he	has	accumulated.	
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The	 Bedroom	 Tax	 cases	 under	 discussion	 here	 are	 not	 unusual.	Firstly,	according	to	the	Government’s	own	impact	assessment,	nearly	two-thirds	 of	 the	 households	 affected	 by	 Bedroom	 Tax	 have	 an	 adult	 with	 a	disability	 in	 them.155	Secondly,	 the	 chronic	 lack	 of	 smaller	 social	 sector	dwellings	in	the	UK	has	meant	that	most	households	affected	by	the	policy	have	had	 to	make	do	with	reduced	benefits,	 rather	 than	being	able	 to	 find	and	move	 to	more	 suitably	 sized	 accommodations	 –	 the	 stated	 aim	 of	 the	policy.	Figures	published	by	The	Independent	in	August	2013	suggest	that	as	many	 as	 96	 per	 cent	 of	 those	 affected	 by	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	were,	 in	 fact,	unable	to	move	due	to	the	lack	of	suitable	properties	in	their	area	and	were,	consequently,	effectively	 ‘trapped’	 in	their	 ‘too	 large’	homes	(Dugan	2013).	According	to	the	Department	for	Work	and	Pensions’	(DWP)	interim	report	on	 the	Bedroom	Tax	(DWP	2014b),	only	4.5	per	cent	of	affected	claimants	had	downsized	to	a	smaller	property	within	the	social	rented	sector,	and	a	further	1.4	per	cent	had	moved	to	the	private	rented	sector	within	the	first	six	months	of	implementation.	Some	claimants	had	looked	for	more	work	to	cover	the	shortfall	in	rent,	but	very	few	were	willing	to	take	in	a	lodger	–	two	of	the	suggestions	made	by	the	DWP	for	people	affected	by	the	new	policy.		Juxtaposing	 the	 cases	 of	 James	Daly	 and	 the	Rutherfords	 illustrates	the	different	ways	in	which	care	and	intimate	relations	played	–	or,	indeed,	did	 not	 play	 –	 a	 part	 in	 the	 Court’s	 decisions.	 In	 both	 cases	 a	 child	 with	significant	 disabilities	 is	 cared	 for	 by	 more	 than	 one	 person.	 The	Rutherfords’	‘spare’	room	is	used	by	respite	carers	two	nights	a	week;	James	Daly’s	 ‘spare’	 room	 is	 used	 by	 his	 son,	 Rian,	 three	 nights	 a	 week.	 As	explained	above,	 the	Rutherfords	won	 their	 case,	whereas	Daly’s	 case	was	one	of	the	five	that	were	dismissed.	The	Supreme	Court	agreed	that	while	it	may	be	appropriate	 for	 the	council	 to	 continue	paying	Daly’s	 rent	 in	 full	 –	thereby	ensuring	that	the	family	can	stay	in	their	current	accommodations	–	at	 the	 same	 time	 it	 was	 not	 unreasonable	 for	 the	 shortfall	 in	 rent	 to	 be	covered	by	a	DHP,	rather	than	the	case	resulting	in	an	actual	exemption	to	the	Bedroom	Tax	policy.	The	Court’s	decision	was	based	on	the	notion	that																																																									155	Children	 with	 disabilities	 were	 not	 included	 in	 the	 impact	 assessment,	 so	 the	 total	number	of	affected	households	with	someone	with	disabilities	in	them	is	likely	to	be	even	higher	(Full	Fact	2013).	
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James	 Daly’s	 need	 for	 the	 ‘spare’	 room	 had	 nothing	 to	 do	 with	 his	 son’s	disabilities,	 and,	 therefore,	 he	 had	 no	 grounds	 for	 challenging	 the	 lower	court’s	 judgement	 on	 equality	 grounds.	 Notwithstanding	 the	 Court’s	assessment	that	the	decision	was	not	 in	violation	of	 the	appellant’s	human	rights,	 the	decision,	nonetheless,	provides	a	striking	contrast	 to	 that	of	 the	Rutherfords.	Since	 the	 shortfall	 caused	 to	 James	Daly’s	 rent	by	 the	Bedroom	Tax	was	already	covered	by	a	DHP	prior	to	the	beginning	of	the	Supreme	Court	proceedings,	 the	 family	 suffered	 no	 financial	 consequences	 –	 or,	 at	 least,	immediate	 ones	 –	 for	 being	 subject	 to	 the	 Bedroom	Tax,	 or	 for	 losing	 the	Court	case.	It	is	important	to	note,	however,	that	DHPs	are	paid	as	a	central	government	grant	to	the	council	and	then	allocated	to	individual	households	at	 the	 council’s	 discretion.	 Decisions	 about	 DHPs	 are	 made	 based	 on	 an	assessment	 of	 the	 urgency	 and	 significance	 of	 the	 varying	 and	 multiple	needs	of	the	many	individuals	and	households	affected	by	the	Bedroom	Tax	and	other	housing	benefit	changes	in	an	LA	area.	They	are	usually	also	only	paid	for	a	limited	time	period,	and	individuals	in	receipt	of	one	are	expected	to	make	long-term	changes	to	their	finances	(Shelter	2016).	Since	DHPs	are	not	guaranteed	by	a	law	or	regulation,	but	are	instead	dependent	on	council	funds	 and	 a	 relative	 assessment	 of	 the	 needs	 of	 everyone	who	 applies	 for	one,	 they	 do	 not	 provide	 the	 same	 kind	 of	 stability	 and	 assurance	 as	 full	housing	benefit	does	–	even	taking	 into	account	 that	 the	stability	provided	by	 housing	 benefit	 can	 itself	 be	 rather	 limited.	 According	 to	 the	 DWP	(2014b),	some	Local	Authorities	struggled	to	make	long-term	plans	for	the	resource	precisely	because	of	the	uncertainty	of	both	future	demand	and	the	future	 size	 and	 availability	 of	 the	 fund.	Moreover,	 56	 per	 cent	 of	 housing	benefit	 claimants	who	 had	 not	 applied	 for	 a	 DHP	 surveyed	 for	 the	 report	said	 they	were	not	aware	of	 the	 fund,	bringing	 into	question	 the	ability	of	the	scheme	to	adequately	support	those	in	danger	of	becoming	homeless.	Further,	and	importantly,	the	discursive	and	regulatory	implications	of,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 being	 exempt	 from	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	 and	 therefore	receiving	 one’s	 housing	 benefit	 in	 full;	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 facing	 a	reduction	 in	 one’s	 housing	 benefit	 because	 of	 a	 ‘spare’	 bedroom	 and	 then	
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receiving	a	DHP	to	cover	the	reduction,	are	also	different.	In	the	former	case	the	 state’s	 agencies	 accept	 that	 the	 room	 in	 question	 is	 not	 ‘spare’	 but	necessary	–	and	in	the	Rutherfords’	case,	specifically,	necessary	for	meeting	Warren’s	 disability-related	 needs.	 In	 the	 latter	 case,	 the	 room	 is,	 indeed,	deemed	‘spare’,	but	the	relevant	state	agencies	decide	to	cover	the	affected	household’s	 rent	 regardless	 –	 perhaps	 for	 reasons	 of	 strong	 need,	 a	particular	and	recognisable	vulnerability,	or	possibly	because	not	to	award	a	DHP	would	overall	end	up	being	more	costly	to	the	council.	The	Rutherfords	were	allowed	an	extra	bedroom	for	the	use	of	respite	carers,	without	whom	they	 would	 not	 have	 been	 able	 to	 take	 care	 of	 their	 grandson	Warren	 at	home.	 Rian	 Daly	 was	 cared	 for	 by	 both	 of	 his	 parents	 but	 at	 different	addresses	 and,	 therefore,	 only	 allowed	 one	 room	 between	 them,	 without	either	parent	facing	a	reduction	in	their	housing	benefit.	 In	the	former,	the	extra	room	allowed	the	grandparents	to	continue	providing	care	to	Warren	at	 home,	 whereas	 in	 the	 latter,	 the	 extra	 room	 allowed	 both	 parents	 to	continue	 sharing	 the	 responsibility	 of	 caring	 for	 their	 son	 –	 as	 well	 as	ensured	that	Rian’s	relationships	with	both	of	his	parents	continued.		While	the	Supreme	Court	did	not	explicitly	adjudicate	on	the	basis	of	James	Daly’s	 relationship	with	 his	 son	 being	 less	valuable	 than	 that	 of	 the	Rutherfords’	 grandson	 to	 his	 respite	 carers	 (or	 to	 his	 grandparents),	 in	practice	 and	 implicitly,	 these	 relationships,	 nonetheless,	 appear	 to	 carry	strikingly	 differential	 value.	 Although	 she	 examines	 immigration	 regimes,	Ala	 Sirriyeh’s	 argument	 that	 immigration	 decisions	 can	 involve	 ‘a	hierarchical	 ordering	 of	 the	 value	 of	 [--]	 relationship[s]’	 (2015:	 236)	 is	relevant	 here.	 In	 this	 case,	 similarly,	 Warren’s	 relationship	 to	 both	 his	grandparents	and	his	respite	carers	materialised	as	differentially	valuable	to	that	 between	 James	 Daly	 and	 his	 son.	 Without	 the	 extra	 room,	 the	Rutherfords	would	have	most	likely	had	to	place	Warren	in	residential	care;	whereas	Rian	would	have	lost	out	on	having	a	relationship	with	both	of	his	parents,	 and	 the	 parents	 on	 being	 able	 to	 share	 the	 responsibility	 of	parenting.	Rian’s	relationship	with	his	father	was,	thus,	implicitly	not	seen	as	equally	valuable	as	that	of	the	Rutherfords	to	their	grandson	–	or	at	least	not	valuable	 enough	 for	 the	 state	 to	 take	 action	 to	 protect	 and	 enable	 it.	 The	
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processes	of	 implementation,	 thus,	produce	their	own	hierarchies	of	value,	which	 may	 be	 different	 than	 the	 values	 explicitly	 expressed	 in	 policy	language	–	as	they	are	in	this	case.		Although	James	Daly’s	situation	indicates	that	at	least	some	councils	are	willing	 to	 take	action	 through	 the	DHP	scheme	 to	enable	 relationships	such	 as	 that	 between	 him	 and	 his	 son,	 nonetheless,	 in	 practice	 separated	parents	 living	 in	 social	 housing	 are	 strongly	 discouraged	 from	 sharing	caring	 and	 parenting	 responsibilities	 evenly	 as	 a	 –	 perhaps	 unintended	 –	consequence	 of	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax.	 Had	 Rian	 been	 cared	 for	 by	 his	 father	alone,	the	Bedroom	Tax	regulations	would	have	allowed	not	only	a	room	for	him,	but	also	possibly	another	room	for	respite	carers,	as	in	the	case	of	the	Rutherfords.	However,	since	James	was	only	partially	responsible	for	Rian’s	care,	even	just	a	room	for	Rian	himself	was	considered	‘spare.’	The	policy’s	regulatory	framework	holds	no	space	for	considering	James	as	fulfilling	the	role	of	a	respite	carer,	providing	much	needed	respite	to	Rian’s	mother.	This	effect	 of	 the	 policy,	 thus,	 also	 sits	 in	 stark	 contrast	 to	 the	 austerity	discourses	examined	in	Chapter	3,	which	tend	to	place	a	strong	emphasis	on	the	importance	of	two-parent	families,	and	specifically	on	that	of	fathering.	In	 this	 case,	 the	 relationship	between	 James	Daly	and	his	 son	was	 seen	as	
unnecessary	for	meeting	Rian’s	disability-related	needs,	and,	consequently,	it	was	precisely	this	relationship	that	also	ended	up	being	the	most	disrupted	by	the	policy’s	effects.		Similarly	to	the	Daly	and	Rutherfords	cases,	a	contrast	could	be	made	between	couples	who	are	unable	 to	share	a	bedroom	due	 to	one	partner’s	need	 for	 disability-related	 equipment	 in	 their	 bedroom	 –	 covered	 by	 the	Bedroom	 Tax	 exemptions,	 as	 highlighted	 by	 the	 Supreme	 Court	 case	 of	Carmichael	–	and	couples	who	are	unable	or	unwilling	to	share	a	bedroom	for	any	other	reason	–	whether	varying	sleep	patterns	or	arrangements,	or	simply	 differing	 preferences	 –	 not	 accommodated	 by	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	regulations.	 Along	 similar	 lines,	 the	 policy	 allows	 children	 not	 to	 share	 a	bedroom	with	a	sibling	if	they	are	over	16	years	of	age,	or	over	ten	years	of	age	 and	 of	 a	 different	 sex	 than	 the	 sibling,	 or	 if	 they,	 again	 similarly	 to	Carmichael,	require	disability-related	equipment	in	their	bedroom	–	but	not	
	 221	
for	any	other	reason.	In	these	situations,	intimate	relationships	with	certain	family	members	 –	 a	wife,	 a	 husband,	 or	 a	 sibling	 –	 are	 imposed	 on	 social	housing	residents	by	the	policy’s	effects.	The	regulations	related	to	siblings	are,	 further,	 based	 on	 naturalised	 assumptions	 about	 the	 nature	 of	 both	sibling	relationships	and	childhood	itself.	Children	under	the	age	of	ten	are	seen	through	a	desexualised	lens,	and,	therefore,	it	is	considered	appropriate	for	 them	 to	 share	 a	 bedroom.156	In	 contrast,	 siblings	 of	 a	 different	 sex	between	 the	 ages	 of	 ten	 and	 16	 are	 (heteronormatively)	 sexualised	 and,	consequently,	 it	 is	assumed	 that	 it	would	be	 improper	 for	 them	to	share	a	bedroom.	 In	 the	 case	 of	 both	 couples	 and	 siblings,	 then,	 the	 affected	individuals	 ‘have	 to	 perform	 a	 normative	 (read	 “heteronormative”),	intelligible	story	of	 intimacy’	(White	2014:	78),	and	the	intimacies	of	those	who	 do	 not	 or	 cannot	 perform	 such	 normative	 intimacies	 are	 subject	 to	implicit	judgement.		The	 cases	 of	 A	 and	 JD	 provide	 a	 final	 illustrative	 example.	 Both	claimants	live	in	specially	constructed	or	adapted	properties:	JD’s	property	due	to	the	disabilities	of	their	adult	daughter,	AD;	and	A’s	under	a	‘sanctuary	scheme’	–	accommodation	that	has	been	adapted	to	provide	protection	 for	women	at	high	risk	of	domestic	violence.	In	both	cases	the	Court	agreed	that	while	it	may	be	appropriate	for	the	relevant	councils	to	continue	paying	the	claimants’	 rents	 in	 full	 through	 the	DHP	 scheme,	 at	 the	 same	 time	neither	claimant	required	the	number	of	bedrooms	they	presently	had,	as	the	special	modifications	 made	 to	 their	 properties	 were	 unrelated	 to	 the	 number	 of	rooms.	 However,	 similarly	 to	 the	 other	 five	 cases	 heard	 by	 the	 Supreme	Court,	JD	and	A	lived	in	their	‘over-sized’	properties	not	because	of	greed	or	a	desire	 for	 ‘spare’	 rooms,	but	because	of	 the	 lack	of	 smaller	properties	 in	their	 area.	 The	 properties	 had	 been	 allocated	 to	 them	 by	 the	 council	 and	then	 modified,	 at	 great	 financial	 cost	 to	 the	 council,	 to	 meet	 their	 exact	requirements.	 Additionally,	 in	 A’s	 case	 the	 sanctuary	 scheme	 adaptations	were	 made	 specifically	 so	 that	 she	 could	 continue	 to	 live	 safely	 in	 her	
																																																								156	On	childhood,	and	specifically	on	the	role	of	sexualisation	in	determining	the	boundaries	of	childhood,	see	Breslow	(2016).		
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current	 accommodations	 without	 having	 to	 move	 –	 a	 stated	 aim	 of	 the	sanctuary	scheme	in	general.		The	 demand	 that	 A	move	 to	 a	more	 suitably	 sized	 property,	made	through	the	application	of	the	Bedroom	Tax	to	her	situation,	thus,	appears	in	stark	contrast	 to	her	 specified	need	not	 to	move	–	a	need	both	 recognised	and	met	by	the	council	through	the	sanctuary	scheme.	The	disruptions	that	the	 policy	 engendered	 in	 A’s	 intimate	 life	 materialise	 in	 the	 literal	
impossibility	of	the	council	meeting	these	competing	needs	and	demands	at	the	 same	 time.	 These	 two	 cases,	 thus,	 highlight	 a	 curious	 discrepancy	between	an	LA	decision	that	allocates	a	particular	property	to	a	household	and	 a	 national	 policy	 that	 then	deems	one	 (or	more)	 of	 the	 rooms	 in	 that	property	‘spare’	and,	consequently,	demands	that	the	household	pays	for	the	privilege	of	having	the	extra	room(s).	In	other	words,	a	household’s	original	need	for	housing	–	met	by	the	council	following	an	assessment	of,	firstly,	all	the	available	social	housing	options	in	their	area	and,	secondly,	the	needs	of	everyone	on	 the	 council’s	 social	housing	waiting	 list	 at	 the	 time	–	appears	here	in	contradiction	with	the	Bedroom	Tax	and	its	demand	that	a	need	for	housing	 should	 not	 be	 over-met.	 The	 policy,	 thus,	 not	 only	 significantly	compromises	 LA	 ability	 to	make	 decisions	 about	 housing	 allocation	 based	on	 their	 knowledge	 about	 the	 conditions	 of	 supply	 and	 demand	 for	 social	housing	 in	 their	 area.	 It	 also	 renders	 any	 central	 government	 claim	 about	increasing	localisation	in	decision	making	meaningless,	thus	also	confirming	Jamie	 Peck’s	 argument	 that	 neoliberalising	 ‘devolution’	 tends	 to	 involve	various	 changes	 in	 ‘regulatory	 responsibilities,	 administrative	 capacities,	financial	 control,	 political	 power	 and	 so	 forth’	 (2001:	 447)	 –	 rather	 than	simply	 a	 relocation	 of	 the	 implementation	 of	 a	 particular	 policy	 from	 the	national	to	the	local	level.157	As	these	cases	show,	therefore,	it	is	specifically	in	the	discrepancy	or	
gap	between	the	national	policy	–	with	its	idealised	aim	that	the	UK’s	social	housing	stock	should	exactly	match	the	needs	of	the	country’s	social	housing	claimants	 –	 and	 the	 (in)ability	 of	 most	 LAs	 to	 realise	 this	 aim,	 that	 the																																																									157	See	 also	 Chapter	 1,	 and	 Featherstone	 et	 al.’s	 (2012)	 conceptualisation	 of	 ‘austerity	localism.’	
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Bedroom	Tax	emerges	as	a	punitive	policy.	 In	other	words,	 the	penality	of	the	 policy	 emerges	 from	 the	 impossibility	 of	 its	 successful	 implementation	according	to	its	stated	aims.	This	reading	also	highlights	that	in	the	context	of	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax	 fairness	 in	 social	 housing	 allocation	 is	 framed	 purely	around	the	financial	value	of	the	number	of	rooms	a	particular	property	has,	rather	than	around	the	suitability	of	the	accommodations	otherwise	–	more	likely	to	be	the	council’s	priority.	The	cases	of	both	A	and	JD	illustrate	that	the	 overwhelming	 focus	 on	 the	 number	 of	 rooms	 functions	 to	 shift	 the	discursive	focus	away,	 firstly,	 from	the	financial	value	of	other	things,	such	as	 special	 adaptations	 made	 to	 properties	 either	 under	 the	 sanctuary	scheme	or	for	disability-related	reasons	and,	secondly,	from	the	value	of	care	
and	intimate	relations	and	towards	monetary	or	financial	value	alone.	Since	the	 same	 range	 of	 peculiar	 intimate	 disruptions	 would	 not	 have	 been	engendered	by	a	focus	on	square	footage,	for	instance,158	this	shift	towards	emphasising	 the	 financial	 cost	of	 the	under-	or	over-use	of	 rooms,	 further,	works	 to	 heighten	 the	 policy’s	 effects	 on	 the	 intimate	 sphere,	 naturalising	the	 implicit	 judgements	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 intimacies,	 needs,	 and	relationships	embedded	in	it.	While	the	original	reasoning	for	the	introduction	of	the	Bedroom	Tax	had	to	do	with	better	utilisation	of	the	UK’s	social	housing	stock	–	and	with	the	potential	for	making	savings	on	social	housing	–	it	is	unclear	whether	the	policy	has	been	a	financial	success.	Although	exact	figures	are	not	available,	due	 to	 the	 combined	 effect	 of	 the	 lack	 of	 suitable	 social	 housing	 stock,	particularly	 of	 one-bedroom	 properties;	 the	 increasing	 number	 of	exemptions	to	the	policy;	and	the	significant	overspending	on	DHPs	in	some	areas,	 it	 is	 unlikely	 that	 the	 overall	 savings	 made	 by	 the	 policy	 are	significant.	However,	 the	policy	has	resulted	 in	at	 least	some	of	 the	cost	of	the	 underuse	 of	 the	 UK’s	 social	 housing	 stock	 being	 shifted	 from	 central	government	 to	 Local	 Authorities,	 housing	 associations,	 and	 individual	households.	DWP	(2016)	figures	show	that	41	per	cent	of	Local	Authorities	(152	 out	 of	 367)	 spent	more	 on	 DHPs	 than	was	 allocated	 to	 them	 by	 the																																																									158	Although	 of	 course	 it	 is	 possible	 that	 such	 a	 focus	 would	 have	 engendered	 its	 own,	peculiar,	range	of	intimate	disruptions.	
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Government	 between	 April	 2015	 and	 March	 2016,	 topping	 up	 the	government	grant	from	their	own	funds.	Further,	as	tenants	are	increasingly	unwilling	 to	 accept	 properties	 deemed	 to	 have	 too	 many	 rooms,	 housing	associations	and	other	large	landlords	are	finding	it	increasingly	difficult	to	utilise	all	of	their	housing	stock	(Criddle	2015).	As	my	discussion	in	the	final	section	of	this	chapter	illustrates,	it	is	landlords	who	have	borne	the	cost	of	repurposing	their	housing	stock	to	better	match	the	needs	of	social	housing	tenants.		Thus,	rather	than	necessarily	resulting	in	overall	savings	–	or,	indeed,	in	 better	 utilisation	 of	 the	 UK’s	 social	 housing	 stock	 –	 perhaps	 one	 of	 the	policy’s	key	values	for	the	central	government	can,	instead,	be	found	in	the	various	 shifts	 in	 value	 themselves.	 These	 include	 both	 the	 discursive	 shift	towards	 financial	 value	 and	 the	 shift	 by	 which	 the	 cost	 of	 the	 poor	 fit	between	 the	UK’s	 social	 housing	 stock	 and	 the	 needs	 of	 its	 social	 housing	clients	–	the	consequence	of	decades	of	lack	of	investment	in	social	housing	–	has	been	moved	onto	the	affected	individuals	themselves,	as	well	as	onto	the	Local	Authorities	 that	 owe	 them	 the	homelessness	duty.	As	well	 as	 its	value	 for	 the	 governments,	 it	 is	 within	 these	 shifts	 that	 the	 policy’s	punitiveness	can	be	found,	as	 it	 is	precisely	 its	over-emphasis	on	particular	kinds	of	financial	value,	and	under-emphasis	on	both	other	kinds	of	financial	value	and	the	value	of	certain	intimate	and	care	relations,	that	 leads	to	the	materialisation	of	various	intimate	disruptions	in	affected	individuals’	lives.	The	 emphasis	 on	 the	 number	 of	 rooms	 and,	 concomitantly,	 on	 intimacy,	thus,	 works	 as	 an	 alibi	 for	 the	 violent	 disruptions	 that	 these	 emphases	engender.	 As	 the	 above	 discussion	 has	 illustrated,	 the	 strange	 effects	 that	the	 Bedroom	 Tax	 (can)	 have	 on	 intimate	 lives	 are,	 further,	 sometimes	explicitly	 contradictory	 to	 policy	 –	 thus	 revealing	 the	 meaninglessness	 of	policy	 rhetoric	 in	 the	 face	 of	 the	 disruptive	 implications	 of	 policy	implementation.	 Yvette	 Taylor’s	 argument	 that	 ‘intimate	 relationships	 are	brought	 into	 being,	 and	 negated,	 in	 interaction	 with	 institutional	frameworks	 and	 through	 intersecting	 legal	 and	 material	 (im)possibilities’	(2013:	18)	is,	thus,	broadly	confirmed	by	the	Bedroom	Tax	and	its	peculiar,	but	violent,	effects	on	the	intimate	lives	of	those	affected.		
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Liveable	Lives	 		As	 briefly	 highlighted	 above,	 in	 November	 2012	 Titina	 Nzolameso,	 a	 51-year-old	 single	 mother	 with	 multiple	 long-standing	 health	 issues	 ranging	from	HIV	to	diabetes,	and	with	five	children	aged	between	eight	and	14,	was	evicted	from	her	home	in	Westminster,	London.	The	rent	for	her	privately-rented	house	had	been	covered	by	housing	benefit	until	the	implementation	of	the	changes	to	Local	Housing	Allowance	rates	earlier	that	year,	resulting	in	a	significant	reduction	in	her	housing	benefit.	She	applied	to	Westminster	council	 for	housing	under	 the	1996	homelessness	provisions,	 and	her	 and	her	children	were	placed	in	temporary	accommodation	in	the	neighbouring	borough	while	she	waited	for	a	decision.	The	council	accepted	their	duty	to	house	Nzolameso	and	her	children	and	offered	her	a	privately	rented	 five-bedroom	house	in	Bletchley,	Milton	Keynes.	Nzolameso	rejected	the	offer	on	several	grounds:	it	was	too	far	away	from	her	friends	and	support	network;	she	did	not	know	anyone	in	Milton	Keynes;	she	had	several	long-term	health	issues	 and	would	 have	 to	 change	GPs;	 her	 children	would	 have	 to	 change	schools;	 and	 she	 had	 lived	 in	 Westminster	 for	 a	 long	 time.	 Her	 refusal	resulted	in	the	council	immediately	notifying	her	that	its	duty	to	house	her	had	 ended.	 Nzolameso	 then	 proceeded	 to	 appeal	 the	 decision	 with	 the	council,	 as	well	 as	 eventually	with	both	 the	 county	 court	 and	 the	Court	 of	Appeal,	but	all	 three	confirmed	 the	council’s	original	decision.	 In	February	2014	 the	 council	 ceased	 to	 provide	 her	 and	 her	 children	 with	 temporary	accommodation,	 and	 since	 the	 children’s	 services	 department	 refused	 to	accommodate	 the	whole	 family	 together,	 she	 requested	 the	department	 to	provide	accommodation	 just	 for	her	children.	The	children	were	separated	between	three	different	foster	families	and	care	proceedings	begun.		Titina	Nzolameso’s	case	is	not	unique:	in	October	2013	48	per	cent	of	all	temporary	accommodation	units	in	the	City	of	Westminster	were	out	of	borough	 (Nzolameso).	 Nationally,	 in	 September	 2014	 a	 quarter	 of	 all	temporary	accommodation	for	homeless	people	was	provided	in	a	different	council	 area	 –	 an	 increase	 of	 29	 per	 cent	 since	 September	 2013	 –	 a	 great	majority	of	which	(93	per	cent)	were	 from	London	boroughs	(DCLG	2014:	
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10).	Furthermore,	according	to	figures	obtained	by	The	Independent	(2015),	between	 July	 2011	 and	 July	 2014	 London	 Councils	 moved	 almost	 50,000	households	 out	 of	 borough,	 with	 over	 2,700	 families	 moved	 out	 of	 the	capital	 entirely.	 In	 a	 large	 proportion	 of	 these	 cases	 the	 receiving	 council	was	 not	 notified	 of	 the	 family’s	 move	 into	 the	 new	 council	 area.	 These	figures	 clearly	 illustrate	 the	 flow	of	 homeless	 families	 from	 inner	 to	 outer	London	 and	 out	 of	 London	 altogether,	 prompting	 many	 commentators	 to	describe	 the	 issue	 in	 terms	 of	 ‘social	 cleansing’	 (Bloom	 2017;	 The	Independent	2015;	Khomami	2015;	Taylor	2015).	Nzolameso’s	case	reflects	these	trends	–	as	well	as	echoes	the	situation	of	Katie,	the	lead	character	in	the	film	I,	Daniel	Blake	discussed	in-depth	in	the	previous	chapter.	Local	 Authority	 decision	 making	 about	 social	 housing	 allocation	 is	not	 just	 about	 the	 suitability	 of	 properties	 in	 general,	 but	 also	 about	matching	those	properties	to	the	specific	needs	of	particular	claimants	–	as	the	 City	 of	 Westminster	 believed	 to	 have	 done	 when	 they	 sent	 Titina	Nzolameso	a	letter	with	the	following	quote:	There	is	a	severe	shortage	of	accommodation	in	Westminster	and	it	 is	 not	 reasonably	 practicable	 for	 us	 to	 offer	 a	 Westminster	home	for	everyone	who	applies	for	one.	That	is	why	we	have	had	to	 offer	 you	 accommodation	 in	 Milton	 Keynes.	 Although	 it	 is	outside	Westminster,	having	 considered	your	 circumstances,	we	
believe	 this	 accommodation	 is	 suitable	 for	 you.	 (City	 of	Westminster	quoted	in	Nzolameso:	555,	emphasis	mine)	Regardless	 of	 the	 council’s	 unilateral	 belief	 in	 the	 accommodation’s	suitability	for	Nzolameso	and	her	family,	however,	the	property	appears	to	be	a	poor	fit	to	her	needs	–	primarily	due	to	its	 location.	The	council	 letter	does	 not,	 for	 instance,	 address	 Nzolameso’s	 claim	 that	 her	 friends	 in	Westminster	helped	her	with	childcare	whenever	she	was	hospitalised;	nor	does	 it	 consider	what	support	and	resources	would	be	available	 for	her	 in	Bletchley,	particularly	 in	terms	of	childcare.	While	the	council	did	consider	her	children’s	schooling	needs	and	her	medical	needs,	neither	were	seen	as	issues	 that	 would	 preclude	 her	 from	 moving	 to	 Bletchley.	 Furthermore,	while	 the	 council	 initially	 accepted	 Nzolameso	 as	 belonging	 to	 a	 specific	priority	group	when	 they	accepted	 their	duty	 to	house	her,	at	 the	point	of	
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decision	 making	 about	 where	 to	 house	 her	 family,	 however,	 the	 specific	needs	that	were	a	direct	consequence	of	her	belonging	to	that	priority	group	dropped	out	of	the	framework	almost	entirely.	In	 2012,	 the	 Department	 for	 Communities	 and	 Local	 Government	(DCLG)	published	supplementary	guidance	that	strengthened	the	obligation	for	 LAs	 to	 find	 accommodation	 as	 close	 as	 possible	 to	where	 a	 household	had	previously	resided.	The	guidance	states	that	LAs		are	 required	 to	 take	 into	 account	 the	 significance	 of	 any	disruption	 with	 specific	 regard	 to	 employment,	 caring	responsibilities	or	education	of	the	applicant	or	members	of	their	household.	 Where	 possible	 the	 authority	 should	 seek	 to	 retain	
established	links	with	schools,	doctors,	social	workers	and	other	key	
services	 and	 support.	 (quoted	 in	 ibid.:	 559,	 emphasis	 in	 the	original)	Of	course	the	 ‘established	links’	Nzolameso	had	with	medical	professionals	and	her	children’s	schools,	for	example,	would	have	been	disrupted	had	she	accepted	 the	 council’s	 housing	 offer.	 The	 more	 informal	 support	 and	friendship	 networks	 she	 relied	 on,	 for	 instance	 for	 childcare,	 would	 have	also	suffered	from	the	move,	however,	but	they	are	not	considered	either	in	the	 official	 guidance	 or	 in	 the	 council’s	 decision.	 This	 omission	 reveals	 a	value	 judgement	 implicit	 in	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 highlighting	 the	differential	 value	 that	 formal	 and	 official,	 compared	 to	more	 informal	 and	
unofficial,	support	networks	and	relationship	are	assumed	to	have.	While	in	Nzolameso’s	 case	 the	 council	 did	 not	 view	 even	 the	more	 formal	 support	and	care	relationships	as	significant	enough	a	reason	for	her	to	continue	to	reside	in	Westminster	(or	London),	the	more	informal	ones	were	not	part	of	the	consideration	in	the	first	place.		White	 discusses	 the	 ‘incongruence	 between	 life	 as	 lived	 (“reality”)	and	 its	 documentary	 representation	 (“papereality”)’	 (2014:	 76)	 that	frequently	 appears	 in	 immigration	 proceedings.	 Along	 similar	 lines,	 the	reality	of	Nzolameso’s	intimate	life	was	not	reflected	in	the	decision-making	processes	 that	 only	 considered	 relationships	 with	 official,	 documentable,	status	 as	 –	 potentially	 –	 important.	 The	 disruptions	 engendered	 in	Nzolameso’s	life	were,	thus,	based	on	an	implicit	assessment	that	rendered	
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official	relationships	more	valuable	than	unofficial	ones.	As	Sarah	Marie	Hall	argues,	however,	care	involves	‘a	complex	assemblage	of	intimate	relations,	including	 combinations	 of	 kin	 [--],	 friends	 [--]	 or	 strangers	 [--]’	 (2016b:	1020).159	The	 decision-making	 processes	 in	 Nzolameso’s	 case	 overlooked	both	‘the	importance	of	family	members	and	friends	outside	of	parent/child	relationships,	 individuals	 who	 feature	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 network	 of	intimacy’	 (Hall	 2016a:	 311),	 and,	 consequently,	 that	 care	 is	 seldom	a	 one-way	 process	 but	 tends	 to,	 instead,	 be	 immersed	 in	 interdependence	 and	interconnectedness.	 The	 appraisal	 of	 Nzolameso’s	 intimate	 and	 caring	 life	through	 a	 hierarchical	 ordering	 of	 official	 and	 unofficial	 relationships	 also	highlights	 the	 decision	 makers’	 view	 of	 disability	 as	 a	 medical	 category	above	 all	 (Shakespeare	 2000),	 as	 her	 relationship	 with	 medical	professionals	 was	 part	 of	 the	 decision-making	 process,	 but	 other	relationships	that	enabled	her	to	live	a	liveable	life	were	not.	Overall,	then,	it	was	 the	kind	of	care	and	 intimacy	 that	develops	 ‘within	everyday	routines	and	 relationships,	 impossible	 to	 price	 apart	 from	 interdependencies,	interpersonal	relations,	inter-	and	intra-generationality’	(Hall	2016b:	1029)	that	 was	 seen	 as	 the	 least	 valuable	 and,	 consequently,	 susceptible	 to	 the	most	significant	disruption	in	Nzolameso’s	case.		This	 case,	 thus,	 illustrates	 that	 Local	 Authorities	 and	 other	 key	decision	makers	 are	 intimately	 involved	 in	 –	 apart	 from	 finding	 ‘suitable’	accommodations	 –	making	 decisions	 about	what	 constitutes	 a	 liveable	 life	for	 someone	 supported	 by	 housing	 benefit.	 Judith	 Butler	 develops	 the	concept	 of	 liveability	 specifically	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 role	 of	 gender	 and	sexuality	norms	in	regimes	of	recognisability,	arguing	that	 ‘certain	humans	are	not	recognized	as	human	at	all,	and	that	leads	to	[an]	order	of	unlivable	life’	(2004b:	2).160	For	her,	recognisability	may	be	a	condition	of	liveability,	but	at	 the	same	time	the	terms	by	which	one	 is	recognised	may	also	make	life	unliveable.	She	goes	on	to	ask	after	the	‘minimum	conditions	for	a	livable																																																									159	See	 also	 Sandhu	 and	 Stevenson	 (2015)	 for	 a	 discussion	 of	 the	 impacts	 that	 losing	community	 support	 networks	 can	 have	 for	 racialised	 and	 ethnic	 minority	 families,	 in	particular.		160	In	 later	 work	 Butler	 (2004a,	 2009)	 further	 develops	 this	 concept	 to	 examine	 the	schemes	 of	 intelligibility	 that	 establish	 who	 counts	 as	 human	 and,	 consequently,	 whose	lives,	when	lost,	are	worth	public	grieving.	
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life	with	regard	to	human	life’	(ibid.:	39).	Although	Butler	is	interested	in	the	
normative	 –	 rather	 than	 material	 –	 conditions	 for	 a	 liveable	 life,	 her	conceptualisation	 is,	 nonetheless,	 relevant	 here.	 A	 liveable	 life	 is	made	 up	not	only	of	 the	basic	conditions	required	for	surviving,	such	as	shelter	and	medical	care,	but	also,	 for	 instance,	of	 the	full	range	of	 intimate	and	caring	relationships	that	a	person	requires	to	thrive	–	which	were	in	Nzolameso’s	case	excluded	from	consideration	from	the	first	instance	of	decision	making	onwards.	Certain	conditions	of	 liveability	are,	thus,	 implicit	 in	the	decision-making	processes	that	attach	to	both	the	Bedroom	Tax	and	the	LA	practice	of	moving	housing	benefit	recipients	out	of	the	LA	area,	as	exemplified	in	the	Nzolameso	case.		The	 absence	 of	 a	 consideration	 for	 informal	 care	 and	 intimate	relations	from	the	council’s	decision	(as	well	as	from	the	official	guidance),	thus,	reveals	an	implicit	assumption	that	a	liveable	life	for	a	housing	benefits	recipient	 or	 a	 homeless	 household	 can	 –	 and	 should	 –	 be	 achieved	 by	meeting	basic	needs	 for	shelter	and	medical	care	and,	crucially,	by	making	sure	 that	 any	 existing	 paid	 employment	 can	 be	 continued	 –	 echoing	 the	implications	of	the	‘worklessness’	discourse	examined	in	chapter	3.	While	at	first	glance	 it	might	seem	that	 the	council	simply	 failed	to	act	according	to	the	 statutory	 guidance,	 quoted	 above,	 and	 to	 provide	 Nzolameso	 with	accommodation	 that	 met	 her	 needs,	 I	 want	 to,	 here,	 highlight	 a	 slightly	different	 set	 of	 questions	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 case.	 If	 Local	 Authorities	 are	obliged	 to,	 ‘where	 possible’,	 retain	 established	 links	 with	 doctors,	 social	services,	 and	 schools	 when	 securing	 housing,	 what	 are	 the	 conditions	 in	which	 it	 is	 permissible	 to	 severe	 these	 links	 and	 to,	 therefore,	 potentially	make	 a	 life	 unliveable?	 According	 to	 the	 letter	 sent	 to	 Nzolameso,	 quoted	above,	unfavourable	local	housing	market	conditions	alone	were	enough	to	justify	 the	 council’s	 decision	 to	 offer	 her	 housing	 outside	 of	Westminster.	Given	the	ease	with	which	this	decision	was	made	in	Nzolameso’s	case	–	as	well	 as	 undoubtedly	 in	 many	 others	 –	 perhaps	 the	 question	 should	 be	phrased	as:	are	 there,	 in	 fact,	any	 conditions	 in	which	 the	 liveability	of	 life	takes	precedence	over	financial	considerations?	
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Nzolameso	was	first	moved	to	bed	and	breakfast	accommodation	in	the	neighbouring	borough,	 then	asked	to	move	outside	of	London	entirely,	and	when	she	refused	this	offer,	her	children	were	placed	 into	care.	These	multiple	changes	of	course	in	significant	ways	disrupted	Nzolameso	and	her	children’s	 lives.	 However,	 they	 do	 not	 constitute	 ‘disruption’	 in	 the	 sense	intended	 in	 the	 supplementary	 guidance	 (quoted	 above)	 –	 the	 council	believed	 it	 had	done	 enough	 to	meet	 the	 requirements	of	 the	 guidance	by	citing	the	‘severe	shortage	of	accommodation	in	Westminster’	as	the	reason	it	was	not	‘reasonably	practicable’	(Nzolameso:	555)	to	offer	her	housing	in	the	 borough.	 What	 then,	 does	 count	 as	 disruption?	 Furthermore,	 and	perhaps	more	importantly,	what	are	the	circumstances	in	which	moving	to	a	faraway	 location	 chosen	 by	 someone	 else	would	not	 constitute	 significant	‘disruption	 with	 specific	 regard	 to	 employment,	 caring	 responsibilities	 or	education	of	the	applicant	or	members	of	their	household’	(quoted	in	 ibid.:	559),	 as	 required	 by	 the	 guidance?	 Here	 disruption	 begins	 to	 appear	 as	something	 inherent	 to	 the	decision-making	process,	 rather	 than	something	that	the	LA	in	question	strives	to	avoid	at	all	cost.		The	Supreme	Court	 ruled	 in	Nzolameso’s	 favour,	 specifically	stating	that	the	standard	paragraph	included	in	the	council’s	decision	letter	was	not	sufficient,	as	it	did	not	include	information	about	what	accommodation	was	available	 in	Westminster	and	why	 it	had	not	been	offered	 to	her;	whether	accommodation	 closer	 to	 Westminster	 was	 considered;	 and	 what,	 if	 any,	inquiries	 had	 been	 made	 to	 assess	 how	 practical	 the	 move	 would	 be	 for	Nzolameso.161	However,	 had	 the	 council	 letter	 provided	 this	 information,	including	a	detailed	assessment	of	 the	properties	available	 in	Westminster	as	well	as	elsewhere	 in	Greater	London,	 the	disruptions	 to	Nzolameso	and	her	 children’s	 relational	 and	 intimate	 lives	would	 have,	 presumably,	 been	justifiable,	 as	 well	 as	 lawful.	 The	 Bedroom	 Tax,	 similarly,	 materialises	 as	
inherently	 disruptive	 if	 we	 consider	 the	 conditions	 of	 unliveability	engendered	by	the	policy.	Does	the	requirement	that	Rian	no	longer	spend	three	days	per	week	with	his	father	constitute	an	unliveable	life	for	either	or																																																									161	Nzolameso	has	since	been	reunited	with	her	children	and	relocated	 to	 the	outskirts	of	London	(Gentleman	2015).		
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both	 of	 them?	 Or	 the	 request	 that	 A	 move	 out	 of	 her	 specially	 adapted	property?	Here	both	 the	 intimate	disruptions	 themselves,	and	 the	resulting	conditions	of	unliveability,	 are	built	 into	 the	processes	by	which	 these	 two	policies	and	practices	operate	at	the	level	of	implementation.		At	the	same	time	as	the	DCLG	acted	to	strengthen	the	guidance	on	the	importance	of	close	location	in	finding	privately	rented	accommodation	for	housing	 benefit	 recipients,	 the	 Government	was	 also	 careful	 to	 emphasise	that	the	guidance	did	not	prohibit	placements	out	of	LA	area	‘where	they	are	unavoidable	nor	where	 they	are	 the	choice	of	 the	applicant’	 (cited	 in	 ibid.:	559).	Additionally,	just	a	year	earlier,	the	same	Government	had	introduced	the	 changes	 to	 the	 Local	 Housing	 Allowance	 rates,	 as	well	 as	 the	 changes	introduced	in	the	Localism	Act	2011	that	made	it	easier	for	LAs	to	discharge	their	homelessness	duty	by	offering	a	homeless	household	accommodation	in	 the	 private	 rented	 sector	 –	 both	 significant	 contributing	 factors	 behind	the	 increase	 in	 out-of-council	 housing	 placements.	 Nzolameso’s	 case	highlights	clearly	these	contrasting	pressures	faced	by	Local	Authorities.	On	the	 one	 hand,	 the	 new	 guidance	 places	 a	 demand	 on	 councils	 to	accommodate	 households	 as	 close	 to	 their	 previous	 housing	 as	 possible,	carefully	taking	into	account	their	specific	circumstances	and	needs;	but	on	the	other,	many	of	the	previously	existing	barriers	to	placing	households	out	of	borough	have	at	 the	same	time	been	removed.	Curiously	 then,	 the	same	Government	 was	 involved	 in	 legislating	 in	 ways	 that	 both	 support	 this	increasing	 practice	 and	 curb	 some	 of	 its	 effects.	 State	 power,	 thus,	 here	appears	 to	 be	 operating	 through	 an	 increasingly	 complicated	 regulatory	framework	 that	 both	 strongly	 incentivises	 LAs	 to	 use	 out	 of	 borough	placements	and	publicly	speaks	against	them.		The	 parameters	 both	 for	 what	 is	 considered	 ‘suitable’	accommodation,	 and	 for	 what	 constitutes	 a	 liveable	 life	 are,	 thus,	 being	
narrowed	 by	 the	 complex	and	contradictory	 regulatory	 framework	around	housing	 placements	 for	 housing	 benefit	 recipients.	 As	 housing	 market	conditions	 and	other	 factors	 are	 leading	 to	 councils	 finding	 it	 increasingly	difficult	to	house	all	the	homeless	households	within	their	areas,	more	and	more	 out-of-council	 placements	 –	 and,	 relatedly,	more	 and	more	 intimate	
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disruptions	 –	 will,	 as	 a	 consequence,	 become	 ‘unavoidable’	 for	 them.	 The	punitiveness	of	this	practice	arises	in	the	contradictory	pressures	created	by	national	 policies	 that	 function	 to	 both	 encourage	 and	 discourage	 the	practice.	 It	 is,	 thus,	 in	 the	 contradictions	 between	 the	 aims	 and	 effects	 of	different	national	policies,	as	well	as	again	–	similarly	to	the	Bedroom	Tax	–	in	 the	 gaps	 between	 national	 policy	 aims	 and	 the	 local	 resources	(un)available	 for	 meeting	 them,	 that	 it	 emerges	 as	 intensely	 disruptive.	
Intimate	disruptions	are,	thus,	built	into	this	contradictory	policy	framework,	in	 such	 a	 way	 that	 the	 conditions	 of	 unliveability	 that	 result	 from	 these	disruptions	 are	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 processes	 by	 which	 state	 power	 is	being	 reconfigured	 through	 its	 supposed	decentralisation	 in	 the	context	of	neoliberalising	austerity.	
	
Everyday	Disruptions		In	2011,	Miss	Reilly	participated	 in	Sector-Based	Work	Academy	(SBWA),	 a	DWP	programme	for	JSA	claimants	that	includes	‘pre-employment	training’	and	a	work	experience	placement.	The	scheme	is	aimed	at	those	without	any	serious	 barriers	 to	 finding	 work,	 and	 it	 is	 administered	 by	 Jobcentres.	Participation	in	SBWA	is	voluntary	but	becomes	mandatory	once	a	claimant	has	 accepted	 a	 place.	 However,	 Reilly	was	 incorrectly	 told	 by	 a	 Jobcentre	adviser	that	her	participation	was	compulsory	and,	consequently,	ended	her	volunteer	placement	at	a	museum	in	order	to	take	part.		In	 August	 2011	 Mr	Wilson	 was	 informed	 by	 his	 Jobcentre	 adviser	that	 in	 order	 to	 continue	 receiving	 JSA,	 he	 had	 to	 take	 part	 in	Community	
Action	 Programme	 (CAP),	 a	 DWP	 scheme	 that	 aims	 to	 help	 long-term	unemployed	claimants	go	back	to	work.	The	programme	is	administered	by	private	 companies,	 including	 Ingeus,	 and	 it	 provides	 up	 to	 six	 months	 of	near	 full-time	 work	 experience,	 as	 well	 as	 includes	 additional	 weekly	 job	search	requirements.	Over	the	following	months,	Wilson	was	sent	multiple	letters	informing	him	that	his	CAP	would	begin	if	he	did	not	find	a	paid	job	within	a	specified	timeframe.	He	was	officially	selected	for	CAP	in	November	2011	and	subsequently	 informed	by	an	 Ingeus	employee	 that	he	would	be	required	 to	 work	 for	 30	 hours	 per	 week	 for	 26	 weeks,	 or	 until	 he	 found	
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employment	of	at	least	16	hours	per	week,	although	these	details	were	not	set	 in	writing.	Wilson	refused	 to	participate	 in	 the	scheme	on	 the	grounds	that	 he	 ‘was	 not	 prepared	 to	 work	 for	 free,	 particularly	 for	 such	 a	 long	period	 of	 time’	 (Reilly).	 As	 a	 result,	 he	 was	 subjected	 to	 multiple	 benefit	sanctions,	totalling	six	months.		The	Supreme	Court	ruled	in	favour	of	Reilly	and	Wilson	on	the	basis	that	the	2011	DWP	regulations	that	both	workfare	programmes	were	based	on	 did	 not	 contain	 a	 sufficiently	 detailed	 description	 of	 the	 schemes.	 Had	Iain	 Duncan	 Smith	 –	 Work	 and	 Pensions	 Secretary	 at	 the	 time	 –	 not	 put	forward	 emergency	 retroactive	 legislation	 to	 introduce	 new	 regulations	immediately	after	the	earlier	Court	of	Appeal	judgement	–	also	in	favour	of	the	 claimants	 –	 the	 Government	 could	 have	 been	 liable	 to	 refund	 up	 to	250,000	claimants	 for	unlawful	sanctioning.162	There	are	no	official	 figures	on	 the	 number	 of	 people	 undertaking	 unpaid	 work	 through	 the	 various	workfare	schemes	at	any	given	time	and,	at	the	same	time,	many	of	them	are	not	counted	in	official	unemployment	figures,	casting	doubt	on	the	accuracy	of	 the	 Government’s	 unemployment	 data.163	However,	 the	 stories	 of	 Reilly	and	Wilson	 appear	 in	 line	with	many	witness	 statements	 available	 on	 the	activist	 websites	 working	 on	 challenging	 workfare	 (Boycott	 Workfare	2018b).	Like	Wilson,	many	claimants	who	take	part	in	workfare	schemes	are	sanctioned,	with	 failure	to	participate	 in	a	 training	or	employment	scheme	being	 the	 most	 frequently	 occurring	 mistake	 that	 results	 in	 a	 sanction	(Beatty	et	al.	2015).	Individuals	can	be	recommended	for	a	sanction	by	both	Jobcentre	 advisers	 and	 workfare	 programme	 providers,	 and	 final	sanctioning	decisions	are	made	by	DWP	decision	makers.	24	per	cent	of	all	JSA	claimants	between	2010-15	received	a	sanction	(Morse	2016:	5).		Ingeus	placed	Wilson	with	an	organisation	that	collects	and	restores	used	furniture	and	distributes	it	to	people	in	need,	requiring	him	to	work	for																																																									162	However,	in	2016	the	Court	of	Appeal	ruled	that	the	retroactive	legislation	was,	in	fact,	itself	incompatible	with	human	rights	law	(Butler	2016a).	At	the	time	of	writing	no	further	appeals	had	been	lodged	by	the	DWP	or	the	claimants.	163	In	2012	 the	Trades	Union	Congress	 (TUC)	suggested	 that	 the	UK’s	 real	unemployment	figure	could	be	up	to	6.3	million	–	significantly	higher	than	the	official	 figures	at	the	time:	2.68	million	(ILO	definition	of	unemployment)	or	1.6	million	(claimant	court	figures)	(TUC	2012).		
	 234	
30	hours	per	week.	This	placement	 followed	the	final	 letter	sent	to	Wilson	informing	him	about	the	start	of	his	CAP	placement,	which	stated:	 ‘to	keep	getting	Jobseeker’s	Allowance,	you	will	need	to	take	part	 in	the	[CAP]	until	you	are	told	otherwise	or	your	award	of	jobseeker's	allowance	comes	to	an	end;	and	complete	any	activities	that	Ingeus	asks	you	to	do’	(quoted	in	Reilly:	464-465,	 emphasis	 mine).	 The	 letter	 notifies	 Wilson	 that	 he	 must	 do	
anything	that	Ingeus	–	the	private	company	administering	CAP	–	asks	him	to	do.	Workfare	 programmes	 frequently	 entail	 near	 full-time	 participation	 in	the	work	experience	or	activity	scheme	involved	–	mirroring	the	expectation	set	 out	 in	 the	 Universal	 Credit	 regulations	 for	 unemployed	 claimants	 to	‘think	of	jobseeking	as	a	full-time	job’	(Gov.UK	2016b).	The	regulations	also	tell	claimants	that	that	they	are	‘expected	to	look	or	prepare	for	work	for	35	hours	 a	 week’	 and	 ‘to	 do	 everything	 [they]	 reasonably	 can	 to	 give	[themselves]	the	best	chance	of	finding	work’	(ibid.).	Overall,	then,	people	in	receipt	 of	 unemployment-related	 benefits	 (JSA,	 ESA,	 and	 UC)	 are	increasingly	 required	 to	 spend	 as	 much	 time	 participating	 in	 DWP-mandated	job-seeking	and	training	activities	as	they	would	in	a	full-time	job	–	at	the	risk	of	a	sanction,	should	they	fail	to	provide	evidence	of	complying	with	the	requirements	set	out	in	their	claimant	commitments.			At	 the	most	 basic	 level,	 then,	 both	 workfare	 schemes	 and	 the	 full-time	job-seeking	requirements	for	JSA,	ESA,	and	UC	claimants	take	away	the	participants’	 time	 –	 and	 their	 ability	 to	 decide	 how	 to	 use	 it.	 These	requirements	can	certainly	have	very	significant	effects	on	claimants’	ability	to	meet	their	formal	and	informal	caring	responsibilities	–	as	well	as	other	kinds	 of	 responsibilities,	 such	 as	 the	 volunteering	 work	 that	 Reilly	 was	involved	 in	 prior	 to	 her	 work	 experience	 placement	 at	 Poundland.	Controlling	 and	 managing	 claimants’	 use	 of	 time	 –	 and	 penalties	 for	perceived	 poor	 or	 erroneous	 use	 of	 one’s	 time	 –	 also	 appear	 to	 be	 a	 key	feature	 of	 benefit	 sanctions.	 Many	 activist	 sites	 that	 track	 personal	experiences	of	sanctioning	detail	examples	of	claimants	being	penalised	for	‘infractions’	such	as	attending	a	funeral,	a	job	interview,	an	interview	with	a	workfare	programme	provider,	or	a	volunteering	placement	–	 instead	of	 a	
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scheduled	 Jobcentre	 appointment.164	This	 ‘micro-management	 of	 the	 poor’	(Peck	 2001:	 449)	 ensures	 that	 ‘these	 days	 people	 who	 are	 poor	 have	 no	money,	no	time	–	and	no	place’	(Friedli	and	Stearn	2015:	45).		Del	 Roy	 Fletcher	 and	 Sharon	 Wright	 discuss	 the	 rise	 of	 ‘conduct	conditionality’	 in	 the	 UK	 welfare	 system,	 increasingly	 taking	 the	 form	 of	‘coercive	 behaviouralism’	 (2018:	 324).165	Lynne	 Friedli	 and	Robert	 Stearn,	similarly,	argue	that	unemployment	policies	‘now	aim	at	more	complete	and	intimate	behaviour	 change	 through	coercive	mechanisms	of	greater	 scope’	(2015:	41).	These	demands	for	particular	patterns	of	behaviour	from	welfare	recipients	 also	 relate	 to	 the	 recent	 increases	 in	 contractual	 governance	within	 both	 welfare	 and	 housing	 policy,	 in	 the	 form	 of,	 for	 instance,	‘Parenting	 Contracts’	 and	 ‘Acceptable	 Behaviour	 Contracts’	 (Bond-Taylor	2014)	 –	 thus	 also	 highlighting	 the	 growing	 convergence	 between	 criminal	and	 welfare	 policy	 agendas.	 As	 well	 as	 behavioural	 change,	 workfare	programme	and	benefit	sanctions	can	aim	at	changes	in	attitude	or	affect.	As	Friedli	and	Stearn	detail:		The	psychological	 attributes	 and	dispositions	 of	 individuals	 and	communities	 (the	 ostensible	 presence	 or	 absence	 of	 optimism,	aspiration,	 self-efficacy,	 conscientiousness,	 sense	 of	 coherence)	are	being	used	to	account	for	unemployment	(and	for	a	range	of	other	 social	 outcomes,	 notably	 health	 inequalities)	 and	 are	promoted	 via	 psychological	 interventions	 that	 aim	 to	 modify	cognitive	function	or	emotional	disposition/affect.	(2015:	42)	These	 trends	 also	 include	 a	 parallel	 rise	 in	 the	 use	 of	 brain	 science	 in	explaining	 social	 issues	 and	 problematic	 behaviours,	 thus	 echoing	 the	increasing	use	of	brain	science	as	 ‘evidence’	 in	cultural	poverty	arguments,	discussed	in	Chapter	3.166		Demands	for	particular	attitudes,	affects,	and	behaviours,	particularly	in	 relation	 to	one’s	use	of	 time,	 are,	 thus,	 the	key	ways	 in	which	workfare	programmes	 and	 benefit	 sanctions	 materialise	 as	 everyday	 disruptions.																																																									164	See,	for	example,	Stupid	Sanctions	(2018)	and	the	Trussell	Trust	(2014).	165	See	also	Joseph	Rowntree	Foundation’s	(2014)	study	on	conditionality	and	sanctions	in	the	UK	welfare	system.		166	As	Friedli	and	Stearn	detail,	this	trend	reads	social	problems	through	understanding	the	brain,	 correlating	 ‘outcomes	 (crime,	 addiction,	 health	 behaviour,	 educational	 attainment)	with	brain	structure’	(2015:	42).		
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Again	questions	about	the	liveability	of	such	tightly	managed	lives	emerge	–	does	 a	 liveable	 life	 require	 some	 level	 of	 control	 over	 one’s	 everyday	activities	 and	 attitudes?	 Does,	 for	 instance,	 the	 replacement	 of	 one’s	informal	 caring	 duties	 with	 unpaid	 work	 at	 a	 for-profit	 organisation	constitute	 a	 necessary	 disruption	 to	 the	 liveability	 of	 one’s	 life,	 justifiable	with	 reference	 to	 the	 perceived	 unfairness	 of	 unemployment	 benefits?	 Or	should	some	value	be	found	within	such	volunteer	or	informal	(caring)	work	itself,	 thus	 countering	 any	 value	 that	 such	 a	 replacement	 creates,	 for	example	 in	 the	 form	 of	 increased	 ‘employability’?167	Here	 the	 examples	 of	both	 White	 Dee	 and	 Katie	 from	 the	 previous	 chapter’s	 discussion	 are	relevant,	raising	the	question:	what	would	be	the	–	both	monetary	and	other	–	consequences	of	them	being	required	to	step	away	from	the	informal	care	and	support	work	they	engage	in	and	instead	spend	their	time	applying	for	jobs	and	making	themselves	more	‘employable’?	Again,	the	absence	of	such	considerations	 highlights	 the	 in-builtness	 of	 intimate	 disruptions	 to	 the	regulatory	 frameworks	 of	 both	 workfare	 programmes	 and	 the	 sanctions	regime.	 The	 conditions	 of	 unliveability	 engendered	 by	 these	 practices	 are	here	seen	as	the	direct	result	of	a	desire	to	control	and	manage	the	minutiae	of	unemployed	benefit	claimants’	everyday	lives	–	a	desire	that,	at	the	same	time,	does	not	necessarily	support	the	aims	of	the	policies	it	attaches	to.		As	with	the	two	practices	and	policies	examined	above,	in	the	case	of	both	 sanctions	 and	 workfare	 a	 curious	 gap	 emerges	 between	 the	programme’s	stated	aims	–	helping	and	incentivising	people	to	find	work	(or	more	work)	–	and	their	actual	intimate	effects.168		For	instance,	applying	for	jobs	 on	 Christmas	 day,	 or	 attending	 a	 scheduled	 Jobcentre	 appointment	instead	of	a	close	relative’s	funeral,169	do	not	appear	as	centrally	important	for	 the	 aim	 of	 helping	 people	 find	 work.	 Further,	 in	 many	 cases	 the	programmes’	everyday	effects	actually	function	counter	to	their	stated	aims	–	people	have	been	sanctioned	for	attending	an	interview	for	a	paid	job	or	a																																																									167	As	highlighted	 in	Chapter	3,	 and	 suggested	by	MacDonald	 et	 al.’s	 (2014b)	 study,	 long-term	unemployed	people	tend	to	engage	in	substantial	amounts	of	care	and	voluntary	work.	168	Although	 the	 demand	 for	 psychological	 and	 attitudinal	 changes	 does	 also	 somewhat	correspond	to	the	DWP’s	own	stated	aims	(Callard	and	Stearn	2015).	169	Both	 real-life	 examples	of	 reasons	 for	which	 individuals	have	been	 sanctioned	 (Stupid	Sanctions	2018;	Trussell	Trust	2014).			
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Jobcentre	 mandated	 training	 programme	 instead	 of	 a	 Jobcentre	appointment,	 as	well	 as	 for	 not	 continuing	 to	 look	 for	work	 after	 already	securing	paid	employment	due	to	start	in	a	few	weeks’	time	(Trussell	Trust	2014).	My	argument	here	is	that	it	is	at	least	partially	due	to	the	increasing	
fragmentation	 of	 service	 delivery	 in	 the	 areas	 of	 both	 sanctioning	 and	workfare	 that	 the	 intimate	effects	 emerge	 in	 individuals’	 lives,	 rather	 than	necessarily	 –	 or	 as	 well	 as	 –	 because	 of	 straightforward	 punitiveness.	Without	 a	 consideration	 of	 these	 processes,	 the	 punitiveness	 of	 these	practices	seems	to	appear	out	of	nowhere,	either	because	of	a	totalising	but	ephemeral	 notion	 of	 neoliberalism,	 or	 alternatively	 as	 the	 result	 of	 the	decisions	 of	 a	 coherent	 state	 actor,	 desiring	 intentionally	 to	 punish	 its	poor(er)	 citizens	 –	 both	 of	 which	 seem	 inadequate	 as	 standalone	explanations.	At	 the	 institutional	 level,	 workfare	 programme	 delivery	 is	increasingly	stratified,	such	that	many	of	the	programmes	(such	as	CAP)	are	provided	 and	 managed	 by	 private	 corporations	 –	 that	 sometimes	 further	subcontract	 the	placement	of	 some	claimants	 to	other	corporations	–	with	the	 work	 experience	 placements	 themselves	 taking	 place	 at	 a	 mixture	 of	private,	 public,	 and	 third	 sector	 organisations.	 Claimants	 can	 be	recommended	 for	 sanctioning	 by	 both	 Jobcentre	 advisers	 and	 workfare	programme	 providers.	 At	 the	 individual	 level,	 the	 DWP	 has	 recently	 put	more	 emphasis	 on	 one-to-one	 relationships	 between	 claimants	 and	 staff,	introducing	 greater	 flexibility	 for	 Jobcentre	 staff	 to	 tailor	 conditions	 to	specific	claimants	(Morse	2016).	Claimants,	consequently,	often	depend	on	a	specific	staff	member	not	just	for	the	continuation	of	their	benefits,	but	also	for	key	information	and	advice,	for	instance	on	the	requirements	they	need	to	fulfil	 to	avoid	being	sanctioned.	Thus,	at	both	the	organisational	and	the	individual	 levels	a	dizzying	array	of	actors	 is	 involved	 in	making	decisions	about	 claimant	 requirements,	workfare	programmes,	 and	 sanctions.	These	decisions	are,	further,	often	driven	by	imperatives	other	than	helping	people	find	work.	 Sharon	Wright’s	 study	 at	 a	 Jobcentre	 concludes	 that	 ‘the	work	done	by	front-line	staff	was	[--]	structured	more	by	pressures	of	time,	forms,	computer	 systems	 and	 performance	 targets	 than	 by	 statements	 of	 official	
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policy	or	guidance’	(2002:	249),	also	echoing	a	National	Audit	Office	(NAO)	review	that	found	the	use	of	sanctions	to	be	‘linked	as	much	to	management	priorities	 and	 local	 staff	discretion	as	 it	 is	 to	 claimants’	 behaviour’	 (Morse	2016:	 9).	 Consequently,	 the	 delivery	 of	 both	 workfare	 and	 sanctions	may	deviate	significantly	from	their	original	stated	aims,	as	the	large	number	of	street-level	 bureaucrats	 involved	 in	 their	 implementation	 re-create	 policy	through	their	day-to-day	work.		The	 information	 provided	 to	 claimants	 about	 workfare	 schemes	 in	advance	is	often	vague	and	sometimes	incorrect	–	as	highlighted	in	the	cases	of	both	Wilson,	who	received	a	letter	informing	him	he	must	‘complete	any	activities	 that	 Ingeus	 asks	 [him]	 to	 do’	 (quoted	 in	 Reilly:	 465,	 emphasis	mine),	and	Reilly,	who	was	given	incorrect	information	about	the	voluntary	nature	 of	 the	 SBWA	 scheme.	 The	 job-seeking	 requirements	 set	 out	 in	claimant	 commitments	 also	 tend	 to	 be	 vague,	 and	 claimants	 have	 been	sanctioned	after	being	given	incorrect	 information	or	different	information	by	different	advisers,	or	after	misunderstanding	the	requirements	(Trussell	Trust	 2014).	 While	 these	 inconsistencies	 and	 miscommunications	 –	 that	sometimes	lead	to	significant	consequences	to	claimants,	such	as	being	left	without	any	 income	 for	 long	periods	of	 time	–	are	certainly	punitive,	 their	punitiveness	 does	 not	 necessarily	 arise	 from	 the	 street-level	 bureaucrats’	desire	to	punish	claimants	(although	that	 is,	 indeed,	also	possible).	 Instead	(or	 in	 addition),	 punitiveness	 is	 built	 into	 the	 increasingly	 complex	 and	fragmented	 nature	 of	 service	 delivery.	 That	 there	 are	 significant	inconsistencies	 in	 the	application	of	benefit	 sanctions	–	 referral	 rates	vary	substantially	 both	 across	 different	 Jobcentres	 and	 providers,	 and	 across	time	 (Morse	 2016)	 –	 suggests	 that,	 rather	 than	 a	 blanket	 shift	 towards	penalisation,	neoliberalisation	tends	to	involve	highly	varying	effects	in	the	case	of	different	localities,	different	providers,	and	even	different	individual	staff	members.	A	 further	 complication	 to	 this	 already	 convoluted	 regulatory	framework	 is	 introduced	 by	 the	 inclusion	 of	 private	 corporations	 in	 the	delivery	of	 statework.	A	 considerably	higher	number	of	 sanctions	 referred	by	workfare	providers	are	overturned	after	reconsideration	or	appeal	when	
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compared	 to	 ones	 referred	 by	 Jobcentres,170 	suggesting	 either	 that	 the	private	 companies	 involved	 in	workfare	 are	 simply	 keener	 sanctioners,	 or	that	 the	 information	 given	 to	 them	 by	 the	 government	 is	 inadequate	 or	incorrect.	 Further,	 government	 contracts	 tend	 not	 to	 provide	much	 detail	about	the	exact	nature	of	services	that	workfare	providers	should	offer,	and	‘what	 control	 there	 is,	 government	 exerts	 through	 a	 tiered	 system	 of	“payment	by	results”’	(Friedli	and	Stearn	2015:	41-42).	Overall	then,	there	is	very	 little	 oversight	 or	 accountability	 in	 the	 contracting	 of	 private	corporations	 to	 deliver	 workfare	 programmes.	 Thus,	 while	 some	 have	argued	that	these	shifts	and	changes	mean	a	transfer	of	state	power	to	other	actors,	state	power,	in	fact,	here	appears	diffused	across	different	actors,	and	the	punitiveness	of	these	policies	conditioned	by	the	vague	and	complicated	policy	 frameworks	 themselves.	While	 increasing	penalisation	may,	 indeed,	be	the	implicit	goal	of	these	policies,	it	is,	nonetheless,	achieved	through	the	ways	 in	which	 the	 delivery	 and	 regulatory	 frameworks	 are	 organised:	 the	increasing	 fragmentation	 of	 service	 delivery;	 the	 structuring	 of	 the	relationships	between	government	and	private	providers	through	‘payment	by	 results’	 contracts;	 and	 the	 increasing	 discretion	 and	 leeway	 given	 to	individual	staff	members.		An	 independent	 comparative	 review	 the	 DWP	 commissioned	 on	workfare	 programmes	 in	 a	 number	 of	 other	 countries	 (Crisp	 and	 Fletcher	2008)	confirms	 that	people	who	engage	 in	workfare	schemes	are	no	more	likely	to	find	a	paid	job	than	people	who	do	not	take	part.	Further,	the	DWP’s	(DWP	2014a;	cf.	Bienkov	2014)	own	impact	analysis	reviewing	a	workfare	scheme	specifically	targeting	young	Londoners	with	less	than	six	months	of	prior	 paid	work	 experience,	Day	One	Support	 for	Young	People	Trailblazer,	found	 that	 those	 who	 completed	 the	 programme	 did	 worse	 in	 terms	 of	finding	paid	employment	than	those	who	failed	to	complete	the	programme,	with	26	per	cent	and	60	per	cent	finding	paid	work,	respectively.	Similarly,	in	 the	 case	 of	 sanctioning,	 although	 the	 DWP	 does	 not	 collect	 or	 make	publicly	 available	 much	 data,	 the	 international	 evidence	 suggests	 mixed																																																									170	26	per	cent	in	the	case	of	providers,	against	the	Jobcentres’	11	per	cent,	in	2015	(Morse	2016:	5).	
	 240	
results	(Morse	2016).	While	sanctioning	may	lead	to	an	increased	chance	of	employment,	 these	effects	are	often	short-lived	and	tend	to	result	 in	 lower	wages.	 Further,	 sanctions	also	 encourage	 some	people	 to	become	 inactive,	stopping	claiming	benefits	entirely	without	finding	work	–	as	China	suggests	when	he	helps	Daniel	complete	his	appeal	form	in	I,	Daniel	Blake.	Thus,	the	ability	of	either	sanctions	or	workfare	to	meet	their	stated	aims	 is,	at	best,	questionable.	At	the	same	time,	the	policies’	most	disruptive	effects	are	not	directly	 related	 to	 these	aims	–	perhaps	 suggesting	again	 that	 the	value	of	these	programmes	for	the	central	government	lies	elsewhere.				
Reconfiguring	the	Public/Private	Divide	Scholarly	 analyses	 of	 conditional	 social	 welfare,	 and	 penalisation	 more	broadly,	 sometimes	 cast	 them	 as	 part	 of	 a	 totalising	 narrative	 of	neoliberalism.	 For	 Loïc	 Wacquant	 (2012),	 for	 instance,	 increasing	penalisation	is	central	to	neoliberalism	–	and	particularly	to	neoliberal	state	power	–	and	the	growing	importance	of	what	he	terms	‘prisonfare’	proof	of	its	centrality.171	These	accounts	tend	to	present	a	clear	narrative	of	the	why	of	penalisation	–	 for	Wacquant,	 for	example,	both	workfare	and	prisonfare	are	 needed	 to	 ‘supervise	 the	 same	 dispossessed	 and	 dishonoured	populations	 destabilised	 by	 the	 dissolution	 of	 the	 Fordist–Keynesian	compact’	 (ibid.:	 67).	 However,	 they	 tend	 to	 be	 considerably	 less	 explicit	about	 the	 how,	 as	 well	 as	 sometimes	 about	 the	what,	 of	 penalisation.	 In	terms	of	the	former,	as	Lacey	(2013)	points	out,	it	is	often	unclear	not	only	which	 political,	 economic,	 and	 social	 institutions	 constitute	 neoliberalism,	but	 also	 how	 exactly	 they	 are	 implicated	 in	 producing	 neoliberal	 penality.	She	argues	that	it	 is	 important	to	ask	 ‘questions	about	how	 [neoliberalism]	has	emerged	and	what	sorts	of	institutional	structures	are	needed	to	sustain	the	policies,	practices	and	arrangements	which	have	come	to	be	associated	with	neoliberalism;	when	 they	emerged;	and	where	 they	hold	sway’	 (ibid.:	261-262,	 emphasis	 in	 the	original).	 In	 terms	of	 the	 latter,	 scholarship	 also	tends	 to	 assume	 that	 exactly	 what	 punishment	 or	 penality	 looks	 like	 is																																																									171	See	 Chapter	 1	 for	 more	 detail	 on	 Wacquant’s	 conceptualisation	 of	 ‘prisonfare’	 and	‘workfare.’	
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unambiguous.	Although	in	the	simplest	sense	the	meaning	of	penality	is,	of	course,	 clear,	 the	 practical,	 everyday	 effects	 of	 increasing	 penalisation	 or	punitiveness	 in	 the	 neoliberalising	 landscape	 of	 austerity	 have	 not	 been	 a	frequent	topic	of	scholarly	analysis.	In	 the	 above	 analysis,	 I	 have	 provided	 some	 answers	 to	 both	questions	–	 the	how	 and	 the	what	–	 in	 the	context	of	UK	austerity	politics,	focusing	 on	 the	 everyday,	 intimate	 effects	 of	 penality,	 as	 well	 as	 on	 the	
institutional	mechanisms	 that	produce	 such	effects.	Disruptions	 to	 intimate	lives,	 relations,	 and	 spaces	 are	 absolutely	 central	 to	 the	 what	 of	neoliberalising	 penality,	 often	 constituting	 the	 primary	means	 by	which	 it	materialises	 in	 everyday	 lives.	 As	 I	 have	 argued	 above,	 these	 disruptions,	firstly,	entail	significant	implicit	judgements	of	the	value	of	different	kinds	of	intimate	 relations,	 practices,	 and	 spaces,	 and,	 secondly,	 they	 also	 tend	 to	constitute	considerable	 interruptions	 to	 the	 liveability	of	 the	 lives	of	 those	affected.	 While	 these	 processes	 are,	 indeed,	 punitive,	 many	 of	 their	 most	disruptive	 effects,	 thus,	 arise	 from	 their	 intrusions	 into	 the	 spheres	 of	 the	intimate	 and	 the	 everyday.	 Penalisation	 itself	 is,	 here,	 seen	 as	 intimately	connected	 to	 intimacy,	 in	 such	 a	way	 that	 paying	 attention	 to	 the	 latter	 is	necessary	for	understanding	the	former.172	Neoliberalism	 is	 often	 seen	 as	 a	 doctrine	 of	 individualism	 and	freedom,	entailing	a	significant	reduction	not	only	in	state	power,	but	also	in	the	 extent	 to	 which	 the	 state	 seeks	 to	 intrude	 in	 the	 private	 sphere.	 The	above	analysis	has,	hopefully,	 illustrated	some	of	the	ways	in	which	this	is,	clearly,	not	 the	 case.	 In	many	 instances	neoliberalisation	 seems	 to,	 in	 fact,	involve	a	significant	increase	in	the	extent	to	which	the	state	seeks	to	intrude	in	 the	private	sphere.	The	three	case	studies	of	 this	chapter	all	 function	as	examples	 of	 such	 intrusions,	 whereby	 various	 agents	 of	 the	 state	 are	involved	in	making	decisions	about	where	a	person	or	family	should	 live	–																																																									172	While	my	analysis	has	not	examined	the	other	side	of	the	growing	penalisation	thesis	–	that	 of	 prisonfare	 –	 it	 is	 important	 to	 note	 that	 the	 interconnectedness	 of	 penality	 to	intimate	 disruption	 is	 not	 limited	 to	 its	 emergence	 in	 the	 sphere	 of	 social	 welfare	 or	housing.	As	Rodriguez	 argues,	 in	 the	workings	of	 the	prison-industrial	 complex,	 a	 central	feature	 of	 punishment	 is	 the	 ‘stripping	 away	 of	 social	 and	 sexual	 belonging	 [--],	accomplished	 in	 part	 through	 prohibitions	 on	 consensual	 sexual	 relations	 in	 prison	 and	restrictions	 on	 visits	 with	 lovers,	 family,	 and	 friends	 that	 might	 allow	 the	 comfort	 of	embrace,	sexual	or	otherwise’	(2014:	16).		
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both	 geographically	 and	 in	 terms	 of	 specific	 accommodations;	 who	 they	should	 live	with;	 who	 they	 can	 (continue	 to)	 rely	 on	 for	 both	 formal	 and	informal	support;	how	many	bedrooms	they	should	have;	how	they	should	spend	their	 time;	how	they	should	behave;	and	what	attitudes	they	should	adopt	or	perform	–	with	the	alternative	to	these	intimate	disruptions	usually	involving	 significant	 financial	 penalties,	 as	 well	 as	 possible	 destitution,	homelessness,	 depression	 and	 anxiety,	 or	 even	 death. 173 	Thus,	 the	neoliberalising	state	seems,	here,	to	be	entering	the	private	sphere	of	some	of	 its	 citizens	 with	 growing	 intensity	 –	 or,	 as	 Wacquant	 argues,	 ‘actually	existing	 neoliberalism	 extolls	 “laissez	 faire	 et	 laissez	 passer”	 for	 the	dominant,	but	it	turns	out	to	be	paternalist	and	intrusive	for	the	subaltern’	(2012:	74).	Yongmie	Nicola	Jo	argues	that	–	in	her	case,	specifically,	means-tested	–	social	welfare	‘arguably	[--]	constitutes	a	violation	of	the	fundamental	right	to	privacy,	the	applicant’s	 life	becoming	an	“open	book”’	(2016:	524),	 from	which	a	caseworker	can	determine,	 for	 instance,	 their	eligibility	 to	welfare	or	 social	 housing,	 or	 decide	 whether	 they	 should	 be	 recommended	 for	 a	sanction.	 Indeed,	 some	 Jobcentre	 advisers	 have	 requested	 access	 to	claimants’	 personal	 email	 accounts	 in	 order	 to	 gain	 proof	 of	 their	 job-searching	 efforts	 (Stupid	 Sanctions	 2018).	 Such	 privacy	 and	 intimacy	violations	 seem	 part	 and	 parcel	 of	 the	 processes	 of	 neoliberalising	penalisation,	which	 affect	 not	 just	 the	boundaries	 of	 the	 sphere	 of	 privacy	one	 has	 access	 to,	 but	 also	 how	 one	 experiences	 privacy	 –	 for	 example	through	 the	 loss	 of	 a	 safety	 net	 following	 an	 out-of-council	 housing	placement.	 Centrally,	 then,	 a	 key	 effect	 of	 neoliberalisation	 in	 the	 intimate	sphere	is	that	this	sphere	is	no	longer	quite	one’s	own	–	with	other	people,	institutions,	and	priorities	determining	how	it	should	be	organised.		
																																																								173	The	 deaths	 associated	 with	 sanctioning	 and	 Work	 Capability	 Assessments	 have	 been	compiled	 online	 (Calum’s	 List	 2018).	 In	 2015	 the	 DWP,	 in	 response	 to	 a	 Freedom	 of	Information	 request,	 also	 released	 the	 statistic	 that	 2,380	 people	 had	 died	 after	 being	declared	 ‘fit	 for	work’	 between	December	 2011	 and	 February	 2014	 (Butler	 2015)	 –	 thus	also	 echoing	 the	 storyline	 of	 Daniel	 in	 the	 film	 I,	Daniel	Blake,	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	chapter.	 For	more	detail	 on	 the	 effects	of	 sanctioning,	 see	Morse	 (2016),	 JRF	 (2014),	 and	Beatty	et	al.	(2015).	
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	The	 intimate	 disruptions	 detailed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 thus,	 also	 play	 a	part	in	reconfiguring	the	public/private	divide	–	although	it	is	important	to	note	that	I	am	not	suggesting	that	this	distinction	is,	or	has	been	in	the	past,	in	 any	way	 stable.	That	 the	boundaries	between	public	 and	private	vary	–	particularly	 along	 racial	 and	 class	 lines	 –	 has	 been	 argued	 by	 many	(Alexander	1994;	Boyd	1997;	Carby	1982;	Mahmood	2005).	My	 argument	here,	 however,	 also	 relates	 to	 the	 centrality	 of	 these	 reconfigurations	 to	processes	of	neoliberalisation,	where	regulating	the	division	between	public	and	private	remains	a	key	aspect	of	the	state’s	role.174	This	discussion,	thus,	also	provides	a	connection	to	my	analysis	in	Chapter	3,	where	I	argued	that	citizenship	 is	becoming	 increasingly	 tied	 to	private	 –	 familial	 and	 sexual	 –	acts	 and	 values	 performed	 in	 the	 quotidian.	 In	 this	 chapter	 I	 have	highlighted	some	of	the	consequences	that	failing	this	performance	carries	–	echoing	Lauren	Berlant’s	argument	that	 ‘the	fantasy	of	a	private,	protected	national	 space	 is	 a	 fantasy	 only	 a	 nonstigmatized	 person,	 a	 privileged	person,	 can	 realistically	 imagine	 living’	 (1997:	 213).	 It	 is,	 thus,	 the	 same	populations	whose	intimacies	are	often	already	deemed	inappropriate	–	and	who,	therefore,	risk	endangering	the	nation’s	future	–	whose	intimate	lives	also	tend	to	be	most	severely	disrupted	and	intruded	upon	by	the	state.	The	 second	 key	way	 in	which	 neoliberalism	 tends	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	entailing	changes	and	shifts	in	the	public/private	divide	is	in	the	reductions	in	state	power	–	and	corresponding	increases	in	the	power	and	freedom	of	other	 actors	 –	 that	 it	 supposedly	 involves.	 However,	 the	 above	 discussion	should	 also	 have	 highlighted	 that	 this	 aspect	 of	 what	 neoliberalisation	 is	often	assumed	to	encompass	is	not	as	straightforward	as	it	may	seem.	As	I	argued	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 Bedroom	 Tax,	 the	 LA	 practice	 of	 out-of-council	housing	 placements,	 and	 workfare	 and	 benefit	 sanctions,	 penalisation	frequently	 emerges	 in	 practice	 less	 like	 a	 straightforward	 and	 intentional	drive	 to	 punish,	 based	 on	 the	 decisions	 of	 a	 coherent	 and	 singular	 state	actor.	The	distinctive	features	of	policy-making	in	a	neoliberalising	context	are	 often	 ‘confused	 –	 deliberately	 or	 otherwise	 –	 with	 preordained	 or	inevitable	forms	of	state	restructuring	and	policy	change	(when	they	are,	of																																																									174	See	Cooper	(1993)	on	this	role	of	the	state	more	generally.	
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course,	 nothing	 of	 the	 sort)’	 (Peck	 2001:	 446).	 Instead	 of	 analytically	presenting	 neoliberalism	 as	 ‘everywhere	 and	 nowhere	 at	 the	 same	 time’	(ibid.:	446),	thus,	I	have	tried	to	provide	an	account	of	some	of	the	processes	that	 Peck	 terms	 ‘distinctively	 new	 forms	 of	 policy	 reconstruction	 and	regulatory	 rollout	 [,	which]	may	 lack	–	 and	perhaps	 this	 is	 the	point	 –	 the	orderly	lines	and	logics	of	Keynesian-welfare	statism’	(2003:	223).	This	‘new	regulatory	“unsettlement”’	(ibid.:	223)	involves	a	set	of	messy,	complex,	and	uneven	processes	of	institutional	restructuring,	which,	furthermore,	blur	the	boundaries	 between	 policy	 areas,	 delivery	 systems,	 and	 governance	 and	accountability	mechanisms,	as	Peck	(ibid.)	suggests.	Above	 I	have	 located	the	emergence	of	penalisation	precisely	 in	 the	fragmented	and	complex	processes	of	restructuring	and	blurring	–	between	central	government,	on	the	one	hand,	and	local	councils,	Jobcentres,	private	providers,	 and	 individual	 street-level	 bureaucrats,	 on	 the	 other	 –	 that	accompany	 neoliberalising	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery.	Importantly,	 the	 gaps,	 discrepancies,	 contradictions,	 and	 fragmentations	within	 the	 processes	 of	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery	 frequently	seem	driven	by	central	government	action,	even	–	or,	perhaps,	especially	–	in	instances	where	national	policy	aims	 themselves	appear	contradictory.	My	analysis,	 thus,	 in	 part	 confirms	 the	 argument	 made	 by	 many	 that	 the	neoliberalising	 processes	 of	 localisation	 (or	 decentralisation)	 and	privatisation	rarely	involve	a	direct	transfer	of	state	capacities	and	power	to	other	actors.175	Instead,	they	tend	to	entail	a	range	of	inter-scalar	shifts	–	in	policy	 framings,	 resources,	 institutional	 capacities,	 delivery	 systems,	accountability	arrangements,	and	so	on,	whereby	the	national	state	remains	firmly	in	control	of	the	processes	of	‘inter-scalar	articulation’	(Jessop	2000:	182).	 Crucially	 then,	 these	 processes	 do	 not	 necessarily	 result	 in	 a	weakening	of	the	state,	or	a	reduction	in	its	power.	Rather,	state	power	(and	the	 capacities	 for	undertaking	 statework)	 are	dispersed	across	 a	 variety	of	actors	 in	 a	 ‘thin’	 form	 of	 devolution,	 where	 autonomy	 for	 local	 actors	appears	 as	 highly	 conditional	 within	 the	 new,	 dispersed	 systems	 of																																																									175	For	variations	of	this	argument,	see	Chapter	1,	as	well	as	Clarke	(2004),	Jones	and	Novak	(1999),	Newman	and	Clarke	(2014),	and	Peck	(2001).	
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implementation	and	service	delivery,	as	both	Peck	(2001)	and	 John	Clarke	(2004)	argue.		Thus,	 whether	 the	 other	 actor	 involved	 in	 the	 delivery	 or	implementation	of	 a	particular	piece	of	 statework	 is	 a	 Jobcentre,	 a	private	provider,	or	a	Local	Authority	–	or,	indeed,	an	individual	employee	at	any	of	them	–	their	autonomy	and	capacity	to	act	are	both	heavily	constricted	and	
simultaneously	 subjected	 to	 fewer	 and	 fewer	 accountability	 mechanisms.	The	 local	 and/or	 private	 institutions,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 individual	 workers	within	them,	are	increasingly	expected	to	act	according	to	narrowly	defined	managerial	 imperatives,	 such	 as	 performance	 targets	 and	 mechanisms	 of	audit	–	as	the	above	discussion	has,	hopefully,	illustrated.176	However,	apart	
from	 these	 managerial	 targets	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 scrutiny,	 very	 limited	accountability	arrangements	are	put	in	place	for	these	actors.	Consequently,	much	of	 the	penalisation	of,	 for	example,	welfare	and	housing	policy	 takes	place	within	 this	 ‘black	box’,	where	 ‘there	 is	 virtually	 no	oversight	 [--],	 no	professional	accountability	and	no	effective	means	of	appeal	against	 them’	(Friedli	 and	 Stearn	 2015:	 41).	 Finally,	 because	 of	 the	 neoliberalising	tendency	towards	almost	permanent	reform,	these	processes	are	unfinished,	as	well	as	in	a	constant	state	of	flux,	as	many	others	(Clarke	2004;	Jones	and	Novak	 1999;	 Peck	 2001)	 have	 argued.	 Neoliberalisation,	 thus,	 involves	 a	complex	 and	 contradictory	 system	 of	 governance	 that	 blurs	 the	public/private	 divide	 by	 placing	 contrasting	 demands	 on	 the	 local	 and/or	private	actors	increasingly	involved	in	statework,	whose	power	and	capacity	to	act	are	simultaneously	expanded	in	some	ways	and	restricted	in	others	–	as	well	as	subject	to	repeated	shifts	and	changes.		The	 increasing	 intrusion	 of	 the	 state	 into	 the	 intimate	 lives	 of	 poor	and/or	 working-class	 populations	 –	 as	 well	 as	 the	 resulting	 shifts	 in	 the	public/private	distinction	–	are,	 thus,	here	seen	as	a	direct	consequence	of	the	 second	 key	 way	 in	 which	 neoliberalisation	 involves	 a	 changes	 to	 the	public/private	divide	–	that	between	the	central	government	and	the	private	and/or	local	actors	that	it	subcontracts	statework	to.	Although	it	is,	indeed,																																																									176	On	 these	managerial	 imperatives	 and	 auditory	mechanisms,	 see	 Clarke	 (2004),	 Friedli	and	Stearn	(2015),	and	Jones	and	Novak	(1999).	
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possible	 that	 the	 intimate	 disruptions	 that	 neoliberalising	 penalisation	materialises	 as	 are	 the	 desired	 consequences	 of	 the	 policies	 and	 practices	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter,	 they	 are,	 nonetheless,	 achieved	 through	 the	processes	 by	 which	 state	 power	 is	 being	 reconfigured	 –	 by	 way	 of	 a	fragmented	 interplay	 between	 the	 local	 and	 national,	 and	 the	 public	 and	private,	actors	involved	in	statework.	The	public/private	divide	is,	therefore,	in	a	process	of	reconfiguration	in	two	separate,	but	intimately	related,	ways	–	first,	 in	the	sense	that	the	boundaries	of	both	statework	and	state	power	are	 being	 blurred,	 and	 second,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 the	 state	 is	 increasingly	disrupting,	and	intruding	in,	the	intimate	and	everyday	lives	of	the	poorest	and	most	disadvantaged	populations.	These	developments	have	significant	consequences	 not	 only	 for	 the	 people	 affected	 by	 them,	 but	 also	 for	 how	political	action	against	them	might	be	conceived,	as	I	explore	in	the	next	and	final	section	of	this	chapter.		
	
Reimagining	the	State:	Spaces	for	Political	Action		Janet	Newman	and	 John	Clarke	argue	 that	 ‘how	we	 imagine	 the	state,	how	we	 feel	 about	 it,	 will	 shape	 the	 kinds	 of	 politics	 that	 are	 possible’	 (2014:	153).	 A	 view	 of	 the	 state	 as	 a	 coherent	 and	 singular	 actor,	 as	 something	entirely	 separate	 from	 civil	 society,	 or	 as	 in	 the	 midst	 of	 a	 process	 of	weakening	 or	 reducing	 in	 significance,	 is	 likely	 to	 result	 in	 feelings	 of	disenchantment	and	loss.	Whilst	the	loss	of	state	funded	institutions,	public	services,	welfare,	 and,	 ‘not	 least,	 the	 capacity	 for	public	 governance’	 (ibid.:	153)	 in	 the	 era	 of	 austerity	 politics	 certainly	 warrants	 both	 scholarly	attention	and	negative	feelings,	these	losses	are,	nonetheless,	not	all	that	has	happened	to	the	state	in	this	period.	As	many	others	have	argued,	states	are	thoroughly	peopled	institutions,	‘in	which	the	success	or	failure	of	individual	reform	projects	is	very	much	a	matter	of	micro-political	struggle,	as	well	as	reflecting	wider,	more	 “structural”	 imperatives’	 (Peck	2001:	451).	Further,	states	 are	 ‘contradictory	 and	 unstable	 institutions’,	 and	 it	 is	 precisely	 the	instability,	 incompleteness,	 and	 unresolved	 contradictions	 that	 create	 ‘the	spaces	 of	 possibility	 for	 alternative	 imaginaries	 of	 the	 state	 to	 emerge’	(Newman	and	Clarke	2014:	160).	In	this	final	section	of	the	chapter	I	explore	
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the	potential	for	such	‘spaces	of	possibility’	to	emerge	within	the	landscape	of	neoliberalising	penality,	examining	in	particular	whether	the	fragmented	and	 complex	 nature	 of	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery	 itself	might	be	 increasing	 such	potential.	By	 focusing	 solely	on	 the	possibility	of	political	action	emerging	within	 the	state,	my	 intention	 is	not	 to	claim	that	activism	 outside	 of	 the	 state	 is	 somehow	 less	 significant	 but	 to,	 instead,	intentionally	direct	attention	to	different	understandings	of	the	political.		The	question	of	whether	the	neoliberalising	processes	by	which	state	power	 is	 dispersed	 across	 a	 broader	 field	 of	 actors	 present	 genuine	opportunities	for	political	action	has	been	asked	by	many.	Peck,	for	instance,	argues	 that	 ‘by	 accident	 or	 design,	 neoliberal	 policy	 programs	 seem	 to	 be	especially	effective	in	undermining	potential	sources	of	political	opposition’,	primarily	because	of	how	the	neoliberalising	‘devolution	of	delivery	systems	and	 the	 continued	 churning	 of	 policy	 strategies	 tends	 to	 (over)stretch	 the	capacities	 and	 diffuse	 the	 energy	 of	 oppositional	 movements,	 rather	 than	opening	 up	 the	 space	 for	 more	 progressive	 local	 initiatives’	 (2001:	 452).	Others	(Newman	2013,	2014;	Newman	and	Clarke	2014)	claim,	in	contrast,	that	 these	 processes	 of	 dispersal	 –	 while	 weakening	 democratic	accountability,	as	argued	above	–	can	also	generate	new	spaces	for	political	action.	The	drive	towards	neoliberalisation	has	been	very	unevenly	realised,	both	geographically	and	temporally,	with	the	consequences	of	not	just	local	variation,	but	also	‘the	co-existence	of	diverse	governmental,	economic	and	political	 projects’	 (Newman	2014:	 3291).	Neoliberalisation	 –	 like	 any	 new	set	of	policy	imperatives	–	has	to	‘reach	accommodations	with	other	forces	and	 fields’	 (Newman	 2013:	 520),	 including,	 for	 instance,	 other	 kinds	 of	understandings	of	the	purpose	and	aims	of	social	welfare	or	social	housing,	other	kinds	of	attachments	to	the	state,	and	other	kinds	of	political	desires	in	the	very	people	responsible	for	the	implementation	of	the	most	punitive	neoliberalising	 reforms.	 It	 is	 in	 these	 other	 understandings,	 attachments,	and	desires	that	the	potential	for	political	space	and	action	emerges	within	the	state	itself.			The	week	before	 the	Bedroom	Tax	came	 into	effect	 in	April	2013	–	with	dozens	of	protests	and	direct	action	campaigns	against	the	policy	also	
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under	way	–	Labour	MP	Frank	Field	called	for	landlords	to	take	direct	action	in	order	to	prevent	the	policy’s	effects	falling	on	the	most	vulnerable:	I	hope	landlords	will	brick	up	the	doors	to	spare	bedrooms	and,	where	appropriate,	knock	down	the	walls,	so	that	the	properties	can	 safely	 fit	 the	 tenants.	 I	 have	 never	 before	 asked	 for	 direct	action.	I	do	so	now	because	I	feel	the	measures	are	grossly	unfair.	(Frank	Field,	Labour	MP	for	Birkenhead,	quoted	in	Morris	2013)	Despite	 a	 warning	 against	 such	 actions	 subsequently	 given	 by	 Welfare	Reform	 Minister	 Lord	 David	 Freud	 –	 threatening	 to	 withdraw	 housing	benefit	 subsidies	 to	 councils	 that	 ‘inappropriately’	 reclassify	 properties	because	of	 the	Bedroom	Tax	 (Brown	2013)	–	some	 landlords	and	councils	have,	 indeed,	responded	to	Field’s	call.	 In	a	well-publicised	case,	Knowsley	Housing	Trust	 in	Merseyside	reclassified	almost	600	properties	as	smaller,	exempting	tenants	from	being	subject	to	the	Bedroom	Tax	(Tolley	2013).	In	a	 similar	 vein,	 Cobalt	 Housing	 in	 Liverpool	 began	 converting	 their	properties	in	2015	to	better	match	the	requirements	of	tenants	in	its	area	–	literally	 knocking	 down	 walls	 (Criddle	 2015).	 While	 in	 both	 cases	 these	actions	 incurred	 costs	 for	 the	 relevant	 landlord,	 the	 reclassifications	 and	conversions	also	make	sense	 from	the	point	of	view	of	demand,	as	tenants	are	 increasingly	 unwilling	 to	 be	 housed	 in	 properties	 deemed	 to	 have	 too	many	rooms	under	the	new	policy	framework.	Reports	of	various	–	usually	Labour-run	–	councils	exploring	the	possibility	of	taking	similar	action	have	followed	(Morrison	et	al.	2013).	The	below	Twitter	handles	and	website	are	–	or,	at	least,	claim	to	be	–	run	 by	 three	 (either	 past,	 or	 current	 and,	 therefore,	 covert)	 Jobcentre	advisers	and	a	Work	Capability	Assessor	employed	by	Atos:	@JobcentreMole	@jcpAdwiser	@secretassessor1	jobseekersanctionadvice.com		As	 the	 ‘about’	 sections	 on	 their	 respective	 Twitter	 pages	 state,	 the	‘JobcentreMole’	 is	 ‘whistleblowing	 to	 help	 anyone	 wanting	 to	 know	 what	[Jobcentre	 Plus]	 dont	 want	 you	 to	 know.	 Try	me’,	 and	 the	 ‘Not	 So	 Secret	
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Assessor’	describes	themselves	as	‘just	a	small	spoke	in	a	big	wheel,	barely	noticeable	until	 that	 spoke	snaps’,	 adding	 ‘oh	yeah,	 looking	 for	a	new	 job!’	The	 @jcpAdwiser	 handle	 and	 the	 website	 are	 run	 by	 former	 Jobcentre	advisers	and	ex-DWP	staff,	respectively,	both	offering	help	and	support	for	people	 dealing	 with	 the	 benefits	 system.	 The	 website	 offers	 advice	specifically	 for	 appealing	 sanctioning	 decisions	 and	 challenging	 workfare	referrals,	 thus	 responding	 directly	 to	 the	 frequent	 inconsistencies	 and	vagueness	 in	 the	 information	 that	 Jobcentres	 provide	 to	 claimants,	 as	discussed	above.	The	Independent	 reported	on	the	website	 in	2014,	stating	that	 the	 ‘three	 disgruntled	 former	 civil	 servants’	 who	 set	 the	 website	 up	‘have	 been	 inundated	 with	 pleas	 for	 help	 [from]	 welfare	 claimants	 who	believe	their	benefits	have	been	wrongly	docked’	(Morris	2014).		While	 the	 challenge	 offered	 by	 these	 social	 media	 examples	 to	 the	increasingly	disciplinary	and	disruptive	politics	of	austerity	is,	perhaps,	less	direct	than	that	provided	by	the	LA	and	landlord	examples	above,	 they	do,	nonetheless,	 provide	 a	 challenge.	 It	 is	 of	 course	 no	 surprise	 that	 the	individuals	 behind	 these	 social	 media	 profiles	 have	 all	 chosen	 to	 remain	anonymous,	regardless	of	whether	they	are	current	or	previous	employees	of	the	DWP	or	Atos.	Perhaps	the	fact	that	some	of	them	have	only	began	to	protest	the	DWP’s	politics	since	no	longer	working	for	the	Department	helps	their	designation	as	‘disgruntled	former	civil	servants’,	as	in	the	Independent	article	 above.	 Alternatively,	 however,	 perhaps	 it	 could	 also	 signal	 the	possibility	that	their	 ‘creative	labour	[--]	can	lever	governmental	resources	and	 capacities	 for	 “other”	 purposes	 and/or	 bring	 alternative	 perspectives	and	 skill	 sets	 into	 the	 policy	 process’	 (Newman	 2013:	 525).	 Their	 actions	may,	 thus,	 mitigate	 some	 of	 the	 harsher	 effects	 of	 punitive	 policy	frameworks,	as	these	workers	‘perform	their	own	active/activist	citizenship	in	 and	 through	 their	 public	 service	 roles’	 (ibid.:	 525)	 –	 as	 well	 as	 after	leaving	 these	 roles.	 Importantly,	 then,	both	 the	actions	and	 the	alternative	understandings	and	desires	of	these	workers	may	also	function	to	transform	the	 state,	 as	workers	who,	 for	 instance,	 imagine	 the	 state	 as	 connected	 to	social	 justice	may	seek	to	actualise	this	 imaginary	 in	their	work,	as	Davina	Cooper	 (2014)	 suggests.	 The	 compassionate	 actions	 of	 street-level	
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bureaucrats,	thus,	make	‘it	possible	to	imagine	political	institutions	of	a	less	bad	life’	(Berlant	2011:	172)	–	as	well	as,	perhaps,	a	state	‘of	a	less	bad	life.’		Somewhat	 similarly,	 the	 LA	 and	 landlord	 actions	 to	 counter	 the	effects	 of	 the	 Bedroom	Tax	 echo	 the	 implications	 of	 some	 of	 the	 research	that	 has	 been	 conducted	 on	 1980s	 municipal	 activism	 in	 the	 UK,	 most	notably	by	Cooper	(2017)	and	Newman	(2012).	At	the	time,	many	councils	opposing	 the	 politics	 of	 Prime	 Minister	 Thatcher’s	 Conservatives	 found	creative	 ways	 of,	 for	 instance,	 supporting	 oppositional	 projects	 and	 local	groups	 by	 ‘drawing	 on	 residual	 or	 unintended	 resources’	 (Cooper	 2017:	348)	 and	 by	 using	 ‘creative	 accounting	 techniques’	 (ibid.:	 346).	 As	well	 as	the	reclassifications	enacted	by	some	councils	and	 landlords	specifically	 to	counter	 the	 effects	 of	 the	 Bedroom	Tax,	 and	 the	 actions	 both	 current	 and	former	 DWP	 employees	 have	 taken	 to	 help	 claimants	 navigate	 the	increasingly	 punitive	 welfare	 policy	 landscape,	 as	 above,	 various	 other	examples	of	such	creative	action	are	certainly	imaginable.	Thus,	while	these	examples	 are	 rather	 limited	 in	 scope,	 they	 do,	 nonetheless,	 indicate	 the	existence	of	a	potential	for	local	councils	–	and	other	actors	–	to	take	action	both	to	mitigate	the	most	punitive	and	disruptive	of	the	effects	of	austerity,	and	 to	 advance	 a	 differently	 oriented	 politics	 from	 that	 of	 neoliberalising	austerity.	These	examples	–	both	from	the	1980s	and	from	the	current	era	of	austerity	 –	 also	 suggest	 possibilities	 for	 states	 –	 or	 parts	 of	 the	 state	 –	 ‘to	provide	a	productive	 terrain	where	progressive	politics	 can	happen’	 (ibid.:	338),	and	where	the	capacity	to	‘push	back	[on]	neoliberal	state	forms	that	serve	to	centralize	and	concentrate	political	and	economic	power’	(Cumbers	2015:	70)	can	increase.	The	situations	of	Local	Authorities	in	the	1980s	and	in	the	post-2010	austerity	 era	 are,	 of	 course,	 not	directly	 comparable,	 especially	because	of	the	ways	in	which	the	neoliberalising	politics	of	austerity	have	reduced	‘the	capacity	of	local	governments	to	offer	an	alternative	base	for	political	action’	(Newman	 2012:	 852).	 Further,	 even	 in	 the	 1980s,	 the	 left	 –	 or	 ‘activist’	 –	councils	 were	 ‘far	 from	 autonomous,	 being	 simultaneously	 embedded	 in	national	 sector	hierarchies,	 such	as	education,	while	 leveraged	and	guided	by	central	government	 carrots	and	restraints’	 (Cooper	2017:	342).	Finally,	
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the	capacities	of	LAs	and	other	actors	to	take	such	oppositional	action	also	vary	depending	on	the	cultural,	political,	and	economic	resources	available	to	them,	as	Newman	(2013)	suggests.	She	goes	on	to	argue	that,	nonetheless,	the	 historical	 tendency	 for	 central-local	 relations	 in	 the	 UK	 to	 be	 highly	antagonistic	 persists	 –	 even	 despite	 the	 contradictory	 pressures	 of	neoliberalisation.	Thus,	while	Local	Authorities	and	other	local	(state)	actors	are	certainly	embedded	within	the	broader	material,	cultural,	and	discursive	context	(of	austerity),	as	well	as	subject	 to	various	constraints	 imposed	by	central	 government	 actions	 and	 aims	 –	 as	 the	 above	 discussion	 has	highlighted	 –	 at	 the	 same	 time,	 they	 are	 not	 just	 passive	 recipients	 of	national	 government	 instruction,	 or	 victims	 of	 processes	 of	neoliberalisation,	 either.	 They	 may	 also	 be	 crucial	 in	 reproducing,	reworking,	and	reconstituting	–	or,	in	other	words,	resignifying	–	neoliberal	discourses,	logics,	and	policy	imperatives,	as	well	as	acting	as	‘incubators	of	new	possibilities	 that	may	bend	or	adapt	neoliberal	 logics	or	 [--]	 establish	alternative	pathways’	(ibid.:	3296).		The	actions	of	both	the	individual	workers	and	the	Local	Authorities	and	 other	 state	 actors,	 can,	 thus,	 perhaps	 also	 be	 usefully	 thought	 of	 as	 a	
politics	 of	 refusal,	 akin	 to	 that	 enacted	 by	 the	 racialised	 and	 sexualised	members	of	the	‘underclass’,	examined	in	the	previous	chapter.	These	actors	refuse	the	positions	the	dominant	discursive	and	regulatory	frameworks	of	the	 neoliberalising	 austerity	 state	 seek	 to	 place	 them	 in,	 instead	 bringing	their	 alternative	 understandings	 and	 desires	 to	 bear	 on	 the	 state.	 They	challenge	 the	 common	 assumption	 ‘that	 the	 state	 is	 only	 made	 up	 of	dominant	interests,	beliefs,	systems,	logics,	and	practices’,	foregrounding	the	actions,	 beliefs,	 and	 desires	 of	 the	 state’s	 ‘dissident	 and	 transient	 parts’	instead	 (Cooper	 2016b:	 317,	 emphases	 in	 the	 original).	 Further,	 and	similarly	to	Cooper,	I	understand	these	dissident	forces	as	part	of	the	state,	and	 their	actions	as,	 consequently,	potentially	exercising	state	power,	 thus	also	highlighting	the	potential	for	reimagining	states	themselves	–	with	the	potential	 for	 them	 to	 be	 ‘a	 source	 of	 emergent	 rationalities,	 and	 provide	resources	for	experiment	and	innovation’	(Newman	and	Clarke	2014:	158).	Such	 a	 view	 counters	 and	 challenges	 not	 only	 the	 common	 view	 of	
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institutions,	 and	 particularly	 states,	 ‘as	 purely	 coercive	 structures	 [--]	 –	 a	form	 of	 thinking	 that	 clings	 [--]	 to	 a	 remarkably	 essentialist	 view	 of	institutions’	 (Felski	 2015:	 147),	 but	 also	 the	 common	 understanding	 of	neoliberalism	 as	 an	 overwhelming,	 all-encompassing	 force	 that	 leaves	 no	space	for	alternative	rationalities	or	politics,	as	Chapter	1	discussed.		Cooper	 suggests	 that	 loosening	 the	 discursive	 ties	 between	welfare	and	 coercion	 might	 help	 us	 ‘imagine	 the	 state’s	 welfare	 identity	 [--]	extending	 towards	 sensual	 pleasures,	 creativity,	 and	 human	 fulfilment	(rather	 than	work,	 security,	discipline,	 and	 risk)’	 (2014:	70).	Perhaps,	 in	 a	similar	 vein,	 the	 state’s	 dissident	 parts	 could	 also	 help	 it	 extend	 towards	
liveability	 and	 the	 value	 of	 intimacy	 –	 rather	 than	 every	 part	 of	 the	 state	always,	without	 exception,	 reproducing	 the	 conditions	 of	 unliveability	 and	the	overwhelming	emphases	on	financial	value	examined	above.	While	I	do	not	want	to	overstate	the	potential	for	political	action	within	the	state	itself	–	especially	given	both	the	power	of	institutional	learning	and	the	strength	of	 the	austerity	discourses	examined	 in	Chapter	3	–	 imagining	parts	of	 the	state	 as	 having	 the	 capacity	 to	 extend	 beyond	 its	 penal	 and	 disciplinary	functions	 in	 this	 way	 in	 itself	 provides	 important	 political	 value.	 Without	such	 imaginaries	 the	 neoliberalising	 state	 appears	 as	 total	 –	 and	 totally	dominant	 –	 with	 the	 only	 source	 of	 political	 action	 to	 counter	 it	 located	entirely	outside	of	it.	In	this	section	I	have	argued	that	the	realities	of	both	states	 and	 neoliberalisation	 are,	 in	 fact,	more	 complex,	more	 uneven,	 and	more	contradictory	than	what	both	popular	understandings	and	neoliberal	discourse	itself	suggest,	thus	potentially	allowing	for	different	desires	–	such	as	those	extending	towards	liveability	and	the	value	of	intimacy	–	to	emerge	and	grow	within	their	folds.		
	
Conclusion	In	this	chapter	I	have	examined	three	practices	and	policies	frequently	seen	as	 examples	 of	 the	 growing	 conditionality	 in,	 and	 penalisation	 of,	 social	welfare	 and	 other	 policy	 frameworks	 as	 a	 result	 of	 neoliberalisation.	 I	focused	 on	 the	 intimate,	 everyday	 effects	 of	 these	 policies	 and	 practices,	highlighting	 the	 judgements	 of	 the	 value	 of	 different	 kinds	 of	 intimate	
	 253	
relations,	needs,	and	practices	embedded	in	them,	as	well	as	suggesting	that	they,	consequently,	engender	certain	conditions	of	unliveability	in	the	lives	of	 affected	 individuals.	 I	 then	 argued	 that	 these	 intimate	 disruptions	materialise	–	at	least	partially	–	due	to	the	fragmented	and	complex	ways	in	which	 neoliberalising	 policy	 implementation	 and	 service	 delivery	 tend	 to	proceed	 and,	 more	 specifically,	 because	 of	 the	 resulting	 gaps	 and	discrepancies	 both	 between	 different	 national	 policy	 frameworks,	 and	between	national	 policy	 aims	 and	 the	 limited	 local	 resources	 available	 for	realising	 them.	 That	 these	 intimate	 disruptions	 are	 becoming	 part	 and	parcel	 of	 neoliberalising	 austerity	 politics	 suggests	 a	 significant	reconfiguration	 of	 the	 public/private	 divide,	 as	 the	 neoliberalising	 state	intrudes	more	and	more	on	 the	 intimate,	everyday	 lives	of	 its	poorest	and	most	disadvantaged	populations.	They	also	entail	a	 further	reconfiguration	of	the	public/private	distinction,	whereby	the	boundaries	of	both	statework	and	state	power	are	becoming	increasingly	blurred,	with	the	number	of	local	and/or	 private	 actors	 involved	 in	 exercising	 state	 power	 –	 albeit	 usually	within	 a	 highly	 conditional	 framework	 –	 continuously	 growing	within	 the	landscape	of	austerity	politics.		Finally,	 this	 chapter	 has	 also	 continued	 the	 previous	 two	 chapters’	discussions	 of	 the	 possibilities	 for	 political	 action,	 subjectivities,	 and	imaginaries	within	austerity	politics,	arguing	that	another	kind	of	politics	of	refusal	 is	possible	within	the	state,	 thus,	perhaps,	complementing	the	many	activist	 actions	 that	have	been	 taken	against	neoliberal	penalisation.	 Since	the	 violent	 everyday	disruptions	 engendered	by	 the	policies	 and	practices	discussed	 in	 this	 chapter	 ‘exceed	 the	 register	of	a	politics	organized	solely	around	 sexuality’	 (Rodriguez	 2014:	 11),	 the	 kind	 of	 politics	 of	 refusal	highlighted	in	this	chapter	is	–	similarly	to	the	previous	two	chapters	–	not	dependent	on	attachments	 to,	 or	 alignments	with,	 either	 sexual	 or	 classed	identity	 categories.	 Such	 a	 politics	 is,	 perhaps,	 more	 akin	 to	 Ann	Cvetkovich’s	suggestion	that	 ‘daily	 life	 in	all	 its	ordinariness	can	be	a	basis	for	the	utopian	project	of	building	new	worlds	in	response	to	both	spiritual	despair	 and	 political	 depression’	 (2012:	 191).	 Overall,	 my	 discussion	 has,	thus,	 hopefully	 also	 highlighted	 some	 ways	 of	 thinking	 the	 political	
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differently	–	outside	of	the	desire	that	our	political	imaginaries	neatly	match	our	identities,	as	well	as	that	it	can	be	organised	entirely	outside	of	the	state.		 	
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A	Scene	of	Protest:	Part	One	In	the	autumn	of	2014,	not	 long	after	beginning	the	process	of	writing	this	thesis,	 I	 watched	 the	 film	 Pride	 in	 the	 cinema.	 Directed	 by	 British	 stage	director	 Matthew	Warchus,	 the	 film	 tells	 the	 story	 of	 a	 group	 of	 gay	 and	lesbian	activists	in	1980s	London,	who	begin	a	campaign	to	raise	money	for	miners	 and	 their	 families	 affected	 by	 the	 1984-5	miners’	 strike	 under	 the	name	 ‘Lesbians	 and	 Gays	 Support	 the	 Miners’	 (LGSM).	 The	 film	 sees	 the	group	gradually	getting	to	know	the	residents	of	a	small	mining	town	in	the	Welsh	 countryside	 –	 chosen	 as	 the	 target	 of	 their	 fundraising	 efforts	primarily	because	they	were	the	first	to	accept,	while	many	others	refused,	the	 group’s	money,	 tainted	 by	 its	 association	with	 sexual	 deviance.	 Based	loosely	 on	 real-life	 events,	 the	 film’s	 narrative	 is	 one	 of	 overcoming	differences	towards	a	common	goal,	and	much	of	its	narrative	drive	–	as	well	as	 its	 comedy	–	derives	 from	 the	awkward	encounters	between	 the	urban	gay	and	lesbian	activists	and	the	Welsh	working-class	miners.		This	 overall	 narrative	 arch	 is	 exemplified	 in	 the	 storylines	 of	 two	characters,	one	on	each	side	of	the	political	divide	central	to	the	film.	Gethin	is	the	owner	of	the	Gay’s	the	Word	bookshop	in	London	but	originally	from	Wales.	During	the	film	he	is	gradually	embraced	by	the	mining	community,	who	 treat	him	as	one	of	 their	own.	He	has	not	 seen	his	mother	 for	over	a	decade,	but	 the	 film’s	events	eventually	bring	 them	back	 into	 contact	with	one	another.	Cliff	 is	an	older	man	from	the	mining	town	and	central	to	the	process	by	which	the	gay	activists	are	accepted	by	the	community.	Towards	
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the	end	of	the	film	he	comes	out	as	gay	to	Hefina,	one	of	the	key	organisers	in	the	town’s	strike	action,	in	the	following	exchange:		
Cliff:		 I’m	gay.	
Hefina:		 I	know.	I’ve	known	for	a	little	while	now,	love.		
Cliff:			 Since	the	gays	arrived?	
Hefina:		 Well,	 I	can’t	speak	 for	 the	rest	of	 the	village.	But	–	speaking	for	myself	–	since	about	1968.		The	storylines	of	Cliff	and	Gethin	mirror	each	other	–	both	have	suppressed	and	hidden	one	side	of	their	identities	while	embracing	the	other,	and	both	find	a	way	to	 integrate	 the	two	and	 live	by	both	of	 them	by	the	end	of	 the	film.		 The	 film’s	 final	 scene	 takes	place	a	 few	months	after	 the	end	of	 the	strike,	 at	 the	 1985	 Gay	 Pride	 parade	 in	 London.	 The	 LGSM	 activists	 are	getting	 ready	 for	 the	 march,	 when	 they	 are	 told	 by	 an	 organiser	 that	 no	political	slogans	will	be	allowed	in	the	main	march,	and	the	group	therefore	has	 to	march	 either	without	 their	 banner,	 or	 ‘at	 the	 back,	with	 the	 fringe	groups.’	The	group’s	disappointed	mood	is	soon	interrupted	by	the	arrival	of	the	miners’	van,	however,	and	the	two	groups	have	a	happy	reunion	–	with	one	of	the	older	Welsh	women	asking	 ‘where	are	my	lesbians?’	as	she	gets	off	 the	 van.	Busloads	 of	miners	 then	 arrive,	 having	 travelled	 to	 London	 to	show	their	support	for	LGSM,	forcing	the	organisers	to	allow	LGSM	and	their	large	 support	 group	 to	 march	 at	 the	 front.	 This	 scene	 is	 followed	 by	 a	sequence	 mixing	 footage	 of	 the	 film’s	 protagonists	 with	 actual	 newsreel	footage	of	the	1985	Pride	march.	As	the	group	marches	against	the	backdrop	of	the	Palace	of	Westminster,	the	footage	is	overlaid	with	text	telling	us	what	happened	to	key	characters,	as	well	as	with	the	following	excerpts:		A	year	after	the	strike	ended,	a	motion	was	tabled	at	the	Labour	Party	 Conference	 to	 enshrine	 gay	 and	 lesbian	 rights	 into	 the	Party’s	manifesto.		Although	 the	 motion	 had	 been	 raised	 before,	 this	 time	 it	 was	passed.		This	was	due,	 in	part,	 to	a	block	vote	of	total	approval	 from	one	key	union	–	The	National	Union	of	Mineworkers.		
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Finally,	the	camera	zooms	in	on	a	Welsh	miners’	banner	depicting	two	hands	clasping	each	other	–	 referenced	multiple	 times	 throughout	 the	 film	–	and	then	the	screen	fades	into	black.		The	film’s	end	scenes	had	the	same	effect	on	me	that	I,	Daniel	Blake	seemed	to	have	on	everyone	who	saw	the	 film	–	the	 images	of	dozens	and	dozens	of	working-class	miners	descending	from	the	buses	to	support	LGSM	and	attend	the	Gay	Pride	march	made	me	cry	not	only	the	first	time,	but	also	the	 second	 time	 I	 watched	 the	 film	with	 a	much	more	 analytical	 eye	 and	attitude.	My	affective	response	was	certainly	not	only	due	to	the	alignment	between	my	own	political	views	and	those	of	the	film’s	protagonists	–	here	both	the	miners	and	the	gay	activists.	No	doubt	it	also	had	to	do	with	a	set	of	affective	attachments	cultivated	in	the	film,	akin	to	those	that	I,	Daniel	Blake	relies	on,	as	I	argued	centrally	 in	Chapter	4.	The	affective	attachments	that	
Pride	 solicits	 from	 its	viewers	are,	 similarly,	 structured	around	nostalgia	–	here	nostalgia	both	 for	a	 time	when	class	and	sexual	politics	were	simpler	and	 more	 clear-cut	 and,	 in	 my	 case,	 also	 for	 another	 version	 of	 my	 own	youth,	 where	my	 class	 and	 sexual	 politics	 could	 be	 seamlessly	 integrated	into	one,	 like	 in	 the	storylines	of	Gethin	and	Cliff.	The	class-based	political	subjectivities	 represented	 by	 the	 miners,	 as	 well	 as	 the	 sexual	 ones	represented	by	the	LGSM	activists,	appear	as	emblems	of	a	bygone	era	but,	importantly,	for	very	different	reasons	and	in	very	different	ways.		It	is	telling	that	I	did	not	cry	when	the	LGSM	activists	descended	onto	the	mining	town,	but	only	when	the	miners,	in	turn,	descended	onto	the	Gay	Pride	 march.	 The	 film’s	 narrative	 structure	 presents	 the	 story	 of	 the	 gay	activists	 as	 central,	 with	 the	 miners	 and	 their	 struggle	 appearing	 as	 a	backdrop.	 That	 this	 narrative	 structure	 reads	 as	 a	 progress	 narrative	specifically	in	relation	to	the	gay	activists’	political	struggle	is	confirmed	by	the	texts	exclaiming	the	political	victories	that	resulted	from	the	actions	of	the	 LGSM	 activists,	 quoted	 above.	 The	 overwhelming	 sense	 of	 unity	 and	resolve	that	the	film	ends	with,	thus,	only	makes	sense	if	we	attach	centrally	to	 the	 gay	 activists’	 story.	 The	 miners’	 story,	 conversely,	 ends	 with	 the	ending	of	 the	 strike	–	 largely	 considered	a	major	victory	 for	Thatcher	 and	her	Government,	as	well	as	a	significant	contributing	factor	in	the	decline	of	
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the	 trade	 union	 movement	 in	 the	 UK.177	The	 miners’	 story,	 thus,	 gets	 no	progressive	political	 ending	or	 closure,	with	 their	 struggle	becoming	more	and	more	futile	in	the	years	following	those	depicted	in	the	film	–	whereas	the	 gay	 activists	 are	 seen	 as	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 progressive	 path,	 perhaps	culminating	with	the	passing	of	the	Marriage	(Same	Sex	Couples)	Act	in	2013.	Further,	 it	 is	specifically	the	gay	male	activists	who	are	centred	in	the	film,	with	 their	 lesbian	 counterparts	 mostly	 providing	 comedic	 release.	 The	framing	of	the	film’s	 lesbian	characters	does	not,	consequently,	quite	allow	them	to	embody	the	same	kind	of	explicitly	politicised	subjectivity	inhabited	by	the	gay	male	activists.		It	 is	no	surprise	–	or,	perhaps,	accident	–	that	Pride	was	released	 in	the	middle	of	the	austerity	era,	just	as	the	harshest	effects	of	many	austerity	policies	were	beginning	to	be	felt	–	as	well	as	only	just	over	a	year	after	the	Marriage	Act	received	royal	assent.	 It	 is	precisely	in	this	time	 that	 it	makes	sense	to	discursively	leave	behind	the	working-class	struggles	of	the	1980s	and	beyond,	as	the	film	arguably	does,	with	their	attachments	to	class-based	political	identities	that	no	longer	match	the	political	realities	of	the	present	–	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 celebrating	 the	 many	 political	 victories	 of	 LG(b)	movements	since	the	1980s.	Ben	Walters	argues	in	an	opinion	piece	on	the	film	 Pride	 that	 it	 is	 part	 of	 a	 broader	 ‘backward	 turn’	 in	 LGBT	 cinema,	representing	‘a	moment	of	taking	stock’:		In	recent	years,	in	the	industrialised	world,	the	struggle	for	LGBT	rights	has	become	closely	bound	to	the	pursuit	of	equal	access	to	institutions	such	as	marriage	and	military	service.	Now	that	those	goals	seem	to	have	been	substantively	achieved,	there’s	space	to	breathe	 and	 become	 reacquainted	 –	 or,	 for	 younger	 audiences,	acquainted	 for	 the	 first	 time	 –	 with	 facets	 of	 past	 queer	experience	 that	might	 be	 useful	 in	 preparing	 for	whatever	 is	 to	come.	(2016)	Arguably	 some	younger	activists	have	gone	on	 to	do	exactly	what	Walters	suggests,	with	 the	group	 ‘Gays	and	Lesbians	Support	 the	Migrants’	 (LGSM)	
																																																								177 	The	 coal	 industry	 was,	 further,	 eventually	 privatised	 in	 the	 1990s,	 and	 former	coalmining	towns	are	amongst	some	of	the	poorest	areas	in	austerity	era	UK	(Foden	et	al.	2014).	
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founded	shortly	after	the	film’s	release.178	This	looking	back	or	‘taking	stock’	is,	 however,	 structured	 differently	 in	 the	 case	 of	 the	 film’s	 two	 groups	 of	activists.		The	 temporality	 of	 Pride’s	 framings	 of	 the	 two	 activist	 groups	 is	decidedly	 linear	 –	 the	 gay	 activists	 are	 part	 of	 a	 long	 march	 towards	 an	inevitable	 sexually	 equal	 future,	 whereas	 the	 miners’	 struggle	 appears	symbolic	of	the	loss	of	working-class	politics	as	we	know	it.	While	the	story	of	 Pride’s	 gay	 activists	 ‘becomes	 a	 repository	 for	 [--]	 traces	 of	 hope	made	manifest	 in	a	utopian	 tale	of	eventual	and	 inexorable	progress’,	 that	of	 the	miners’	 remains	 mired	 in	 ‘nostalgia	 in	 a	 dystopian	 account	 of	 inexorable	loss’	(Hemmings	2018:	22;	cf.	Hemmings	2011).	As	I	have	centrally	argued	throughout	this	thesis,	however,	these	discursive	framings	only	make	sense	if	 we	 view	 sexual	 politics	 as	 inherently	 belonging	 to	 specific,	 predefined	sexual	 identities	 and,	 therefore,	 innately	 structured	 by	 the	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction	–	as	well	as	if	we,	similarly,	view	class-based	 politics	 as	 intrinsically	 structured	 by	 particular,	 clear-cut	 class	identities.	Along	somewhat	similar	lines,	Clare	Hemmings	argues	that:	In	 imagining	 that	we	 know	 how	 to	 ameliorate	 gendered,	 racial,	and	 sexual	 inequalities,	 or	 indeed	 what	 gender,	 race,	 and	sexuality	are,	 it	 is	easy	 to	miss	 the	profound	ambivalence	about	these	terms	and	the	inequalities	or	pleasures	that	cluster	around	them.	(2018:	5,	emphasis	in	the	original)	The	narrative	of	Pride’s	gay	activists	is	based	precisely	on	such	a	notion	–	of	the	knowability	of	the	processes	by	which	sexual	inequalities	can	and	should	be	–	as	well	as,	importantly,	already	have	been	–	ameliorated.	The	discursive	framings	of	the	miners	and	the	gay	activists	through	imaginaries	of	loss	and	progress,	 respectively,	 thus	 also	 functions	 to	 hide	 the	 ‘profound	ambivalence’	 that	 Hemmings	 refers	 to,	 masking	 the	 many	 other	 possible	trajectories	 for	 both	 class	 and	 sexual	 politics	 –	which	may	 or	may	 not	 be	determined	by	identity.	In	this	thesis	I	have	offered	a	number	of	such	other	trajectories,	each	underpinned	 by	 an	 examination	 of	 a	 particular	 site	 in	 which	 sexual	 and																																																									178	See	LGSM	on	Twitter	@lgsmigrants.		
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intimate	lives,	subjects,	and	politics	are	being	made	(im)possible,	(il)legible,	or	 (il)legitimate	 within	 the	 context	 of	 austerity	 politics	 in	 the	 UK.	Throughout	my	 analysis	 I	 have	 shown	 that	 this	 takes	 place	 through	many	discursive	 and	 regulatory	 mechanisms	 that	 are	 not	 centrally	 sutured	 to	sexual	 identity	categories	or	the	homosexual/heterosexual	distinction	–	or,	indeed,	the	material/cultural	distinction	as	Chapter	3	suggested.	In	Chapter	3	 I	 investigated	 the	 sexual	 and	 gendered	 assumptions	 and	 implications	underpinning	the	‘cultural	poverty’	argument	and	argued	that	the	processes	by	 which	 poverty	 is	 being	 increasingly	 familialised,	 individualised,	 and	culturalised	depend	centrally	on	a	notion	of	an	 idealised,	generational	and	reproductive,	heteronormativity.	In	Chapter	4	I	argued	that	the	figuration	of	the	 ‘benefit	 scrounger’	 or	 ‘benefit	 recipient’	 becomes	 legible	 through	processes	 of	 sexualisation	 and	 racialisation	 to	 such	 an	 extent	 that	imaginaries	 of	 deservingness	 of	 social	 welfare	 remain	 tied	 to	 particular,	sexualised	 and	 racialised,	 frames	 of	 authenticity	 through	 which	 this	figuration	 is	 continuously	 assessed	 and	 judged.	 Finally,	 in	 Chapter	 5	 my	focus	was	on	welfare	and	housing	policies	and	practices	that	materialise	in	the	 lives	 of	 affected	 individuals	 as	 a	 series	 of	 intimate	 disruptions,	 which	were	shown	to	entail	significant	judgements	of	the	value	of	different	kinds	of	intimacies,	as	well	as	 to	engender	certain	conditions	of	unliveability.	Here,	similarly	 to	Hemmings,	my	 task	 has	 been	 ‘a	 politically	motivated	 one	 that	starts	 from	an	 interest	 in	what	 is	 left	out	of	 the	 frame’	 (2018:	17)	–	 in	my	case	specifically	the	frame	of	sexual	identity.	Importantly,	however,	my	point	has	not	been	to	claim	that	sexual	(or	other)	 identities	 have	 somehow	 dissipated	 –	 a	 notion	 that	 Heather	 Love	argues	blinds	scholars	‘to	the	tenacity	of	this	concept	both	in	history	and	in	individual	subjectivity’	(2009:	44).	Identity	remains	an	important	organising	concept	 both	 in	 political	 structures	 and	 in	 individual	 experience	 –	 and	clearly	 it	 also	matters	 to	me,	given	my	strong	affective	 reaction	 to	 the	gay	activists’	 storyline	 in	 Pride.	 Neither	 has	 it	 been	 to	 argue	 for	 the	 greater	importance	 of	 other	 identity	 categories,	 such	 as	 class-based	 ones,	 over	sexual	 identities.	 As	 James	 Clifford	 argues,	 rather	 than	 preceding	 political	participation,	identity	is	‘made	and	unmade,	connected	and	disconnected,	in	
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the	 interactive	arenas	of	democratic,	national,	and	transnational	social	 life’	(2000:	 95).	 People	 become	 political	 subjects	 through	 their	 ‘social	 and	historical	 connections	 and	 disconnections’	 (ibid.:	 96),	 and	 politics	 is,	therefore,	 not	 so	 much	 about	 mobilising	 existing	 identities	 but	 about	 the	processes	 by	which	 these	 connections	 and	 disconnections	 are	 forged.	 For	Clifford,	 identity	 politics	 itself	 is,	 thus,	 also	 open-ended	 and	 ‘fraught	 with	ambivalence’	(ibid.:	95),	and	analyses	of	such	politics	need	to	acknowledge	its	 foundation	 in	 a	 community	 or	 group’s	 desire	 to	 ‘make	 “room”	 for	themselves	in	a	crowded	world’	(ibid.:	96).	While	much	could,	no	doubt,	also	be	said	about	the	shifting	terrain	of	(sexual)	identity	politics	in	the	austerity	era,	my	project	has	focused	specifically	on	non-identitarian	deployments	of	sexuality	 within	 the	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	 mechanisms	 of	 austerity	 –	and,	consequently,	on	non-identitarian	modes	of	sexual	politics.	Rather	than	to	question	identity	politics	as	such,	my	aim	here	has	been	to	problematise	predefined	identity	categories	as	 the	only	 legible	and	 legitimate	basis	 for	a	sexual	politics.	In	 each	 case	 my	 analysis	 has,	 thus,	 also	 been	 intended	 to	 help	 us	think	 sexual	 politics	 in	 the	 austerity	 era	 differently	 –	 outside	 of	 the	teleological	narratives	of	progress	that	imaginaries	of	sexual	politics	tend	to	attach	to,	such	as	in	the	film	Pride.	In	Chapter	3	I	argued	that	the	processes	by	which	 (class)	 politics	 are	 increasingly	 ‘displaced’	 by	 ‘cultural’	 concerns	are	not	the	result	of	an	over-emphasis	on	sexual	and	gender	identities,	or	on	identity	 politics	 more	 broadly,	 as	 is	 often	 claimed,	 but	 rather	 that	 of	 an	
under-emphasis	on	sexuality	 (as	well	 as	gender,	 race,	and	 class)	as	part	of	regimes	 of	 material	 inequality.	 I	 then	 suggested	 that	 the	 inequalities	 that	arise	 due	 to	 austerity	 politics	 are,	 perhaps,	 usefully	 thought	 of	 as	 sexual	
inequalities,	 thereby	 intentionally	 bringing	 sexuality	 into	 discursive	framings	 of	 material	 inequality.	 In	 Chapter	 4	 I	 examined	 the	 ‘benefit	scrounger’	 figuration	and	argued	 that	 the	possibility	of	her	appearing	as	a	normatively	 intelligible	political	subjectivity	 is	 foreclosed	by	the	discursive	processes	 that	 sexualise	 and	 racialise	 her,	 and	 consign	 her	 to	 frames	 of	immorality	 and	 criminality;	 and	 in	 Chapter	 5	 I	 argued	 that	 the	 increasing	intrusion	 of	 the	 state	 into	 the	 intimate	 lives	 of	 poor	 and/or	working-class	
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populations	 is	 the	 consequence	of	 the	blurring	of	 the	boundaries	between	the	 state	 itself	 and	 the	many	private	 and	 local	 actors	 now	 responsible	 for	various	 aspects	 of	 statework	 –	 with	 significant	 consequences	 for	 how	political	action	against	these	processes	might	be	thought	of.	In	both	chapters	I	then	went	on	to	argue	that	–	despite	the	significant	limitations	–	a	politics	
of	refusal	 is	both	possible	and	evident	within	the	discursive	and	regulatory	processes	examined.	Scholarly	 (as	 well	 as	 other)	 analyses	 of	 neoliberalising	 political	contexts	–	such	as	that	of	austerity	–	frequently	treat	neoliberalism	as	total	and	 all	 encompassing.	 Many	 of	 these	 accounts	 verge	 on	 the	 dystopian,	 as	they	focus	on	neoliberalism	unfolding	‘a	vision	of	the	world	seen,	unhappily,	as	taking	space’	(Cooper	2014:	30),	creating	a	temptation	to	 ‘locate	change	for	 the	 better	 in	 some	other	 and	 –	 usually	 for	 optimistic	 projects	 –	 future	time’	(ibid.:	223).	This	 temporal	configuration	of	politics	as	something	that	happens	somewhere	else	or	in	some	other	time,	rather	than	in	the	here	and	now,	is	based	on	an	understanding	of	politics	as	something	that	takes	place	against	 ‘an	 already	 completed	 ideological	 formation	 or	 political	 project’	(Newman	2014:	3302).	As	Rita	Felski	states,	bestowing	one’s	political	hopes	purely	on	a	‘future	to	come’,	thus,	carries	the	risk	of	rendering	‘the	multiple	hues	 of	 the	 present’	 ‘into	 a	 monotone	 shade	 of	 gray’	 (2015:	 145).	Throughout	 this	 thesis	 I	 have	 tried	 to	 avoid	 flattening	 the	 present	 into	 a	reality	 entirely	 enclosed	 by	 and	 within	 the	 logics	 and	 rationalities	 and	austerity,	 and	 aimed	 to,	 instead,	 highlight	 some	 more	 varied	 shades,	exemplified	 in	 the	 alternative	 political	 logics	 and	 imaginaries	 already	available	in	the	present.		Both	the	‘benefit	scrounging’	characters	of	I,	Daniel	Blake	and	Benefits	
Street,	examined	in	Chapter	4,	and	the	street-level	bureaucrats	responsible	for	 delivering	 some	 of	 the	 most	 punitive	 welfare	 and	 housing	 policies,	discussed	in	Chapter	5,	engage	–	or	at	least	have	the	potential	to	engage	–	in	a	politics	of	refusal	that	is	firmly	grounded	in	the	present.	This,	at	the	very	least,	 indicates	that	the	neoliberalising	 logics	of	austerity	can	be	in	various	ways	 resisted,	 challenged,	 negotiated,	 appropriated,	 and	 ignored.	 Their	politics	 are	not	 about	 campaigning	 for	 future	 changes,	 or	 about	proposing	
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future	policy	amendments.	Rather,	 they	are	about	 the	everyday,	quotidian,	almost	 mundane	 actions	 that	 ameliorate	 the	 harshest	 effects	 and	 most	subjugating	 logics	 of	 the	 current	 political	 situation	 and,	 therefore,	 also	
create	 the	 conditions	 for	 a	 different	 future	 –	 even	 if	 just	 temporarily.	 Tina	Campt	offers	a	response	to	the	dominant	logics	that	have	refused	a	futurity	to	marginalised	communities	–	in	her	case,	specifically,	black	subjects	–	and	argues	 for	 a	 ‘grammar	 of	 black	 feminist	 futurity	 that	 [--]	moves	 beyond	 a	simple	definition	of	 the	 future	 tense	as	what	will	be	 in	 the	 future’,	 striving	instead	 ‘for	the	tense	of	possibility	that	grammarians	refer	to	as	the	future	real	conditional	or	that	which	will	have	had	to	happen’	(2017:	17,	emphases	and	bold	 in	the	original).	The	acts	of	refusal	discussed	above	echo	Campt’s	notion	 of	 ‘a	 performance	 of	 a	 future	 that	 hasn’t	 yet	 happened	 but	 must’	(ibid.:	 17),	 offering	 both	 much-needed	 improvements	 to	 the	 austerity	present	and	‘a	resource	for	the	political	imagination’	(Muñoz	2009:	189)	for	the	future.			 A	state	bureaucrat	who	bends	the	rules	to	make	life	more	liveable	for	a	welfare	claimant,	or	a	single	mother	who	refuses	the	dehumanising	logics	of	 the	 welfare	 system,	 thus,	 both	 exhibit	 nuggets	 of	 ‘the	 potential	 that	resides	 within	 different	 nows	 as	 they	 gesture	 toward	 different	 futures’	(Cooper	2014:	220).	While	 these	 readings	of	 the	political	 in	 the	 context	of	austerity	 echo	 the	notion	of	prefigurative	 politics,	 they	 are	not	necessarily	intentional	or	planned	in	the	sense	that	many	prefigurative	political	projects	are.179	They,	 nonetheless,	 signal	 the	 complexity	 of	 the	 present,	 as	 well	 as	that	of	potential	futures,	refusing	to	conform	both	to	the	present	logics	and	to	the	future	imaginaries	of	austerity.	While	my	analysis	has	focused	on	just	three	 examples	 –	 as	 well	 as	 purely	 on	 dominant	 policy	 and	 cultural	formations	–	I	am	not	suggesting	that	these	are	the	limits	of	the	political	in	the	context	of	austerity.	If	anything,	the	minor	examples	of	ways	of	thinking	sexual	politics	differently	included	here	should	indicate	that	‘the	contours	of	the	 present	 are	 never	 fully	 knowable’	 (Hemmings	 2018:	 25)	 –	 thus	suggesting	 that,	while	 the	dominant	discursive	and	regulatory	 frameworks																																																									179	On	the	notion	of	prefiguration	and	on	prefigurative	politics,	see	Berlant	(2011),	Cooper	(2014,	2016a,	2017),	Newman	(2013),	and	Weeks	(2011).	
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of	 austerity	 certainly	 seek	 to	 prescribe	 a	 particular	 kind	 of	 future,	 other	kinds	of	futures	are	already	available,	or	being	made,	in	the	present.	Rather	than	summarise	the	argument	of	the	thesis	so	far	in	any	more	detail,	in	the	rest	 of	 this	 brief	 concluding	 chapter	 I	 continue	 thinking	 through	 and	with	these	alternative	imaginaries	of	the	political.180	
	
A	Scene	of	Protest:	Part	Two	In	August	2011	England	saw	what	has	been	described	as	‘the	worst	bout	of	civil	unrest	in	a	generation’	(Lewis	et	al.	2011:	1).	Between	the	sixth	and	the	11th	 of	 the	 month	 an	 estimated	 14,000	 people	 engaged	 in	 looting	 and	violence	 across	 the	 country,	mostly	 concentrating	 on	 bigger	 cities	 such	 as	London,	Birmingham,	Manchester,	and	Liverpool,	but	also	affecting	smaller	cities	and	towns	across	the	country.	A	large	proportion	of	the	‘rioters’	were	young	people	–	30	per	cent	of	those	interviewed	for	the	research	conducted	jointly	by	The	Guardian	 and	 the	London	School	 of	Economics	 and	Political	Science	(LSE)	(ibid.:	13)	were	under	18,	and	a	further	49	per	cent	were	aged	between	18	and	24.	They	were	 from	mixed	ethnic	and	racial	backgrounds,	and	close	to	20	per	cent	of	them	were	female	(ibid.:	13-14).	The	event	that	sparked	what	has	come	to	be	known	as	the	 ‘2011	England	riots’	had	taken	place	 two	 days	 before	 the	 start	 of	 the	 ‘unrest’	 –	 the	 shooting	 dead	 of	unarmed	 29-year-old	 Mark	 Duggan	 by	 a	 police	 officer	 in	 Tottenham,	London.	The	‘riots’,	as	well	as	the	discursive	responses	to	them	both	within	the	media	and	amongst	politicians,	have	been	the	subject	of	much	scholarly	interest,	and	my	intention	here	is	not	to	replicate	these	analyses.181	Rather,	I	want	to	end	this	thesis	with	a	discussion	of	some	of	the	ways	 in	which	the	
political	–	or	a	desire	for	it	–	could	be	configured	in	and	through	the	‘riots.’		Imogen	Tyler	 (2013)	 insists	 firmly	on	understanding	 the	 ‘riots’	as	a	
political	event,	against	a	discursive	backdrop	that,	almost	without	exception,	painted	the	‘rioters’’	behaviour	as	‘pure	criminality’	(Cameron	2011),	‘chaos																																																									180	For	more	in-depth	summaries	of	the	arguments	made	in	the	previous	three	chapters,	see	the	concluding	sections	in	each	of	them.	181	On	the	‘riots’	themselves,	as	well	as	for	analyses	of	some	of	the	explanations	offered	for	them	in	the	subsequent	media	and	political	discussions,	see	Allen	and	Taylor	(2012),	Bond-Taylor	(2014),	De	Benedictis	(2012),	Gillies	(2012),	 Jensen	(2012),	Shildrick	et	al.	 (2016),	and	Tyler	(2013).	
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and	 dysfunctionality’	 (Ian	Duncan	 Smith	 quoted	 in	Mulholland	 2011),	 and	‘mindless	violence	and	thuggery’	(David	Cameron	in	HC	Deb	2011:	c1053),	or	 as	 the	 actions	 of	 ‘feral	 kids’	 (Riddell	 2011),	 ‘the	 underclass’	 (ibid.),	 or	simply	‘scum’	(Johnston	2011).182	The	responses	tended	to	reproduce	much	of	 the	 ‘cultural	 poverty’	 argument	 and	 ‘underclass’	 discourse	 examined	 in	Chapters	 3	 and	 4,	 with	 the	 looting,	 criminality,	 and	 violence	 attributed	primarily	 to	 bad	 parenting,	 growing	 up	 without	 a	 father,	 and	 cultures	 of	dysfunctionality.	Prime	Minister	David	Cameron	stated	in	his	address	to	the	House	of	Commons	on	August	11th:		This	 is	 not	 about	 poverty;	 it	 is	 about	 culture	 –	 a	 culture	 that	glorifies	 violence,	 shows	 disrespect	 to	 authority	 and	 says	everything	about	rights	but	nothing	about	responsibilities.	In	too	many	cases,	the	parents	of	these	children	–	if	they	are	still	around	–	do	not	care	where	their	children	are	or	who	they	are	with,	 let	alone	what	they	are	doing.	The	potential	consequences	of	neglect	and	immorality	on	this	scale	have	been	clear	for	too	long,	without	enough	action	being	taken.	(HC	Deb	2011:	c1054)	In	 a	 speech	 on	 August	 15th	 he	 continued:	 ‘I	 don’t	 doubt	 that	many	 of	 the	rioters	 out	 last	 week	 have	 no	 father	 at	 home.	 [--]	 we	 need	 more	 urgent	action,	 too,	 on	 the	 families	 that	 some	 people	 call	 “problem”,	 others	 call	“troubled”’	(2011).	Akin	to	my	analysis	in	Chapter	3,	sexualised	judgements	and	assumptions	were,	 thus,	 centrally	drawn	upon	 to	paint	 the	 ‘rioters’	 as	part	of	a	both	culturally	and	morally	dysfunctional	‘underclass.’	These	 discursive	 framings	 are	 confirmed	 in	 the	 responses	 to	 a	 poll	conducted	by	The	Guardian	(Lewis	et	al.	2011:	11)	on	public	perceptions	of	the	 causes	 of	 the	 ‘riots’,	 with	 ‘poor	 parenting’,	 ‘criminality’,	 and	 ‘moral	decline’	voted	as	the	top	three	causes	by	the	paper’s	readers.	The	opinions	of	 the	 ‘rioters’	 themselves,	 however,	 stand	 in	 significant	 contrast	 to	 these	views	–	here	‘poverty’,	‘policing’,	and	‘Government	policy’	appear	as	the	top	three	 explanations	 (ibid.:	 11).183 	For	 those	 who	 engaged	 in	 the	 ‘riots’,	therefore,	 the	 events	 appear	 as	 resolutely	 political,	 with	 one	 interviewee																																																									182	For	more	detail	and	a	discussion	of	the	various	‘dehumanising	epithets’	used	to	refer	to	the	rioters	in	media	and	political	commentary,	see	Connolly	(2011).			183	The	only	major	overlap	can	be	found	in	‘unemployment’	–	coming	up	as	the	fourth	most	significant	cause	in	both	The	Guardian	poll	and	the	views	of	the	‘rioters’	themselves	(Lewis	et	al.	2011:	11).	
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stating	decidedly:	‘I	still	to	this	day	don’t	class	it	as	a	riot	[--],	I	think	it	was	a	protest’	(quoted	in	ibid.:	24).	The	Guardian	and	LSE	research	frames	‘a	long-burning	 frustration	 and	 anger	 with	 the	 police’	 (ibid.:	 18)	 as	 the	 first	 key	factor	behind	the	events	themselves,	as	well	as	central	to	explaining	the	link	between	the	actions	of	the	‘rioters’	and	the	shooting	of	Mark	Duggan	–	which	the	 researchers	 argue	 ‘symbolised	 the	most	 extreme	end	of	 a	 spectrum	of	targeted,	 unjust	 and	 brutal	 treatment	 to	 which	 they	 perceive	 they	 are	subjected’	 (ibid.:	 18).	 Secondly,	 the	 ‘riots’	 expressed	 ‘a	 pervasive	 sense	 of	injustice’	 (ibid.:	 24),	 whether	 about	 poverty,	 inequality,	 or	 social	stigmatisation	and	subjugation,	with	many	interviewees	directly	mentioning	welfare	 cuts	 and	 especially	 the	 scrapping	 of	 the	 Education	 Maintenance	Allowance	(EMA).	Thirdly,	 the	researchers	highlight	varied	motivations	 for	why	 the	 ‘rioting’	 materialised	 specifically	 as	 looting,	 with	 many	 talking	about	stealing	consumer	items	as	 ‘getting	their	“just	rewards”,	[--]	reacting	to	a	society	 fuelled	by	greed,	resenting	being	excluded	 from	a	consumerist	world	and	placing	some	of	the	blame	on	big	business	and	advertising’	(ibid.:	28).	 Lauren	 Berlant	 argues	 that	within	 the	 conditions	 of	 neoliberalising	precarity,	‘there	is	little	room	for	imagining	revolution	or	indeed	any	future	beyond	the	scavenging	present’	 (2011:	179).	Some	of	 the	people	who	took	part	 in	 the	 ‘riots’	 seem	 to	 confirm	 her	 view,	 with	 one	 interviewee	responding	 to	 a	 question	 about	 what	 he	 would	 like	 to	 see	 change	 with	nonchalance:	 ‘dunno,	 don’t	 really	 care	 about	 that	 no	more.	 I’ve	 gone	 past	caring.	Just	think	there’s	no	point	in	me	wishing,	wanting	things	to	happen’	(quoted	in	Lewis	et	al.	2011:	26).184	For	these	(mostly)	young	people,	a	blind	faith	 in	the	traditional	mechanisms	for	achieving	political	change,	or	 in	the																																																									184	Similar	sentiments	of	defeat	or	dispassion	in	regards	to	the	future	were	also	expressed	by	others:		All	I	can	tell	you	is	that	me,	myself	and	the	group	I	was	in,	none	of	us	have	got	jobs,	yeah?	I	been	out	of	work	now	coming	up	two	years	 ...	and	it's	 just	 like	a	depression,	man,	that	you	sink	into		...	I	felt	like	I	needed	to	be	there	as	well	to	just	say	'Look,	this	is	what's	gonna	happen	if	there's	no	jobs	offered	to	us	out	there.	(quoted	in	Lewis	et	al.	2011:	25)	When	no	one	cares	about	you	you’re	gonna	eventually	make	them	care,	you’re	gonna	cause	a	disturbance.	(quoted	in	ibid.:	25)	
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state’s	reciprocity,	simply	makes	no	sense.	This	is	especially	the	case	given	not	 only	 that	 austerity	 and	 neoliberalisation	 have	 led	 to	 worsening	inequalities	 and	 poverty	 as	 Chapter	 1	 detailed,	 but	 also	 that	 these	 effects	tend	 to	make	 themselves	 felt	 in	 the	 everyday,	 as	 a	mood,	 atmosphere,	 or	affect	 –	 thereby	 also	 conditioning	 future	 expectations,	 as	 discussed	 in	 the	introduction.	Perhaps,	as	Rebecca	Coleman	suggests,	 the	 ‘rioters’	can,	 thus,	be	 seen	 through	 a	 lens	 of	 refusal	 –	 as	 refusing	 a	 futurity	 and,	 instead,	accepting	 or	 even	 embracing	 ‘the	 diminished	 future	 that	 austerity	 has	created’	 (2016:	97)	–	 in	contrast	 to	 the	claims	of	many	commentators	 that	they	have	‘lost	touch	with	their	own	future’	(Nick	Clegg	cited	in	ibid.:	96).		Berlant	 (2011)	 suggests,	 further,	 that	 politics	 in	 mass	 democracy	requires	a	split	between	attachment	and	expectation	–	we	continue	to	attach	fervently	to	the	rituals	and	mechanisms	of	democracy,	despite	the	growing	futility	of	doing	so.	The	young	people	who	chose	to	engage	in	the	‘riots’	had,	conversely,	 left	 such	 attachments	 behind,	 choosing	 instead	 to	 engage	 in	 a	kind	of	politics	of	the	present	 that	holds	no	particular	 claims	 for	particular	futures.	 In	 the	 remainder	 of	 this	 chapter	 I	want	 to	 explore	 the	 possibility	that	such	a	‘politics	of	the	present’	centrally	both	depends	on	and	animates	a	
desire	for	the	political.	The	previous	chapters	have	illustrated	multiple	ways	in	which	the	discursive	and	regulatory	actions	of	the	state	(and	other	actors)	can	inhibit	or	limit	the	kinds	of	intimate	and	sexual	lives	that	are	possible	in	the	 austerity	 context.	 However,	 my	 suggestion	 here	 is	 that	 desire	 and	intimacy	 in	 the	 time	 of	 austerity	 are	 not	 just	 about	 the	 discursive	 and	regulatory	 operation	 of	 austerity	 –	 they	 do	 not	 belong	 to	 the	 state	 or,	 for	instance,	 to	 the	 dominant	 discursive	 frameworks	 that	 demonise	 welfare	recipients,	 so	 to	 speak.	 Rather	 –	 and,	 perhaps,	 rather	 controversially	 –	 I	want	to	think	through	whether	the	‘riots’	could	allow	us	to	imagine	ways	of	locating	desire	and	intimacy	in	the	sphere	of	the	political,	too.		The	Guardian	 and	LSE	research	strongly	disputes	 the	Government’s	view,	much	circulated	and	discussed	in	the	media,	that	‘at	the	heart	of	all	the	violence	sits	the	issue	of	the	street	gangs’	(Cameron	in	HC	Deb	2011:	c1054).	It	 was	 also	 suggested	 that	 the	 ephemeral	 ‘gangs’	 were	 responsible	 for	coordinating	 the	 looting	 and	 the	 attacks	 on	 the	police	 (Lewis	 et	 al.	 2011),	
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whereas,	 in	 fact,	 the	 days	 of	 the	 ‘riots’	 saw	 an	 unprecedented	 truce	 form	between	 many	 gangs.	 Many	 interviewees	 expressed	 ‘surprise,	 and	 often	delight,	that	during	the	riots	the	postcode	warfare	that	was	for	them	a	fact	of	life	 had	 –	 for	 a	 short	 time	 –	 melted	 away’	 (ibid.:	 22).	 One	 interviewee	describes	his	experience	of	the	‘truce’:	‘there	weren’t	no	gangs.	I	didn’t	know	no	 one	 there,	 but	we	 all	 got	 together	 that	 day,	 the	 Asians,	 the	 blacks,	 the	whites.	 It	 felt	 like	 we	 were	 like	 one	 big	 gang’	 (quoted	 in	 ibid.:	 23),	 and	another	suggests	that	during	the	days	of	the	‘riots’,	‘everyone	was	smiling.	It	was	 literally	 a	 festival	 with	 no	 food,	 no	 dancing,	 no	 music	 but	 a	 free	shopping	 trip	 for	 everyone’	 (quoted	 in	 ibid.:	 28).	 The	 ‘rioters’	 express	 joy	and	pleasure	at	the	momentary	intimacies	created	in	the	space	of	the	‘riots’,	their	comments	reminiscent	of	Berlant’s	notion	of	the	political	as	‘that	which	magnetizes	 a	 desire	 for	 intimacy,	 sociality,	 affective	 solidarity,	 and	happiness’	–	as	separate	from	politics	as	‘a	scene	of	antagonism’	(2011:	252).	Here	 ‘affective	 life	 slops	 over	 onto	 [--]	 political	 life’	 (Berlant	 and	Warner	1998:	560),	as	intimate,	if	not	erotic,	relationships	are	formed	with	friends,	acquaintances,	and	strangers	–	and	even	enemies	–	in	the	heat	of	the	riotous	moment.	As	 they	protested	against	 a	myriad	of	 injustices	and	participated	 in	unusual	–	but	no	doubt	pleasurable	–	intimacies,	the	‘rioters’	also	confronted	some	of	 the	 logics	 of	 austerity	 politics.	 These	 logics	 have	 tended	 to	 either	harness	the	intimate	sphere	to	stand	in	for	a	sanitised	and	normative	image	of	 an	 increasingly	 privatised	 and	 familialised	 citizenship,	 as	 I	 argued	 in	Chapter	 3;	 or	 to	 establish	 it	 as	 a	 site	 of	 intensifying	 state-mandated	disruption,	as	I	argued	in	Chapter	5.	Against	this	backdrop,	engaging	in	the	‘riots’,	 perhaps,	 also	 provided	 those	 who	 participated	 with	 a	 rare	opportunity	 to	 engage	 in	 kinds	 of	 sociality	 and	 intimacy	 that	 are	 rarely	available	 to	 them,	 both	with	 each	 other,	 and	against	 a	 perceived	 common	enemy	 –	 the	 police	 and/or	 the	 Government.	 Further,	 Berlant’s	 suggestion	that	 ‘one	 “does	 politics”	 to	 be	 in	 the	 political	 with	 others’	 (2011:	 260)	 is	relevant	 here.	 The	 intimacies	 created	 and	 sustained	 through	 the	 ‘riots’	animate	 not	 just	 a	 desire	 for	 the	 political,	 but	 also	 a	 desire	 to	 be	 in	 the	political	with	others.	Thus,	as	well	as	a	chance	to	protest,	the	instance	itself	
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also	certainly	provided	something	important	to	the	protesters,	in	the	form	of	altered	 paths	 for,	 and	 alternative	 imaginaries	 of,	 intimacy,	 desire,	 and	pleasure.		Eve	Cherniavsky	asks	pointedly:	‘how	do	we	measure	ground	gained	against	forms	of	political	power	that	are	indifferent	to	the	disposition	of	our	hearts	and	minds?’	(2017:	176).	She	discusses	the	Occupy	Wall	Street	(OWS)	movement,	exploring	Douglas	Rushkoff’s	formulation	of	the	movement	‘not	[as]	a	game	that	someone	wins,	but	rather	a	form	of	play	that	is	successful	the	 more	 people	 get	 to	 play,	 and	 the	 longer	 the	 game	 is	 kept	 going’	(2011).185	For	Cherniavsky,	OWS	challenges	an	understanding	of	politics	as	representation	–	 in	both	senses	of	the	word,	as	 it	neither	seeks	to	stand	in	for	 an	 anonymous	 mass	 of	 participants,	 nor	 casts	 its	 participants	 as	 pre-constituted	 political	 subjects.	 Instead,	 the	 subject	 imagined	 is	 ‘a	 kind	 of	hologram	 –	 a	 projection	 of	 how	 one	 might	 choose	 to	 move	 in	 the	 world’	(Cherniavsky	2017:	194).	While	OWS	and	the	England	‘riots’	seem,	in	many	ways,	a	world	apart,	could	something	akin	to	both	Cherniavsky’s	‘hologram’	and	Rushkoff’s	 ‘play’	be	 found	within	 the	 ‘riots’	 and	 the	subjectivities	 they	brought	into	being,	no	matter	how	temporarily?	After	all,	while	the	‘rioters’	were	certainly	engaged	in	a	form	of	protest,	this	was	no	traditional	protest,	aimed	 at	 changing	 the	 law,	 a	 particular	 policy,	 or	 even	 public	 opinion.	Rather,	the	 ‘success’	–	 if	 it	can,	 indeed,	be	called	that	–	of	the	 ‘riots’	 for	the	‘rioters’	themselves	can	be	found	in	the	sustained	time	period	in	which	they	were	in	control,	and	not	the	police,	nor	the	Government	–	as	exemplified	in	one	 interviewee’s	 statement:	 ‘normally	 the	 police	 control	 us.	 But	 the	 law	was	obeying	us,	know	what	I	mean?’	(quoted	in	Lewis	et	al.	2011:	23).		The	 ‘rioters’,	 like	the	OWS	protesters,	 ‘no	longer	exist	at	the	level	of	political	 institutions,	 and	 so	 find	 themselves	 compelled	 to	 devise	 other	arenas	 in	 which	 collectively	 to	 conceive	 and	 cultivate	 modes	 of	 political	identification	 and	 political	 agency’	 (Cherniavsky	 2017:	 178).	 In	 the	 arena	created	–	and	sustained	for	almost	a	week	–	by	the	‘rioters’,	they	had	access	to	consumer	goods,	intimacies,	and	political	subjectivities,	as	well	as	a	level																																																									185	See	 also	 Bhattacharyya	 (2015)	 and	 Gibson-Graham	 (2006)	 for	 discussions	 of	 politics	that	do	not	begin	with	the	aim	of	capturing	power,	for	instance	from	the	state.		
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of	 freedom	from	both	police	 interference	and	 ‘postcode	warfare’,	 that	 they	could	normally	only	fantasise	about.	Of	course	this	arena	also	included	many	actions	that	would	be	characterised	by	most	as	bad,	immoral,	or	unethical	–	and	my	 intention	 here	 is	 certainly	 not	 to	 condone	 such	 actions.	 However,	despite	the	fact	that,	for	many	of	the	‘rioters’,	the	‘hologram’	or	projection	of	a	way	of	moving	in	the	world	they	created	was	violent,	they,	nonetheless,	for	several	days	‘simulated	an	alternate	plane	of	political	life,	outside	the	ruined	institutions	 of	modern	democratic	 politics’	 (ibid.:	 194).	 Thus,	 although	not	intentionally	 aiming	 at	 a	 specific	 kind	 of	 future	with	 their	 protest	 and/or	play	 –	 as,	 for	 instance,	 the	 protesters	 of	 Pride	 did	 –	 the	 ‘rioters’	 could	perhaps	 be	 seen	 as	 inhabiting	 a	 prefigurative	 political	 praxis,	 propelling	 a	different	 kind	of	world	 into	 temporarily	 existing	 –	while	 at	 the	 same	 time	refusing	 the	 futurity	 prescribed	 for	 them	by	 the	 logics	 of	 austerity.	 In	 the	words	of	Campt,	they	at	the	same	time	refused	and	affirmed	their	‘capacity	to	inhabit	a	future	against	all	odds’	(2017:	113).	The	‘riots’,	thus,	tell	us	something	important	about	the	desire	for	the	political	 in	the	era	of	austerity.	The	 ‘rioters’	–	as	well	as	the	other	refusing	subjects	 explored	 throughout	 this	 thesis	 –	 have	 chosen	 to	 disengage	 from	the	 scenes	 and	 mechanisms	 of	 traditional	 politics,	 the	 promises	 of	 which	hold	little	meaning	to	them.	Rather	than	admit	defeat	and	entirely	succumb	to	the	austerity	present,	however,	they	express	their	desire	for	the	political	in	 other	 arenas,	 creating	 other	 kinds	 of	 intimacies,	 other	 kinds	 of	subjectivities,	and	flashes	of	other	 imaginaries	of	 the	 future	along	the	way.	These	expressions	allow	for	a	rethinking	of	intimacy	and	desire	in	ways	that	suggest	 they	 can	 be	 wrestled	 away	 from	 the	 hands	 of	 the	 state	 and	 its	discursive	and	regulatory	mechanisms,	as	well	as	 in	ways	that	do	not	bind	them	to	the	imaginaries	and	logics	of	specific,	predefined	identity	categories.	They	do	not	constitute	‘resistance’,	or	even	‘politics’,	in	any	traditional	sense	and,	 in	 fact,	 to	 frame	 them	 as	 such	would	 be	 to	 not	 only	mischaracterise	them,	but	also	position	them	within	the	political	imaginaries	of	austerity.		The	juxtaposition	between	the	scene	of	protest	depicted	in	Pride,	and	those	enacted	by	the	‘rioters’	of	2011,	thus,	allows	for	a	reimagining	of	what	sexual	or	intimate	politics	in	the	era	of	austerity	might	look	like,	as	well	as	
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brings	 this	 thesis	 to	 a	 close.	 In	 the	 conditions	 created	 by	 and	 within	austerity	politics,	many	kinds	of	sexual	and	intimate	lives	are	made	illegible	and	 illegitimate,	 and	many	 kinds	 of	 futures	 are	 foreclosed	 for	 those	most	intensely	 and	 intimately	 affected	 by	 austerity’s	 discursive	 and	 regulatory	frameworks.	 Perhaps,	 in	 these	 conditions,	 when	 the	 rational,	 reasonable,	and	 well-travelled	 paths	 of	 protest	 are	 not	 available	 –	 or	 turn	 out	 to	 be	nothing	 but	 cruel	 optimism	 –	 it	 is	 the	desire	 for	 the	 political	 that	matters	above	all.	In	enacting	their	desire	for	the	political,	the	many	subjects	of	this	thesis	 did	 not	 change	 –	 or	 even	 aim	 to	 change	 –	 the	 world	 but,	 instead,	refused	the	dominant	 logics	and	rationalities	of	austerity	altogether.	These	desires	–	and	the	resulting	pleasures	–	at	the	very	least	indicate	a	‘stubborn	[--]	 refusal	 to	 give	 out,	 wear	 out,	 or	 admit	 defeat’,	 suggesting,	 as	 Berlant	does,	 that	 ‘optimism	 might	 not	 be	 cruel	 at	 all,	 but	 the	 bare	 minimum	evidence	 of	 not	 having	 given	 up	 on	 social	 change	 as	 such’	 (2011:	 259).	Perhaps	 in	austerity	politics,	 and	 in	 light	of	bleak	austerity	 futures,	 such	a	‘stubborn	 refusal’	 is	 more	 than	 it	 seems	 –	 a	 moment	 of	 respite,	 an	alleviation,	 a	 flash	 of	 unlikely	 intimacy,	 evidence	 that	 there	 is	 more	 to	(sexual)	 life	 than	what	 is	prescribed	by	austerity	politics,	or	a	desire	 for	a	different	kind	of	future,	here	and	now.			 	
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